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1. Introduction 
This thesis studies the creation, use and ultimate demise of a rather peculiar 
high-level programming language named Chill.1 It was peculiar in its origin, 
a United Nations specialised agency. It was peculiar in its application area, 
which was programming of large-scale telecommunication switches. It was 
also peculiar in its process of realisation, which was done within an 
international committee, consisting of a number of computer scientists, 
telecommunication experts and bureaucrats from different organisations and 
countries. The negotiations went on inside the committee for almost six 
years before the language was unleashed in 1980, as an official 
recommendation of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).2  
By 1990, Chill was the only programming language that was common 
to more than one of the major public telecom switching systems that were in 
use. By that time, more than 12,000 programmers had used the language in 
one way or another.3 20 years after its inception, by the late 1990s, Chill was 
a marginal technology. It was almost close to extinction. No new software 
developments were made with the language and by 1999 the ITU published 
what was to be the last maintained version of Chill.4 Still, legacy Chill code 
lives on in telecommunication systems that continue to run today. This thesis 
explains how and why the telecommunication industry first handed over the 
responsibility for a key technology to a group of programming language 
designers, and then how it readily would apply the results, only to abandon 
the technology a few years later.  
                                                     
1 CHILL is an acronym for CCITT High Level Language. CCITT was, in turn, an 
abbreviation for Comité Consultatif International Télégraphique et Téléphonique 
(the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee), which was the 
technical wing of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). CCITT is now 
the ITU’s Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T), but I will use the 
term CCITT throughout this thesis. For reasons of readability, I will not capitalise 
the name Chill in the running text. This follows the typographical conventions for 
the rest of the thesis: names that are more or less pronounceable are treated as proper 
names and written as ‘Chill’, whereas unpronounceable acronyms are written in a 
capitalised form. In direct quotation, however, the style adopted by the original 
source is preserved. An example of Chill code is given in Appendix 1. 
2 CCITT High Level Language (CHILL), CCITT Recommendation Z.200, (1980). 
3 Chill was used in some of the most successful switches on the market, like the 
System 12 by the ITT (later Alcatel) and the EWSD switches by Siemens. On the 
use and status of Chill in the early 1990s, see Kristen Rekdal, "CHILL - The 
International Standard Language for Telecommunications Programming", 
Telektronikk, 89, no. 2/3 (1993).  
4  CHILL - The ITU-T Programming Language, ITU-T Recommendation Z.200 
(1999). 
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The peculiar programming language Chill was neither a total failure nor a 
total success. This in-between status was reflected in its features, its 
background and its process of realisation. Technologically, Chill was a 
programming language that was one out of many. It tried to reconcile the 
particular needs of real-time communication systems with the generality of 
high-level programming language principles, an aim shared by many other 
programming languages designed in the 1970s.5  It also extended on the 
design practices common to programming languages of an older vintage, like 
the pioneering high-level programming languages of the 1960s. On an even 
more general level, Chill was part of a larger shift towards programming as a 
dominant activity in the telecommunication industry, where balls of wires 
were replaced by loops of programming code.6 Historically, it was created 
within the vicinity of what was perceived as the anchor of an oligopolistic 
regime of telecommunication administrations and manufacturers, the ITU, 
right before a comprehensive organisational transformation of the 
telecommunication industry. Organisationally, it was created by a committee 
torn between the agendas of several communities of technological 
practitioners, telecommunication administrations and manufacturers. It was 
really “betwixt and between”.7  
This thesis studies this peculiar technology, from its inception in the 
first half of the 1970s and up until the last maintained publication of the 
standard by the ITU in 1999.8 I approach this through a detailed study of 
how Chill was shaped during its life cycle. I explain which priorities gained 
                                                     
5 A comparison could be the programming language Ada, which was commissioned 
by the American Department of Defence in the mid-1970s. For an overview, see 
William A. Whitaker, "Ada—the project: the DoD high order language working 
group", ACM SIGPLAN Notices 28, no. 3 (1993). 
6 A contemporaneous review is M. T. Hills and S. Kano, Programming electronic 
switching systems - real-time aspects and their language implications, IEE 
Telecommunications Series (Stevenage: Peter Peregrinus Ltd, 1976). 
7 I have appropriated the term “betwixt and between” from a classic essay by the 
anthropologist Victor Turner, which was concerned with initiation rituals and 
transition ceremonies from one social status to another. My use of Turner’s 
expression is intended as an illustration of transition periods of a rather different 
kind than those of initiation and social transition and carries no further empirical or 
theoretical denotations to Turner’s work. On the direct meaning of the expression, 
see Victor Witter Turner, The forest of symbols; aspects of Ndembu ritual (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967), 93-111.  
8 While long-term studies of the industrial structure as a consequence of life-cycle 
developments have flourished, few studies of a specific technology life cycle have 
been published. On this problem, and an effort to somewhat rectify this, see William 
Walker, "Entrapment in large technology systems: institutional commitment and 
power relations", Research Policy 29, no. 7-8 (2000). 
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prominence in which period, by which mechanisms and who carried them 
through. Furthermore, I consider how the changing political economy of the 
telecommunication industry and the strategies of administrations and 
manufacturers shaped the fate of the language. Together, the technical 
features and the use of the language are understood as the direction of 
technological change that was constituted by Chill. In particular, I am 
interested in the move towards a common and standardised hybrid high-level 
programming language: general, yet specialised, high level, yet efficient, 
common, yet atypical.  
I approach the question of the direction of technological change 
through an analysis of the technical diplomacy throughout the phases of 
emergence, use and demise. This diplomacy was related to both its technical 
features and its use. The diplomacy happened both on the level of quarrelling 
over language concepts as well as on an organisational level about how 
binding the supporting organisation saw their commitment to Chill. This 
approach to technological change, as a diplomatic process, combines 
research into decision-making at the individual level, negotiations at 
community level, firm-level strategising and the role of institutional regimes. 
I particularly look into how shared norms and ideals held in communities of 
technological practitioners shaped Chill and how the changing political 
economy of telecommunications intervened in its life.9 I also investigate how 
different strategies on the division of programming labour among 
telecommunication administrations and manufacturers influenced the design 
and use of the programming language. This makes it possible to analyse 
processually how, to what extent and in which periods the various sources of 
influence dominated the Chill life cycle.  
The main period under investigation, from the early 1970s to around 
1990, was one of substantive technical change and an emerging 
organisational transformation of the telecommunications field. The 
introduction of digital transmission and computer-controlled switching 
transformed the telecommunication infrastructures dramatically over the 
course of two decades, moving the industry from the analogue to the digital 
domain. The organisational principles of telecommunications were also 
about to undergo radical changes, as the dominant pattern of a strongly 
regulated industry was put under increasing pressure, although the real 
liberalisation of the industry was still some years away. This coincided with 
what has been proposed to be a general shift in business, where the role of 
                                                     
9  The term “communities of technological practitioners” builds on Edward W. 
Constant, The origins of the turbojet revolution, Johns Hopkins studies in the history 
of technology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980). A more refined 
definition and clarification regarding similar concepts is developed in a later section 
of this chapter. 
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the large multidivisional firm as a generator of innovation and growth 
diminished, a change in the direction of “deverticalisation”.10 Furthermore, it 
concurred with the emergence of what has been described as the 
“knowledge-based economy”, a term used to describe the centrality of 
science and technology within sectors such as pharmaceuticals and 
information and communication technologies, and the term has increasingly 
been used to describe economies where the importance of the information 
sectors is high and the “share of intangible capital is greater than that of 
tangible capital in the overall stock of real capital”.11 However, the 1970s 
and early 1980s were also something in between. It was a period of 
transition between the numbing stability before the 1970s and the raucous 
revolutions that turned the industry upside down in the 1990s. The period 
was more like what Victor Turner found to be a common phase in initiation 
rituals, a “liminal period” where things were “betwixt-and-between”, both 
technically and organisationally.12  
To those involved in the development of software for 
telecommunication systems at the time, the 1970s and early 1980s were also 
a period of “fruitful darkness”, where “king and people are closely 
identified”, to paraphrase Victor Turner’s anthropology once again.13 In this 
darkness, decisions about new and novel technologies like programming 
languages were of a different kind than in projects of “normal engineering” 
or of radical inventive development. The practitioners and scientists 
involved in the Chill project knew a lot about programming languages before 
designing one for telecommunication systems. This was based on prior 
experience in general computing – but the combination of computing and 
telecommunications was still uncharted territory, unknown and untested.14 It 
was somewhat risky, but not completely uncertain, made by daring 
                                                     
10 Richard N. Langlois, "The vanishing hand: the changing dynamics of industrial 
capitalism", Industrial and Corporate Change 12, no. 2 (2003). 
11  Dominique Foray, Economics of knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
2004), ix. Foray, Economics of knowledge; Robin Cowan, Paul A. David, and 
Dominique Foray, "The Explicit Economics of Knowledge Codification and 
Tacitness", Industrial and Corporate Change 9, no. 2 (2000). For critical 
discussions, see Richard N. Langlois, "Knowledge, Consumption, and Endogenous 
Growth", Journal of Evolutionary Economics 11, no. 1 (2001). 
12 Turner, The forest of symbols; aspects of Ndembu ritual. 
13 Ibid., 110  
14 The foundations of programming language design were laid in the late 1950s and 
1960s. In 1969, it was already time to release a tome on the history of programming 
languages. See Jean E. Sammet, Programming languages: history and 
fundamentals, Prentice-Hall series in automatic computation (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.,: Prentice-Hall, 1969). 
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technological practitioners rather than heroic inventors.15 As in the rituals 
investigated by Turner, technological change under liminality can be 
characterised by a duality, where the process was ambiguous but still goal-
directed at its outset and depended on successful reintegration into the 
economic and technical system at its end. This thesis analyses the 
combination of telecommunication knowledge and computer knowledge and 
explicates how individuals, communities and organisations acted under 
liminality and how they tried to reintegrate the combinatory knowledge into 
stable arrangements.  
Chill originated in the early 1970s when the ITU drummed together 
experts from the telecommunication industry and the computer field, and put 
them to work on solving the mounting difficulties related to programming 
telecommunication equipment. The prospect of one common programming 
language, a technology that could be shared between manufacturers and 
administrations, gathered support. Several large manufacturers, like the 
multinational firm ITT, the Swedish company L. M. Ericsson, Siemens of 
Germany and the Dutch firm Philips, put their weight behind the proposal 
early on. During the design process, the technologically leading company, 
the American AT&T, participated through its research branch Bell 
Laboratories. European administrations backed the initiative from the outset 
and the Japanese NTT followed suit. The organisations’ decisions to 
participate in the Chill project were rooted in different agendas, in particular 
about who should control the programming of new telecommunication 
equipment, but also in strategies of international expansion and exports. 
In retrospect, the fate of Chill looks almost inevitable. Why would 
anyone in their right mind design a programming language especially for the 
application domain of telecommunication switching, from the ground up, in 
an international committee, right before the comprehensive organisational 
transformation of the telecommunication industry? According to Remi 
Bourgonjon, who led the committee in the ITU that was responsible for 
Chill, a common programming language was perhaps not the best of ideas: 
“In hindsight it was totally stupid,” he said when I interviewed him. 16 
However, at the time the project made sense to the participants involved in 
the project and to its sponsors. “It made perfect sense,” Bourgonjon told 
me.17 What apparently looked like a rather bad idea in retrospect was also 
part of a general trend, as projects with similar technical aims and 
                                                     
15 On risk and uncertainty, see Frank H. Knight, Risk, uncertainty and profit (Boston 
and New York,1921). 
16  Remi Bourgonjon, interview with author, 16 January 2009, Heeze, the 
Netherlands. 
17 Ibid. 
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organisational background were initiated in comparable industries a few 
years both before and after the Chill initiative.18 
 An historical understanding of Chill’s fate must be rooted in the 
context of the project itself, how it was understood by its participants and 
contemporaries and how it was related to the actions and strategies of 
telecommunication manufacturers, administrations and international 
organisations at the time. A proper account of the creation, use and demise 
of the language as it appeared at the time will allow an historical 
understanding of the technology. Subsequently I analyse whether what can 
appear as failures to us now was a result of decisions made within the project 
or shaped by factors external to the participants control and understanding. 
This might also contribute towards a better understanding of technical 
change in software development in telecommunications in general. 
This thesis also has a general ambition: it aims at explaining how and 
why the telecommunication industry started to use high-level programming 
languages in the development and production of telecommunication 
equipment. It seeks out an understanding of the direction of this technical 
change and its organisational underpinnings and results. There are three 
reasons for this ambition. Firstly, the empirical context of international 
cooperation and transnational collaboration makes it possible to understand 
how technological choices were made through technical diplomacy at a level 
beyond local circumstance. By accounting for the international context of 
technological change, it is possible to analyse the general conditions and 
priorities that directed the particular evolution of Chill. Secondly, the unruly 
and peculiar nature of Chill encourages such general ambitions: Chill 
involved, in some way or another, almost all large telecommunication 
manufacturers and most telecommunication administrations of importance in 
the period and allows a detailed understanding of how programming with 
specialised, yet high-level, languages was perceived as a viable route in the 
sector at large. The sources available in the study of this one programming 
language highlight the development and use of programming languages in 
telecommunication at large. The third reason for this general ambition is 
theoretical: this thesis tries to search out the limits of established models of 
product life cycles at both the particular and the product group level of 
programming languages for telecommunication systems. This necessitates a 
                                                     
18 The US Department of Defense embarked on a very similar project when they 
tried to standardise the programming language Ada in many of their operations from 
the late 1970s. See Whitaker, "Ada—the project: the DoD high order language 
working group". Before that, similar projects were initiated and standardised in the 
technical field of process control. See I. D. Hill and B. L. Meek, Programming 
language standardisation, Ellis Horwood series in computers and their applications 
(Chichester, Eng., New York: E. Horwood ; Halsted Press, 1980). 
7 
  
general understanding of the direction of the technical change that the turn to 
high-level programming languages constituted in telecommunications, and 
an understanding of through what means this turn was sought. 
 
Historiography 
Chill was a programming language similar to many others. It shared both 
technological and organisational similarities to other so-called real-time, 
parallel or concurrent programming languages. Such similarities can only be 
understood if we approach the subject in a manner that steps beyond local 
circumstance and the peculiarities of Chill. Consequently, I approach the 
development of Chill and high-level programming languages in a different 
way than the one that dominates in the history and sociology of technology. 
In this thesis, there is greater focus on international cooperation and local 
circumstance is less in the foreground than is usual. 19  Causes of the 
technological change and the similarities between high-level languages of 
the time are sought at the level of international communities of technological 
practitioners as well as embedded in the strategies of telecommunication 
administrations, equipment manufacturers and research establishments. 
Ultimately, these interests were reconciled at the level of an international 
organisation, bound together in what can be understood as the international 
telecommunication regime. This moves the thesis away from the internalistic 
approaches that have dominated the history of programming languages for a 
long time, where the development and design of such technologies often is 
considered as solely an intellectual undertaking rooted in the academic 
discipline of computer science, or as responses to needs caused by advances 
                                                     
19  The view that science and technology are predominantly about local and 
contingent practices is a claim that permeates much of the so-called constructivist 
writing on science and technology. See, for example, many of the contributions in 
Edward J. Hackett et al., The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, Third 
Edition (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2007). It would be unfair to accuse the 
large body of work of constructivist writing as completely ignoring the international 
level. See, for example, how issues of locality and international networks are 
integrated in David Wade Chambers and Richard Gillespie, "Locality in the History 
of Science: Colonial Science, Technoscience, and Indigenous Knowledge", Osiris 
15(2000). Furthermore, a turn towards the transnational has recently emerged also in 
the history of technology, in a move that resonates well with tendencies in general 
history. See for example Alexander Badenoch and Andreas Fickers, Materializing 
Europe : transnational infrastructures and the project of Europe (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
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in computer hardware.20 Still, the thesis aims at a goal common to much of 
this literature, as it explicitly tries to open up the black box of technology 
and render what is typically impermeable more or less transparent.21  
Earlier research on the history of Chill can be accused of being kept 
well within a black box, although the available publications are not without 
strengths. In the Robert J. Chapuis and Joel E. Amos tome on telephone 
switching technology from 1960 to 1985, one of a few publications where 
the history of Chill is analysed by someone outside the Chill project, the 
technical details of the programming language are kept to a minimum.22 
Chill is instead briefly presented as an efficient technology, but also as a 
standard that enjoyed “relatively limited spread of use”.23 However, as the 
chapter was published in 1990, Chapuis and Joel argue that more widespread 
use of Chill might happen as a consequence of the radical concentration of 
the switching industry that was observed at that time, while the limited 
appeal of the language up until 1990 was generally explained by the 
popularity of one of Chill’s competitors, the programming language C. 
Chapuis and Joel place the development of Chill in an international 
framework, presenting the programming language as a part of ITU’s move 
towards the standardisation of other computer-related standards.24 
                                                     
20 On the internalistic bent in the historiography of programming languages, see Jan 
Rune Holmevik, Educating the machine : a study in the history of computing and 
the construction of the SIMULA programming language, STS rapport ; nr 22 
(Dragvoll: Senter for teknologi og samfunn, Universitetet i Trondheim, 1994); Peter 
Mark Priestley, "Logic and the development of programming languages, 1930 - 
1975" (University College London, 2008). The literature in question is largely 
available through the proceedings of the three “history of programming languages“ 
conferences (HOPL) held in 1981, 1996 and 2007. 
21  The black box metaphor has been persistently used in both economic and 
sociological approaches to technology. See Nathan Rosenberg, Inside the black box 
: technology and economics (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982); Bruno Latour, Science in action : how to follow scientists 
and engineers through society (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987). 
22 See Robert J. Chapuis and Amos E. Joel, Electronics, computers and telephone 
switching: 1960-1985, 2 vols., vol. 2, Studies in telecommunication (1990), 267-90; 
Kristen Rekdal, "CHILL - The Standard language for Programming SPC Systems", 
IEEE Transactions on Communications 30, no. 6 (1982); Rekdal, "CHILL - The 
International Standard Language for Telecommunications Programming"; C. H. 
Smedema, "Some Issues in the International Standardization of CHILL and Ada", 
Computers & Standards 4, no. 2 (1985).  
23 Chapuis and Joel, Electronics, computers and telephone switching: 1960-1985, 
283. 
24 This is no coincidence, as Robert Chapuis was very much part of the CCITT 
community. On his background, see Robert Chapuis, an oral history conducted in 
1993 by Frederik Nebeker, IEEE History Center, New Brunswick, NJ, USA. 
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The opposite of this international outlook is found in a comprehensive 
historical investigation of the computer department of the Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology, where the historian Ola Nordal 
explicates the Norwegian setting of Chill in some detail, highlighting the 
particular organisational framework of the Norwegian contributions to the 
CCITT project.25 The way Chill is presented here, as a part of a trajectory of 
programming language research at one particular organisation, makes 
Nordal’s analysis part of a local history, and consequently presents only a 
part of the Chill history. Still, this is one of the few publications that present 
the wider implications of Chill for Norwegian industry, as it studies a 
Norwegian effort to commercialise knowledge obtained through the 
Norwegian participation in the Chill project as part of a broader study of 
spin-offs and commercialisations from the technical university of Norway 
related to computing. 
Some of the participants in the Chill project have also published brief 
overviews of the history of Chill.26 The general view put forward in these is 
that Chill was a viable language with some particular technological and 
organisational strengths. While these publications offer some good 
overviews of how Chill was realised, none of them follows the technology 
up until its end.  
On the history of the ITU, Chill’s organisational origin, a more 
comprehensive literature exists that highlights the development of the 
organisation.27 The ITU was created in 1932 by joining the International 
Telegraph Union (founded in 1865) and the signatories of the International 
Radio Telegraph Convention of 1906. By the late 1960s, the main bodies of 
                                                     
25  See Ola Nordal, Verktøy og vitenskap: datahistorien ved NTNU (Trondheim: 
Tapir akademisk, 2010), 172-78. 
26 For some noteworthy examples of work by insiders from the Chill project, see 
Rekdal, "CHILL - The International Standard Language for Telecommunications 
Programming"; Smedema, "Some Issues in the International Standardization of 
CHILL and Ada"; C. H. Smedema, P. Medema, and M. Boasson, The programming 
languages : Pascal, Modula, CHILL, and Ada (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice/Hall International, 1983). 
27 The standard history of the ITU is Harold K. Jacobson, "ITU: A potpurri of 
Bureaucrats and Industrialists", in The Anatomy of Influence, ed. Robert Cox and 
Harold K. Jacobson (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973). See also 
George A. Codding and Anthony M. Rutkowski, The International 
Telecommunication Union in a changing world (Dedham, MA: Artech House, 
1982); George A. Codding, The International Telecommunication Union; an 
experiment in international cooperation (Leiden,: E. J. Brill, 1952). For a more 
recent overview, see William J. Drake, "The Rise and Decline of the International 
Telecommunications Regime", in Regulating the Global Information Society, ed. 
Christopher T. Marsden (London: Routledge, 2000). 
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the ITU were the International Consultative Committee for Telegraph and 
Telephones (CCITT), the International Consultative Committee for Radio 
(CCIR) and the International Frequency Registration Board. These bodies 
were responsible for developing recommendations about 
telecommunications standards, developing telecommunications facilities and 
networks, establishing the lowest possible rates consistent with efficient 
service, allocating the radio frequency spectrum, registering radio frequency 
assignments, coordinating orbital slots for communications satellites and 
helping developing countries to improve their telecommunications 
equipment and networks. The system was based on a one vote, one nation 
principle, basically meaning the vote of the national telecommunication 
administration, which often held monopolistic power over 
telecommunication services in this period. A few studies have successfully 
engaged in analysing the regulatory regime of international 
telecommunications within the political sciences and sociology. 28  In 
particular, Peter Cowhey has claimed there was a strong relationship 
between the national monopolies and the international telecommunication 
organisation, and has claimed that the ITU and the CCITT sustained “one of 
the most lucrative and technologically significant international cartels in 
history”.29 According to Cowhey, the CCITT was “the anchor of a regime 
that facilitated bilateral monopolistic bargains, reinforced national 
monopolies, and limited the rights of private firms in the global market”.30  
To Cowhey, the CCITT was also an “epistemic community devoted to the 
idea of a ‘natural monopoly’ for telephone services”. 31  This community 
would pervert technologies into something that would be beneficial for the 
established regime. To the CCITT veteran Gerd Wallenstein, the CCITT was 
something completely different. It was “a transnational subculture held 
together by technical expertise and a specialised language of their own 
making”.32 It was a suprapower in the transnational structure of standards, 
although fraught with infighting and difficulties. Its mission was the creation 
                                                     
28  See Drake, "The Rise and Decline of the International Telecommunications 
Regime"; Peter F. Cowhey, "The international telecommunications regime: the 
political roots of regimes for high technology", International Organization 44, no. 
169-199 (1990); Eli Noam, "International Telecommunications in Transition", in 
Changing the Rules: Technological Change, International Competition, and 
Regulation in Communications, ed. Robert W. Crandall and Kenneth Flamm 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1989). 
29  Cowhey, "The international telecommunications regime: the political roots of 
regimes for high technology". 
30 Ibid.: 176. 
31 Ibid.: 173. 
32 Gerd Wallenstein, Setting Global Telecommunication Standards: The Stakes, The 
Players & The Process (Norwood, MA: Artech House, 1990), 1. 
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of non-binding technical recommendation through “mutually distrustful 
bedfellows”, which Wallerstein believed fostered standards and technologies 
that works as the law in civil law countries, “presumably fair, equitable, and 
common property of mankind”.33 To Wallerstein, the system was a safeguard 
against the problems that Cowhey ascribed to it.  
Few of these studies have been concerned with technological 
development, but remained focused on regulatory issues. Furthermore, much 
of this work has seldom been concerned with the actor level and how 
individuals act within the boundaries of regimes and organisations.34 The 
institutional orientation common to much of this research has rendered the 
individuals active in the international telecommunication organisations as 
captive to the national stratified logic of the industry. In this thesis, I analyse 
how regime logics and community norms are interrelated in some periods 
and opposed to each other in other periods. As such, I develop an historical 
understanding of regimes and community norms that goes beyond the simple 
handcuffs of the international telecommunication regime of Cowhey, 
without succumbing to the technocratic rule envisioned by Wallerstein.   
As part of the history of software in general and programming 
languages in particular, the history of Chill adds to the available literature in 
several ways: at the outset of the Chill project, some three-quarters of the 
productive energies of the computer industry were going into software.35 
Nevertheless, the historical literature has been slow in recognising this point. 
What is more, the specialised history of computing has been slow in 
recognising the importance of software altogether.36 Historical explorations 
of the software industry and professions have been published, and a recent 
emphasis on applications and the societal changes resulting from software 
                                                     
33 Ibid. 
34 One notable exception to both concerns is Susanne K. Schmidt and Raymund 
Werle, Coordinating technology : studies in the international standardization of 
telecommunications, Inside technology (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998). 
35  Barry W. Boehm, "Software and its Impact: A Quantitative Assessment", 
Datamation 19, no. 5 (1973). Here referred from Michael S. Mahoney, "Software: 
The Self-Programming Machine", in From 0 to 1: An Authoritative History of 
Modern Computing, ed. Atsushi Akera and Frederik Nebeker (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002).  
36 Mahoney, "Software: The Self-Programming Machine", 92. 
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are slowly emerging. 37  Some important contributions to the history of 
software have also integrated this into research on more general historical 
interest. One example is found in Atsushi Akera’s book Calculating a 
natural World. 38  Another example is the historically oriented sociologist 
Donald MacKenzie’s book Mechanizing Proof, in which through research 
into the history of software the author makes a significant contribution to the 
sociology of knowledge.39 My thesis tries to follow suit, although the general 
context is that of international cooperation and collaboration in the 20th 
century.40 
The rather specialised field of the history of programming languages 
has been one of the best-covered themes within the history of computing. 
This literature has, however, remained largely internalistic and has largely 
been written by specialists in the field.41 A typical tendency is the way they 
have imposed a logic and coherence that was typically absent at the time, 
                                                     
37 A more recent historiographical overview is Martin Campbell-Kelly, "The History 
of the History of Software", IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 29, no. 4 
(2007). On the history of the software industry, see ———, From airline 
reservations to Sonic the Hedgehog : a history of the software industry, History of 
computing (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003). On the use of software, see 
JoAnne Yates, Structuring the information age : life insurance and technology in the 
twentieth century, Studies in industry and society (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2005). On the professions of software workers, see Nathan 
Ensmenger, The computer boys take over : computers, programmers, and the 
politics of technical expertise, History of computing (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT 
Press, 2010).. See also Thomas Haigh, "How Data Got its Base: Information Storage 
Software in the 1950s and 1960s", IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 2009. 
38 Atsushi Akera, Calculating a natural world : scientists, engineers, and computers 
during the rise of U.S. cold war research, Inside technology (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 2007). 
39 Donald A. MacKenzie, Mechanizing proof : computing, risk, and trust, Inside 
technology (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001). 
40 On the historical role of international organisations in general, see Akira Iriye, 
Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the 
Contemporary World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). International 
organisations and relations have also attracted interest within the history of science 
and technology, for a recent example, see John Krige and Kai-Henrik Barth, Global 
power knowledge: science and technology in international affairs (Chicago, Ill.: 
University of Chicago Press, 2006).  
41  Sammet, Programming languages: history and fundamentals; Richard L. 
Wexelblat, History of programming languages (New York: Academic Press, 1981); 
Thomas J. Bergin and Richard G. Gibson, History of programming languages II 
(New York: ACM Press; Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1996); Thomas J. Bergin, "A 
history of the history of programming languages ", Communications of the ACM 50, 
no. 5 (2007). 
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and that they render the evolution of programming languages as a genealogy 
separate from its context. This does not, however, mean that this internalistic 
body of work is without strengths. A particularly important contribution is a 
recent study on the relationship between software engineering and 
programming language design, which has shown how various application 
domains and the research field of software engineering shaped programming 
language design in the 1970s.42 Empirically, this is closely related to the 
study of the design and use of programming languages in 
telecommunications. However, a particular emphasis in terms of theoretical 
orientation or dominant contextualisation is difficult to find. Two notable 
exceptions are Jan Rune Holmevik’s study of the programming language 
Simula and Mark Priestley’s study of the role of logic in what he calls the 
Algol research programme. 43  Both approach the history of programming 
languages with an ambition of going beyond the internalistic tendencies. 
Where Priestley grounds his study in theoretical approaches common to the 
traditional history of science, Holmevik's study reflects the wider history of 
research funding, research politics and the understanding of the computer in 
Norwegian society. 
The business history of the software industry has been engaged with 
an economic approach to software, although it has seldom been engaged 
with programming languages. This is primarily evident in the books and 
articles of Martin Campbell-Kelly. 44  In his survey of the history of the 
software industry, From airline reservation to Sonic the Hedgehog, he 
highlights the dynamics of the software industry from its early days and up 
until the mid-1990s. Campbell-Kelly is explicitly focusing on the software 
industry as a whole, while I am concentrating of a part of the industry that 
existed on the fringes of both telecommunications and computing.  
                                                     
42  Barbara G. Ryder, Mary Lou Soffa, and Margaret Burnett, "The Impact of 
Software Engineering Research on Modern Programming Languages", ACM 
Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology 14, no. 4 (2005). 
43 Priestley, "Logic and the development of programming languages, 1930 - 1975"; 
Holmevik, Educating the machine : a study in the history of computing and the 
construction of the SIMULA programming language; Jan Rune Holmevik, Inside 
innovation: The Simula Research Laboratory and the History of the Simula 
Programming Language (Oslo: Simula Research Laboratory, 2004). 
44  Most prominently, Campbell-Kelly, From airline reservations to Sonic the 
Hedgehog : a history of the software industry. For an examination of more recent 
trends, see Martin Campbell-Kelly and Daniel D. Garcia-Swartz, "From Products to 
Services: The Software Industry in the Internet Era", Business History Review 81, 
no. Winter 2007 (2007). Another effort is found within Knut Sogner, En liten brikke 
i et stort spill : den norske IT-industrien fra krise til vekst 1975-2000 (Bergen: 
Fagbokforl., 2002). 
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The role of innovation in software production and development has been 
analysed by scholars working on a different level of analysis than Campbell-
Kelly, namely within the “national innovation systems” approach pioneered 
by Christopher Freeman, Richard Nelson, and Bengt-Åke Lundvall.45 Two 
different studies, conducted more or less within this approach, has 
approached the software sector in general: David Mowery has compared the 
development of the U.S and Japanese software industries, where a number of 
systemic differences such as financial systems and intellectual property 
rights regimes are used as explanatory factors of different development 
paths. Mowery’s study is relevant to understand the industrial dynamics of 
new entrants in the software industry, but is not concerned with software as 
an activity of other industries, such as telecommunications.46 Furthermore, 
Mowery highlights national characteristics and national innovation systems, 
rather than the transnational and international character of the knowledge 
communities examined in this project. Secondly, Ed Steinmueller has written 
two historically oriented articles on the American and the European software 
industries.47 According to Steinmueller, “the sites of knowledge generation 
in the software industry are extremely dispersed among disciplines and 
organisations”. 48 Knowledge is gained through imitation and 
experimentation, in problem-solving related to specific and situated 
bottlenecks or innovative ideas, but also from basic research into computer 
science and software engineering.49 This dispersed nature is readily present 
in the history of software development in telecommunications.  
The existing history of Chill, software development and programming 
languages can be summarised as partly too internalistic, and while the 
general literature has recently turned towards issues such as how external 
factors can shape emergence and use, it has only to a limited extent been 
interested in economic aspects of this history. The considerable literature on 
the evolution of telecommunications, on the other hand, abounds with 
                                                     
45 For an overview of the literature, see Jan Fagerberg, "Innovation: A guide to the 
literature", in The Oxford Handbook of Innovation, ed. Jan Fagerberg, David C. 
Mowery, and Richard Nelson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
46 David C. Mowery, The international computer software industry : a comparative 
study of industry evolution and structure (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1996). 
47  W. Edward Steinmueller, "The US Software Industry: An Analysis and 
Interpretive History", in International Computer Software Industry, ed. David C. 
Mowery (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); ———, "The European software 
sectoral system of innovation", in Sectoral Systems of Innovation: Concepts, Issues 
and Analyses of Six Major Sectors in Europe, ed. Franco Malerba (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
48 Steinmueller, "The European software sectoral system of innovation", 221. 
49 Ibid. 
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research into organisational aspects, almost to an extent that other issues 
have been overlooked. In particular, the relationship between the 
institutional setting of the industry and the direction of technological change 
under its control has received little attention. Furthermore, parts of this 
literature are too nationally oriented, in particular when concerned with 
technology, and those few concerned with international cooperation have 
largely regarded this level as captive to the national monopolistic systems, 
and consequently give little agency to the participants in projects such as 
Chill.  
 
Theories 
My analysis of Chill is grounded in some general conceptualisations and 
theoretical assumptions. Below, I provide some clarifications and definitions 
regarding terminology. Following this, I discuss how my application of these 
concepts is related to larger theoretical concerns.  
Changes in programming technologies are cases of technical or 
technological change, and should be grounded in established theoretical 
conceptualisations of this.50 Here, it makes sense to understand change in the 
broadest possible sense, as something that necessitates novel ideas and the 
application of them, which makes it comparable to the commonly held 
distinction between invention and innovation, although here I restrict it to 
the realm of technology.51 Technological change, consequently, is something 
that implies use, as there has simply not been a change in technology if it has 
not been put into use.  
The term technological change has, at least throughout the last 
century, been given a meaning that predominantly includes changes in 
knowledge, practices and artefacts, the word technical change has often been 
confined to more narrowly defined works within economics.52 That term has 
first and foremost been used to describe situations where firms choose 
                                                     
50  For a philosophical exposition on roughly the same issues, see Jon Elster, 
Explaining Technical Change, ed. Jon Elster and Gudmund Hernes, Studies in 
Rationality and Social Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
51 The distinction between invention and innovation is typically attributed to the 
influential economist Joseph Schumpeter. See in particular chapters three and four in 
Joseph Alois Schumpeter, Business cycles; a theoretical, historical, and statistical 
analysis of the capitalist process, 1st ed. (New York, London,: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, inc., 1939). For a discussion, see Vernon W. Ruttan, "Usher and 
Schumpeter on Invention, Innovation, and Technological Change", The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 73, no. 4 (1959). 
52  On the changing meaning of the word technology, see Eric Schatzenberg, 
"Technik Comes to America: Changing Meanings of Technology before 1930", 
Technology and Culture 47, no. 3 (2006); Leo Marx, "Technology - the Emergence 
of a Hazardous Concept", Technology and Culture 51, no. 3 (2010).  
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different techniques when producing a given output. In the following, I will 
use the two terms more or less interchangeably, where technological change 
includes, but is not restricted to, technical change in the production of 
telecommunication equipment. The term direction of technological change 
has traditionally been confined to the same constituencies of economic 
research that limit the term technical change to choice of techniques 
producing a given output. Here, the direction of the change has been 
restricted to the factor bias, typically restricted to whether it saves on labour, 
capital or energy.53 In the following, I apply the term direction to understand 
the technological specificities of programming language design and use, 
where it has been typical to argue that the technology evolved towards 
higher levels of abstractions and degrees of modularity through time. Other 
directional concepts, like increased reliability and testability of software, 
should also be considered part of this broader concept of the direction of 
technological change. Chill was a change towards a relatively high-level 
hybrid language, especially designed for telecommunication systems, and 
intended as a common and standardised language. 
The term direction is thus applied to highlight choices, which implies 
that by other design decisions the technological change would have looked 
different. Design should here, in the way proposed by Edward Layton, be 
understood as the purposeful and value-laden application of technological 
means, integrating technological knowledge with social and economic 
aims.54 Use is understood as intertwined with design decisions and equally 
purposeful. Chill was a language designed to reduce variety, as a standard, 
and it opted for a technical solution that can be described as a hybrid, 
catering towards high levels of abstractions as well as the computing 
efficiency of lower level code.  
I approach the fate of Chill through its full life cycle. Still, it has been 
important to step away from the rigid conceptualisation of product life 
cycles, where innovation happens in one distinct period of a technology’s 
                                                     
53 Elster, Explaining Technical Change. 
54 Edward T. Layton, "Technology as Knowledge", Technology and Culture 15, no. 
1 (1974). 
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life.55 In particular, I have highlighted how innovation was made possible as 
well as limited by decisions influenced by the community of technological 
practitioners and by the strategising among interconnected firms and 
organisations in all three phases of life: birth, maturity and death. Still, the 
phase of birth was the main design phase of Chill, from around 1974 to 
1980. I will typically refer to this phase as emergence. The period where the 
language diffused and was used equals the period of maturity, roughly 
spanning the years between 1980 and 1990. I often refer to these years as the 
years of diffusion or use. The years where the language was more or less 
confined to legacy systems, from 1991 to 1999, I refer to as the years of 
demise. 
In many ways, Chill was not a typical technology understood as an 
artefact. Chill was also an effort of creating a legislative binding agreement 
on how a programming language for telecommunication equipment should 
be and by whom it should be used, embodied as a text – almost a legal 
document. Its fate was very much dependent on how this recommendation 
was received and how it was put into action. As a whole, the process was an 
exercise of standardisation, a sub-case of institutionalisation.56 Furthermore, 
programming languages can be regarded as institutionalisation per se, as 
they always involve ways of codifying programming techniques into a set of 
rules and procedures, rules and procedures that can be tools when 
programming – which is the act of creating programs. Consequently, it 
                                                     
55 The way I use the term ”life cycle” is different from the product life cycle concept 
common in some quarters of economics and marketing. Where the product life cycle 
concept of economics has mainly been concerned with the product group level and 
the industrial structure underpinning it, I am solely focused on the changes over the 
course of one technology’s life cycle. However, I do adopt the three-pronged 
characterisation of technology development – birth, maturity, death (without any 
claims about the natural passing of such periods) – but hold the questions on 
innovation, shaping and standardisation of the product more open than what is 
common in the “conventional model” of product life cycles, which is more geared 
towards mass market commodity goods. For an introduction to the product life cycle 
literature in economics, see James M. Utterback and William J. Abernathy, "A 
dynamic model of process and product innovation", Omega 3, no. 6 (1975). 
56 On the role of standardisation in history, see Andrew L. Russell, "Standardizing in 
History: A Review Essay with an Eye to the Future", in The Standards Edge: Future 
Generations, ed. Sherrie Bolin (Ann Arbor: Sheridan Press, 2005); ———, 
""Industrial Legislatures": Consensus Standardization in the Second and Third 
Industrial Revolutions" (The Johns Hopkins University, 2007); Amy Slaton and 
Janet Abbate, "The Hidden Lives of Standards: Technical Prescriptions and the 
Transformation of Work in America", in Technologies of power: essays in honor of 
Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley Hughes, ed. Michael Thad Allen and 
Gebrielle Hecht (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001). 
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makes sense to also understand programming language technology as tools 
and, in essence, capital goods.57  
Following this, it should be possible to reconcile Chill’s life cycle 
with the life cycle pattern typical to capital goods. However, programming 
languages are also a very peculiar type of capital good: they are intangible, 
abstract and at first highly malleable. When diffused, however, changes to 
the language are an intricate matter, as they could easily break existing 
implementations and code. As such, innovation and obsolesce of this 
technology appears similar to that of complex products and services. 58 
Andrew Davies has suggested that complex systems evolve through two 
phases of innovation. First, the development of new systems architecture 
comes prior to commercialisation of the product and another where the rate 
of components and systemic innovation increases and new products and 
components are introduced, without fundamentally altering the established 
architecture. Following this, it is argued that innovation happens through a 
long period of time. In many ways, programming languages are similar to 
such architectures or platforms that a technological system forms around or 
is built on top of.  
Throughout the thesis I refer to the combined process of 
institutionalisation and technological change as bound up in processes of 
technical diplomacy. Here, both the figurative and the direct meaning of the 
term diplomacy are applied to the task. The concept refers to the extensive 
negotiations that went on among technological practitioners and scientists, 
discussed at an international level within the ITU, a process very much 
similar to that of diplomatic negotiations of international relations: 
bargaining, standoffs, coercion and ratification of agreements were all part 
of the process. I also apply the term diplomacy to the general process of 
directing and shaping the future of programming languages in the 
telecommunication industry, here including strategic positioning among 
telecommunication organisations that went on outside the ITU arena and the 
small-scale negotiations on technicalities that happened at technical 
conferences and symposia around the world. As such, the concept includes 
diplomacy at large and diplomacy of the daily routine, beyond the phases of 
                                                     
57 On the role of software as capital, see Howard Baetjer, Software as capital : an 
economic perspective on software engineering (Los Alamitos, Calif.: IEEE 
Computer Society, 1998). 
58  On the historical importance of capital goods, see Nathan Rosenberg, 
"Technological Change in the Machine Tool Industry, 1840 - 1910", The Journal of 
Economic History 23, no. 4 (1963). On complex products and services, see Andrew 
Davies, "The life cycle of a complex product system", International Journal of 
Innovation Management 1, no. 3 (1998); Mike Hobday, Howard Rush, and Joe Tidd, 
"Innovation in complex products and system", Research Policy 29, no. 7-8 (2000). 
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emergence. As such, the diplomacy related to whether the programming 
languages should be used is understood to be as important as the initial 
positioning.   
The processes of technical diplomacy were shaped by the international 
telecommunication regime, which in turn influenced norms held among the 
participants in communities of technological practitioners and by the 
strategies and actions of telecommunication organisations such as 
telecommunication administrations, equipment manufacturers and research 
organisations. In the following, I will define each in turn. 
Traditionally, the ITU has been described as the main key in an 
international telecommunication regime, a system that in retrospect has been 
named the “ancien regime” by some scholars.59 This regime was protecting a 
system of national telecommunication monopolies and controlled by the 
telecommunication administrations.60 Typical to writers analysing the ITU as 
part of such regimes is that they allow the individual participants little room 
for manoeuvre and little room for technical norms that would transgress the 
boundaries of the interest. This thesis questions this approach, as it assigns at 
least some agency to communities of technological practitioners, without 
making these communities independent of the established political and 
economic structure of the international telecommunication regime. 
Furthermore, as the organisation of telecommunications to some extent 
varied beyond the typical monopolistic regime described by Cowhey, in 
particular in the Nordic countries, there are further reasons to be cautious 
about accepting this description in full.61 Still, the structural description of 
Cowhey is a valid one, just as the term “ancien regime” for 
telecommunications is an historical fact. What it questions in this thesis is 
the mechanisms assigned to this “ancien regime”. 
A community of technological practitioners is understood as a 
structure of both social and epistemological character, where its body of 
knowledge and its social dimensions are intertwined. Such communities 
form around a communally defined problem, which is gradually redefined by 
the practitioners who are attracted to it. They are often quite small, although 
varying over time, and non-exclusive. As such, their members might be 
active in several different communities. The non-exclusivity, problem-
                                                     
59 Drake, "The Rise and Decline of the International Telecommunications Regime". 
60  Cowhey, "The international telecommunications regime: the political roots of 
regimes for high technology". 
61  A pertinent reminder of the variety of organisational principles in the 
telecommunication industry is Andrew Davies, Telecommunications and Politics: 
The Decentralised Alternative (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994). 
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orientation and small size and informal membership process is what 
separates a community from a profession.62  
The economist Dominique Foray has underscored the importance of 
the community as an organisational system allowing the exploitation of the 
properties of knowledge in his book The Economics of Knowledge. 63 
According to Foray, knowledge-based communities, which are similar to my 
conceptualisation of communities of technological practitioners, are 
networks of individuals striving, first and foremost, to produce and circulate 
new knowledge, and working for different, even rival organisations. He has 
described their workings as the “machineries of knowing”.64 Foray claims 
that the relevance of these communities is increasing. However, it is obvious 
that such communities were also very much in effect in radical technological 
transformations, such as the transition towards computer-controlled 
switching systems in telecommunications. The historian of technology 
Edward W. Constant argued in the early 1980s about the importance of 
specialised, differentiated, well-defined communities of technological 
practitioners. To Constant, focusing on a technological community helped 
him explain and account for the turbojet revolution in aviation.65  While 
Constant was inspired by sociological studies of the “invisible colleges” in 
science, he drew a sharp line between how community structures worked in 
relation to science and to technology. In my review of the interaction and 
intersections of various software communities, these boundaries seem less 
clear. The communities of technological practitioners do not exclude 
researchers, designers or users. The term “technological practitioners” has to 
be understood rather broadly.  
Over time, these communities are held together by norms, understood 
as a set of common understandings or values that allow members of the 
communities of technological practitioners to choose among a set of options. 
These norms addressed what was held as important attributes of 
                                                     
62  A similar application of the community term is found in Ann Johnson’s 
application of the “knowledge community” framework in her study of anti-lock 
braking systems, where the basic argument is that communities are the basic locus of 
knowledge production in design engineering and much science. See Ann Johnson, 
Hitting the brakes : engineering design and the production of knowledge (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2009).  
63 Foray, Economics of knowledge. 
64 Ibid., 183. 
65 Constant, The origins of the turbojet revolution. 
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programmers, be it a rigour, systemic thinking, creativity or speed.66 In this 
particular setting, I refer to these norms as development virtues, and when 
practiced, the communities would inevitably refer to these practices as good 
programming. These norms created dispositions towards certain 
technologies or tools, and were able to attract or direct processes of 
technological change. Still, the term development virtue is solely an 
analytical concept that I use for reasons of explanatory power and clarity. It 
is not a concept that can be found explicitly in the vicinity of software 
developers, either in the historical period I investigate or today. However, it 
is not without precedents: just as objectivity has been deemed the most 
important epistemic virtue in western science, that is to say that objectivity 
has been understood as the most important moral attribute of scientists, 
several ways of programming have been elevated as virtuous ways of 
programming. In particular, programmers driven by ideals such as elegancy, 
minimalism and formalism have been held in high esteem, although the 
elevation has often been contested and is a source of conflict.67 Development 
within different “communities of computing” differed, just as software 
development for finance institutions and military operations varied in 
strikingly different manners.68 As these differences became obvious, new 
development virtues were established through community processes and 
directed communities and participants in their continued struggle with 
changing their ways of developing software. When moving software 
development into telecommunications, norms would have to be adapted to 
this new application domain, which in turn made room for heated debates. 
Typical of those opposing development virtues were some who wished for 
software development as a formal undertaking, or at least one that was 
rigorous and systematic, a view that often clashed with those inclined to a 
                                                     
66 Here, I appropriate parts of the terminology used by the historian of science Peter 
Galison when studying what he calls epistemic virtues. See Lorraine Daston and 
Peter Galison, Objectivity (New York: Zone Books, 2007). Furthermore, I include 
the core concept of agendas found in work by Michael S. Mahoney, a historian of 
science that has written extensively on the history of software. See Mahoney, 
"Software: The Self-Programming Machine"; Michael S. Mahoney, "Software as 
Science - Science as Software", in History of Computing: Software Issues, ed. 
Reinhard Keil-Salwik Ulf Hashagen, Arthur L. Norberg (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 
2002); ———, "Finding a history for software engineering", Annals of the History 
of Computing 26(2004); ———, "The histories of computing(s)", Interdisciplinary 
Science Reviews 30, no. 2 (2005). 
67 Such discussions are everywhere in contemporary literature, both from trade and 
from the sciences. For an illustrative overview, see Ensmenger, The computer boys 
take over : computers, programmers, and the politics of technical expertise. 
68  On the “communities of computing,” see Mahoney, "The histories of 
computing(s)". 
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more artisan approach to software development. Such sets of norms could be 
shared across professional identities, be it computer scientists, professional 
programmers or software engineers.69 In the following, I treat these various 
groups as part of different communities of technological practitioners.  
Processes where technical features were decided on through 
diplomacy between community members were not the only ones that shaped 
Chill, as technological development is seldom enclosed to such a technical 
realm alone. It was just as much influenced by the organisational linkages of 
the participants and a number of factors more external to the Chill project. 
This includes the strategies and actions of telecommunication 
administrations and manufacturers in relation to common programming 
languages in general as well as to the Chill project more specifically. In 
particular, the strategies on the future division of programming labour, 
among administrations, manufacturers and independent firms, would 
influence language design. Throughout this thesis, I try to discern between 
how such strategising was acted upon by the very same participants who 
held strongly shared norms, and by actions carried out above their level of 
authority. 
The main period under investigation, from the early 1970s to around 
1990, was one where the organisational principles of telecommunications 
were also about to undergo radical changes, as the dominant pattern of a 
strongly regulated industry was put under increasing pressure. However, this 
did not imply a unification of strategies among telecommunication 
administrations or manufacturers. On the contrary, the general shift towards 
“deverticalisation” was not one adhered to by all organisations. 70  By 
focusing on a particular piece of the game, this thesis highlights the unruly 
strategic landscape that led to the dissolution of the “ancien regime” of 
telecommunications.71 
In this thesis, I analyse how the relative strength of the two factors, the 
strategising of the telecommunication organisations and the norms of the 
communities of technological practitioners, oscillated throughout the periods 
of emergence, use and eventually demise – in short the full life cycle of the 
specific technology. Furthermore, I analyse how the unruly relationship 
between the dissolving international telecommunication regime, the 
communities of technological practitioners and the telecommunication 
organisations changed over time, and shaped Chill.  
                                                     
69 Ensmenger, The computer boys take over : computers, programmers, and the 
politics of technical expertise. 
70 Langlois, "The vanishing hand: the changing dynamics of industrial capitalism". 
71 Drake, "The Rise and Decline of the International Telecommunications Regime"; 
Cowhey, "The international telecommunications regime: the political roots of 
regimes for high technology". 
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The theoretical apparatus accounted for above is related to three streams of 
research that are found within various incarnations of economic, sociological 
and historical theories of the direction of technical change, broadly defined. 
This involves theories that account for technological design as well as use, 
either by pointing out how the two phenomena differ or how they might be 
interrelated. I call these broad traditions “contingentism”, “institutionalism” 
and “rationalism.” By contingentism, I lump together theories that explain 
technical change by pointing to local processes that easily could have ended 
up differently, or different processes that could have ended up instigating the 
same result.72 This view is shared in theories such as the social construction 
of technology and actor-network theory, both mainstays within so-called 
science and technology studies (STS).73 By institutionalism, I expand the 
theoretical category of new institutional theory to comprise theories that 
explain technical change by trial and error processes and technological 
paradigms, including evolutionary economics and neo-Schumpeterian 
theories of innovation.74 By rationalism, I group together theories that apply 
economic or technical rationality as a determining factor when explaining 
which technologies are being developed among a set of feasible changes, 
and typically conflate the question of diffusion to the same rational decision 
process.75  
The move towards high-level programming languages for 
telecommunications, in general, can be explained by a rationalistic 
framework, as it successfully accounts for how a particular price structure 
induced innovations to follow route. Two traditions of this way of reasoning 
are typical. The first, following the lead of John Hicks, is a stream of 
research within what is generally known as the theory of induced innovation 
that dominated the 1960s and 1970s.76 Secondly, and more recently, research 
associated with the so-called endogenous growth models has tried to seek 
                                                     
72 Fittingly, the term contingency has been defined in a number of different ways in 
different research traditions. Most typically, it involves either the modal logic 
understanding of “neither necessary nor impossible”, or the more casual 
interpretations of the word meaning either dependency or chance. In general, all the 
conceptualisations share a focus on indeterminacy and unpredictability.  
73 One early example of this is found in Wiebe E. Bijker and John Law, Shaping 
technology/building society : studies in sociotechnical change, Inside technology 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992). 
74 For an overview of the literature, see Fagerberg, "Innovation: A guide to the 
literature".  
75  See for example Vernon W. Ruttan, Technology, growth, and development : an 
induced innovation perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
76  For a short presentation and comparison of the institutional theories laid out 
above, see ———, "Induced Innovation, Evolutionary Theory and Path Dependece: 
Sources of Techncial Change", The Economic Journal 107, no. 444 (1997). 
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out how research and development can influence growth across countries – 
and as a part of this strived towards modelling technological change as a 
consequence of intentional actions taken by people who respond to market 
incentives.77 The most explicit effort to explain the direction of technical 
change is associated with the Hicksian induced innovation theory, where the 
core idea was that “a change in the relative prices of factors of production is 
itself a spur to innovation and to invention of a particular kind – directed at 
economising the use of a factor which has become relatively expensive”.78 
Following this, innovation was understood as a rational, goal-seeking 
activity, helped forward by an exogenously created knowledge frontier. The 
major limitation of this model was pretty obvious, also to its main 
proponents: the internal mechanism, such as the learning, search, research 
and development, remained unexplained – exogenous to the economic 
system. These mechanisms have recently been rectified, either through the 
integration of evolutionary theories, or through endogenous growth 
theories.79 In the latter incarnations, the price effect that creates incentives 
for innovations in the familiar Hicksian way is supplemented by other 
factors when explaining technological direction, such as the market size 
effect, “which encourages the development of technologies that have a larger 
market”.80 Following this, the diffusion of innovations follows almost in an 
automatic fashion, whereas rational actors would apply the most effective 
technique available, and since innovations are understood as only happening 
if they save a given factor. In the case of Chill, such theorising can, to some 
extent, explain the initiative, as a common programming language could be a 
labour-saving technology. However, its sudden fall from grace would 
necessitate either the appearance of a more effective technology or radically 
changing factor prices. None of these explanations are very convincing. The 
explanation must take into account the changing strategies of established 
organisations, emergent communities of technological practitioners and the 
changing political-economic regime surrounding telecommunications. 
The study of the technical diplomacy that shaped Chill throughout its 
life, be it the small-scale diplomatic bickering about programming language 
features or the large-scale diplomacy regarding the adherence to the Chill 
“treaty”, is at the centre of this thesis. At first sight, this seems related to 
what is commonly held as important tenants of any variant of contingentism, 
where the negotiability of technologies has been a main concern. This is 
                                                     
77 The new growth models stems, in large parts, from Paul M. Romer, "Endogenous 
Technological Change", Journal of Political Economy 98(1990). 
78 John Hicks, The theory of wages (London,: Macmillan, 1932), 124-25. 
79 See for example Daron Acemoglu, "Directed Technical Change", The Review of 
Economic Studies 69, no. 4 (2002). 
80 Ibid.: 793. 
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often found within work in what is now known as social studies of 
technology, and often also related to sociological studies of science.81 Here, 
technology development is perceived as the outcome of interactions and 
negotiations between various social groups, but ordinarily eschews economic 
superiority and technical efficiency as criteria for change and choice. 
Innovation, the shaping of technologies and their use are understood as an 
outcome of controversies stemming from interests, strategies and knowledge 
among actors. 82  It is theorised that within these controversies, a 
technological framework emerges and is gradually shared among relevant 
social groups and then directs the process towards closure. This process is 
understood as contingent, which basically implies that the technology would 
have ended up rather different given other constellations of actors, while the 
shared set of technological frameworks is understood as fairly rigid and 
difficult to overcome. The latter is something that is built alongside the 
technological project and hence not predetermined. 
However, I am not convinced that it is really necessary to eschew 
economic and technical rationality to favour contingent negotiations. I find 
that the explanatory power can be strengthened if one reconciles parts of the 
literature focused on the contingent aspects of technology with literature 
oriented towards the institutional aspects of technological change.83 Within 
the stream I labelled institutionalism, the direction design and use of new 
technology stems from norms, technological trajectories, paradigms, and 
routines that can all be understood as institutions influencing decision-
making. 84  All these concepts have been applied as explanations of the 
direction of technical change: In the evolutionary tradition following Nelson 
and Winter, routines and technological trajectories push evolution in given 
directions.85 In another variant, Dosi has extended the Kuhnian notion of 
                                                     
81  For an overview, see the various contributions in Bijker and Law, Shaping 
technology/building society : studies in sociotechnical change. 
82  Wiebe E. Bijker, Of bicycles, bakelites, and bulbs : toward a theory of 
sociotechnical change, Inside technology (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995). 
83  An attempt to reconcile the sociology of scientific knowledge, an important 
stream of research within the field of science and technology studies, is put forward 
in D. Wade Hands, "The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge: Some Thoughts on the 
Possibilities", in New Directions in Economic Methodology, ed. Roger Backhouse 
(London: Routledge, 1994). 
84 Here institutions imply the humanly devised rules of society, to paraphrase the 
economist and historian Douglass North, a main character in traditional institutional 
thinking and theorising. Douglass C. North, Institutions, institutional change and 
economic performance, The Political economy of institutions and decisions 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
85 Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter, An evolutionary theory of economic 
change (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1982). 
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paradigms to encompass the field of technology, where the search for new 
products or processes is formed by an “outlook” that directs the efforts of 
technologists and engineers. To Dosi, “a technological paradigm embodies 
strong prescriptions on the directions of technical change to pursue and those 
to neglect”.86 A similar Kuhnian outlook is found in Edward W. Constant’s 
historical research, which I already quoted as an influence when stressing the 
importance of understanding the community level of technological change. 
In his research, knowledge and norms held by communities of technological 
practitioners are the level where technical change emerges and its fate is 
decided upon.  
Constant explicitly applied the concept of normal technology as an 
analogy to Kuhn’s normal science, where the improvement of the accepted 
tradition or its application under new or more stringent conditions is akin to 
the “puzzle solving” of Kuhn. It is functional failures and anomalies in 
periods of normal technology that direct the emergence of novelty, and the 
model firmly places the directional element within the stable practice. In 
many ways, Constant shares this with the prominent historian of technology 
Thomas Hughes, whose outlook on the dynamic element in the evolution of 
large technical systems is innovation caused by reverse salients – understood 
as bottlenecks or weak spots observable in technical arrangements.87 
When I emphasise the importance of norms at the level of the 
communities of technological practitioners, I also draw on another branch of 
the institutionalist literature. Within so-called neo-institutionalism, studies of 
how actors or organisations follow norms to gain legitimacy have been an 
important strand. 88  Parts of this literature have tried to explicate how 
collectively valued purposes can influence normative or moral legitimacy. In 
some ways, this can be reconciled with the Kuhnian outlook of Constant that 
I discussed above, as it adds a mechanism for understanding individual and 
organisational behaviour within paradigms, as the value of gaining or 
retaining legitimacy are understood as what directs actions. 
Although the similarities between my approach to the design and 
diffusion of Chill is similar to many institutionalist theories, it does not share 
                                                     
86  Giovanni Dosi, "Technological paradigms and technological trajectories", 
Research Policy 11(1982): 158. 
87 Thomas Parke Hughes, Networks of power : electrification in Western society, 
1880-1930 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983). 
88 The new institutionalism’s interest in legitimacy started with John W. Meyer and 
Brian Rowan, "Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and 
ceremony", American Journal of Sociology 83, no. 2 (1977). Following this, a huge 
literature has emerged and expanded in many directions. See for example David L. 
Deephouse and Mark Suchman, "Legitimacy in Organizational Institutionalism", in 
The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, ed. Royston Greenwood, et 
al. (London: Sage Publications, 2008). 
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this approach towards periodisation: macro-based periodisation is a 
demarcation strategy common to much historical thinking, and similarly 
something held by many institutionally oriented scholars. Typically, some 
periods are thought to be characterised by a dominant technology such as 
“the age of steam” or “the internet era”. Others periods are characterised by 
radical change and a particular technical breakthrough, such as the industrial 
revolution or the rapid electrification of the late 1800s. Such an 
understanding of technological periods is bound up in an idea that basic 
innovations cluster in time, which again has resulted in the popular idea that 
the appearance and diffusion of innovations and technical change as an 
uneven process, sometimes gradual and sometimes explosive.89 This model 
is shared by many writers within the Schumpeterian tradition of studies of 
innovation, and the more institutional approaches in general.90 It was also 
popular in particular in the so-called “long-wave” theories that were 
somewhat in vogue from the late 1970s and into the 1980s.91 Typically, such 
period frameworks are based on the stability of “normal technology” versus 
periods of revolutionary innovations. 92  At the micro-level, similar two-
pronged models are just as common, often putting up sharp dichotomies 
between phases of innovation and phases of diffusion within technological 
life cycles.93  
In this thesis, I argue that this two-pronged pattern is unsatisfactory, at 
the micro- as well as at the macro-level. I put forward the proposition of a 
three-pronged model, where one can argue that decision-making about new 
and novel technologies can be shaped by various “period specificities”, 
either in forms of stable technological paradigms, to use Kuhn’s term 
describing normal science, revolutionary upheaval or Turnerian liminality.94 
To the practitioners involved in processes of technical change, some periods 
are not mainly about “puzzle solving” or decision-making under complete 
uncertainty. Somewhere in between lie periods of transition between 
                                                     
89 This is the very heart of the writings of Joseph Schumpeter. On the clustering of 
basic innovations in time, see Schumpeter, Business cycles; a theoretical, historical, 
and statistical analysis of the capitalist process, 75. 
90 On a direct appropriation of the Kuhnian model of change in sciences, see Dosi, 
"Technological paradigms and technological trajectories". 
91 For a recent example and a summary, see Christopher Freeman and Francisco 
Louçã, As time goes by : from the industrial revolutions to the information 
revolution (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
92 On normal engineering, see Constant, The origins of the turbojet revolution. 
93 See, for example, Steven Klepper, "Entry, Exit, Growth, and Innovation over the 
Product Life Cycle", The American Economic Review 86, no. 3 (1996). 
94  On scientific paradigms, see Thomas S. Kuhn, The structure of scientific 
revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago,: University of Chicago Press, 1970). 
28 
  
somewhat stable states.95 Such periods are perhaps best compared to periods 
where one navigates towards a somewhat known goal, but where the waters 
are uncharted. At the micro-level, such uncharted waters are typically found 
when new technology is moved from a phase when one goal dominates, to 
another phase, where more and more new targets emerge. Such phases are 
found in the period of time when a new process is moved from the testing 
laboratory to the production line, or when a programming language for 
telecommunication switching undergoes extensive trial implementations, 
after a period of innovative design. Such liminality is a common feature in 
processes of technical change and innovation, perhaps more so than in other 
types of social activities. Periods of liminality mean complex and novel 
decision-making for technological practitioners, not necessarily fitting the 
grand scheme of things made up by historians and social scientists.  It is this 
category of periods that is the focus of this thesis. Here, periods and 
technologies are understood less in terms like monarchic successions, but 
more as “new stars twinkling into existence, not replacing old ones but 
changing the geography of the heavens”, to paraphrase an imaginative 
illustration of the way modes of scientific reasoning have changed over 
time.96 
Chill was initiated in what might perhaps best be described as such a 
liminal phase at the macro level, at the outset of the knowledge-based 
economy, where the meaning of programming as an activity to both 
manufacturers and administrations was unknown. It was really “betwixt and 
between” positions assigned by prior knowledge, technical solutions and 
organisational patterns. 
At the micro level, it is possible to recognise similar “betweenness,” 
typical in periods moving on from inventive design to implementing use and 
from rapid growth to stagnating diffusion. In the following, I apply a three-
pronged micro-periodisation when comparing how Chill was shaped through 
periods of invention, innovation and diffusion, but pay particular attention to 
the periods in between these well-defined phases.  
Many of the discussions over the last three decades on social 
scholarship on the direction of technological change have been about the 
apparent gulfs between the three main streams pointed out above, the 
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“contingentism”, the “rationalism” and the “institutionalism”. 97  Changes 
within social studies of technology during the last three decades have almost 
altogether rejected the notion of a direction of technical change (and even 
more so, trajectories) as a plausible term when considering technological 
change, mainly because of its implication of technological determinism. On 
the other hand, the traditional concept of directed technical change within 
economics has been revived, in particular as economics has turned towards 
the problems of technological solutions to climate change.98 In the following, 
I am equally interested in the possibilities inherent in these established 
theoretical streams as in their limitations.  
 
Methods 
The following presentation of the methodology is organised around three 
general principles, concerned with the design of the investigation, its level of 
analysis and the sources used in the analysis. Although they are formulated 
in rather general terms, they are intended for the applicability to the project 
at hand rather than generality.  
Sticking point number one is to reconstruct the historical sequence of 
events by following the technology through primary sources. Principle two is 
to compare across time and space. The third principle is to validate the 
historical reconstruction and the comparison through secondary sources and 
contemporary data. I will deal briefly with each principle in turn.  
The methodological principle number one is concerned with the level 
of analysis and the sources used in the analysis, as it states that I should 
reconstruct the historical sequence of events by following the technology 
through primary sources. By this, I imply that the study follows the 
technology rather then a set of predetermined set of actors. I have tried to 
reconstruct the constantly changing communities and organisations that 
exerted influence over Chill over time. This implies that the theoretical 
model sketched out above is primarily sought out at a level of individual 
                                                     
97  On the gulf between evolutionary and mainstream economics regarding 
technological change, see Fulvio Castellacci, "Evolutionary and new growth 
theories: Are they converging?", Journal of Economic Survey 21, no. 3 (2007). On 
the differences between social construction of technology and evolutionary 
approaches, see Odd Einar Olsen and Ole Andreas Engen, "Technological change as 
a trade off between social construction and technological paradigms", Technology in 
Society 29(2007). 
98  Most explicitly rejected in the introduction in Bijker and Law, Shaping 
technology/building society : studies in sociotechnical change. On the interest in 
directed technical change and its relation to climate change, see the various 
contributions in Arnulf Grübler, Nebojša Nakicenovic, and William D. Nordhaus, 
Technological change and the environment (Washington, DC: Resources for the 
Future ; International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 2002). 
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actors rather than one where the strategies of firms and the institutional 
framework can be appreciated from a vantage point high above the heads of 
the participants. On the contrary, the way I have chosen to follow the 
technology allows an understanding of organisational strategies and 
institutional regimes as they appear at the level of individual participants. 
This makes this history almost a history from below, regardless of its 
insistence on not following a prescribed set of actors.  
This principle renders the investigation of little use if I were to explain 
differences in how groups of actors behave, or the variance in the level of 
competitiveness or performance of some firms or nations. However, I find 
the principle all the more fitting when concerned with explaining the 
direction of technical change, although such a strategy might have some 
unfortunate consequences when dealing with something as esoteric as a 
programming language. The technical vocabulary might seem alien even to 
technically gifted readers, and impenetrable to those not well versed in the 
lingo of programming. I have tried to keep the discussion as non-technical as 
possible. However, the aim of opening the black box of something as 
heterogeneous and specialised as programming language design prevents me 
from bypassing technological arguments and conflicts as something wholly 
esoteric.99 
The historical reconstruction is based on an extensive use of primary 
archival sources. They are mainly of two kinds: One category of sources 
embodies the technological project, such as working documents and plans, 
and is of a descriptive character. These sources originated in the technical 
project itself. Another type of documentation says something about its 
originator and author, like travel reports and written correspondence between 
developers and users, which can in some cases reveal intentions, hopes and 
values, information that is important to the historical accounts. Such sources 
embed part of the social fabric that the participants were woven into. 
Together, the breadth and number of sources makes a detailed reconstruction 
possible. I discuss the limitations and possibilities of the available sources 
more directly in a specific section below.  
It is also worth noting that although I rely primarily on archival 
sources, I also activate a slightly broader methodological apparatus 
throughout the thesis. Interviews have been used to some extent as part of 
the reconstruction, which I will deal with more extensively below. When 
analysing relationships between participants in the ITU design and 
implementation projects, I utilise so-called social network analysis (SNA) to 
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discern patterns of cooperation and alliances. 100  Here, I focus on the 
relationships formed through mutual participation in the official meetings 
and the contributions made by team members, or their parent organisation, to 
different meetings. This makes it possible to distinguish between importance 
(or centrality, to use the lingo of SNA) won through participation and the 
willingness to exert influence through contributions to the various meetings. 
The former is understood as a position in a network made up of ties between 
the participants and the latter is understood as an indication of a willingness 
to exert influence over the decisions made at each individual meeting. 
Throughout chapters three and four, I measure participation networks and 
the willingness to influence decisions through such methods. More thorough 
discussions on the methodological possibilities and limitations of such 
network analysis and its measures are carried forward throughout the 
relevant chapters.  
The social network analysis is coupled with a close to complete 
analysis of various written contributions to the programming language, 
which makes it possible to compare how linkages between participants were 
reflected in contributions, beliefs and behaviour in the committee work, 
which adds to the gains from the social network analysis. It is worth noting 
that the social network analysis is only appropriate when analysing and 
comparing the shaping of the programming language that was going on 
within the boundaries of the ITU, and is not applicable when analysing the 
later stages of Chill’s life cycle. The analysis of its wider use and adaptation 
has to rely on other methods, like comparing patterns of use across various 
organisations.  
The second methodological principle is to compare through time and 
space. The purpose is to come up with a descriptive explanation of the 
problem at hand, an explanation that is inherently historical and dynamic in 
the sense that I amplify the contextual and the period specifics of the events 
analysed. The time-oriented comparison is based on a periodisation of the 
development of the Chill project, and tries to compare the directional push 
towards a specialised, yet high-level programming language, along the two 
sources of influence discussed above.  
The “life cycle” of the Chill programming language lends itself to 
quite distinct periodisation, as the institutional base of Chill, the ITU, was 
strictly organised around a principle of pre-planned “study periods” with an 
interval of four years. The organising principle of the time-based comparison 
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that is particularly useful when considering community structures and analysing 
relational data. For an introduction, see Linton C. Freeman, The development of 
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is, as such, internal to the study object, rather than based on a broad and 
externally originated period or phase.  
The period-oriented comparison is also, more inherently, a 
comparison across space. The level of analysis, including communities of 
technological practitioners, the international organisation ITU and nationally 
bound administrations and manufacturers, allow me to seek out common 
concerns and actions across boundaries typical to national-oriented analysis 
of innovation.101  As such, my approach allows for the international and 
transnational aspects of technology development as well as use to come to 
the foreground. However, it also makes it possible to compare how actors 
coming from widely different organisational and national backgrounds acted 
at that international level, and thus being able to answer whether the 
convergence upon some technical features was a result of tough negotiations 
or common agendas.  
The third methodological sticking point is basically a safety valve: I 
have tried to validate my findings and my interpretations of primary sources 
through secondary sources. This includes an extensive use of 
contemporaneous technical and scientific literature and retrospective 
interviews with some of the key actors in the Chill project. In this regard, I 
have relied on interviews with important actors in the Chill project to 
strengthen my analysis. This includes some important Norwegian, Swedish, 
Dutch, Japanese and American participants, but includes nowhere near what 
would be demanded of a representative population of interviewees.102 As 
such, it is important to stress that the way I have utilised these interviews has 
mainly been to validate information found in archival sources, or to point out 
relationships that were not evident from the primary sources in the first 
place. As such, there are parts of the analysis that rely more heavily on 
interviews than others. In these cases, I have tried to support the evidence 
with other interviews and secondary sources as much as possible. 
These interviews have been done orally and in an unstructured way, 
except in some cases, where conversations by electronic mail have been used 
due to distance and time. Some of the interviews and conversations have, 
following the validation criteria, taken place late in the research process. In 
some parts of the text, these interviews have provided me with unique 
knowledge and information, which in turn has informed my understanding in 
                                                     
101 On the deficiencies of a national-oriented approach to innovation and use of 
technology, I find David Edgerton’s arguments convincing. See David Edgerton, 
The shock of the old : technology and global history since 1900 (Oxford ; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 103-37.   
102 For more details, see list of interviews in the appendix. In the running text, 
references to interviews have been given the following form: Name of interviewee, 
interviewed by author, date of interview, and place of interview. 
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a considerable way, although they appear infrequently in the referring 
footnotes. 
When I have used direct quotes from interviewees in the text, the 
quotations have been approved by the interviewees. The evidence used for 
most parts of this thesis has been in written form and from the time they 
cause concern. The unwillingness to rely more on interviews and oral history 
methods is based on the considerable problems with the reliability of such 
interviews, in particular due to the sketchy reliability of memory and the 
problem of retrospective interpretation. This is, however, not due to the 
specific informants available to this specific project, but a general scepticism 
towards the use of interviews as evidence on my behalf. The interviews 
conducted for this thesis have also played a significant role in identifying 
written sources and provided access to private collections of papers and 
communications. As such, the interplay between interviews and written 
sources has to some extent gone beyond the validation-oriented principle 
stressed above.  
Summing up, the methodology applied aims at reconstructing the 
Chill project through the use of mainly archival sources; it compares the 
directional push to the technology through its life cycle, and validates the 
specifics and general implications through secondary and contemporary data. 
Let me briefly consider the strengths and weaknesses of the archival sources 
in a separate section below. 
 
Sources 
As discussed above, the historical reconstruction is based on an extensive 
use of primary sources. These are sources that embody the technological 
project, such as working documents and plans, and are of a descriptive 
character, or documentation that says something about its originator and 
author, like travel reports and written correspondence between developers 
and users that can in some cases reveal intentions, hopes and values of their 
originator. The two categories of source material have been found in a 
number of different archives and private collections. First, the official 
archive of the ITU has made available the official documentation from the 
Chill project, meaning the working documents from the study group from 
around 1973.103 The ITU material in this period consists of approximately 22 
metres of shelving, and includes material from all working groups active 
during the study periods, but not the final publications. However, only a 
small fraction of this material is relevant for my study. They lack detail, 
because of ITU’s policy of archiving only documents of the official working 
group and the documents submitted to them within a particular timeframe. 
                                                     
103 International Telecommunication Union Archive, Geneva, Switzerland (hereafter 
cited as ITUA). 
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As such, what the ITU termed delayed contributions is not held by the 
archive. Reports on meetings within the working group structure are also 
found within ITU’s journal, the Telecommunication Journal, which has been 
consulted for all periods analysed. Official documents from ITU’s plenary 
assemblies have been examined for the relevant periods and the final 
publications of the Chill recommendation.104 Furthermore, I have also used 
some periodicals relevant to the subject matter. First, the ITU publication, 
the Telecommunication Journal, which was published monthly in Geneva, 
has been looked through for the years 1975 to 1985.105 
Secondly, I have looked into material in the archival holdings of the 
Norwegian Telecommunication Administration (NTA) held at the 
Norwegian National Archive. 106  This includes material held by the 
administrative department of the administration as well as its research 
establishment, the Norwegian Telecom Research (NTR).107 In addition, I 
have studied records from the technical department as well as copybooks and 
journals from the central administration. The NTR coordinated the common 
Nordic efforts in the ITU on Chill, but the archival holdings are sporadic and 
incomplete. Some valuable insights into the administration’s view on 
programming and its importance for future telecommunication networks are 
nevertheless possible to find here. This archive also held invaluable material 
for the later years of my study, in particular regarding efforts to 
commercialise Chill-related products. 
Thirdly, I have enjoyed full access to the private collection of Kristen 
Rekdal, who was the main Norwegian researcher active in the Chill 
development work from 1975 and headed the international standardisation 
work from 1980 to 1984. He started the firm Urd and Kvatro, which 
commercialised some Chill products from 1983.108 This archive amounts to 
roughly three metres of shelving, related to the CCITT project, as well as a 
                                                     
104 Revisions to the original recommendation were issued in 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996 
and 1999. 
105  The Telecommunication Journal was previously called the Journal 
Télégraphique, which had been issued from 1869. The Telecommunication Journal 
was launched in 1933. 
106 Norwegian Telecommunication Administration (Teledirektoratet in Norwegian), 
Norwegian National Archive (Riksarkivet in Norwegian), Oslo (hereafter cited as 
NTA).   
107  The latter is held in the following archive: Norwegian Telecom Research 
(Teledirektoaretet, Televerkets forskningsinstitut in Norwegian, hereby cited as 
NTR), Norwegian National Archives, Oslo. 
108 Private collection of Kristen Rekdal (hereby cited as KRC). The archive is about 
to be handed over to the archive of the Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology, Trondheim. I have named the boxes and binders in full, as they appear 
now, to ease finding the sources in any future reorganization of this collection. 
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supporting project done within Nordtel, an organisation for cooperation 
between telecommunications administrations of Norway, Denmark, Finland, 
Sweden and Iceland. Part of the archive also holds official material from the 
ITU - far more material than is available in the official archives of the ITU. 
The archive also holds several series of travel reports and commentaries 
about the progress of the work, material that has be harnessed to understand 
the ideals, beliefs and plans of its Norwegian originator.  
Fourthly, I have looked briefly into the private collections of two 
Dutch participants in the Chill project, Remi Bourgonjon and Kees 
Smedema.109 In the first case, this helped me complete the series of ITU-
issued material, while in the latter case, internal documents of the Dutch firm 
Philips was made available. Both holdings were fragmentary and of a 
personal nature, and consequently they did not lend themselves to any 
systematic investigation. Information about decisions made within Philips 
and the organisational setting of the participants from Philips in the ITU 
project was obtained through these consultations. For more details about the 
archival sources utilised in this thesis, see the list of sources at the end of the 
thesis. 
Additionally, this thesis makes use of a large number of journal 
papers, conference papers and technical reports to highlight how many 
organisations used and regarded Chill.  In an industry that in this period 
remained fairly closed to outside observers, such sources have proven 
invaluable. In particular, I have looked into the complete proceedings from 
the Software Engineering for Telecommunication Switching Systems 
(SETSS) conferences, from its first incarnation in 1973 and up until 1992. 
Eight conferences with about 30 papers each have been indexed and 
analysed.110 Furthermore, the proceedings of the larger industry meeting of 
the International Switching Symposium (ISS) have been analysed from 1972 
to 1990.111 Another important venue was the Chill conferences, five of which 
were held five times from 1981 to 1990. The papers given at these 
conferences has been analysed in detail and have revealed many details 
about the diffusion and use of Chill in almost all of the organisations that 
                                                     
109 Both Remi Bourgonjon and Kees Smedema live in Heeze in the Netherlands. 
110  The Software Engineering for Telecommunication Switching Systems 
conferences were held in 1973, 1976, 1978, 1981, 1983, 1986, 1989 and 1992. They 
were organised by the Electronics Division of the Institution of Electrical Engineers 
(IEE), which became the Institution of Engineering and Technology in 2006. The 
various SETSS conferences were organised together with various other European 
institutes and associations around Europe and all the proceedings were published by 
the IEE. 
111 In this period, the ISS were held in 1972, 1974, 1976, 1979, 1981, 1984, 1987 
and 1990 at various venues around the world. All the proceedings have been 
published. 
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used the programming language.112 The specific articles that have been used 
are listed in the bibliography while a full article index of the Chill 
conferences, the proceedings of which were not widely circulated, has been 
included as an appendix. 
One weak point in the sources that have been available to me is the 
lack of corporate archives from some of the large telecommunication 
manufacturers that were active in the Chill project. Such archives could have 
strengthened the understanding of the strategic manoeuvring of these firms 
and how that translated into actions within the Chill project. However, parts 
of the source material that have been available to me have gone some way to 
rectify the lack of corporate sources. First of all, by utilising the material 
submitted to the working groups within the ITU, it was possible to get 
information from a much larger set of manufacturing firms than a single 
corporate archive could offer. Secondly, due to the tangled nature of the 
telecommunication industry of the time, material from some manufacturers 
was available in the NTA archives. This does not, however, make up for the 
lack of corporate archives. In some special cases, in particular in the case of 
the multinational ITT and Philips, I have had to rely on interviews and 
conversations with people with a background in the Chill project, and the use 
of private collections of papers, notes and communications. For information 
about the Swedish firm L. M. Ericsson, I have also been able to make use of 
source material from the Nordic Chill compiler project, where Ericsson 
played a minor part. This has also been supplemented by source material 
made available through a large research project on Swedish IT history 
between 1950 and 1980, which has produced a number of transcribed 
witness seminars where former Ericsson employees have been extensively 
interviewed.113 The public availability of these sources has, together with 
systematic study of the technical journal Ericsson Review, been able to 
further my knowledge about what went on in L. M. Ericsson.114 
                                                     
112  The Chill conferences were held in 1981, 1983, 1984, 1986 and 1990. The 
proceedings very not officially published, but have been made available to me 
through the Kristen Rekdal collection, except for the proceedings of the first 
conference in 1981, which I have not been able to allocate.  
113 In particular, the following transcripts of witness seminars have been utilised: Per 
Lundin, "Tidlig programmering : Transkript av ett vittnesseminarium vid Tekniska 
museet i Stockholm den 16 mars 2006", (Stockholm: Filosofi och teknikhistoria, 
2007); Mikael Nilsson, "Staten och kapitalet: Betydelsen av det dynamiska 
samspelet mellan offentligt och privat för det svenska telekomundret : Transkript av 
ett vittnesseminarium vid Tekniska museet i Stockholm den 18 mars 2008", (2008). 
114 The Ericsson Review was published four times a year and contained technical 
articles written in a fairly approachable manner. The journal was first published in 
1923. I have looked at volumes 46 to 76.  
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The lack of corporate archival sources points out what can also be perceived 
as a methodological weakness, namely that the contextualisation of the Chill 
project in general and the approach to organisational strategies in particular 
rely, to a large extent, on secondary sources. When approaching projects 
involving as many organisations and participants as Chill, such problems are 
almost unavoidable. Constraints in time and space make a more detailed 
study of each and every organisation difficult to achieve. In this thesis, the 
main approach has been to use source material that originated between the 
participating organisations, close to the project that is. As such, what is 
studied is strategising as it appeared from below, which is the vantage point 
that this thesis has favoured. Still, I have tried to reconcile this with an 
extensive use of secondary sources, sources that are not only interviews, but 
also the large and extensive historical literature mentioned above. 
 
Outline 
In this introduction, I have presented my subject and research problems, my 
methods and the theoretical orientation of my study. I have also briefly given 
a historiographical overview of relevant research. The rest of the thesis is 
organised as follows. The thesis is organised around three main parts, where 
each part is concerned with one of the three periods in the life cycle of the 
programming language Chill: its emergence, diffusion and demise. 
The second chapter presents the broad technological and 
organisational background of the influence of programming and computing 
in the world of telecommunication administrations and manufacturers. Here, 
I also discuss differences between the two domains and put these into an 
historical perspective, in particular focusing on the years leading up to the 
Chill initiative, from around the mid-1960s. In particular, this chapter 
describes the state of affairs at the very first years of the 1970s, and outlines 
the invention of high-level and real-time programming languages. 
Furthermore, I seek out the first seeds of the communities of technological 
practitioners that shaped Chill, and analyse their institutional boundaries. 
Chapters three and four are concerned with the period of emergence of 
high-level programming languages in telecommunications in general and the 
design of the Chill programming language in particular. This period is 
studied in detail, as decisions on programming language design is sought 
both in the internal dynamics of the international standardisation effort and 
in the external pressure from the participating organisations as well as 
external experts and knowledge communities. Chapter three is focused on 
programming language design, while chapter four focuses on how the 
language was implemented early on, and how this rubbed off on the 
language design. 
Chapter five is an analysis of the early diffusion, use and 
implementation of the programming language Chill in large industrial firms. 
Chapter six focuses on the diffusion among administrations as well as how a 
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community of core language developers and more peripheral industrial users 
tried to influence the future of the programming language during the 1980s. 
Together, these two chapters study the phase where Chill matured into a 
language that was put into real use. 
Chapter seven is concerned with the final diffusion phase and the 
ultimate demise of Chill. Here, I discuss a number of organisational 
alternatives for diffusion, in particular through small start-ups and the 
emergence of independent tool suppliers. I also discuss the way the impetus 
behind the language waned, and how it ultimately disappeared as a 
maintained ITU standard in 1999. Chapter eight presents my conclusions. 
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2. When switches became programs: 
telecommunication and computing, 1965 - 1974 
In late 1974, delegates to the CCITT decided that a special purpose 
programming language for telecommunication switches should be created 
under the auspices of a committee appointed by the organisation. A common 
and internationally standardised programming language was thought to be an 
important way of unifying forces against the towering difficulties 
experienced when programming the very first generations of computer-
controlled telecommunication switches.1 No existing programming language 
fitted the bill drawn up by the members of the CCITT. Not technically, not 
economically, not politically. It was simply not possible to match the ideals 
and expectations that the delegates had of a special purpose programming 
language for telecommunication switching systems.  
Programming language design was a field where the CCITT delegates 
and the employees of telecommunication administration held little 
experience or knowledge. The knowledge of the telecommunication 
manufacturing industry was also limited. 2  Programming a 
telecommunication switch was considerably different to programming a 
general computer, and little knowledge on how to do it existed even within 
the general computer industry.  
The effort of standardising a programming language within the 
CCITT was just one of many ventures into the unknown waters of 
programming language design for telecommunication equipment. In many 
ways, such programming languages became “boundary objects”, spanning 
and mediating the borders of different technological and scientific 
communities and explicating different means of managing the complexity of 
programming telecommunication switches.3  
                                                     
1 In the terminology of telecommunications, this first generation of switches was 
often referred to as Stored Program Controlled (SPC) telephone exchanges. 
2  The first computer-controlled switching system, the AT&T “Number One 
Electronic Switching System” (No. 1 ESS), is described in numerous sources. See 
for example the contemporary description in Bell System Technical Journal 43, no. 
5 (1964). The Bell System Technical Journal is available in its entirety online, see 
http:// bstj.bell-labs.com/ 
3 The concept of “boundary objects” was first used in Susan Leigh Star and James R. 
Griesemer, "Institutional Ecology, 'Translations' and Boundary Objects: Amateurs 
and Professionals in Berkeley's Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907-39", Social 
Studies of Science 19, no. 3 (1989). It has recently been applied in the theoretical 
field of communities of practice. For an example, see Etienne Wenger, Communities 
of practice : learning, meaning, and identity, Learning in doing (Cambridge, U.K. ; 
New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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This chapter sketches out the background of the decision to create a CCITT-
approved programming language for telecommunication switching. It charts 
the waters of designing and governing programming languages in general 
and outlines the challenges and solutions to programming switches sought 
during the first 10 years of computer-controlled switching, up until the 
CCITT decision in the mid-1970s.  
Drawing on the framework established in chapter one, I stress the 
community as an organisational principle for understanding the development 
of programming languages. Consequently, I pay simultaneous attention to 
the social dimension of the community formation and how new knowledge 
was produced within it, the development virtues held by different 
communities, and how the borderlines between the two industrial sectors of 
computing and telecommunications became a zone where virtues clashed 
and new ones were established – virtues that again would influence the 
development of the CCITT-approved programming language.  
 
Programming languages in science and industry 
In the early days of computing, software was not identified as a particular or 
isolated aspect of it. This changed in the late 1950s. As pointed out by the 
historian Paul Ceruzzi, computer programming, and consequently the whole 
software concept, was something contingent and emergent which came to 
the fore around 1959: 
The activity known as computer programming was not foreseen by the pioneers 
of computing. During the 1950s they and their customers slowly realized: first, 
that it existed; second, that it was important; and third, that it was worth the 
effort to build tools to help do it. These tools, combined with the applications 
programs, became collectively known as ‘software,’ a term that first came into 
use around 1959.4  
This realisation was closely related to the emergence of computer use 
outside the laboratory, in industry and businesses. This had two implications: 
New applications of computing meant that programming became an activity 
that translated real-world problems into computable terms. It also meant that 
the programming activity of computers became an activity of the many. This 
caused the birth of a profession of programmers as well as an interest in 
building tools to help the programmers with programming software. In 
particular, this caused an interest in programming languages that could 
bridge real-world problems into computable expressions and constructions. 
These languages became the primary means of managing the complex 
                                                     
4  Paul E. Ceruzzi, A history of modern computing, History of computing 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), 108. 
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process of programming computer systems.   
Initially, programming was a task requiring an understanding of 
obscure machine codes, a language few were to master. To ease the tedious 
and esoteric work of machine code, various types of notations were created, 
which was what we now call programming languages. That gave way to a 
more general notion of high-level computer languages, which implied that 
they were somewhat more readable to a human than to a machine, and that 
there existed a hierarchical system of programming languages, where the 
high-level programming languages were understood as something “above” 
the machine code and the intermediate level of so-called assembly 
languages. The high-level languages’ expressions and constructions 
represented an abstraction of the computer, and were closer to the real-world 
problems than obscure machine codes. The instructions written by a 
programmer in a high-level language could be translated into machine code 
by the computer, by generating (or compiling, in computer lingo) machine 
code based on a careful analysis of what the programmer specified in such a 
high-level language.5 This came, however, at a price: high-level language 
brought inevitable penalties in terms of size and performance of the 
compiled code and could run slowly on limited computing powers. The 
gains were increased programmer productivity, fewer bugs in the compiled 
code and better communication among programmers. Some degrees of 
machine independence of the code could be achieved, as solutions to specific 
computable problems could move more or less freely between specific 
computers. 6  For a casual illustration of the hierarchy of programming 
languages as of the 1960s, see below. 
 
                                                     
5 To be precise, the code could either be compiled or interpreted. Compiled code 
means that the programming language expressions have been translated into “object 
code” that can run on a specific machine. Interpreted code is, on the other hand, 
executed on a step-by-step basis as each statement is translated into object code “on 
the fly” rather than in one batch. On the definitions, see Sammet, Programming 
languages: history and fundamentals, 12. 
6 On the early history of programming languages, see Ibid. 
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Figure 2.1 Programming languages and the levels of abstractions 
 
The design of such high-level programming languages was a heterogeneous 
activity involving people from radically different backgrounds. Different 
agendas were followed when designing programming languages, agendas 
that were rooted in different software development virtues and ideals about 
how programming should be done. Some communities were interested in the 
efficiency of the code, held fast calculations as an ideal and the way 
programming should be done was considered secondary to the code. Others 
were mainly interested in applying mathematical algebra to the task, 
idealising programming as some sort of mathematical activity. As 
programming language design became an activity that attracted people with 
rather different backgrounds, the programming languages became boundary 
objects spun off and shared between communities of technological 
practitioners, scientists and other types of experts. Such a boundary object 
meant different things to different people. At one of the very first discussions 
of the programming language concept, a 1954 conference on programming 
organised by the US Navy, differences in the understanding of what a 
programming language should be were very apparent.7 Most of the papers 
delivered at the conference were concerned with techniques for 
programming specific computers, while a few approached the task with the 
                                                     
7  Mathematical Computing Advisory Panel United States Navy, Symposium on 
automatic programming for digital computers, 13-14 May 1954. (Washington,: U.S. 
Dept. of Commerce, Office of Technical Services, 1955). I was made aware of this 
conference and its illustrative powers in discussions with, and from article drafts by 
Gerard Alberts and David Nofre.  
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aim of liberating the programmer from the specificities of one machine, by 
applying more universal formal notation.  In a paper by Saul Gorn, this was 
spelled out rather explicitly:  
As an alternative to the commercial capture of the computer and data processing 
field by one make of machine, or arbitrary ruling on machine specifications by 
government fiat, one now has the interesting possibility of a common, universal, 
external language arrived at by mutual agreement and persuasion.8 
The solution, to Gorn and to a few other participants, was to root this 
universal language in the language of mathematics.9 Not only that, Gorn 
invoked the tools of mathematics as a way of abstracting away the 
manufacturers’ control over computer machinery. In the following years, 
those two issues, the application of mathematical logic and algebra to 
programming language design and the way of abstracting away the concrete 
machinery through universal language concepts, would form a central part of 
what basically became known as computer science in the USA and 
informatics in many European countries. 10  As the historian Michael 
Mahoney has argued, computer science formed upon an amalgam of a 
number of knowledge fields, such as numerical analysis, algebra, automata 
theory and computational complexity.11 An overreaching issue for computer 
scientists was, regardless of the amalgamate background, to separate the 
issues of software from engineering and to strengthen the understanding of 
programs as mathematical expressions that could be proved right.12 One way 
that academic computer scientists tried to enforce their particular view about 
what should be understood as good programming was through the design of 
programming languages. By injecting a particular logic and vocabulary into 
the most important capital good in programming, one could achieve the aims 
                                                     
8  Saul Gorn, "Planning Universal Semi-Automatic Coding", in Symposium on 
automatic programming for digital computers, 13-14 May 1954. , ed. Mathematical 
Computing Advisory Panel United States Navy (Washington: U.S. Dept. of 
Commerce, Office of Technical Services, 1954), 75. 
9 J. Brown and J. Carr III, "Automatic Programming and its Development on the 
MIDAC", in Symposium on automatic programming for digital computers, 13-14 
May 1954. , ed. Mathematical Computing Advisory Panel United States Navy 
(Washington: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Office of Technical Services, 1954). 
10  On the formation of computer science and informatics, see Paul E. Ceruzzi, 
"Electronics Technology and Computer Science, 1940-1975: A Coevolution", IEEE 
Annals of the History of Computing 10, no. 4 (1989); Mahoney, "Software as 
Science - Science as Software"; Ensmenger, The computer boys take over : 
computers, programmers, and the politics of technical expertise, 111 – 36. 
11 Mahoney, "Software as Science - Science as Software". 
12  On the issue of provability in the history of computing, see MacKenzie, 
Mechanizing proof : computing, risk, and trust. 
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of virtuous programming. However, the formalistic development virtue that 
dominated computer science was an approach that was not shared by most 
working programmers. As historian Nathan Ensmenger has argued, 
computer programming was generally regarded as an undisciplined and 
unscientific activity throughout the 1950s. By the early 1960s, computer 
scientists and professional programmers looked upon each other in a 
mutually suspicious manner. Ensmenger has argued that “computer scientists 
expressed disdain for professional programmers, and professional 
programmers responded by accusing computer science of being overly 
abstract or irrelevant”.13 Consequently, programming languages designed by 
computer scientists would not always be understood as injecting virtuous 
deeds and rules by professional programmers, but rather would be seen as 
impractical and cumbersome. In contrast, programming languages designed 
by industrial researchers were looked upon by equal suspicion by computer 
scientists, who argued they were inconsistent and nothing but short hacks. 
Programming languages were designed by scientists aiming at universality, 
but also by industrial researchers wanting efficient coding for particular 
machines and by local hacks making local machinery more approachable. 
Programming languages were really something that came about in widely 
different ways, with widely different objectives.  
The different approaches to programming languages, and 
programming in general, were reflected in their first popular incarnations. 
The first widely known programming language was Fortran, developed by 
IBM and standardised in 1957. It was soon followed by the first Algol 
version in 1958, which was standardised in 1960.14 Cobol, issued by the US 
Department of Defense followed suit in 1962, developed jointly by a 
committee of European and American scientists.15 While Fortran and Cobol 
succeeded as widely used programming languages, and are still used in some 
quarters, Algol was less successful in practice but became important 
scientifically.16 Of the early languages, the universality and formalistic virtue 
wished for by Gorn, Brown and Carr in 1954 were most evident in the Algol 
programming language, created by high-profile computer scientists like the 
                                                     
13 Ensmenger, The computer boys take over : computers, programmers, and the 
politics of technical expertise, 129. 
14 On Fortran, see IEEE Annals of the History of Computing. vol. 6 (1984). On 
Algol, see David Nofre, "Unraveling Algol: US, Europe, and the Creation of a 
Programming Language", IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 32, no. 2 
(2010). 
15 On Cobol, see IEEE Annals of the History of Computing. vol. 7 (1985). 
16 Mark Priestley has argued that Algol became a paradigmatic example within 
computer science and computer language design, influencing technical and 
organisational decisions throughout the 1960s and the early 1970s. See Priestley, 
"Logic and the development of programming languages, 1930 - 1975". 
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Dutch Edsger W. Dijkstra, the Dane Peter Naur and the American John W. 
Backus.17 With Algol, a transatlantic committee put their heads together to 
create a programming language, independent of any manufacturer, 
documented and specified so that it could be used on a wide variety of 
machinery and mathematical in its form, so that it could express almost any 
computable algorithm. The objectives behind Cobol had some resonance 
with this, as it was deliberately constructed in a way that encouraged 
portability from one type of machine to another, even though the 
implementers struggled to meet this criterion. Cobol was also a deliberate 
effort to make a programming language English-like and readable, in stark 
contrast to the mathematical virtuosity put into Algol. Algol cohort Edsger 
W. Dijkstra even wrote that Cobol “cripples the mind” because of what he 
perceived as its linguistic ugliness and inconsistencies. 18  The different 
perceptions of what constituted good programming and software 
development were obvious: the humanly readable Cobol and the formalism 
of Algol represented different approaches to achieve virtuous programming, 
and would typically appeal to different communities of computing. 
Obviously, other differences between the two approaches existed, like their 
different national and institutional origins, intended application domains and 
the level of commercial and industrial support. These differences were no 
less important than how the languages reflected different approaches to 
programming. For reasons of clarity it is, however, sufficient to argue that 
the basic two-pronged categorisation could be upheld regardless of the 
demarcation criterion, although some reservations about this must be 
maintained.19 
Throughout the 1960s, a whole range of new programming languages 
appeared, some from the halls of computer science, some from the computer 
industry. The development of hundreds, or even thousands, of programming 
languages created a situation comparable to the Tower of Babel: confusion 
caused by a scattering of numerous languages. 20  Once again, calls for 
universality and machine independence appeared, similar to those initial 
concerns in the 1950s. At the end of the 1960s, scientific communities as 
well as the computer industry strived toward the creation of a single, 
                                                     
17 J. Perlis Alan, "The American side of the development of Algol", SIGPLAN Not. 
13, no. 8 (1978); Naur Peter, "The European side of the last phase of the 
development of ALGOL 60", SIGPLAN Not. 13, no. 8 (1978). 
18  Here quoted from Ensmenger, The computer boys take over : computers, 
programmers, and the politics of technical expertise, 100. 
19 In particular, the popular view that Algol and its formalism were particularly 
European has been challenged recently. See Nofre, "Unraveling Algol: US, Europe, 
and the Creation of a Programming Language".  
20 Jean Sammett’s landmark survey from 1969 reviewed or described about 120 
languages. See Sammet, Programming languages: history and fundamentals. 
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powerful, programming language to cater for as wide a range of applications 
as possible, much like a programmer’s lingua franca. IBM’s PL/1 and new 
versions of Algol (Algol 68) were created with this in mind. However, both 
failed to replace the “twin towers” of Fortran and Cobol – universalism 
prevailed by other means than PL/1 and Algol68, but by sheer path 
dependence.21  
Considering systems programming, which involves software that is 
designed to operate the hardware and to provide a platform on which to run 
application software, the situation was somewhat similar. Here, the 
efficiency of the compiled code was of even greater importance, and the idea 
of one particular all-embracing language like PL/1 and Algol 68 was not 
viable. However, the design of languages for system implementation was 
still influenced by the idea of aiming at higher levels of abstraction, and the 
ideal of one systems implementation language that could replace a whole 
slew of others gained support. 
As a result, a hybrid entity of so-called “machine-oriented higher level 
languages” was introduced when the 1960s turned into the 1970s.22 The goal 
was to achieve almost assembler-level performance as well as a high level of 
abstraction. One of the first examples of this was PL/360, created by the 
Swiss computer scientist Niklaus Wirth in 1968. Wirth would later on 
greatly influence the history of programming languages more in general, 
when he created the programming language Pascal. 23  However, PL/360 
would influence the sub-discipline of systems programming language 
design, a field that was also close to the telecommunication industry, which 
also relied on highly efficient code in its systems. 
  
                                                     
21 Ceruzzi, A history of modern computing, 107. 
22  See W. L. van der Poel, L. A. Maarssen, and International Federation for 
Information Processing. Technical Committee 2., Machine oriented higher level 
languages : proceedings of the IFIP Working Conference on Machine Oriented 
Higher Level Languages, Trondheim, Norway, August 27-31, 1973 (Amsterdam; 
New York: North-Holland Pub. Co. ; American Elsevier, 1974). 
23 Niklaus Wirth, "A Brief History of Software Engineering", IEEE Annals of the 
History of Computing 30, no. 3 (2008). 
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Figure 2.2 Machine-oriented higher-level languages 
 
During the early 1970s, the balance between abstraction and performance 
was sought in development along the lines of “machine-oriented higher-level 
languages,” which provided abstract constructs that would easily compile 
into effective machine code. Another important change in the development 
of software and the design of programming languages came about at the end 
of the 1960s, with the emergence of the hotly contested field of software 
engineering. This would also influence programming language design 
throughout the 1970s. 
 
Software engineering 
Programming has always seemed to play catch-up on the advances in 
hardware. The technical, managerial and organisational challenges related to 
programming seemed to be in a constant turmoil, inspiring widespread 
discussions on the roots of the problem. Typically, these discussions would 
be wrapped up in the concept of the software crisis, a term used to describe 
the various troubles with software, as in always being late, over budget and 
below expectations. According to the historian Nathan Ensmenger, the years 
between 1968 and 1972 were a major turning point in the history of 
programming and the understanding of its problems, as “the existence of a 
looming software crisis [was] widely and enthusiastically embraced within 
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the popular and industry literature”. 24  The problems and one proposed 
solution came to a head in 1968, when it was the subject of a Nato-sponsored 
conference held in Garmisch, an event that has taken on almost mythical 
proportions in terms of importance in the literature. 25  The conference 
introduced the term “software crisis” to describe the problems related to the 
fact that software was almost “[…] never produced on time, never meets 
specification, and always exceeds its estimated cost”. 26  Secondly, the 
conference proposed a cure. The term “software engineering” was brought 
up and according to the organisers it implied “the need for software 
manufacture to be based on the types of theoretical foundations and practical 
disciplines that are traditional in the established branches of engineering”.27 
Various interpretations of what this software engineering concept should 
consist of and which established engineering concepts it should be based on 
have been a dominant strand in debates in the software field ever since.28  
The very conference was, at least to some of its participants, a 
continuation of the early Algol effort. One of the organisers was Friedrich L. 
Bauer, which had held a prominent position in the Algol programming 
language effort. To Bauer and his compatriots at the Nato conference, the 
solution to the software crisis was closely aligned with the mathematical 
discipline they had strived for in programming language design. They 
basically moved the formalistic development virtue from the scientific 
approach of designing programming languages to a similar approach to the 
art of creating software.  
                                                     
24 Ensmenger, The computer boys take over : computers, programmers, and the 
politics of technical expertise, 195. 
25 Over the years, this conference has been used in a number of historical accounts. 
In particular, see Donald MacKenzie, "A View from the Sonnenbichl: On the 
Historical Sociology of Software and System Dependendability", in History of 
Computing: Software Issues, ed. Reinhard Keil-Salwik Ulf Hashagen, Arthur L. 
Norberg (Berlin: Springer, 2002); MacKenzie, Mechanizing proof : computing, risk, 
and trust; Mahoney, "Software as Science - Science as Software"; ———, "Finding 
a history for software engineering". See also the proceedings of the conference, 
"Software Engineering", (Garmisch, Germany, 7 - 11 October 1968). 
26  The discussions about the terminology are reported in the proceedings, see 
"Software Engineering", 119 - 25. 
27 Ibid., 13. 
28 Michael S. Mahoney’s search for a history of software engineering is made along 
the lines drawn up at the Garmisch conference. He looks at how various competing 
agendas for the emerging software engineering profession were essentially tied in 
with managerial, social and political ideals and furthermore, how these were tied in 
with models of other engineering professions. According to Mahoney, mechanical 
engineering, applied science and industrial engineering were evoked to shape 
software engineering. See Mahoney, "Finding a history for software engineering". 
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Another important contribution of the Nato conference was an increased 
attention to concepts that could facilitate modularisation in the software 
development process, ranging from structured programming approaches to 
modularisation techniques. Modular techniques in software development 
meant that one piece of programming code could be written with little 
knowledge of the code in another module, and secondly, techniques that 
allowed “[…] modules to be reassembled and replaced without reassembly 
of the whole system”.29 Finding solutions to the dilemma of “mathematical 
rigor for small programs against the intractability of large programs” were 
high on the agenda.30 Whereas the rigour that Bauer, Dijkstra and their likes 
idealised was tractable when approaching small programs, it was all the 
more difficult to achieve when working on large and complex systems. 
Nevertheless, “mathematical rigour” was still the guiding principle for a 
large community of technical and scientific experts interested in 
programming.  
This would soon feed back into the subject of programming language 
design, making the development virtue go full circle. While the issue of 
abstractions was prominent in the 1960s, concepts for facilitating 
modularisation in programming language design were actively sought in the 
1970s, following up the issues at hand when building the software 
engineering discipline. 31  As such, it was no coincidence when Jack B. 
Dennis of MIT lectured on modularity in an advanced course in software 
engineering in the winter of 1972 – and that one of the issues that he 
approached was how existing programming languages lacked facilities for 
“proper” modularisation.32  The advanced course was a follow up of the 
Nato-sponsored events of the late 1960s, and organised by Friedrich L. 
Bauer, the chairman of the 1968 conference at Garmisch. 33  As such, 
Dennis’s concern with modularity tied in with Bauer’s prior interest in 
structured programming and mathematical virtuosity – and how this should 
be tied in with programming language design and software engineering.34  
According to a recent study on the relationship between software 
engineering and programming language research by Barbara G. Ryder, Mary 
Lou Soffa and Margaret Burnett, “Software engineering research and 
                                                     
29 David Lorge Parnas, "On the Criteria To Be Used in Decomposing Systems into 
Modules", Commun. ACM 15, no. 12 (1972): 1053. 
30 Wirth, "A Brief History of Software Engineering". 
31 Ibid. 
32 Jack B. Dennis, "Modularity", in Advanced Course on Software Engineering, ed. 
F. L. Bauer (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1973). 
33 The lectures are compiled in F. L. Bauer, ed. Advanced Course on Software 
Engineering, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems (Berlin: 
Springer-Verlag,1973). 
34 Dennis, "Modularity". 
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programming language design have enjoyed a symbiotic relationship, with 
traceable impacts since the 1970s, when these areas were first distinguished 
from one another.” 35  This symbiotic relationship was found to have 
influenced several major features of modern programming languages, like 
data abstractions and modularity concepts. This relationship first 
necessitated a separation of the two fields, a separation the study traces to 
the early 1970s and the advent of two separate conferences: the first 
Symposia on Principles of Programming Languages, held in 1973, and the 
first International Conference on Software Engineering, held in 1975. 
Summing up, two particular concerns dominated the early discussions 
and developments within computer science and the computer industry when 
entering the 1970s: abstractions and modularisation. While the first concern 
was evident in high-level languages that appeared in the late 1950s, the latter 
emerged as a greater concern during the 1970s. The former was mainly 
related to the move from scientific computing towards real world 
applications that took place during the 1960s. The latter was related to the 
influence of the emerging software engineering discipline, as indicated and 
initiated at the Garmisch conference. Both changes were shaped by technical 
communities that valued the mathematical development virtue, in particular 
the participants in the community of computer scientists.  
 
Programming switches  
In May 1965, after seven years of intensive research and development, the 
American AT&T introduced the very first software-controlled computer in 
telecommunication switching by putting their “Number One Electronic 
Switching System” (No. 1 ESS) into service.36 By 1975, over 800 switching 
systems controlled by electronic computers were in operation worldwide, 
and numerous telecommunication administrations were planning on 
introducing computer-controlled switching in their networks over the next 
few years.37  During this 10-year period large electromechanical switches 
were being replaced by switches that, essentially, were software programs – 
switches became programs. The production and development of this 
equipment was very different to the way electromechanical switches were 
put together. Balls of wires were increasingly replaced by loops of 
programming code at the development and production facilities of many a 
                                                     
35 Ryder, Soffa, and Burnett, "The Impact of Software Engineering Research on 
Modern Programming Languages": 431. 
36 No. 1 ESS is analysed in numerous sources. See for example the articles in Bell 
System Technical Journal, 43:5, September 1964. The Bell System Technical 
Journal is available in its entirety online. See http:// bstj.bell-labs.com/ 
37 Hills and Kano, Programming electronic switching systems - real-time aspects 
and their language implications. 
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telecommunication manufacturer, and computer programmers were hired at 
a great rate. 
This was a radical technological change where software were 
introduced into the very centre of telecommunication, as switches and 
exchanges are the hubs in the communication networks, connecting 
telephone calls and providing the transfer of speech from one phone to 
another. By introducing computer-controlled switching and later digital 
transmission of speech and communication into the networks, the efficiency 
and potentiality of network operations increased dramatically.  
Computer-controlled switching systems evolved considerably in the 
10 years between the first public uses of the technique in 1965. By the mid-
1970s, AT&T was rolling out their fourth incarnation of their ESS series. 
Challengers like L. M. Ericsson, ITT, Siemens, Northern Telecom, NTT and 
Philips were all steaming ahead developing their own computerised switches 
on a large scale by this time, and only a few years later, fully digital 
switching saw the light of day.38  
Programming a telecommunication switch was considerably different 
to programming applications for a general computer. The general 
development of programming languages, towards higher levels of 
abstraction and concepts that would facilitate higher degrees of modularity 
was not immediately of use to those grappling with the very first computer-
controlled switches in the late 1960s. It was strongly believed that the trade 
off between machine performance and coding efficiency was too great when 
using general high-level languages.  
However, other objectives valued in telecommunications were more 
compatible with high-level languages, in particular the idea that high-level 
languages could foster more reliable programming. If there was one common 
ideal in telecommunications, it was the idea of the telecommunication 
system as critical, needing high reliability and availability. While operations 
of a general computer may be stopped without any serious consequences, 
telecommunication systems relied on “service continuity”, meaning that few 
interruptions were tolerated.39 The standard applied for telecommunication 
systems at the time was that a two-hour break in the operation of an 
exchange was tolerated during its expected 40 years of service, something 
                                                     
38 Chapuis and Joel, Electronics, computers and telephone switching: 1960-1985, 
283-90. 
39 The difference between general computing and computing in switching systems 
was already highlighted in the first description of the pioneering No. 1 ESS by the 
AT&T. See W. Keister, R. W. Ketchledge, and H. E. Vaughan, "No. 1 ESS: System 
Organization and Objectives", Bell System technical Journal 43, no. 5 (1964). 
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completely different to the fast changing world of computing. 40  These 
availability standards would necessitate extremely reliable software, which 
again was understood as a good reason to use high-level languages and 
software engineering practices. 
Both concerns, the low efficiency of code from high-level 
programming languages and the higher reliability of coding done with high-
level languages opened up for a new hybrid or boundary object, so-called 
machine-oriented languages and even more specifically, telecommunication-
oriented languages. 41  Both were touted as the solution to the mounting 
programming troubles at telecommunication manufacturers related to the 
development of software. The main idea was to combine the general 
knowledge of high-level programming languages and the reliability it could 
enforce with that of efficient utilisation of computing resources that lower 
level coding could provide. 
The problem associated with programming large telecommunication 
switches attracted telecommunication engineers, computer scientists and 
computer programmers, many of them interested in designing these specific 
programming languages. These people formed a distinct community of 
technological practitioners in the cracks between engineering and science, 
telecommunications and computing. From the late 1960s, this community 
gathered around organisational novelties like conferences on “Software 
Engineering for Telecommunication Switching Systems”, which were first 
held in 1973 (SETSS), and within tracks in already established channels, like 
the International Switching Symposium, and eventually within the technical 
wing of the ITU.42  
Up until the mid-1970s, the programming of computer-controlled 
systems was, with few exceptions, done with assembly-level languages, but 
the development of machine-oriented and telecommunication-oriented 
languages was in the making. This could look like a local tower of Babel: in 
a widely read survey conducted by M. T. Hills at the University of Essex and 
S. Kano from the Japanese NTT (the Japanese telecommunication 
administration) in 1975, 25 different programming languages were 
considered suitable for programming switching systems, and several 
                                                     
40 Chapuis and Joel, Electronics, computers and telephone switching: 1960-1985, 
262. 
41 See, for example, the Poel, Maarssen, and International Federation for Information 
Processing. Technical Committee 2., Machine oriented higher level languages : 
proceedings of the IFIP Working Conference on Machine Oriented Higher Level 
Languages, Trondheim, Norway, August 27-31, 1973. 
42  See, for example, the proceedings of the first SETSS conference: "Software 
Engineering for Telecommunication Switching Systems", (Stevenage, 2 - 5 April 
1973). 
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machine-oriented, real-time and specifically telecommunication-oriented 
languages were analysed in detail. 43  
In the Bell System, assembly languages were used up until the more 
evolved EPL programming language was introduced when the fourth 
incarnation of their ESS switches was developed. 44  The Canadian Bell 
Northern used their own Protel programming language for the DMS family 
of switches. In France, the research institute CNET (the French National 
Center for Telecommunication Research) had created Pape (also named 
LP2), a programming language that was used for most exchanges created by 
various French manufacturers. Pape was tailor-made for programming 
telecommunication equipment, as part of what was to become a future 
Alcatel switching system.45 
The Swedish company L. M. Ericsson had created their own 
programming language Plex, which was used throughout the 1970s and 
1980s in their Axe series of switches.46 In Japan, the administration NTT had 
developed a programming language called DPL, which was used to program 
early computerised switches produced by NTT’s preferred manufacturers 
NEC, Hitachi, Oki and Fujitsu.47 Finally, the European companies in the ITT 
conglomerate used a programming language called ESPL/1, which in some 
respects looked like IBM’s PL/1 language. All of the manufacturers 
augmented their programming language with the possibility of inserting 
assembly and machine code, and was as such not a complete replacement of 
their old ways. 
                                                     
43 A survey of this is given in Hills and Kano, Programming electronic switching 
systems - real-time aspects and their language implications. 
44 Later on, the programming language C became the standard when programming 
telecommunication equipment in the Bell system. For an overview, see Chapuis and 
Joel, Electronics, computers and telephone switching: 1960-1985, 283-89. 
45 M. Martin, "Utilization of the high level language Pape for the E12 siwtching 
system software", in Third International Conference on Software Engineering for 
telecommunciation Switching Systems (Helsinki, Finland: Institution of Electrical 
Engineers, 1978). 
46 Plex is described in Göran Hemdal, "AXE 10 - Software Structure and Features", 
Ericsson Review 53, no. 2 (1976). On Axe, see also Mats Fridlund, "Switching 
Relations and Trajectories: The Development Procurement of the Swedish AXE 
Switching Technology", in Public Technology Procurement and Innovation, ed. 
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Technology and Innovation (Norwell, Mass.: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999). 
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of the Institution of Electrical Engineers, 1979). 
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Did these early examples of firm-specific programming languages bear any 
resemblance to programming languages that originated in computer science? 
Technical inspiration from computer science in terms of generalities was 
obvious in most of these languages. For example, IBM’s PL/1 programming 
language was a main source of inspiration, in particular at firms like the ITT 
and the NTT.48 Furthermore, in terms of governance, all these programming 
languages were considered the property of the telecommunication firms, in 
contrast to the commons approach typical to many computer science 
programming languages.49 
 
Interfaces and interaction 
Up until the late 1960s, little interaction existed between those interested in 
telecommunication and those concerned with general computer systems. 
They were parallel worlds, separated by high walls, technologically, 
culturally and organisationally. By the early 1970s, this changed, as more 
manufacturers developed computer-controlled switching systems and 
computer networks and interactive systems became of great interest to the 
computer specialists.  
Furthermore, a new “family” of programming languages specialised 
for the use in telecommunications appeared, facilitating interactions between 
communities interested in programming language design and those working 
on switching systems. The challenges of programming telecommunication 
switches attracted various groups and communities, and interfaces between 
established communities of computer practitioners and telecommunication 
engineers emerged gradually.  
The Nato conferences on software engineering offers a glimpse of the 
complex composition of the international computer and software community 
at that time, and more implicitly a way to understand the interactions (or the 
lack of such) with the international telecommunication community and 
industry.50 As the editors of the conference report made clear, the Garmisch 
conference was special in the way it gathered both practitioners and 
academics: 
  
                                                     
48 See for example the various contributions of the NTT and the ITT to the CCITT 
organised Team of Experts, detailed out in chapter three in this thesis. 
49 Algol is the most obvious example. 
50  "Software Engineering"; "Software Engineering Techniques", (Rome, 27 - 31 
October 1969). 
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The Garmisch conference was notable for the range of interests and experience 
represented amongst its participants. In fact the complete spectrum, from the 
inhabitants of ivory-towered academe to people who were right on the firing line, 
being involved in the direction of really large scale software projects, was well 
covered.51 
However, none of the groups was homogenous. Some represented large 
computer firms such as IBM, while others general electronics firms like 
AEG. This was more obvious at the 1969 conference, where companies such 
as Boeing, Siemens and General Electric also were present.52 The conference 
was an invitation-only meeting, gathered together by the main organisers’ of 
the event, the German computer scientist Fritz Bauer, H. J. Helms, a Danish 
member of Nato’s science department, and the French computer scientist 
Louis Bolliet.53  Few participants from the established telecommunication 
industry were present at both conferences. At the meetings in Garmisch and 
in Rome, representatives of the American Bell Telephone Laboratories were 
participating, but that was about it for the communication industry.54 As Bell 
was the pioneering firm in terms of computer-controlled switching systems, 
with the introduction of the computer-controlled Number 1 Electronic 
Switching System (No. 1 ESS) in 1965, their participation was no surprise.55 
At the 1968 conference, the software development of Bell’s No. 1 ESS was 
presented as an example of the particular difficulties faced when 
programming large, complex and real-time systems.56  
While the two Nato-sponsored conferences are considered watershed 
events within the history of software, no similar event has a similar status 
within the history of telecommunications. Two examples still illustrate its 
emergence. In 1966, the very first International Switching Symposium (ISS) 
in Paris was marked by the appearance of the first lectures on software used 
                                                     
51 "Software Engineering", 7. 
52 It should be noted that General Electric was at the time one of the major computer 
manufacturers as well as part of the general electric industry. See for example H.R. 
Oldfield, "General Electric enters the computer business-revisited", IEEE Annals of 
the History of Computing 17, no. 4 (1995). 
53  The information on the organizing of the Garmisch conference is found in 
MacKenzie, Mechanizing proof : computing, risk, and trust, 34 - 35. 
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55 At the 1968 Garmisch conference, Dr. E. E. David, Dr. M. D. McIllroy and Mr. J. 
A. Harr from Bell Labs participated. At the 1969 Rome conference, Dr. W. S. 
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for programming telecommunication switches. 57  A large conference 
arranged by the Institution of Electrical Engineers (IEE, a British 
professional organisation, now a part of the Institution of Engineering and 
Technology (IET)) on switching techniques for telecommunication networks 
was held in London in 1969, which also included presentations about 
software-specific problems when creating computer-controlled switching 
systems.58 
While a large number of computer scientists at various academic and 
research institutions were present at the Nato-sponsored conferences on 
software engineering, the IEE conference on switching drew participants 
almost exclusively from industry and various telecommunication 
administrations-run organisations. 59  The issues discussed, however, had 
some overlap with those at the software engineering conferences. One 
example was one session devoted to various aspects of Bell’s No. 1 ESS.60 
One paper touched on the very essence on the software crisis, but within a 
telecommunications project. The problems associated with delivering the 
software necessary for the pioneering ESS system on time and according to 
expectations were presented in some detail in a paper by E. Earle Vaughan.61 
Another mutual concern was discussed in a session on “Control and 
Software”, 62  where two of the papers were discussing programming 
techniques and languages in a telecommunication context.63 In this session, 
one of the few academia-affiliated participants was to be found: M. T. Hills 
and H. Constantine from the University of Essex, which was an important 
academic partner to the British telecommunication administration at the time 
and would organise special conferences about software in 
telecommunication systems.  
These two conferences marked the beginning of a period where 
software rose in importance for both administrations and manufacturers. 
Four years later, this was all the more obvious, as the IEE considered 
software engineering for telecommunications systems worthy of a 
conference on its own: Software Engineering for Telecommunication 
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59 While the reports from the Nato software engineering conferences offer lists of 
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60 Eight papers were presented. See Ibid., 447 – 75. 
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Switching Systems (SETSS) was held for the first time in 1973 at the 
University of Essex, with 64 authors presenting 36 papers, all on different 
aspects of software in telecommunications. 64  This change illustrates the 
growing importance and interest in software in the telecommunication 
industries, as well as how this coincides with the maturation of computer 
science and emergence of software engineering. 
SETSS was not the only intersection or contact zone for interaction 
between software and communications. A parallel arena for discussion, 
knowledge sharing and creation on software systems similar to those 
employed in telecommunications, grew out of the programming language 
community within the International Federation for Information Processing 
(IFIP), which was set up under the auspices of UNESCO in 1960.65  A 
conference on so-called machine-oriented languages was held in the 
Norwegian city of Trondheim in 1973, which proved to be the starting point 
of a particular working group within IFIP working on machine-oriented 
higher-level languages, the 2.4 working group.66 This is the subject of the 
next section. 
 
Closer to the machine 
Contact zones like transnational working groups or international conferences 
do not appear by themselves. Sometimes they emerge due to the mobility of 
people. The 1973 conference on machine-oriented higher-level languages 
and the IFIP 2.4 working group can be attributed to one such move: in the 
winter of 1970, the American Mark Rain arrived in Trondheim, Norway.67 
Previously, he had worked as a programmer at the American computer 
manufacturer Burroughs, a company particularly known for using a 
particular subset of Algol as their main programming language. In 1970, 
Rain got a position at Sintef, the foundation of scientific and industrial 
research at the Norwegian Institute of Technology (today named NTNU, the 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology), where he started 
working on the design of a machine-oriented language, later to be named 
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67 The following details are found in the transcriptions of a panel session at the IFIP 
conference. See Ibid., 400 - 01. 
58 
  
Mary. 68  According to Rain, his interest in this had already begun at 
Burroughs, but it was still very much an undefined field with only some 
vague predecessors: 
At the time when I came to Norway and started with the MARY project, in the 
winter of 1970, PL/360 had been published. There were rumours that there were 
a language called PASCAL but I could not find any reference to it. BLISS had 
just been published, and there was some interest in what I am calling machine-
oriented languages, certainly it was nebulous and no one knew what was going 
on or how.69 
By 1972, Rain had set up a printed bulletin, which drew more than 500 
subscribers around the world. By 1973, the nebulous conditions would drift 
away and clarity would swathe the field at the conference on so-called 
machine-oriented languages, held in Trondheim. According to Rain, it 
seemed that “we have tapped off a running wave that nobody really knew 
existed”.70 The running wave was partly formed around problems related to 
how one could programme efficient code, yet still retain the readability of 
high-level programming languages. At first, such an intersection between 
machine orientation and machine independence seemed to be quite 
impossible. However, and this would become the premise for the future 
interest in machine-oriented higher level languages, certain machine-
independent tasks could be approached in a machine-oriented manner, 
reaching the machine a little better than what was deemed possible in high-
level languages of the ordinary kind. The interest was, consequently, to 
figure out whether these tasks could be programmed close to the machine, by 
applying general principles. If so, one could approach the problem of 
systems programming in a more or less machine-independent way.  
To many of the participants at the 1973 conference, these aims were 
coupled with the question of so-called “portability”, which implies that a 
machine-oriented language should “make possible transportation of 
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programs between different machines and diverse configuration of the same 
machine”. 71  This ideal of portability was very much the same that was 
brought into the Algol effort, which basically was to free software from the 
machine. However, when considering systems implementation, which was 
the most obvious target for the use of such machine-oriented languages, the 
problems were far greater then when considering the portability of other 
types of applications.  
The Trondheim conference in 1973 was dominated by academia, but 
nevertheless drew participants from various large computer companies. 
Indeed, even a separate panel discussion on the industry’s views of “the 
MOL [Machine-Oriented Languages]-problem” were arranged with 
discussants from Xerox, Univac, IBM and the small Swedish computer 
manufacturer SAAB Scandia.72 To the academically oriented participants, 
great interest was shown in how to combine the insights won through 
computer science with the question of providing portability at a level close 
to the machine.  
To the participants from the industry, the ideals that were upheld by 
the academic participants at the conference were not in line with their own 
priorities: Troost, a manager at the American computer manufacturer Univac 
and head of their internal programming language developments, was 
particularly harsh in his condemnation of the academics’ interests: “What I 
have heard you talk about are toys, not tools.”73 To Troost, the issues of 
portability were of little interest. “The points that other people have stressed 
as of high interest frequently have a low interest for us. […] Portability is 
nice, but again it is not that important. From our point of view, the most 
important thing is the ease of maintenance.”74 The maintenance question 
would greatly divide the approaches found within academically oriented 
researchers and those working within industrial firms, as all the panellists in 
the industry panel agreed that their systems programming language would be 
an in-house language, and not released to a wider community, mainly 
because of the fear of costs related to the maintenance of a programming 
language.75 
Was the telecommunication community as alienated from the 
scientific computing field as the computer manufacturers represented at the 
                                                     
71 See William A. Wulf’s introduction in Ibid., 7-18. 
72 SAAB Scandia was better known as a car and bus manufacturer. 
73  Poel, Maarssen, and International Federation for Information Processing. 
Technical Committee 2., Machine oriented higher level languages : proceedings of 
the IFIP Working Conference on Machine Oriented Higher Level Languages, 
Trondheim, Norway, August 27-31, 1973, 212 - 13. 
74 Ibid., 213. 
75 Ibid., 216 - 17. 
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IFIP conference? None of the presented papers at the IFIP conference dealt 
with the particularities in programming telecommunication switching 
systems. However, before Mark Rain participated and helped organise the 
IFIP conference in Trondheim, he participated in the aforementioned SETSS 
conference. While Rain was a typical participator at the IFIP conference, he 
was one of the few academics at SETTS.  
Nevertheless, Rain presented Mary to an audience where it would 
seem tailor-made, as it was a machine-oriented language with a goal of 
portability – which greatly could enhance the possibility to move software 
from one switching system to another. To Rain, that would make it a viable 
alternative to a series of both high-level languages and macro-languages 
used in a wide range of switching systems. Did it resonate? Programming 
languages, administration and maintenance of software are some examples 
of the issues dealt with at the conference, and the problem Rain was 
concerned with was both explicitly and implicitly discussed in numerous 
papers.76 One issue that dominated was that of programming languages, and 
in particular the challenges in using high-level languages in an application 
area where performance and reliability were of the essence. Out of 36 
presentations, 14 papers dealt with language specific problems. And out of 
these, nine papers discussed explicitly the use of either high-level or 
machine-oriented higher-level languages in the setting of telecommunication 
switching. Rain was in all likelihood one of the few attendees using the 
vocabulary of machine-oriented languages, a vocabulary frequently used at 
the IFIP conference. However, it was clear that programming switching 
systems was believed too special, that it had other characteristics than that of 
regular programming.  
The special needs when programming telecommunication equipment 
were not without precedence. Telecommunications shared this in-between 
role with a number of industries concerned with real-time issues, like those 
involved with computer control of industrial processes and machinery. 
Programming languages that combined the machine-oriented features with 
parallel constructs were first made in the process-control area, pioneering the 
move discussed at the Trondheim conference. Well-known examples were 
the programming languages Pearl and Coral66. 77  The communities of 
technological practitioners interested in the intersection between real-time 
process control and programming language design had a similar international 
footing as those discussed above, and in some respect they shared the same 
arenas. The international discussions on these issues took place primarily 
within the International Federation of Automatic Control (IFAC) and in 
                                                     
76 "Software Engineering for Telecommunication Switching Systems". 
77 All three are mentioned in Hills and Kano, Programming electronic switching 
systems - real-time aspects and their language implications. 
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conjunction with the above-mentioned IFIP. 78  Quite early on, the 
communities involved in real-time programming languages oriented 
themselves towards the possibility of international standardisation, as 
evident from the first international conference on programming languages 
for machine tools, Prolamat for short, which was held in Rome in 1969. The 
standardisation efforts were first done through the accommodation of 
existing high-level languages like Fortran, and later on through concerted 
efforts towards the development of a so-called Long Term Procedural 
Language (LTPL), which sprang out of the European branch of the 
International Purdue Workshop in the early 1970s.79 Also the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) was involved in the quest for a 
programming language for machine tools, already from the late 1960s.80 
Also here, the development of specialised and standardised programming 
languages was seen as a remedy for the mounting problems with software. 
Theodore J. Williams of the Purdue Laboratory for Applied Industrial 
Control argued in the early 1970s that: 
                                                     
78 Examples are the joint IFAC and IFIP workshops on real-time programming and 
programming languages for numerical control. See for example William Henderson 
Paterson Leslie, "Numerical control programming languages: proceedings of the 1st 
International IFIP/IFAC PROLAMAT Conference, Rome 1969" (Amsterdam, 
1970); J. Hatvany, "Computer languages for numerical control: proceedings of the 
Second IFIP/IFAC International Conference on Programming Languages for 
Machine Tools, PROLAMAT '73,Budapest, April 10-13, 1973" (Amsterdam, 1973); 
P. D. Griem, "Real time programming 1975: proceedings of the IFAC/IFIP 
Workshop Boston/Cambridge, Mass" (Oxford, 1976); C. H. Smedema, "Real time 
programming, 1977: proceedings of the IFAC/IFIP Workshop, Eindhoven, 
Netherlands, 20-22 June 1977" (Oxford, c1978). The history of IFAC is dealt with in 
Christopher Bissell, "Control in the technical societies: a brief history.", 
Measurement and Control 43, no. 7 (2010). 
79 The LTPL effort is briefly mentioned in Whitaker, "Ada—the project: the DoD 
high order language working group". See also M. Kronental et al., "The LTPL-E 
tasking proposals", Software: Practice and Experience 11, no. 1 (1981). 
80 Werner B. Mangold, "N/C Language Standardization in I.S.O", in The Second 
IFIP/IFAC International Conference on Programming Languages for Machine 
Tools, PROLAMAT '73, ed. J. Hatvany (Budapest: North-Holland Publishing 
Company, 1973). 
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Misjudgements by project personnel concerning project software requirements 
and capabilities have resulted in a high percentage of late and incomplete 
computer process control projects. By easing programming requirements through 
the promotion of use of special high level languages and specific program 
packages, programming standardization activities promise to greatly ease the 
above mentioned difficulties.81 
Many of the efforts in process control and machine tools programming 
would later on be conflated with the already mentioned large-scale effort 
towards standardising the programming language Ada. 82  Where the 
standardisation of programming languages for process control systems was 
first made within a quite heterogeneous institutional framework, the IFAC 
was a free-standing international body, the Purdue workshop was a 
voluntarily organised interest group spun off from a university seminar and 
the industrial real-time Fortran standard was issued by the Instrument 
Society of America (ISA), the move towards a standardised programming 
language in telecommunication involved a rather different kind of authority. 
To gain momentum in the world of telecommunication, the technical 
community interested in programming languages for these systems would 
have to be aligned with the interests of the international telecommunication 
regime. This is the subject of the next few pages. 
 
Computing and the international telecommunication regime 
At the first International Switching Symposium (ISS) in 1966, some of the 
first lectures on software used for programming telecommunication switches 
were presented. ISS was the first intersection between telecommunications 
and software. At the same venue, the idea of involving the technical flank of 
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in studies on this new 
subject was launched during informal talks.83 This meant that the nascent 
field was considered important to the main organisation in the international 
telecommunication regime, and something that the organisation could 
spearhead. 
By the 1970s, the ITU was often mentioned as an organisation 
unlikely to be spearheading anything. ITU’s standards were increasingly 
                                                     
81 Theodore J. Williams, "CAM and NC Software Systems: Needs for and Benefits 
From Generalized and Multi-Industry Standardized Languages", in The Second 
IFIP/IFAC International Conference on Programming Languages for Machine 
Tools, PROLAMAT '73, ed. J. Hatvany (Budapest: North-Holland Publishing 
Company, 1973), 1. 
82 See Kronental et al., "The LTPL-E tasking proposals". 
83 Chapuis and Joel, Electronics, computers and telephone switching: 1960-1985, 
265. 
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looking like “hybrid monsters,” to use an expression by Raymond Croze, 
director of the CCITT from 1972.84 The standards were considered bloated, 
inconsistent and often arriving too late to make a difference. As digital 
technology and techniques became more and more applicable in the world of 
telecommunications in the late 1960s, this tendency could be argued to be all 
the more visible. While the international computing community was 
discussing the evolution towards high-level programming languages and the 
formation of the discipline of software engineering, the ITU was discussing 
telex tariffs. To be fair, the digital era was gradually making its mark on the 
ITU from around 1968, as both digital signalling systems and data 
communication protocols were part of the technical discussions and 
workings of the CCITT. 85  However, the general impression was of an 
organisation with considerable difficulties in adjusting to the new realities of 
digital communications. 
What were the people interested in programming languages for 
telecommunication systems getting themselves into if they were to tag along 
with the CCITT? Was it the start of a technocratic exercise in technical 
collaboration or the start of a process to forge the newly won academic and 
industrial interest in systems implementation languages, so called “machine 
oriented higher level languages”, into a tool for what could be understood as 
a telecommunication cartel? 
Programming was a very different subject from those traditionally 
covered by CCITT. For a time, there was even doubt to whether the ruling 
authority of the CCITT, that is its Plenary Assembly, would allow a move 
that far off the regular path. From 1968, a study group within the CCITT was 
given the task to report on, among other things, programming languages. 
The suggestion came from the Swedish telecommunication administration, 
Televerket. Here, it was seen as important that in the future, the 
administration could move programs freely between switches made by 
different manufacturers. In short, they wanted portability. A common 
programming language was envisioned as an important tool to achieve this.86 
This coincided with a general proactive approach to international 
standardisation by the Swedish telecommunication administration, in 
                                                     
84 Raymond Croze used this term on a large number of CCITT recommendations in 
a speech made to the CCITT Plenary Assembly, the same event where he used the J. 
G. Thompson article referenced above. See “Minutes of the Plenary Meetings,” 
CCITT Plenary Assembly 6 Orange Book Vol. I - IV 1976, 23, CCITT, ITUA. 
85 A short summary of this is found in Chapuis and Joel, Electronics, computers and 
telephone switching: 1960-1985. 
86  The background for the Swedish proposal is described in Bertil Forss,  in 
Autobiographies, “From Computing Machines to IT” (Stockholm: National 
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particular by its technical director Gösta Lindberg, who together with Bertill 
Forss was directly responsible for raising the issue of programming 
languages at the CCITT in 1968.87 Chapuis and Joel, two close observers of 
the process, have described it as follows: 
First, its regularly attending delegation of faithful experts had to make room for 
newcomers, experts in the new discipline of software. This took some time. It is 
thus hardly surprising if the 1968 – 1972 period was little more than exploration 
since the CCITT was venturing into virtually unknown waters.88 
After a period in these unknown waters, the organisation considered moving 
more actively into the area of programming languages. At the 1974 
International Switching Symposium, held in Munich, the chairman of 
CCITT’s 11th study group, Mr. J. S. Ryan, commented on what were 
perceived as a new role for the CCITT: 
In the past, the International Consultative Committee for Telegraph and 
Telephone (CCITT) has made only minimal recommendations concerning 
international switching systems, and very few concerning national signalling and 
switching systems. […] is this minimal role in signalling and switching adequate 
in the future? […] It is obvious that the switching engineer whether he is 
designing international or local exchanges and signalling systems will be directly 
affected by CCITT Recommendations more in the future than in the past. The 
question that has been raised is just how far the CCITT can or should go in 
making Recommendations for national systems and at what point in time.89 
With the advent of a programming language not only approved by the 
CCITT, but also created within its ranks, it was obvious that the purpose was 
to penetrate quite deeply into the switching systems inner workings. In fact, 
by creating a CCITT recommendation on a programming language, the 
impression was immediately that telecommunication administrations could 
impose this tool on manufacturing firms. This caused tensions, which were 
both an obstacle towards a functional language definition, as well as a 
necessary frictional element towards a forward-looking language.  
While the picture Cowhey paints of the ITU was one where the 
interests of telecommunication administrations and the many nationally 
                                                     
87  Lindberg also initiated the Nordic participation in Chill as well as the 
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limited manufacturers were in harmony, this was not always the case.90 A 
tension between the interests of the administrations and that of various 
manufacturers was evident in many smaller countries around the world, 
while in some larger markets the ties were stronger than ever. In the UK, the 
Post Office directed their favoured manufacturers on their route to digital 
switching through the System X project throughout the 1970s, and in Japan, 
the administration, the NTT, applied a so-called coordinated competition 
system among their favoured manufacturers.91 
One early indication of the conflict is found in a questionnaire 
circulated by the CCITT in 1970. 92  This questionnaire tried to gather 
information on how various administrations looked on the particular 
challenges of computer-controlled switches, and in particular how the 
administrations looked on the role of software. 11 administrations replied to 
the questionnaire. No general consensus existed on how the administrations 
should organise and act on the new technological reality. The majority of the 
replying administrations stated that they obviously needed new capabilities 
to be able to assume responsibility for the management and maintenance of 
switching systems software. However, one administration in particular held a 
view that was quite contrary to the others, namely that the administrations 
should employ a team of specialists that would be responsible for managing 
and producing programs for new switches on their own. One other reply 
refers to the question of the separate supply of hardware and software for 
SPC exchanges. In this case the hardware would be purchased from the 
telephone equipment manufacturers and the software sub-contracted to 
software firms. The report given on the questionnaire concludes on this by 
stating that: 
  
                                                     
90 Peter Cowhey’s conceptualisation of the international telecommunication regime 
and its national underpinnings was presented in chapter one. See Cowhey, "The 
international telecommunications regime: the political roots of regimes for high 
technology". 
91 On System X, see Geoffrey Owen, From Empire to Europe (London: Harper 
Collins, 1999), 282-88. On NTT, see Martin Fransman, The market and beyond : 
information technology in Japan (Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990); ———, Japan's computer and communications industry : 
the evolution of industrial giants and global competitiveness (Oxford ; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995). 
92 The findings of this questionnaire are reported in COM XI 1-E (1973 – 1977), 
CCITT, ITUA. The individual answers are not in the ITU archive.  
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To facilitate the work of these specialists, the organizations would be in favour 
of CCITT recommendations on the presentation, specification and 
documentation of the hardware and software functions in SPC exchanges. In 
particular, the majority of them are ready to participate in a CCITT study of an 
advanced-level programming language.93  
A questionnaire the following year tried to sound the administrations on 
what they understood by “an advanced-level programming language”. While 
only seven organisations replied, a considerable difference of opinion was 
evident on what an advanced-level programming language meant to them. 
Based on the replies, a high-level language at the level of Algol was wanted 
by a number of administrations. Some other replies favoured a specification 
language coupled with advanced assembly techniques. In the previous 
questionnaire, one responding PTT also argued in favour of using 
“assembly-level languages in order to not lower the real-time call handling 
capacity of systems”.94 Regardless of belief in abstraction-based languages, 
the CCITT reported that there was a general agreement that a standardised 
high-level language could be justified “on the grounds of maintenance, 
education of staff, administration and software modification”. 95  Others 
mentioned information transfer, accuracy and readability as reasons to work 
in this direction. Nevertheless, it coincided nicely with the first SETTS 
conference (held in 1972) and the mainly academic affair at the IFIP-
organised conference on machine-oriented higher-level languages held in 
Trondheim in 1973.  
Would the interest in programming languages among the 
administrations reinforce the “ancien regime”, or would it crack it open? 
Would it align them with the interests of the manufacturers or could they 
bank on the support of the computer science community? In this early phase, 
the CCITT’s interest in programming language was unfocused. It was 
neither dependent on the “ancien regime” nor about to crack it open. It was 
an indication of the growing concern of a community of technological 
practitioners interested in the programming of telecommunication switches, 
a community that were embraced by the CCITT. From about 1973, this 
unfocused approach changed. A more active and pronounced policy towards 
programming languages was put into motion by the CCITT when it started a 
review of a number of existing programming languages, with the intention of 
elevating the best to the status of a CCITT standard.  
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State of the art 
From 1973, the CCITT was engaged in reviewing a number of existing 
programming languages, with the intention of elevating the best to the status 
of a CCITT recommendation. Participants from AT&T, ITT, Siemens, the 
UK Post Office and the French administration got busy teasing out the 
strengths and weaknesses of a total of 27 programming languages that had 
been submitted for review. The review process was based on 15 loosely 
defined requirements spun around concerns such as machine independence 
and program portability, the logical structuring of programs, modularisation 
and extensibility.96 All in all, the requirements were casually defined and 
inspired by general tendencies in programming language design at the time, 
in particular the academic interest in machine independence and program 
portability and the industrial interest in modularisation were important 
criteria.97 
Among the contenders were a host of general programming languages 
such as Algol 68, Pascal and PL/1, as well as proprietary languages 
developed by telecommunication manufacturing companies such as ITT and 
L. M. Ericsson.98 Quite early on Algol 68 and IBM’s attempt on a general 
programming language, PL/1, were scrapped, supposedly because they were 
not considered suitable for switching systems.99 Eventually, seven language 
were shortlisted as possible candidates: ESPL/1, DPL, Mary, Pascal, Pape, 
Plex and TPL2. ESPL1, from the international conglomerate ITT and PLEX, 
from the Swedish company L. M. Ericsson, were two specialist languages 
with no other aims than that of programming telecommunication switches. 
Two languages had their origin at technical universities: TPL2 from the 
University of Essex (created in cooperation with the British Post Office 
Research Department) and Mary, from the computer centre (RUNIT) at the 
Norwegian Institute of Technology. Both languages were created with 
machine orientation, and implicitly efficiency of the compiled code, in mind, 
and stemmed from the interest towards low-level system implementation 
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languages that had been a concern of the computer science milieu since the 
late 1960s. 
Pascal, another of the shortlisted programming languages, was a 
general purpose programming language designed by the Swiss computer 
scientist Niklaus Wirth, and had been used in various computer platforms 
since its first publication in 1970.100 DPL and Pape were languages with an 
explicit link to telecommunications, created by the Japanese and French 
telecommunication administrations, respectively. 
The reviewers found a number of deficiencies in all the shortlisted 
languages. In particular, the review panel put great emphasis on the strengths 
in the specialist programming languages rather than the more generalist 
languages like Mary and Pascal. However, such technical strengths, due to 
their particular orientation towards telecommunication switching, were not 
compatible with the diplomatic nature of the CCITT, where it was deemed 
impossible to elevate a technology developed and owned by a single 
manufacturer as to the status of a recommendation. Furthermore, this would 
have undermined the possibility of using the programming language as a tool 
for creating telecommunication administrations less dependent on their 
manufacturers when it came to programming. According to Joel and 
Chapuis, there “was no way that a language adopted by a given manufacturer 
could be selected as the sole universal CCITT language”.101  
The working group that was to decide on the question based on the 
review panel’s discussion was put together in such a way that a consensus 
decision was unlikely. The result was, predictably enough, that: “[…] it was 
found that it was not possible to obtain a consensus for any one language in 
either a modified or unmodified form”, to quote the original report.102 Even 
the two languages that were free of such baggage, Mary and Pascal, were 
unable to gather enough support. Mary was directly related to the academic 
interest in machine-oriented higher-level languages and designed by Mark 
Rain, who, as previously noted, was one of the organisers of the IFIP 
conference on this subject. Pascal had a similar academic background, 
designed by Niklaus Wirth, who also had pioneered the move of such 
implementation languages with his PL360 a few years before the design of 
Pascal. Pascal ended up being described as not particularly suited to so-
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called “real-time processing”. 103  Wirth did not disagree with this, as he 
added his own comments to the language description, and found them both 
“objective and quite accurate”. 104  As such, the ITU participants brushed 
aside the straight academic route as well as the path laid down by 
manufacturers. By rejecting the existing, it was up to CCITT to design a new 
language, something completely new to the organisation and most of its 
members. This is the subject of the next chapter. 
 
Some conclusions 
What could be gained by opting for a common and standardised 
programming language? The decision made by the CCITT rested on the 
strategies of the telecommunication administrations: the idea was first put 
forward by representatives of the Swedish telecommunication administration 
in 1968. It was the administrations that were sounded out in the early 1970s, 
through questionnaires and by common working groups organised by the 
CCITT. It was their votes that decided that a group of experts should design 
a new programming language from the ground up in the end of 1974. As 
such, the decision to study and move forward on the question regarding an 
international standardised programming language was completely in line 
with the logics attributed to the international telecommunication regime. 
Nevertheless, many a manufacturer submitted their favoured programming 
language to the CCITT review panel, letting outsiders in on one of their 
ways of managing the complexities of switching software. However, there is 
little evidence that the manufacturers that submitted their existing 
programming language altruistically shared their proprietary secrets for the 
greater good of the technical community. They were simply banking on 
gaining an advantage if their language could be approved as a CCITT 
recommendation. In this first round of technical diplomacy and 
institutionalisation efforts no such advantage was given to any of the 
manufacturers. The way forward was envisioned along the lines of a new 
programming language, aligned with the academic interest in machine-
oriented higher-level languages. The manufacturers would continue to strive 
for influence, and some of their representatives would soon be closely 
aligned to technical communities working together on programming 
language design. 
This chapter has also argued that by the early 1970s, a number of 
other issues concerning programming coalesced: the ideal of universality 
through mathematics had grown in legitimacy through the normalisation of 
computer science. The conceptualisation of software engineering as a 
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solution to the software crisis, influenced by the mathematical development 
virtue, appeared in the years from 1968 to 1972, and would gradually 
influence programming language design in the period that followed. The 
possibility of machine-oriented higher-level languages emerged in the same 
period. At the same time, computer-controlled switches were coming of age, 
maturing into a large and extremely demanding field. Together, these 
developments led to the formation of a distinct community of people 
interested in programming languages for telecommunication equipment. 
This community was organised around conferences like the IFIP conference 
on machine-oriented higher-level languages and the SETSS conferences. In 
the end, this triggered the interest of participants in the ITU, the main 
organisation of the international telecommunication regime. Programming 
languages were boundary objects in which different communities held an 
interest.  
Above, I have claimed that the agendas of these communities were 
informed by a set of development virtues, ideals about the act of 
programming. In particular, I have identified how a mathematical oriented 
development virtue was important to many programming language designers 
and theorists in the late 1960s. Another agenda was rooted in programming 
as a way of English-like expressions and more pragmatic in terms of how the 
act of programming should be managed. Both were understood, by their 
supporters, as necessary approaches to a set of difficult and complex 
problems. While the adjective mathematical certainly can be understood as 
impractical, this was hardly the case here. To be mathematically precise was 
indeed understood as a virtue, even a practical one.  
In the area of systems implementation and machine-oriented higher 
level languages, two competing development virtues were evident: One was 
embedded in the agenda promoting portability of machine-oriented 
languages, an agenda mainly in line with what was considered typical to 
computer science. The second agenda promoted maintainability and minimal 
languages, rooted in a more pragmatic development virtue.  
I have also highlighted how the virtues of computer science and 
software engineering influenced telecommunications through a number of 
intersections and encounters. These existed at an international level, such as 
the Nato-sponsored conferences on software engineering, conferences 
organised by IFIP, and more specialised telecommunication conferences 
such as ISS and SETTS. When CCITT got involved with this, many of these 
technical issues resonated with the logics of the international 
telecommunication regime. Could this resonance be extended when 
approaching a brand new programming language design? This leads us into 
the next chapter, which is concerned with the first real round of technical 
diplomacy concerning the design of this programming language. 
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3. Contested designs: agreeing on a programming 
language for telecommunication 
From January 1975, a group of programming language researchers, 
telecommunication bureaucrats and telecommunication industry experts 
started to design a programming language from scratch, a language that 
could be used by telecommunication administrations and manufacturers to 
programme future equipment. The group, named the High Level Language 
Team of Specialists, was set up by the CCITT to create this new and special 
purpose programming language. Five years later, the final recommendation 
was approved by the CCITT Plenary Assembly and became CCITT 
Recommendation Z.200.1  
The programming language was designed within the Team of 
Specialists until the summer of 1977, when the “Implementors’ Forum” 
replaced the small circle of the specialist group. The initial design was then 
ready, while the actual implementation and practical tests of the language 
were the work of the Forum. This chapter is devoted to the Team of 
Specialists, who they were, where they came from, the ideas and opinions 
they shared and, most importantly: how did they design the programming 
language?2  
In retrospect, the leader of the Team of Specialists has described part 
of the life of the group as “a period of chaos”. 3  Sharp disagreements, 
conflicts and communication problems characterised much of what went on. 
Some of the participants even felt that the rifts within the team were too 
great and that it would be impossible to agree on a coherent language 
                                                     
1 CCITT High Level Language (CHILL), CCITT Recommendation Z.200 (1980). 
2 The account in this chapter is based on sources from mainly two archives: The ITU 
archive in Geneva (ITUA) and the private collection of Kristen Rekdal (KRC). 
Since the Team of Specialists was not part of the official CCITT hierarchy, none of 
their communications are held by the official ITU archive. However, their reports to 
the working group XI 3/2 are available. “COM XI-No.19-E,” Period 1977 – 1980, 
CCITT, ITUA, gives a review and a list of the documents. None of the so-called late 
contributions to the working groups were kept by the ITU. However, the Kristen 
Rekdal collection holds more complete series of documents from early 1975 and 
forwards, containing both reports from the Team of Specialists, communication 
between its members as well as late contributions to the official CCITT process, and 
the numbered working documents.  
3  Remi Bourgonjon, interview with author, 16 January 2009, Heeze, the 
Netherlands. 
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proposal.4 The differences were mainly about features of the programming 
language. They appeared as clashes between strongly held ideas about how 
programming should be done, and how such ideas could be embedded into a 
programming language. However, it was also a game of strategic positioning 
involving the team participants’ parent organisations, which ranged from 
manufacturing firms, administrations to research organisations. The design 
process was one of intense technical diplomacy among specialists coming 
from a community of technical practitioners as well as delegates strategically 
positioning the large organisations that employed them. Diplomacy shaped 
by strongly held virtues as well as industrial strategy was the result. 
This chapter delves into issues concerning programming language 
design, standardisation and diplomatic bickering in detail through a 
description of the processes. Following this, it answers how the team was 
able to traverse a number of hurdles and arrive at a coherent proposal. First, I 
describe the composition of the team, before I pay particular attention to the 
diplomatic process within Team of Specialists and how, gradually, they were 
able to align the rather different perspectives of the team participants 
towards a common proposal. In the end, I arrive at a social network analysis 
(SNA) of the collaboration and conflicts in the period from January 1975 to 
the summer of 1977, which I compare to the findings from the qualitative 
assessments preceding it.   
 
A Team of Specialists? 
The Team of Specialists was unlike CCITT’s heavily structured working 
groups, working parties and study groups. It was an ad-hoc group atypical 
for the CCITT, in that it was largely autonomous, and it was led by an 
industry representative: normally in the CCITT, the only ones with voting 
power were administration representatives. Following this, the group leaders 
were normally chosen among members with voting power.5  
At first, the CCITT had hoped to delegate the design job to a single 
specialist, namely the programming expert Niklaus Wirth.6 The Zürich-based 
Wirth had previously designed the programming language Pascal, a hugely 
                                                     
4  See for example Svein Hallsteinsen, ”Reiserapport fra møte i CCITT’s 
spesialistgruppe for høynivå programmeringsspråk, Bern, 26. januar – 5. februar”, 
13 February 1976, box ”CCITT - HLL Team of Specialists - Møtereferater 1974 - 
1976, Møte 1-6”, KRC. Svein Hallsteinsen was part of a research group at the 
computing centre of the University of Trondheim (Runit) and sponsored by all the 
Nordic telecommunication administrations. 
5 The formal working group concerned with the design of a programming language 
was named XI/3-2, a sub-group of the working party XI/3, which again was a part of 
the study group XI.  
6 COM XI-No. 135-E, ”Report on the meeting held in Geneva from 18 September to 
25 September 1974”, Part IV, Annex A, CCITT, Period 1973 – 1974, ITUA. 
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influential programming language created in the late 1960s and popular right 
up into the 1990s. Pascal was also one of the seven shortlisted languages that 
the working group considered promising the year before, although it ended 
up as being deemed as unsatisfactory. 7  While Wirth’s best-known 
contribution to programming language design was deemed unsuitable for the 
domain CCITT sought, Wirth had practically ignited the field of machine-
oriented languages with his creation of the PL360 programming language. 
PL360 was among the first programming languages to combine exact 
machine language instructions with features commonly found in high-level 
languages. Wirth had also been involved in the language review conducted 
by the CCITT before the decision on creating a programming language. 
Wirth had consulted Bertill Forss, the Swede who initially had brought the 
programming language question to the CCITT in 1968, as Forss acted on 
behalf of the Swiss telecommunication manufacturer Hasler and the Swiss 
telecommunication administration, as he reviewed some of the existing 
programming languages as candidates for the CCITT.8 With his background, 
Wirth looked like a perfect match for the assignment. However, he declined 
the offer, after a lengthy process in which the CCITT had tried to facilitate 
the unprecedented move of trusting an assignment to someone without any 
formal ties to any telecommunication organisations. 9  The task was then 
delegated to the Team of Specialists.  
On 15 January 1975, a meeting in Bern brought together what was 
called a fire brigade of international experts. They were to start what had 
been planned for Wirth.10 However, just to come to a mutual understanding 
of what that would involve was no easy task. Meetings in January and 
February 1975 were held just to agree on a mandate of the Team of 
Specialists, before its first official meeting could be arranged. Progress 
came, but often at a numbing speed. Disagreements, tangles and conflicts 
                                                     
7 Working Party XI/3, The “Pink Document”, CCITT, Period 1973 – 1976, ITUA, 
95. 
8 This is explicated in Forss. 
9 In retrospect, that does not seem very surprising. In a paper by Wirth from 1974, 
”On the design of programming languages”, he lists 11 lessons he had learned as a 
programming language designer. The last point reads as follows: ”Keep the 
responsibility for the design of the language (and possible changes) confined to a 
single person.” The manacles of the CCITT were perhaps not a natural fit for such 
an idea. See Niklaus Wirth, "On the Design of Programming Languages" (paper 
presented at the Information Processing 74, Stockholm, Sweden, August 5-10 1974).  
10 As the report of the meeting explained: ”the meeting was a sort of fire brigade 
action as Prof. Wirth unfortunately was not in a position to carry out the task that the 
Subgroup had asked of him.” See Subgroup XI/3-2, “Report of an informal CCITT 
meeting held in Bern from 15-17 January 1975”, Temporary document No. 4-E, 
CCITT Study Group XI, Geneva, 10-19 February, ITUA. 
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came in the way of real technical design. I turn to a report given by a 
Norwegian delegate, Kristen Rekdal, to illustrate this: 
It was clear from the outset that it was a great deal of disagreements within the 
group. This seemed to be due to the fact that not everybody was interested in 
developing a language as soon as possible. Some believed the Team of 
Specialists should be given a carte blanche and work as fast as possible. Others 
wanted that XI/3-2 [the superior work group] should be given more control. 
Furthermore, they wanted a larger and broader Team of Specialists. The 
Japanese and to some degree the Americans were afraid that the team would be 
dominated by Europeans.11 
However, Rekdal hoped that a Team of Specialists would be the right forum 
to overcome such difficulties. Followed up his description, he added: “By 
organising the work within a group of specialists that will work more or less 
full time, I have high hopes that the project will be a success. Normally, it is 
easier to come to an agreement on professional grounds rather than 
political.”12 Which “professional grounds” dominated the team? And could 
such a team be exclusively professional?  
The team came to be made up of representatives from the Dutch 
manufacturer Philips, the NTT of Japan (its administration, with strong 
influence over the Japanese telecommunication manufacturing industry), the 
Nordic telecom administrations (which cooperated by sending one common 
delegate, from a research group at the computing centre of the Norwegian 
Institute of Technology in Trondheim, Runit), Siemens of Germany, L. M. 
Ericsson of Sweden, the international manufacturing conglomerate ITT, the 
British Post Office (then the British post and telecommunication 
administration) and the Swiss telecommunication administration. Its 
composition came as much from its ad-hoc basis as from political and 
industrial strategies, as the team was brought together at a very short 
notice.13 Many organisations declined the possibility of being part of the 
Team. One should note that apart from the representative of L. M. Ericsson, 
none of the industrial participants came from firms particularly close to the 
technical leading edge when it came to digital switching. None of them held 
                                                     
11  Kristen Rekdal, ”Reiserapport fra møte i CCITT arbeidsgruppe XI/3 om 
Programmeringsspråk for datamaskinstyrte telefonsentraler, Geneve 10. – 19. 
februar 1975”, 6 March 1975, box ”CCITT - HLL Team of Specialists - 
Møtereferater 1974 - 1976, Møte 1-6”, KRC. My translation. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Both the UK Post Office and the French administration participated actively in the 
review process that preceded the Team of Specialists, but did not actively pursue the 
work within the Team. Furthermore, many of the delegates of the parent CCITT 
groups represented organisations not present in the Team. 
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positions as early adopters of high-level programming languages in their 
programming of computer-controlled switches.  
Compared with similar working groups in the CCITT, the Team of 
Specialists looked odd. Two comparable groups, one concerned with a so-
called man-machine language (called MML) and a specification and 
description language (called SDL) started out in parallel to the programming 
language project. The specification language was an effort to standardise the 
graphical representations of the functionality of telecommunication systems, 
which was rather different than creating a programming language, which 
was intended to deliver the functions of the telecommunication systems. 
Both the MML and the SDL received far more attention from 
telecommunication manufacturers than the Chill group. Furthermore, the 
SDL group received more attention from typical CCITT participants, such as 
electrical engineers and telecommunication experts. However, the very same 
manufacturer that played a role in the Team of Specialists, L. M. Ericsson, 
held a high stake in the SDL committee, and just as in the case of 
programming languages, L.M. Ericsson had pioneered the use of 
specification languages in the process of designing digital switches.14  
Who was not part of the Team? Notable absentees were the French as 
well as the Americans. The representatives of the ITT were, in earnest, 
represented by their French subsidiary, which sent the Americans Beierle 
and Parente – indeed a double whammy in terms of making up for 
absentees.15 More central French representatives, from the administration or 
from a larger French manufacturer, were absent. Pioneers like AT&T’s Bell 
Laboratories and the Canadian Bell Northern Research were, as often was 
the case in international telecommunication cooperation, not participating in 
CCITT activities in any substantial roles, although the parent study group of 
the Team of Specialists, Study Group number XI, was led by J. S. Ryan of 
the Bell Laboratories.16  None of the actors that participated in the prior 
language review continued their work in the Team of Specialists in any 
capacity, with the exception of the participants from the British Post Office 
(R. T. Boyd).  
From spring 1975 until February 1977, the Team of Specialists held 
seven lengthy meetings at different locations around the world. In between 
meetings, the group relied on informal correspondence and formal 
publications of working papers and language proposals submitted by 
                                                     
14 Hemdal, "AXE 10 - Software Structure and Features". 
15 On the status of ITT, see Sverre A. Christensen, "Switching Relations: The rise 
and fall of the Norwegian telecom industry" (BI Norwegian School of Management, 
2006), 38-45; Robert Sobel, I.T.T. : the management of opportunity (New York, 
N.Y.: Times Books, 1982). 
16 See various reports in COM XI 1973-1977, ITUA. 
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committee members or by their parent organisations. Details of the locations 
and dates are summarised in the tables below. 
 
Meeting Dates Place Participants Documents 
1 28 April - 9 May 1975 Geneva 9 7 
2 25 August - 5 September 1975 Geneva 6 17 
3 8 -19 December 1975 Bern 6 17 
4 26 January - 5 February 1976 Bern 7 5 
5 10 - 21 May 1976 Bern 7 16 
6 12 - 22 October 1976 Kyoto 9 18 
7 21 - 25 February 1977 London 8 - 
Table 3.1: Meetings in the Team of Specialists. 
 
Table 3.2 gives a brief overview of who attended the meetings. What seems 
evident is the apparent stability of the group and the little variation in terms 
of attendees. In general, the Team of Specialists was dominated by 
participants that showed up regularly throughout its life.  
 
  Meeting  
Name Country Organization  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
J. D. Beierle France/USA ITT  X X X X X X X 
R. Bourgonjon Netherlands Philips  X X X X X X X 
R. T. Boyd UK UKPO  X - - - - - X 
K. Clements UK UKPO  - - - - - X X 
S. Hallsteinsen Norway RUNIT  - - - X - - -  
H. Kvarneby Sweden LME  X X X X X - X 
T. Koizumi Japan NEC  X - - X - - -  
K. Maruyama Japan NTT  X X X - X X X 
K. Rekdal Norway RUNIT  X X X - X X X 
L. Sandberg Swiss PTT  - - X X X - -  
H. Sorgenfrei Germany Siemens  X X - X X X X 
Table 3.2: Participants in the HLL Team of Specialists, ordered alphabetically. 
 
The mere design of the group heralded difficulties already from the outset. It 
was in no way homogenous, consisting of bureaucrats representing 
administrations, researchers as well as representatives of competing 
manufacturers, such as Philips, the ITT and L.M. Ericsson. The group leader 
Remi Bourgonjon, from Philips Telecommunications, and the Norwegian 
researcher Kristen Rekdal were the only group members that could devote 
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almost their full working time to the project, while the others were 
participating in addition to their normal work responsibilities within their 
parent organisations. As a consequence, Bourgonjon and Rekdal held 
positions that could exert considerable influence over the team’s work. 
However, it was not only the time spent at work in the team that made 
Bourgonjon and Rekdal important actors in the standardising and design 
processes. Both had a background in computer science and mathematics and 
shared a technical expertise and a specialised language not necessarily 
shared by all the other members of the team. This background was indeed 
what Rekdal had in mind when he hoped that the professional qualities 
would overcome the political tensions and make the group special when 
compared with other CCITT-initiated groups.17 
Bourgonjon’s role as the convenor of the Team of Specialists 
underscored the peculiar role of this group within the CCITT. As a 
representative of a manufacturer, Bourgonjon represented a group of 
participants that held no voting power within the CCITT, and, consequently, 
was not normally entrusted with group leader roles. Tellingly, Bourgonjon 
was given the title of convenor rather than chairman. Titles and procedures 
had a high standing within the CCITT, and the role of convenor indicated the 
otherness that surrounded the team. Another similar indication was the fact 
that the first meeting had to be held in Bern rather than in the ITU’s native 
Geneva, which was not a coincidence. The team was not deemed a real ITU 
group, and was consequently not given a time slot within the ITU tower at 
Geneva. Again, formal procedures had a high standing in the ITU.  
The Team of Specialists that was drummed together in Bern, in early 
1975, had considerable less experience and expertise than Niklaus Wirth. 
When I interviewed Remi Bourgonjon about his role in the group, he 
invoked the saying that “in the land of the blind the one-eyed man is king” 
when asked about his own background and his role in the Team of 
Specialists.18 In 1975, Bourgonjon was a young programmer employed at 
Philips Telecommunications at Hilversum in the Netherlands. He had never 
previously thought about designing a programming language. For two years, 
he had worked as a programmer assigned to a small computerised exchange 
project – a project that was brought to an abrupt end in 1974. As one of the 
first employees with a background in the emerging field of computer 
science, Bourgonjon had lobbied for the use of a high-level language within 
                                                     
17  Kristen Rekdal, ”Reiserapport fra møte i CCITT arbeidsgruppe XI/3 om 
Programmeringsspråk for datamaskinstyrte telefonsentraler”, Geneve, 10 – 19 
february 1975”, 6 March 1975, box ”CCITT - HLL Team of Specialists - 
Møtereferater 1974 - 1976, Møte 1-6”, KRC. My translation. 
18  Remi Bourgonjon, interview with author, 16 January 2009, Heeze, the 
Netherlands.  
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Philips, which was still relying on assembler code in their software 
production. This lobbying did not immediately change the practice at 
Hilversum, but led Bourgonjon to a rather unsuspected career change: 
Almost by accident, he found himself given the responsibility of leading 
CCITT’s Team of Specialists, even though his superiors were sceptical about 
its economic implications. According to Bourgonjon, Philips was, 
nevertheless, in a position where the CCITT activities could pay off, since 
the adoption of a high-level programming language was very much in the air 
at that moment, and Philips had come late to the party. If the CCITT 
standard would lead the telecommunication administrations to make this 
specific programming language a requirement, Philips wanted to have a head 
start. They had nothing to lose, since they were still programming in 
assembly. Disregarding the scepticism within Philips, Bourgonjon was given 
the opportunity to work on the CCITT assignment almost full time for the 
coming years. Before his appointment as the convenor of the Team of 
Specialists, Bourgonjon had participated in some of the early preparatory 
meetings in the CCITT. According to Bourgonjon, this participation was the 
reason behind his choice as group leader. Over the course of these meetings, 
Bourgonjon had raised his voice over what he considered to be rather 
uninformed comments made by other group members. These comments 
made people take notice, and when Wirth declined, the CCITT thought their 
next best option was Bourgonjon. According to Bourgonjon, he was both 
honoured and shocked at the same time, considering his age and 
experience.19  
Figure 3.1 below is a picture of the core group, meeting in London in 
1977 at the end of the study period, showing eight of the most active 
specialists working on the programming language. What is evident from this 
picture is, among other things, the age difference between the core members. 
Bourgonjon was really the youngest of all the team members, at 29, while 
the administration representatives, like Ken Clements of the UK Post Office, 
was a veteran when it came to international standardisation work and in his 
50s.  
 
 
                                                     
19 Remi Bourgonjon, telephone interview with author, 17 March 2011.  
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Figure 3.1 The Team of Specialists.20 
 
Not all the participants had the same possibilities as Bourgonjon – some 
participated in the expert group part time, while others had a considerably 
narrower mandate. Furthermore, the participants were not equal in terms of 
expertise. This unevenness, in terms of time and expertise, contributed 
substantially to a design process that was fraught with difficulties. In 
addition, the fact that none of the key members of the group had English as a 
mother tongue and mastered the language to varying degrees contributed 
substantially to this unevenness. According to Bourgonjon, the first period, 
lasting for the whole of 1975 and well into 1976, was essentially “a period of 
chaos”.21 Conflicts of interest, as well as the difference in knowledge as well 
as communication skills, all contributed to this. The task of developing a 
programming language within an international team was an uphill battle, 
especially within a tight timeframe. Bourgonjon summarised this in a note to 
the team members: 
  
                                                     
20 Back row: Jack Beierle (ITT), Heiko Sorgenfrei (Siemens), Hans Kvarneby (L M 
Ericsson), Trevor Boyd (UK Post Office), Katsumi Maruyama (NTT). Front row: 
Remi Bourgonjon (Philips), Ken Clements, (UK Post Office), Kristen Rekdal 
(RUNIT). 
21  Remi Bourgonjon, interview with author, 16 January 2009, Heeze, the 
Netherlands. 
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[…] this task is far from trivial. Experiences with comparable projects have 
shown that either, with an international team not working directly together, it 
will cost rather much time, or else the work must be done in a small group, 
working closely together. We are facing the problem of developing a 
programming language in an international team, not working very closely 
together, in a reasonable time.22 
The anatomy and specific problems of this team are the subject of the 
coming pages, where I first sketch the structure of the cooperation, and then 
look into a few key issues in the technical design of the programming 
language. 
 
Coordinating contestations 
From 26 January 1976 seven programming specialists met for ten days at the 
Swiss telecommunication administration headquarters in Bern to discuss the 
development of the standardised programming language for telephone 
switches. During the January meeting, tensions between the group members 
rose, as they were unable to agree on almost anything about the new 
programming language. The Norwegian researcher Svein Hallsteinsen 
participated and reported on the tensions to his supervisors: 
The impression after this meeting is that it will be impossible to agree on one 
language, unless it really consists of two languages. This is unacceptable to most 
of the participants. It is more likely that we will end up with two proposals, one 
European and one Japanese (PL/1 like).23  
Hallsteinsen believed that the project could turn into what the CCITT’s 
director Raymund Croze had called “hybrid monsters” at the general 
assembly of the organisation the year before, a bloated amalgam of every 
programming language that existed.24 If not, the CCITT would have to vote 
on two different proposals, one coming from a broad group of European 
delegates and another one from the Japanese delegates that represented the 
NTT, the Japanese telecommunication administration. The sharp 
disagreement that Hallsteinsen had observed, between two wings within the 
                                                     
22 Remi Bourgonjon to all members of the Team of Specialists, 6 March 1975, box 
“CCITT arbeidsdokumenter”, KRC. 
23  The quote is from Svein Hallsteinsen, ”Reiserapport fra møte i CCITT’s 
spesialistgruppe for høynivå programmeringsspråk, Bern, 26. januar – 5. februar”, 
13 February 1976, box ”CCITT - HLL Team of Specialists - Møtereferater 1974 - 
1976, Møte 1-6”, KRC. My translation. 
24 Minutes of the Plenary Meetings, CCITT Plenary Assembly 6 Orange Book Vol. I 
- IV 1976, CCITT, ITUA. 23. See chapter three for more about Raymond Croze’s 
concerns about the development of technical standards within the CCITT. 
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expert group, was about features of the programming language. This tension 
between Japanese and European participants existed from the first meeting 
of the Team of Specialists, a tension felt by many of the participants 
throughout the project. 25  The number of documents contributed by the 
participating organisations illustrates these blocks, as the NTT, Philips and 
Runit were the main contributors. 
 
Organisation   Meeting  Total 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
NTT 1 6 3 1 5 7 - 23 
UKPO 1 3 - - - - - 4 
Swiss PTT 1 - 2 - - - - 3 
Philips 2 4 6 - 4 3 - 19 
ITT - 1 - 1 - - -  2 
Siemens - 2 - - - 2 - 4 
LME - - 1 - - - -  1 
Dutch PTT - - 1 - - - - 1 
Runit 2 2 4 3 6 3 - 20 
Runit/LME/Philips - - - - 1 1 -  2 
The Team of Specialists - - - - - 1 - 1 
Table 3.3: Number of working documents. 26  
 
Where the European participants, in general, could agree on some main 
features derived from existing programming languages similar to Algol, the 
Japanese would often come up with arguments that ran counter to the 
perceived wisdom among the other participants. Their favourite among 
existing programming languages was IBM’s effort to create an ultimate 
high-level programming language for almost all purposes, the PL/1.27 This 
message was reiterated time and time again by the main participant from the 
NTT, Katsumi Maruyama.  
Both Algol and PL/1 were significant markers of different 
professional identities. Algol was, as discussed in chapter two, an important 
output of computer science, by some considered a paradigmatic exemplar of 
                                                     
25 This is based on interviews with some of the participants, reviewing reports from 
the Norwegian delegates and official reports from the meetings. 
26 The documents are listed in COM-XI No. 19-E, Annex A, box Period 1977 – 
1980, CCITT, ITUA.  
27 PL/1 held some technical similarities to Algol. On the history of PL/1, see George 
Radin, "The early history and characteristics of PL/I", ACM SIGPLAN Notices 13, 
no. 8 (1978); Sammet, Programming languages: history and fundamentals, 540-82.  
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the scientific approach to programming language design.28 PL/1 had been 
created by the IBM and its user groups, called SHARE, in the mid-1960s. It 
was considered a multipurpose programming language that should cater for 
all uses, including systems programming and real-time systems, but in many 
ways it was considered an optimal substitute for Fortran.29 Many technical 
similarities existed between the two, but the governance models that 
underpinned Algol and PL/1 were considerably different. Algol was in many 
ways a commons, a programming language governed by a self-appointed 
and self-regulating community of scientists, while PL/1 was the property of 
the IBM.  However, there were also technical differences. One example of 
the schism came to the surface at the fourth meeting of the Team of 
Specialists, and was related to technicalities. The Norwegian researcher, 
Svein Hallsteinsen, commented on it in the following manner: 
It is a sharp disagreement within the Team of Specialists about whether security 
is an important property for a programming language for telephone switches. 
The PL/1 supporters consider the consistent use of variables a responsibility of 
the individual programmer and that security checks on compilation would 
severely reduce the flexibility of the language and consequently reduce 
programmer’s productivity.30  
The Japanese representatives wanted a less strict, and apparently less secure, 
solution, while the Europeans wanted something stricter – where the 
programmers’ hands were tied considerably tighter than in the Japanese case. 
This was part of a wrangling over professional identity as well as strategic 
efforts to maintain the compatibility of already existing programming 
languages, where the European and the Japanese representatives held widely 
differing views and agendas. The main European representatives were 
steeped in mathematical computer science and its development virtues while 
the Japanese representatives were less concerned about such goals.   
While the NTT was arguing for a PL/1-like language, Remi Bourgonjon 
from Philips and the Nordic telecommunication administrations wanted the 
                                                     
28 Priestley, "Logic and the development of programming languages, 1930 - 1975". 
29 See Sammet, Programming languages: history and fundamentals, 547. On the 
history of SHARE, see Atsushi Akera, "Voluntarism and the Fruits of 
Collaboration", Technology and Culture 42, no. 4 (2001). 
30 Svein Hallsteinsen, ”Reiserapport fra møte i CCITT’s spesialistgruppe for høynivå 
programmeringsspråk, Bern, 26. januar – 5. februar”, 13 February 1976, box 
”CCITT - HLL Team of Specialists - Møtereferater 1974 - 1976, Møte 1-6”, KRC. 
This view is supported by the official document by the Sub-working party XI/3-2, 
“Progress report of the HLL Team of Specialists Fourth meeting: 26 January – 5 
February 1976”, Temporary document No. 29-E, box ”CCITT - HLL Team of 
Specialists - Møtereferater 1974 - 1976, Møte 1-6”, KRC. 
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standard to become an Algol-inspired language, which implied a more 
theoretical and mathematical foundation.31 This was of no great surprise, as 
Algol was a dominating force in European computer science at the time, 
although generally shunned by the European computer industry. 
Furthermore, Bourgonjon was backed by the Belgium research laboratory of 
Philips, called the MBLE, which was considered to contain some of the best 
Algol specialists around.32 The very first proposals stemming from Philips 
were written by Georges Louis, Paul Branquart and Paul Wodon of the 
MBLE.33 The cooperation between Bourgonjon and the Belgian laboratory 
continued throughout the work on Chill, and according to Bourgonjon, the 
close cooperation with the researchers was a great inspiration and resource 
for him.34  
The researchers hired by the Nordic telecommunication 
administrations, based at the research group at the computing centre of the 
Norwegian Institute of Technology in Trondheim (Runit) had a background 
in designing the programming language Mary, some sort of an Algol 
derivate.35 The local team engaged in the CCITT work, people like Svein 
Hallsteinsen and Kristen Rekdal, had all been involved to some degree in the 
work on Mary. This had a lasting influence on the documents submitted by 
the Runit group, especially in the early period of the committee work, which 
often would use examples and experience gained through the Mary project 
as a point of departure.36 The result was a series of small skirmishes between 
the Norway-based group and the Philips group. One example is the 
following quote: 
  
                                                     
31 Peter, "The European side of the last phase of the development of ALGOL 60"; 
Alan, "The American side of the development of Algol". 
32 See, for example, P. Branquart et al., "The composition of semantics in Algol 68", 
Commun. ACM 14, no. 11 (1971).  
33 P. Branquart, G. Louis, P. Wodon, “Segments, a means for specifying access 
authorization”, Document A4, April 1975, box “Arbeidsdokumenter”, KRC. 
34  Remi Bourgonjon, interview with author, 16 January 2009, Heeze, the 
Netherlands. 
35 Rain, "Some formal language aspects of Mary or Algol X revistited". 
36 One example is Svein Hallsteinsen, Kristen Rekdal, Per Holager, ”Macros for 
CCITT HLL”, 4 December 1975, Document C2, box “CCITT Arbeidsdokumenter”, 
KRC. 
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A parameterized text substitution mechanism like the one in MARY offers a 
reasonable implementation for several highly recommendable language features. 
However, it is a very flexible tool that requires some discipline on the part of the 
programmer. The alternative is an assortment of special constructs as proposed 
in (1), which will be safe and structured in use, but harder to learn and to 
implement. 37 
The latter alternative (denoted as 1) was proposed by Remi Bourgonjon. 
Here, it was presented in a discussion about how much flexibility the 
programmers would get in terms of so-called macros when using the future 
programming language, something mirroring some of the arguments used in 
the European versus Japanese discussions mentioned above. In some 
respects, the Runit proposal, which was largely inspired by the experience 
with Mary, and the general “machine-oriented higher-level languages” field 
in computer science, was more oriented towards efficiency of the compiled 
code rather than security. Again, the very design of the programming 
language was tied in with how the future user was conceived by the various 
parties of the quarrel.  
When looking back at this debacle, Hallsteinsen, Bourgonjon and 
Rekdal all reinforced the impression of a particular tense relationship 
between the European participants and the Japanese one.38 What about the 
Japanese themselves: did they share this impression? I have only been able 
to get in contact with Norio Sato, who served in the CCITT working group 
from around 1981.39 The two Japanese participants in the original Team of 
Specialists, K. Maruyama and T. Koizumi, both attended some, but not all, 
of the meetings held in the team. I have not been able to interview them. 
However, the impression I got from Sato was that none of the Japanese 
participants was altogether happy with the results of the international 
cooperation.40  
The tensions influenced the behaviour of the participants. In an 
interview with Rekdal conducted almost 30 years after the start of the Chill 
project, he commented on the process in the following way: “Of course, you 
never talk politics in groups like these. Everything is formulated in technical 
terms. Every problem is converted into technical problems, so they sound 
factual. It was a big challenge for an engineer, to manage the political 
                                                     
37 Ibid., 13 – 14. (1) is a reference to R. H. Bourgonjon, “Macros and High level 
language”, August 1975, Document B9, box “CCITT Arbeidsdokumenter”, KRC.  
38 Interviews with Svein Hallsteinsen, Remi Bourgonjon and Kristen Rekdal. See the 
list of interviews at the back for details.  
39 Norio Sato, e-mails to the author, November 2008. 
40 Ibid. 
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problems in all this.”41 This process of translating everything into technical 
lingo found favourable conditions in the geographically widespread team 
organisation. Similarly, Bourgonjon underscored that forming alliances 
through mutual contributions in the form of written documents would ease 
the tensions, something that appeared for the very first time at the sixth 
meeting of the Team of Specialists in a document cooperatively prepared by 
Hallsteinsen, Rekdal, Bourgonjon and Kvarneby.42  This came into being 
after several informal meetings of members of the Team of Specialists. 
Apparently, this strategy worked well. In Kristen Rekdal’s report from 
the fifth meeting of the Team of Specialists, the tone far more positive than 
the earlier gloomy reports. “This is one of the best meetings we have had. 
The Japanese attitude is considerably more flexible and ITT has declared 
support for the work. For the first time, we also got through the full 
agenda.”43 These positive signs marked the ending of the “period of chaos” 
and also implied that the framework for the end product, Chill, was 
emerging through the work of a real manual for the programming language. 
This change was based on an effort to orchestrate agreements, or to 
coordinate congestions, in particular between the two groups that worked 
full time on the project, at Philips and Runit. 
 
Maintaining compatibility 
Professional identities aside, the wrangling over which existing 
programming language should provide the blueprint for the future CCITT 
programming language influenced the strategic manoeuvring of the large 
industrial organisations that participated through their delegates. Maintaining 
compatibility between the future proposal and an already existing 
programming language could greatly reduce the cost of compliance for any 
of the firms involved.  
In one of the very first documents submitted by the NTT, which was 
actually a full proposal for a programming language, filed at the second 
meeting of the Team of Specialists in August and September 1975, these 
priorities were evident. The aim was to maintain compatibility with their 
own DPL language and PL/1, as well as a “basic feature integration of 
Pascal, ESPL-1, Pape, DPL, Mary, PLEX and TPL-2, taking standard 
                                                     
41 Kristen Rekdal, interview by Lars Thue and Gard Paulsen, 13 September 2004, 
Trondheim, Norway. My translation.  
42 R. H. Bourgonjon, S. Hallsteinsen, H. Kvarneby, K. Rekdal, “Some proposed 
modifications to the revised manual”, Document F2, box “CCITT 
Arbeidsdokumenter II”, KRC. 
43 Kristen Rekdal, ”Reiserapport fra 5. Møte i CCITTs spesialistgruppe for høynivå 
programmeringsspråk, Bern 10. – 21. mai 1976,” 22 July 1976, box “CCITT-HLL 
Team of Specialists Møterapporter mote 1-6”, KRC. My translation. 
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electronic switching systems into considerations”.44 This proposed amalgam 
language was based on a PL/1 notation, but added a few unique features 
found in all the seven shortlisted languages. In essence, though, it was 80% 
DPL, the proposed and specialised language of the NTT, hence the dual 
lopsidedness.45  
The NTT’s initial efforts can be understood as a defence of their own 
position and their own programming language, DPL, rather than a full-on 
support for PL/1, even though they believed in the general purpose 
programming language from IBM. According to Kristen Rekdal, the 
Japanese participants would repeatedly invoke the following line of 
arguments: since Algol 60 and 68 were developed mainly within academia, 
Algol was therefore perceived as an academic language; PL/1, on the other 
hand, was developed by IBM, and was therefore an industrial language. 
Since the new CCITT language was to be used for developing industrial 
products, it had to be an industrial language, and therefore it had to be PL/1-
like.46 To the Japanese, the PL/1 language implied efficiency, both in terms 
of learning and execution. However, this line of argument did not convince 
everyone. For one thing, it did not consider the fact that PL/1 had some 
distinct Algol flavours thrown into its mix.  
Is there any evidence, in writing, that the other participants defended 
their own programming language in a similar way? L. M. Ericsson was 
represented in the group by Hans Kvarneby.  L. M. Ericsson's programming 
language Plex had, just like the DPL-language of the NTT, been considered 
a viable candidate by the CCITT in the review round. Nevertheless, 
Kvarneby submitted only one sole-authored working document, “On 
separately compiled modules”, in 1975. 47  This document cannot be 
interpreted as an effort to shift the standardisation effort in the direction of 
Plex, as it is more or less a paper that supports a technical solution proposed 
by Remi Bourgonjon and Philips.48 
The ITT, which had their ESPL/1 language favourably reviewed in the 
initial assessment, submitted one document in 1975 and another in 1976.49 
The 1975 paper was only two pages long, and did not contribute or argue in 
any particular direction. The paper cannot in any way be understood as an 
                                                     
44 NTT, “A proposal of a programming language for electronic switching systems”, 
Document B18, box “CCITT Arbeidsdokumenter”, KRC. 
45 “Remarks on the language proposed by N.T.T.”, Temporary Document No. 201-
E, box “CCITT Arbeidsdokumenter”, KRC. 
46 Kristen Rekdal, interview with author, 18 June 2008, Oslo, Norway.  
47 Hans Kvarneby, L. M. Ericsson, “On separately Compiled Modules”, Document 
C10, box “CCITT Arbeidsdokumenter”, KRC. 
48 Ibid. 
49  R.J. Parente, “Comments on separately Compilable Modules and debugging 
tools”, Document B12, box “CCITT Arbeidsdokumenter”, KRC. 
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argument for particular functions found in their own programming language 
ESPL-1. The second paper submitted by ITT was called “Use of Based 
Variables in Systems written in ESPL-1.”50 As evident from the title of the 
paper, this hand-written and rather short document was based on the use of 
ITT’s programming language ESPL-1. However, it reads more as a comment 
on a very particular technical question, rather than a solid proposition for 
how this question should be tackled in the new programming language. 
The fourth manufacturer represented in the group, Siemens, did not 
have a programming language reviewed by the CCITT in 1974. They 
submitted only two working documents in 1975, “Proposed flow of control 
statements” and “I/O functions in a HLL for electronic switching”.51 Neither 
can be understood as an attempt to swing the development effort in any 
particular direction, as it reads more as an investigation of the seven 
shortlisted languages and contains only very general propositions.  
As pointed out earlier, Kristen Rekdal acted on behalf of the research 
establishment Runit and the Nordic telecommunication administrations. The 
origin of this cooperation was the early proposal of Mary as a contender 
language in the CCITT review process. As such, the actions of Rekdal and 
Runit could be understood as a similar compatibility-seeking manoeuvre like 
those discussed above, although the vested interests in Mary were 
considerably smaller compared with those of the manufacturers that had 
applied in-house programming languages in existing products. Nevertheless, 
Mary had a lasting influence on the documents submitted by the Runit 
group, especially in the early period of the committee work, which often 
would use examples and experience gained through the Mary project as a 
point of departure.52  
 
Orchestrating agreements 
In 1976 agreements replaced tensions, quarrels and disputes on several 
levels. The Team of Specialists became more unified and finally agreed on a 
proposal for a CCITT recommendation, which was filed as “the blue 
                                                     
50 D. Copen, January 23 1976, “Use of Based variables in Systems written in ESPL-
1. Some examples”, Document D4, box “Arbeidsdokumenter II”, KRC. 
51  Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, “Proposed Flow-of-Control Statements for the 
CCITT HLL”, 7 august 1975, and  “I/O functions in a HLL for electronic switching 
systems”, 7 august 1975, Document B13 and B14, both in box “CCITT 
Arbeidsdokumenter”, KRC. 
52 One example is Svein Hallsteinsen, Kristen Rekdal, Per Holager, ”Macros for 
CCITT HLL”, 4 December 1975, Document C2, box “CCITT Arbeidsdokumenter”, 
KRC. 
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document” in May 1977.53 This document compiled all the different ideas 
about what a programming language should be into one rough draft. The 
document was approved by the formal CCITT hierarchy, which agreed to 
prolong the programming language project until 1980. This ensured that the 
language would be developed further from the rough draft of the “blue 
document” to a more capable programming language three years later. 
During and between the fourth, fifth and sixth meetings of the Team of 
Specialists, from late 1975 to autumn 1976, a coherent framework was 
agreed and supported by most of the group’s members. The “period of 
chaos” was replaced by a year of agreements. This was a period of practical 
work, as the team had to decide how they should describe, formulate and 
define the programming language they had argued about for the last year, in 
essence an exercise in writing down everything about the language, such as 
its syntax and its intended semantics. The practical work on the manual 
forced the participants into a more concrete way of working. This finally 
turned this awkward squad into something of a top-level troop, more 
effectively dealing with their differences than ever before. However, a real 
platoon it was not. 
Still, disputes could escalate quickly. As they more or less followed a 
common pattern, this made them easier to avoid. Some of the most intense 
debates and quarrels could be postponed, while others were bypassed by 
making compromises: some of these compromises were even in the direction 
of the dreaded possibility of being PL/1-like, proposed by the ever more 
unlikely group of Europeans.54 Since the two only participants that worked 
more or less full time on this project were Remi Bourgonjon and Kristen 
Rekdal, the majority of the manual writing was done in Hilversum and 
Trondheim.  
On which direction did they agree? The committee tried, as they 
worked their way through each and every language concept, to strike a 
balance between the need for efficiency and flexibility on the one side, and 
reliability on the other – inset with the overall goal of achieving machine 
(and, inherently, manufacturer) independence and program portability. At an 
overall level, this balance was sought by aligning the background in 
computer science that many of the team members shared with the virtues of 
the community of electrical engineers that dominated the CCITT and the 
                                                     
53 The HLL Team of Specialists, ”Proposal for a recommendation for a C.C.I.T.T 
High-level programming language”, The Blue Document, May 1977. The document 
is available at the ITUA. 
54  Kristen Rekdal, Svein Hallsteinsen, Per Holager, ”CCITT HLL and Based 
Variables”, 22 January 1976, Document D2, box ”CCITT Arbeidsdokumenter II”, 
KRC. This note explored the possibilities of fitting the based variable concept of 
PL/1 into the CCITT HLL. 
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telecommunications world in general. By arguing that certain features of the 
programming language could contribute to the production of more reliable 
software, the programming language would at least appear to be very much 
in line with the reliability focus with which the telecommunication world 
was preoccupied.  
The group would agree on specific language features that were 
believed to be related to high reliability, such as the possibility to check as 
much as possible at the time of compilation, or in other words, at the 
moment the programming code was translated into machine code. Efficiency 
was also deemed to be one of the most important requirements at a time 
when computing power was very much a limited resource. The obvious way 
to achieve this was to bypass the high-level constructs and dip into machine 
code. Mechanisms that allowed for such toe dipping were consequently a 
major discussion point at the team meetings. It would most certainly 
contradict the philosophy of a high-level language in the first place – and 
make it less portable. More importantly, extensive use of low-level features 
was believed to degrade the program reliability. Too many programmers 
would bypass the programming language and design fast but erroneous low-
level hacks. To marry efficiency and reliability was impossible. 
Consequently, the language had to strike a fine balance and reach a number 
of compromises. However, to be able to reach a number of agreements, some 
of the most debatable topics were postponed, in particular those related to 
low-level constructs. 
The end result was a manual that described the vocabulary of the 
proposed language, including a formal syntax and informal semantics. This 
was not, however, something that came by itself. The first set of drafts of the 
manual was “inconsistent both in syntactic and semantic description”.55 The 
inconsistency was seen as highly unsatisfactory, not only from a scientific 
point of view, but also because the goal of making this language a standard. 
As Bourgonjon had stated, “for standardisation reasons, the descriptions 
should be unambiguous and complete”. The real question then, is how could 
the group create consistency when progress by compromise was the ‘plate de 
jour’? 
 
Descriptions and alignments 
During the summer of 1976 the first substantive draft manual was finished. 
The inconsistencies were gradually ironed out in meetings throughout 1976 
                                                     
55 Remi Bourgonjon to the members of the HLL Team of Specialists, Hilversum, 7 
September 1976, Document F1, box “CCITT Arbeidsdokumenter II”, KRC. 
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and one last editorial meeting in London in February 1977.56 By applying 
what was described as an extended Backus-Naur Form syntax, the work was 
eased out by applying the state of the art in computer science concerning 
syntax description. The Backus-Naur Form was a metasyntax used to 
express context-free grammars: that is, a formal way to describe formal 
languages. It was created by John Backus as part of the creation of the 
programming language Algol in the late 1950s. The Danish computer 
scientist Peter Naur simplified Backus’s initial design, which became known 
as the BNF during the 1960s.57 Again, the team went along with ongoing 
concerns in the wider community of computer scientists to be able to achieve 
the goals set by themselves as well as the CCITT: a consistent programming 
language. 
The moves leading towards a provisional and more consistent 
language description were also a result of a growing alignment of the 
different attitudes towards programming languages by the members of the 
Team of Specialists. However, these alignments also depended on local 
“support teams”, in particular work within the MBLE in Belgium, which was 
the Belgian subsidiary of Philips, and at Runit in Trondheim. During 1976, 
the involvement with the MBLE would not only influence the thinking of 
Bourgonjon, but would also function as a meeting place between the 
Norwegian researchers involved in the Runit-led project and the Dutch 
researchers and language designers, as meetings between these actors were 
held at the MBLE.58 Furthermore, similar meetings were arranged at L. M. 
Ericsson in Sweden in August 1976. These meetings that were held outside 
the team’s official agenda would result in co-written contributions to that 
agenda, which dramatically increased their possibility of being approved by 
the others.  
By the end of 1976, the Team of Specialists had agreed on the central 
features of the language and the “Crozian monster” envisioned by Svein 
Hallsteinsen was avoided. The next step would be to gather support for the 
language beyond the participating organisations. One particularly telling 
example was the last “official” meeting of the Team of Specialists, held in 
Kyoto, Japan, in October 1976. The meeting was devoted to the “syntax for 
the full CCITT HLL language proposal”, and the participants were able to 
                                                     
56 For reports on the meetings, see the official report: The HLL Team of Specialist, 
“Progress report of the HLL Team of Specialists”, March 1977, COM XI No. 19-E, 
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58  Kristen Rekdal, “Reiserapport fra uformelt møte om CCITT’s høynivåspråk i 
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agree on how the syntax should be described in the language manual.59 The 
meeting in Kyoto was held at the same venue as the large International 
Switching Symposium (ISS), a major trade meeting and technical conference 
held biannually at various locations throughout the world.60 Just days after 
agreeing upon the syntax on their new programming language, the team 
could discuss it with other interested parties in the larger telecommunication 
world. Here, the group could gather support and align their proposal – or for 
that matter, they could also risk receiving a blatant rejection from the 
important decision makers.  
Remi Bourgonjon presented the progress of the Team of Specialists in 
a session devoted to the concept of high-level languages in 
telecommunication systems, together with presentations from researchers 
from the NTT, the ITT and the French CNET laboratory.61 Bourgonjon’s 
paper made the influence from computer science explicit with references to 
publications by well-known figures from the computer science field, such as 
Niklaus Wirth, Per Brinch Hansen, Tony Hoare, David Parnas and Jean 
Ichbiah.62 
That manufacturing firms like ITT, L. M. Ericsson, Bell and Siemens 
all presented various papers on aspects of the use and creation of software in 
telecommunication systems confirmed the importance that programming and 
software development steadily gained within the field of 
telecommunications. However, there were few other signs of formal backing 
of the CCITT initiative at the ISS. Only Bourgonjon could break the news 
that it was decided that Philips would use the programming language at the 
ISS.63 The NTT, which had participated in the Team of Specialists, however 
uncooperatively, presented their continued work on the programming 
language DPL at ISS. 64  The NTT did, however, agree that they would 
modify DPL to a certain extent so that it would be in accordance with the 
                                                     
59 HLL Team of Specialists, “Progress report of the sixth meeting of the HLL Team 
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CCITT high-level language. 65  This underlined that a CCITT-approved 
programming language would enter a crowded “market”.  
The first public discussion of the work within the Team of Specialists 
was an indication of an agreement at the level of the technical community 
concerned with programming telecommunication systems. The 1976 ISS 
even coincided with the 100th anniversary of the invention of the telephone. 
In a celebratory article written by the chairman of the CCITT’s study group 
XI (the parent group of the Team of Specialists), J. S. Ryan of the Bell 
Laboratory, acknowledged that “the programming of switching processors” 
had “become a separate art”.66 The Team of Specialists was perhaps not that 
interested in turning the programming of telecommunication into an “art,” 
but separate it certainly was. Nevertheless, their work was duly noted as 
something of importance for the second century of the telephone. The 
endorsement from the study group leader, who presided over the work of the 
Team of Specialists in the CCITT, was an indication that the organisation 
looked on the Team’s work with some satisfaction.   
 
Postponed deadlines and delayed concepts 
The team had worked on the fringes of CCITT’s hierarchical system for 
most of 1975 and 1976. The fringe status implied that they needed to gather 
support for their work within the ranks of the CCITT as they were closing in 
on their target. Since there was no way that a finished programming 
language could be expected before the deadline for proposals to the plenary 
meeting of the CCITT in 1977, the team was in need of a temporary seal of 
approval and a go ahead to further their work beyond this study period.  
Long before the draft manuals were getting into any shape that would 
resemble anything useful, the Team of Specialists would have to report their 
results to the formal CCITT hierarchy. All the various parenting groups 
declared themselves “pleased at the progress made by the Team of 
Specialists”, even though they had not come very far.67 They also realised 
that a satisfactory proposal only could be fulfilled in the next plenary period. 
The Team of Specialists received an endorsement to continue, but only with 
some new and modified work assignments. One was that they would have to 
publish their preliminary results as a semi-official CCITT publication in 
1977, which again forced the group to put their ideas down on paper sooner 
rather than later. In the end, the 1977 Plenary Assembly stated that work in 
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the next study period would be concentrated on three particular issues. 
Firstly, experience from evaluation and implementation had to be gained, 
which was also something that was proposed by the members of the Team of 
Specialists. Secondly, there had to be efforts to strengthen the relation 
between the three different languages created by the CCITT: the high-level 
programming language Chill, the specification and description language 
SDL and the man-machine language MML. Finally, the Plenary asked the 
working groups to consider “the aim of establishing a common standard 
terminology over the entire field of telephony and computer sciences “.68 
The first point was obvious: before unleashing a programming 
language as a standard for the telecommunication world, it had to be used in 
a setting beyond small academic exercises conducted by a small number of 
players. The effect was the formation of the Implementors’ Forum from 
1977, which replaced the narrowly focused Team of Specialists. The two last 
points, however, stressed a tension that I have not considered in any 
substantial way previously: the tensions between different working groups 
within the CCITT hierarchy. While the last point only hints at a wish for 
greater linguistic coherence, the second one proved all the more serious, and 
one that I have not dealt with in any great detail previously: integration 
between Chill, SDL and MML.  
The study group 11 of the CCITT and ultimately the CCITT’s Plenary 
Assembly decided that the two other languages should be closely integrated 
with the work on the programming language, which in the period studied in 
this chapter was an almost non-existent consideration. The SDL language 
was an effort to standardise the graphical representations of the functionality 
of telecommunication systems. During the study period, the participants 
from L. M. Ericsson pushed the SDL group in the direction of a high-level 
description language, rather than standardised pictograms for advanced flow 
charts. This direction made the working group envisage a tighter integration 
of the programming language and the description language, or even a full 
integration. This triggered the idea of closely aligning the two languages – 
an idea that had not been discussed widely within the Team of Specialists. 
Such an alignment would mean a closer cooperation between the electrical 
engineers of the SDL group and the computer scientists dominating the Chill 
group.69 Whether this move was part of a grand scheme by L. M. Ericsson, 
which would have to involve the inactivity in the Team of Specialists and 
their high ambitions of the work on SDL and the eventual proposal to 
integrate the two efforts, is not known.70 Anyway, the call for integration 
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was largely ignored by the two groups, partly because of the technical 
difficulties, but mostly because each group had enough to deal with already, 
and could not take on the extra load of further coordination. 
The Team of Specialists had on purpose left out some important issues 
that needed decisions. Firstly, the bargaining process about whether and 
ultimately how the language should provide access to very low-level 
constructs was put off beyond the life of the group itself. Secondly, the issue 
of concurrency was also delayed, partly because of internal wrangling as 
well the state of the art. Concurrency, which basically implied the possibility 
of several operations executing and overlapping in time, and potentially 
interacting with each other, was at the time little understood or developed in 
the computer science field, and was perhaps best left for later.71  
Consequently, when the so-called Blue Document was issued in May 
1977, the group had come one step closer to creating a general purpose 
programming language, but created with a rather particular interest in mind, 
namely that of telephone switching systems. The group had argued that the 
range of applications used in a switching system was so broad that what was 
needed was a language with general capabilities. However, it was lacking in 
a number of areas. It was not integrated with other CCITT technologies that 
were developed in parallel, like SDL. It lacked concepts for handling 
concurrency in the language. In addition, several of the language constructs 
were inconsistent. All this was left to the group’s successor, the 
Implementors’ Forum.  
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Figure 3.2 The CCITT Study Group XI meeting in 1976.72 
 
What did the participants think of the results? In the beginning of May 1977, 
Kristen Rekdal delivered his report on Runit’s participation in the CCITT 
Team of Specialists to the Norwegian Telecommunication Administration. 
Here, he outlined his experiences and the results of the projects. He argued 
that the group was riddled with “contentions both between manufacturers 
and administrations, and between the individual manufacturers”. 73 
According to Rekdal, the administrations favoured standardisation in 
general, as it could ease the operation of their networks and perhaps reduce 
costs. The manufacturers were interested in better tools, but only if it put 
them ahead of the competition. Thus, standardisation for its own sake was of 
little interest, and was seen as bad if it costs anything. If one could arrive at 
some sort of compatibility between the programming languages already used 
by the manufacturers and the future recommendation, it would obviously be 
a fortunate position for a manufacturer. Another reason for the 
disagreements was the background of the team’s members. Rekdal noted the 
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following to his superiors:  
Both in cultural background, education and knowledge of English, the Team was 
inhomogeneous. Sometimes disagreements were caused by pure 
misunderstandings. In the beginning, this was a problem. In spite of these 
differences and many heated discussions, personal relations within the Team 
have been good. We are still friends and on talking terms.74 
When the Team was finally dissolved after its final meeting in London in 
February 1977, it had survived a “period of chaos”, to use the Bourgonjon’s 
expression, and had escaped with a language description that merited further 
work. The consensus that the Team arrived at was a result of aligning the 
very different backgrounds of the team members, and the difficulty of 
gaining any strategic position within the Team by running solo. The 
alignments and the alliances were the key to the progress, as none of the 
efforts towards retaining compatibility between Chill and existing 
programming languages used in telecommunications was successful.  
 
The structure of collaboration 
The account of the Team of Specialists has so far focused on the process of 
technical diplomacy. The route towards the interim halt of the programming 
language project that was the Blue Document could do with a second 
approach: one concerned with the structure of the negotiations, but one that 
can retain the processual outlook. A further investigation of who held 
prominent positions in the group and who was “in the thick of things” is 
pertinent.75 In the following, I apply a social network analysis (SNA) to the 
task of teasing out a number of structural features of the work done in the 
Team of Specialists, which supplements as well as questions parts of the 
story told above. 
The specific case of the structure of the Team of Specialists is of 
limited complexity, and a full-blown and formal SNA study might seem 
unnecessarily complicated when dealing with something that can be 
highlighted through simple frequency counts, such as the number of 
contributions made by different organisations to each meeting. However, a 
network analysis provides a more robust measurement of the work that went 
on within the Team, measurements that are possible to compare with the 
structure of the collaboration in later periods. 
Only 11 participants were represented in the group, and there were 
never more than eight representatives at the same meeting. The number of 
                                                     
74 Ibid. 
75 Linton C. Freeman, "Centrality in social networks conceptual clarification", Social 
Networks 1, no. 3 (1978). 
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official contributions, in form of written and submitted proposals and 
working documents, were about 70 distributed across seven meetings. I 
focus on two measurements. Firstly, the relationships formed through mutual 
participation in official meetings are measured in the joint appearance 
model. Secondly, the importance of contributions made by team members, or 
their parent organisation, to different meetings is measured in a model that 
estimates the participants’ willingness to influence each meeting. 
This makes it possible to distinguish between importance (or 
centrality, to use the lingo of SNA) gained through participation and an 
apparent centrality due to the willingness to exert influence through 
contributions to the various meetings. Both the joint appearance network and 
the influence model are based on measurements of the number of relations 
each individual has formed and the strength of these ties. However, there is 
an important difference: The joint appearance network has been projected 
onto a one-mode network where the tie strengths are measured by co-
participation at each meeting during the study period of the Team of 
Specialists (meaning that the “heaviest” ties come from the most co-
appearances). The influence network measures the strength of the ties as 
stemming from the number of contributed documents to each meeting by the 
parent organisation or the participant, joined with co-appearances. To be 
able to calculate the centrality indices, the original affiliation network has 
been projected onto a one-mode network, where the sum of the number of 
documents and the appearances is the weight of the different ties in the 
network, rather than just the multiplied co-appearance measure used 
before.76 The crucial question when applying this measure is the relative 
importance of tie weights to the number of ties in weighted networks. In the 
following, I have viewed the tie weights as the most important, so that the 
ties with large weights are considered to have a greater impact than ties with 
only small weights.  
  
                                                     
76 Contributions made by organisations that did not have any representatives at the 
meetings are, as a consequence, not included. I have also excluded documents 
credited to the whole Team of Specialists, while documents written by more than 
one organisation have been included in the count. This is because the document in 
question, the one credited to the Team of Specialists, was the full language proposal 
and not a document used in the discussion in the group. 
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 Participants Meetings Ties Density 
ToS 14 8 314 0.765  
Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics of the Team of Specialists measured as a 
network.77 
 
The high density, which measures the cohesion of the two-mode affiliation 
network and the clustering co-efficient, pays testimony to the tight 
integration that was evident in the Team of Specialists.  
The centrality of nodes has always been the key issue in SNA.78 
Degree centrality has been a particularly important measure, being defined 
as the number of nodes to which a focal node is connected.79 It is somewhat 
difficult to apply degree centrality to the influence-measuring model, as it 
was designed for binary networks and would disregard the weighted 
information. Although a number of attempts to apply this centrality measure 
to weighted networks, these attempts have focused on tie weights only, 
going too far in the opposite direction.80 Even though I consider tie weights 
more important in both networks, disregarding the number of ties completely 
would be unfortunate. In an attempt to combine both degree and strength, I 
apply a measure recently defined by Tore Opsahl to ease the analysis of 
weighted networks.81 This applies a tuning parameter to assess the relative 
importance of the number of ties compared to tie weights, and report a 
degree centrality measure, which is the product of the number of nodes to 
which a focal node is connected, and the average weight to these nodes 
adjusted by the tuning parameter. Following this, I report the normal degree 
centrality, and the variant of degree centrality that takes both the number of 
                                                     
77 The density of the two mode networks is calculated in Ucinet. See Steve Borgatti, 
Martin Everett, and Lin Freeman, Ucinet 6 for Windows: Software for Social 
Network Analysis Ver. 6.0, Analytic Technologies, Harvard. 
78 Freeman, The development of social network analysis: a study in the sociology of 
science. 
79  Other measures exist. Typically, closeness and betweenness centrality are 
considered important. Closeness centrality is the inverse sum of shortest distances to 
all other nodes from a focal node, measuring how quickly a participant could reach 
others. Betweenness assesses how a node is able to channel the flow of a network as 
it calculates the degree to which a node lies on the shortest path between two other 
nodes. Both defined in ———, "Centrality in social networks conceptual 
clarification". 
80 Examples are listed in Tore Opsahl, Filip Agneessens, and John Skvoretz, "Node 
centrality in weighted networks: Generalizing degree and shortest paths", Social 
Networks 32, no. 3 (2010). 
81 Ibid. 
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ties and the tie weight into consideration.82 Furthermore, a normalised degree 
centrality score is presented in the case of the joint appearance network, 
which is calculated from the raw binary affiliation matrix. This is primarily 
intended as a comparative measure, used more extensively in the next 
chapter.83 
 
 Joint appearance  Willingness to influence 
Participant Degree Degree 
(Alpha) 
Degree 
(norm) 
Degree Degree (Alpha) 
J. D. Beierle 43 78.20 1.000 55 113.13 
R. Bourgonjon 43 78.20 1.000 156 540.40 
R. T. Boyd 7 7.00 0.143 21 34.02 
K. Clements 14 17.46 0.286 15 18.37 
S. Hallsteinsen 6 6.00 0.143 24 48.00 
H. Kvarneby 35 65.48 0.857 47 101.89 
T. Koizumi 13 15.62 0.286 20 29.81 
M. Kakuma 8 8.00 0.143 8 8.00 
K. Maruyama 37 64.97 0.857 75 187.50 
S. Ogawa 8 8.00 0.143 8 8.00 
K. Rekdal 37 64.97 0.857 137 462.90 
L. Sandberg 17 24.78 0.429 27 49.60 
H. Sorgenfrei 38 64.97 0.857 65 145.34 
T. Wakamoto 8 8.00 0.143 8 8.00 
Table 3.5 Centrality measures of the Team of Specialists. 
 
The joint appearance network highlights the presence and ties between three 
important industrial participants, Bourgonjon of Philips, Sorgenfrei of 
Siemens and Beierle of the ITT. It also highlights less active participants 
from telecommunication administrations, except the appointed mutual 
representation of the Nordic administrations through the researcher Kristen 
Rekdal and the strong presence of Japanese participants representing the 
                                                     
82  This follows Ibid. The joint measurement includes a tuning parameter, α, to 
control for the relative importance of the number of ties and the weight of the ties. 
The α parameter is set to 1.5, which weights tie weights as the most important.  
83 Normalised degree centrality on the co-appearance network normalises the scores 
against the maximum possible scores in an equivalently sized connected two-mode 
network and hence provides appropriately scaled measures. The score is calculated 
in Ucinet. See Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman, Ucinet 6 for Windows: Software for 
Social Network Analysis. Alpha-justified scores calculated with R and tnet. See 
Tore Opsahl, Structure and Evolution of Weighted Networks (University of London 
(Queen Mary College), London, UK, 2009); R Development Core Team,  (Vienna, 
Austria: R Foundation for Statistical Computing, R: A Language and Environment 
for Statistical Computing). 
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NTT.84 By considering the centrality indices, Beierle and Bourgonjon are 
ranked as the most central participants when considering co-appearances, but 
when taking the influence measurements into consideration, a somewhat 
different pattern emerges. The obvious lack of influence-gaining 
contributions from centrally positioned actors such as Sorgenfrei of Siemens 
and Bierle of the ITT render their ties in the network as weak, even though 
their appearance at all the meetings makes the number of ties (to meetings, 
this time) high. This also becomes clear when inspecting two comparable 
illustrations of the two networks, one based on the projected one-mode 
network of co-appearances, the other a joint display of meetings and 
participants based on the weighted influence network. 85  In the first 
illustration, the tie between participants is based on the number of co-
appearances, while the weight of each tie in the latter illustration is 
calculated as a sum of participation and the number of written contributions 
made to each meeting rather than the total score, which is used in the 
centrality measures above. This makes it possible to get an impression of the 
variance of influence-seeking actions through time, and the intensity of 
document submission at various meetings coupled with who was present.   
 
  
                                                     
84 On the setup of the telecommunication industry in Japan, see Fransman, Japan's 
computer and communications industry : the evolution of industrial giants and 
global competitiveness. 
85 Katherine Faust, "Using Correspondence Analysis for Joint Displays of Affiliation 
Networks", in Models and Methods in Social Network Analysis, ed. Peter J. 
Carrington, John Scott, and Stanley Wasserman (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005). 
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Summing up, based on analyses of joint appearances and influence 
ambitions, some structural features of the cooperation seem evident. Some 
participants had a strong presence at the group meetings but contributed little 
to the work in terms of written documents. This could be rooted in two 
different reasons. Either the actors participated in the work in order to 
observe what went on, but held no real interest in directing the work in any 
particular direction, or they held so little expertise that any meaningful 
contributions were impossible. I will consider each of these possibilities in 
the qualitative analysis below.  
Both measurements have a number of other shortcomings. First of all, 
the simple metric of the number of contributions might indicate a willingness 
to influence, but it says little about whether this effort was successful or not. 
The number of contributions cannot be considered a part of some sort of out-
numbering game. Second, the individual-oriented participation network does 
not take into the account the fact that some of the organisations sent different 
participants to different meetings, but retained continuity through local 
teams. Furthermore, it is important to stress that the SNA glances over 
important qualitative dimensions of the contributions, such as the quality of 
the argument, its consistency and so forth.  
Co-affiliations illustrate the opportunities to influence the decision 
processes in the team, and the ability to form relationships through joint 
appearances made such influence all the more effective. The coupling of 
appearances and contributions reveals a number of actors who were less 
active than their position made possible. This is particularly so for the 
representatives of Siemens and the ITT, Sorgenfrei and Bierle. As such, the 
network analysis has revealed some additional features of the Team of 
Specialists that have not been evident in the archival material and interviews 
that formed the basis of the rest of the chapter. However, more importantly, 
it has strengthened the impression that the main players in the Team of 
Specialists were participants that shared a similar technical background in 
computer science, in particular Bourgonjon and Rekdal.  
 
Some conclusions 
In this chapter I have described how the Team of Specialists traversed a 
number of hurdles towards a first sketch of a CCITT-recommended 
programming language. Professional differences and strategic manoeuvring 
were overcome through technical diplomacy, as a set of problems and 
difficulties were managed. This was more due to an alignment of the 
participants’ ideas on programming language design than processes in the 
parent organisations of the participants. I have argued that many of these 
realignments were due to a shared understanding, a common development 
virtue if you like, that ran prior to the work in the Team of Specialists. 
However, a number of the finer ingredients in the diplomatic process were 
bound up in compromises made in a pragmatic fashion.  
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The first set of problems that faced the Team of Specialists was related to 
whether the future programming language should be an amalgam of existing 
languages used in telecommunications, or whether the group should try to 
build on the cutting edge of programming language design. Throughout the 
“period of chaos” much of the diplomatic negotiations stemmed from the 
strategic manoeuvring of administrations and manufacturers that had already 
invested in programming language technologies, wishing to regain 
compatibility with that and the future recommendation.  Later on, this was 
replaced by more focused technical decision-making, which gradually 
bypassed the arguments for solutions grounded in the wider technical 
community. However, existing languages were not only technologies that 
held industrial ramifications, but were also markers of different professional 
identities. One of the most pronounced arguments within the team was the 
combined issue of the compatibility problem and the professional identity 
markers, as the struggle between the PL/1-supporting Japanese 
representatives and the Algol-oriented Europeans illustrated. Hurdle number 
three was related to the special needs in a telecommunication programming 
language, like how to handle parallelism and the relationship to SDL. In this 
chapter, I have highlighted the process and structure of the technical 
diplomacy that went on within the Team of Specialists, and how each of 
these three difficulties was managed 
First of all, the period from 1975 to 1977 was about how a number of 
contestations were brought under control through a number of 
orchestrations: First, by aligning the work of Remi Bourgonjon at Philips 
and Kristen Rekdal at Runit, the Team of Specialists was able to produce a 
proposal for a recommendation on how a CCITT high-level programming 
language could look. Secondly, by engaging the full team in the practical 
work of writing a description and a manual for the language, the work 
became more practically oriented and consequently more consensus-based.  
The structural analysis of the technical diplomacy in the Team of 
Specialists revealed additional aspects of the project. Important and visible 
participants in the Team, the actors habituating central positions in the 
network, were representatives of manufacturing firms.  
The influence analysis revealed that a number of these central participants 
were, however, more observers than contributors. They were centrally 
positioned, but showed little willingness to influence. 
This underlines the impression of the Team of Specialists as untypical 
of the CCITT. It was not dominated by representatives of administrations, 
even though they had been instrumental in its formation. The most effective 
participants were those who formed alliances based on a shared outlook on 
how programming should be done, and consequently, how a programming 
language should promote such virtuous programming. These alliances were, 
however, not only internal to the Team, but also pulled together external 
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participants, like Bourgonjon’s contact with researchers in Philips’ Belgian 
research laboratory MBLE and the support of the CCITT hierarchy.  
Knowledge creation and knowledge adaptation at the crossroads of 
computer science and electrical engineering, within a bureaucratic 
organisation in transition, were never straightforward. Technical 
considerations on flexibility, security, efficiency and portability were all part 
of the design process. Some of them were postponed for later consideration, 
like the integration of the programming language and the description 
language (SDL), the creation of concepts allowing for concurrency and the 
availability of low-level constructs for hardware level access. All in all, 
during 1976 and early 1977, compromise and postponements led the project 
towards a partial fulfilment and the subsequent dissolution of the Team of 
Specialists. 
During those two years, the Team of Specialists drew support for their 
work from outside resources, like non-committed firms and international 
organisations. In the summer of 1977, the Team of Specialists was to be 
dismantled. A new organisational entity, the so-called Implementers Forum, 
was about to embark on perhaps an even more difficult task than designing 
and agreeing on a high-level programming language: they were about to 
make it work in practice. This is the subject of the coming chapter. 
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4. Compromise and complexity: the 
implementation of a programming language 
Starting in the summer of 1977 the programming language designed by the 
Team of Specialists was put through the hoops in extensive field trials. It 
was finally approved by the CCITT Plenary Assembly in November 1980 as 
an official recommendation.1 During this period, new features were added to 
the language, existing ones were refined and the language was implemented 
through the construction of a set of compilers. Implementation and 
programming language design were combined and allowed to feed back into 
each other, as the participants in the CCITT made the language ready for 
programming duty. Throughout this period the language designers of Chill 
met with prospective users of the programming language in the 
Implementors’ Forum, which was the continuation of the Team of 
Specialists.2  
The Forum was characterised by collaboration, conflict, compromise 
and complexity. The participants in the Forum were able to collaborate on 
practical projects beyond the common language they were set to design, in 
particular on the construction of compilers. Still, there were heated debates 
and conflicts, in particular on unresolved programming language design 
issues that were bound up with conflicting development virtues and ideals. 
The way out of the first set of deadlocks was found in compromises, 
typically by aligning different actors through mutual contributions. 
However, some of the compromise solutions also added to the complexity of 
the programming language, duplicating features and constructs, so much that 
a leading computer scientist declared that Chill was  “by far the most 
complex, uneven and compromise-ridden programming language the world 
has yet seen”, when he first encountered it.3 Such complexity added to the 
difficulty of implementing the language in any effective fashion, although 
several parties succeeded in developing compilers for Chill by the end of the 
period of the Implementors’ Forum. Most implementors dealt with this 
duplication and complexity by implementing only those subsets of Chill that 
were suitable for the compilers’ intended application.  
                                                     
1 The language definition was published as CCITT High Level Language (CHILL), 
CCITT Recommendation Z.200 (1980). On the ratification, see Minutes of the 
Plenary Meeting, 10 – 21, November 1980, ITUA. 
2 The progress reports from the Implementors’ Forum are attached to COM XI-No. 
270-E, Period 1977-1980, CCITT, ITUA. 
3 Dines Bjørner and Peter L. Haff, “A formal ‘denotational’ semantics definition of 
CHILL”, Technical report ID888, September 14, 1979, ix, box “NTT 72-2/NT-P 
1979 – 1980”, KRC. 
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Despite the complexity, compromises and conflicts, the period also fostered 
a small community, and in the end, a language specification worthy of 
publication. What had been a small project partly embedded in a community 
of technological practitioners interested in programming telecommunication 
systems soon became a community on its own, the Chill community if you 
like. Considering the infighting, the tangles and the tensions that had marred 
the Team of Specialists and the Implementors’ Forum, this was no small 
achievement. After the last meeting of the Implementors’ Forum in 
Melbourne, in late September 1979, Rekdal noted they had “achieved what 
very few believed was possible five years ago”, concluding with: “Chill is 
finished!” 4  The result was, he claimed, “a language with several novel 
features, and it is a very comprehensive language”.5  
This chapter tracks the last years of the Chill project before its 
ratification as an official recommendation by the CCITT in 1980.6 It focuses 
on language design decisions, implementation issues, how the field trials 
were organised and how feedback was allowed into the language design 
process. I also analyse how the Chill community was developed and 
extended in the period from around the summer of 1977 until the 
programming language was published as a standard in 1980. Throughout the 
chapter, I investigate how community-level norms and organisational level 
strategies influenced the fate of Chill up until its final ratification. 
 
Design, implementation and feedbacks 
Before we look into the activities of the Implementors’ Forum in more 
detail, it can be useful to recapitulate the distinction between language 
design, implementations and systems programming. Programming language 
design is commonly understood as the efforts of putting together the 
definition of the lexical, syntactical and semantic elements of a language, 
hopefully fulfilling some sort of design criteria. The majority of the 
programming language design of Chill was done within the Team of 
Specialists. Here, the key features of the language, such as key words, 
concepts and capabilities, were decided. In particular, the design goals that 
                                                     
4 Kristen Rekdal, Travel report, Melbourne 24 – 29 September 1976, CCITT – 
Implementors Forum SWP XI/3-2, WP/3 Melbourne, Sept. 1979, box 
“Implementors Forum 9. møte Melbourne, Sept. 1979, Serie O”, KRC. My 
translation. 
5 Kristen Rekdal, "The Nordic CHILL Project", in Runit Report (Trondheim: Runit, 
1980), 1. 
6 The account is again based on mainly two collection of sources, the ITU archive 
(ITUA) and the Kristen Rekdal Collection (KRC). Some documents not available in 
the KRC were complemented by the private collection of Remi Bourgonjon (hereby 
cited as RBC), which holds a complete set of official documents for the 
Implementors’ Forum period.  
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made their way into the language already in the 1977 specification from the 
Team of Specialists were concerned with enhancing reliability by making 
the language constructs possible to check when compiling the code, placing 
severe restrictions on the intermixing of data types (so called strong typing, 
again to ensure reliability), to permit the generation of efficient machine 
code by adopting features from so-called machine-oriented higher level 
languages and still be flexible enough to cover a wide range of applications 
and different types of hardware.  
However, the Forum would have to sort out some of the 
inconsistencies in the draft language sketched out by the Team of 
Specialists, as well as adding new features necessary for making the 
language viable for the telecommunications industry. As such, the Forum 
was an extended effort in language design. The ultimate result of the 
programming language design activities was the final language specification 
– which was published by the CCITT in 1980 as an official 
recommendation.7 A language description is, however, nothing but text. To 
be able to use the programming language, one would need to implement the 
language, which was the main concern of the Forum. 
Programming language implementation is most commonly 
understood as the creation of compilers. A compiler is a program that 
translates code written by programmers into code understandable to the 
targeted computers. As described in chapter two, computer hardware does 
not interpret code written in a programming language directly, as hardware 
deals with sequences of particular instructions in machine code. Therefore, 
the code written in a high-level programming language has to be translated 
into machine code before it can be processed by a computer. This translation 
can be automated and forms a program in itself. Such a translation program 
is called a compiler, and the text to be translated is called source code. Such 
a program is, in itself, characterised by three languages: its source language, 
being the high-level programming language used by the programmer, its 
object language, which is given by the target hardware platform, and the 
language in which it is written, being the implementation language.  
In the 1950s and 1960s, compilers figured among the largest 
programming projects of the time, involving large investments and 
numerous man-years, and also attracted much research and development.8 In 
the late 1970s, the situation was somewhat different. According to the 
important textbook on the subject, by Alfred V. Aho and Jeffrey D. Ullman 
from 1977, the effort needed to construct a compiler was much less than 
                                                     
7 CCITT High Level Language (CHILL), CCITT Recommendation Z.200 (1980). 
8 A reliable source on both the history and technical details of compilers is Niklaus 
Wirth, Compiler construction, International computer science series (Harlow, 
England ; Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1996). 
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before: “[...] it is not unreasonable to expect a fairly substantial compiler to 
be implemented as a student project in a one-semester compiler design 
course.” 9  One major reason for this was that the tasks involved in 
compilation had been thoroughly understood and that a shared understanding 
of the processes of compilation was available.  
This typically involved a number of tasks that were common to any 
compiler, regardless of the source language or the object language. The 
process of compiling source code involved passing the code through several 
phases of lexical and syntactical analyses, optimisation and finally code 
generation. A figure illustrating the steps involved in the translation of code 
normally involved in a compiler as of the second half of the 1970s is 
produced below. 
                                                     
9 Alfred V. Aho and Jeffrey D. Ullman, Principles of compiler design, Addison-
Wesley series in computer science and information processing (Reading, Mass.: 
Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1977), 1. 
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Figure 4.1 Phases of compilation 
 
Regardless of the common aspects of all compiler design, to implement a 
programming language that was still in the making was a more complex 
undertaking, and more importantly, the quality of these early compilers had 
to be well beyond what was achievable for a single student in a one-semester 
course.  
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Kristen Rekdal, one of the most central participants in the Team of 
Specialists and the Implementors’ Forum, described the importance of 
implementations and compiler construction in the following way: 
The practical usefulness of a programming language can only be demonstrated 
by using it for practical programming. Furthermore a language can only be 
evaluated together with its compiler. A good language can be rendered useless 
by a poor compiler, and a good compiler can compensate for language defects.10 
In the end, however, the compiler is just a tool made for the programmers 
developing systems and applications. In programming, these two things are 
normally understood as quite separate undertakings. Application 
programming is the creation of software that provides services to a user 
while systems programming provides services to hardware. Considering 
Chill, it would be fair to assume the development of programs intended to 
solve a specific telecommunication problem, like a routing application or a 
billing procedure and so forth, were more similar to systems programming 
than applications programming, although the terminology was often mixed 
together. In this early phase, the availability of implementations was non-
existent, so to start using the programming language an implementation 
project would often be a necessary precondition to take up actual systems or 
application programming projects.  
Although the creation of a programming language inevitably moves 
along a path from design towards systems or application programming, it is 
not altogether linear. In reality, the boundaries between the periods were a 
lot less distinct and knowledge from implementation efforts and application 
programming efforts was allowed to feed back into revisions of the language 
design throughout its existence. The period of the Implementors’ Forum 
makes this very clear, as the Forum would, at the same time, be active in 
compilation design and make numerous language revisions. Inevitably it was 
also a considerably larger group. While the members of the Team of 
Specialists had been restricted to a selected few, the Forum included a total 
of 70 different participants over the whole period.11 The level of activity 
grew just as much, an indication being the 174 written contributions made to 
the Forum.12  The Forum held nine lengthy meetings during a period of 24 
months, clocking in 44 days of discussions, reviews and decision-making in 
various locations around the world. The 70 different delegates that 
participated in the Forum came from more than 25 different organisations, 
                                                     
10 Rekdal, "The Nordic CHILL Project", 1. 
11 The number includes delegates but not observers. 
12 Contributed documents were listed in the nine official progress reports that the 
Implementors’ Forum made to the official CCITT Working Party (XI/3-2). The total 
number includes all types of working documents.  
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spanning several telecommunication administrations, research organisations 
and industrial firms, and representing 16 different countries. In comparison 
to the period from 1975 to 1977, the Forum was certainly a lot more 
comprehensive and ambitious, both in terms of the number of participants 
and the activity level. The amount of work done on Chill-related projects in 
this period can be characterised as substantial and widespread. I have 
summarised some of the details about the Implementors’ Forum in the table 
below. 
 
Meeting  Dates  Place  Participants  Documents 
1 12 – 16 September 1977 London 21 12 
2 22 – 28 November 1977 Geneva 18 26 
3 13 – 17 February 1978 The Hague 19 23 
4 5 – 8 June 1978 Geneva 22 24 
5 18 – 22 September 1978 Tokyo 18 12 
6 12 – 15 December 1978 London 26 24 
7 19 -22 February 1979 Geneva 36 18 
8 14 – 18 May 1979  Florence 32 23 
9 24 – 28 September 1979 Melbourne 31 12 
Table 4.1 Meetings in the Implementors' Forum, with number of participants 
and number of contributed documents.13 
 
The group was organised outside the formal CCITT hierarchy, but affiliated 
with the work of its parent Study Group within the CCITT. In parallel to the 
cooperation in the Implementors’ Forum, several participants ran Chill-
projects on the side, like the joint-Nordic compiler project and a cooperative 
effort between Philips and the Dutch administration, racking up the number 
of collaborations and the number of participants in Chill-related activities. In 
the following, I will look a bit more into the structure of the Implementors’ 
Forum through the concepts of social network analysis, before I analyse how 
compilation construction and language design was intertwined in the period 
of the Forum.  
 
Implementing structure 
The actors that had been active in the Team of Specialists dominated the 
Implementors’ Forum. Remi Bourgonjon of Philips continued as the 
convenor of the group, with Kristen Rekdal of Runit working as the vice-
                                                     
13 Information from the official reports written by Remi Bourgonjon, most of which 
are available in KRC, except for reports on meetings number one and two, where the 
reports are only found in the RBC. 
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convenor. A number of manufacturing firms were present throughout the 
period, some new to the group, and others with experience from the Team of 
Specialists. The ITT, L. M. Ericsson, Western Electric, Siemens, Philips, 
Hasler, AT&T, as well as a couple of Japanese manufacturing firms were 
active participants.14 Another group attending the meetings were researchers 
and scientists. One example was Dines Bjørner, a computer scientist from 
the Technical University of Denmark and acting as a specialist on behalf of 
the Danish telecommunication authority. Other participants with a similar 
background came from the Italian research organisation CSELT. Kristen 
Rekdal had held a similar position since the work started in the Team of 
Specialists, working on behalf of the Nordic telecommunication 
administrations, but based at the computer centre of the Norwegian Institute 
of Technology of Trondheim, Norway. The number of passive observers 
grew, including a number of sporadic attendees from the telecommunication 
administrations of Brazil, Hungary and the GDR, making up a fairly 
inconsistent and heterogeneous group. How was this group different to the 
Team of Specialists? 
Following the social network analysis in chapter three, it is possible to 
review the structure of the Forum through the analysis of joint appearances 
and document contributions, as well as comparing some descriptive statistics 
of the Team of Specialists with the Implementors’ Forum.  
 
 Participants Meetings Ties Density 
ToS 14 8 314 0.765 
IF 70 9 4636 0.319 
Table 4.2: A comparison of network measures of the Team of Specialists and 
the Implementors’ Forum.15 
 
Whereas the Team was small and dense, in terms of frequencies as well as 
the density measures, the Forum was dispersed and much larger. 16  This 
structure is mirrored in the individual measures of centrality, which gives an 
indication of who were “in the thick of things”, both in terms of a position 
where it could be possible to influence the network through affiliations and 
                                                     
14 Study Group XI, Sub working party XI/3-2,“Progress report on the ninth meeting, 
Melbourne, 24 – 24 September 1979,” Melbourne, 1-11 October 1979, Temporary 
Document No. 201, box “Implementors Forum 9. møte Melbourne, Sept. 1979, 
Serie O”, KRC. 
15 The calculations follow the conventions established in chapter three. 
16 The density measure is highly sensitive of the size of the network. See Noah E. 
Friedkin, "The development of structure in random networks: an analysis of the 
effects of increasing network density on five measures of structure", Social 
Networks 3, no. 1 (1981). 
  115 
 
in actual documented contributions.17 A larger group of participants held 
high scores in terms of centrality in the Implementors’ Forum, but relatively, 
the core group was smaller than in the Team of Specialists, due to the large 
group of participants attending only a few meetings of the Forum. In terms 
of organisational affiliations, the core members of the Forum, both in terms 
of participation and influence-seeking activities, were largely from 
manufacturing firms, with a few important exceptions. In particular, the 
representative of the Dutch telecommunication administration, R. W. Meijer, 
was an active member of the Forum.  
The figures also highlight the general impression of the continuity 
between the Implementors’ Forum and the participants in the Team of 
Specialists. The individuals listed in the figure participated in three meetings 
or more, together with the participants with which they are linked. We 
recognise the centrality of former Team of Specialists members Bourgonjon, 
Rekdal, Sorgenfrei and Clements. Some new individuals, such as the Italians 
Martucci and Benevolo, the Dutch telecommunication administration 
representative Meijer and the important participants Bjørner and Jacobson 
also figure in the social network analysis illustrations. The main group of 
new participants were European, coming from both manufacturers and 
administrations. In the Italian case, Benevolo represented the operator-
owned research establishment CSELT while Martucci was from the 
manufacturing company SIT-Siemens, soon to be renamed Italtel.18 Below, 
figures and tables that underline these general points are presented. The 
displays articulate the complexity of the Forum, while the tables make it 
possible to compare some of the centrality measures used in the study of the 
Team of Specialists. To recapitulate a bit, the measurements are focused on 
different ways of measuring degree centrality, which is the number of nodes 
to which a specific node is connected and indicate who were the most 
centrally positioned and active members of the network that was the 
Forum. 19  As discussed in the previous chapters at some length, all the 
measures have a number of deficiencies, although the set of general degree 
centrality, normalised scores and the tuned alpha-score were considered 
useful to the task at hand. Now, the normalised degree centrality scores of 
                                                     
17 Freeman, "Centrality in social networks conceptual clarification". 
18Chapuis and Joel, Electronics, computers and telephone switching: 1960-1985, 
432. 
19  Other measures exist. Typically, closeness and betweenness centrality are 
considered important. Closeness centrality is the inverse sum of shortest distances to 
all other nodes from a focal node, measuring how quickly a participant could reach 
others. Betweenness assesses how a node is able to channel the flow of a network as 
it calculates the degree to which a node lies on the shortest path between two other 
nodes. Both defined in Freeman, "Centrality in social networks conceptual 
clarification". 
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the joint appearance network are particularly interesting, as they are more 
directly comparable to the numbers put forward in the previous chapter.20 As 
discussed before, it is not viable to calculate a similar score on the 
willingness to influence scores, because of its inherent weighted nature.  
                                                     
20 This follows Opsahl, Agneessens, and Skvoretz, "Node centrality in weighted 
networks: Generalizing degree and shortest paths". The joint measurement includes 
a tuning parameter, α, to control for the relative importance of the number of ties 
and the weight of the ties. The α parameter is set to 1.5, which weights tie weights as 
the most important.  
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  Co-appearance 
Name Organization Degree Degree (Alpha) Degree (norm.) 
R. W. Meijer PTT Netherlands 192 320.28 1.000 
K. Rekdal RUNIT 192 320.28 1.000 
R. Martucci S. I. T Siemens 192 320.28 1.000 
C. Breeus Philips (MBLE) 176 285.25 0.889 
H. R. Sorgenfrei GEC 174 280.41 0.889 
R. H. Bourgonjon Philips 173 275.94 0.889 
K. F. Clements UKPO 165 271.37 0.889 
E. Benevolo CSELT 159 248.68 0.778 
D. Combelic ITT 158 246.34 0.778 
I. Jacobson LME 142 220.30 0.778 
R. Reed GEC 143 218.95 0.667 
D. Bjørner Tech.Uni. Denmark 141 210.94 0.667 
T. Denvir ITT 108 149.98 0.444 
C. G. Denenberg ITT 84 136.10 0.556 
P. W. Dell UKPO 86 132.92 0.556 
Table 4.3: Top 15 by joint appearance, sorted by the parameterised alpha-
measure. 
 
Comparing the normalised degree centrality scores with the ones of the 
previous study period, it is evident that in real numbers, the well connected 
were a much larger group in the Team. 16 members of the Team scored 
above 0,5 on normalised degree centrality, while six comparable members 
were active in the period of the Team. Proportionally, 16 out of a total 
number of 70 delegates, was, however, a far smaller share.  
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  Influence 
Name Organisation Degree Alpha 
C. Breeus Philips (MBLE) 891 3249.22 
R. H. Bourgonjon Philips 838 2941.79 
R. W. Meijer PTT Netherlands 697 2215.26 
K. Rekdal RUNIT 521 1431.63 
C. G. Denenberg ITT 368 1247.95 
R. Reed GEC 423 1113.90 
D. Combelic ITT 361 850.75 
H. R. Sorgenfrei GEC 335 749.08 
K. F. Clements UKPO 324 746.71 
I. Jacobson LME 296 663.00 
D. Bjøner Tech. Univ. Denmark 281 593.46 
G. Louis Philips (MBLE) 251 592.79 
K. Maruyama NTT 209 581.48 
R. Martucci S. I. T Siemens 247 467.33 
J. R. W. Smith GEC 170 380.13 
Table 4.4: Top 15 by willingness to influence, sorted by parameterised alpha-
score. 
 
When analysing the scores that measure document contributions, the team of 
Camille Breeus and Remi Bourgonjon, both from Philips (MBLE in the case 
of Breeus) emerges as the most active in the Forum. All in all, the measures 
indicate a very strong Dutch group, as the administration representative 
Meijer emerges in the top three in both tables, while Breeus and Bourgonjon 
score particularly highly when considering document contributions. 
In the previous period, the working documents were typically from 
Philips, Runit and the NTT (with some notable exceptions). Working 
documents issued in the Forum included contributions from 20 different 
organisations, ranging from the Italian research institute CSELT to the 
Finnish telecommunication administration (the full listings are available in 
the appendix). All in all, the number of representatives of manufacturing 
firms was still the largest, just as in the Team of Specialists, but with a larger 
number of researchers with ties to administrations attending and influencing 
the direction of the work.23  
Co-authored documents indicated an alliance between the participants 
in the forum. These alliances were important in the Forum, more so than in 
the Team of Specialists. 17 of 164 working documents were co-authored by 
delegates from different organisations. This type of contribution strategy was 
used by the veteran players, such as the participants from the Nordic 
telecommunication administrations, Philips, the Dutch administration and 
Runit. The main actors in the Forum in terms of activity were the 
representatives of Philips, who contributed to 34 working documents, either 
                                                     
23 For the complete listing, see Appendix 2. 
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as sole authors or in collaboration with other contributors. Remi Bourgonjon 
also issued 16 documents as the convenor of the group.  
The contributed documents can be grouped into three categories. One 
type dealt with inconsistencies of the language proposal and correcting 
errors, large and small. Another type was concerned with refinements of the 
language, often dealing with issues that had been postponed within the Team 
of Specialists or which they had left in a fairly preliminary state. Together, 
these two groups of documents were concerned with programming language 
design. A third group of documents were reports of various implementation 
projects, often reporting on various compilation design techniques.   
Most documents concerning new features, refinements and correction 
of errors were submitted by organisations that had been active in the Team 
of Specialists. The latter group of documents, reports of progress in ongoing 
implementation projects, were issued by various participants. All in all, most 
contributions were issued by organisations that had been involved in the 
project from its start. 
The idea behind a forum of implementers was to let practical 
experience feed back in to the language proposal. Practical experience with 
the programming language was mainly gained through the creation of 
compilers. The Implementors’ Forum was extended by of a set of local 
initiatives and networks concerned with specific compiler construction 
projects. The Forum functioned as a central hub where information about the 
progress of local projects was reported, commented on and dealt with. There 
was much local variation in terms of host machines, target machines, level of 
commitment, competence, and investments. This variation was important for 
the development of the programming language itself, since a lot of this 
feedback pointed out ambiguities and errors in the language. Much activity 
in the Forum was dedicated to the issues that were raised when creating the 
compilers, which is the subject of the next few pages. 
 
Compiling Chill 
The development of compilers, programs capable of translating code written 
in Chill into machine code understood by various telecommunication 
switches and computers, was a large part of what went on in the 
Implementors’ Forum. 11 different implementation projects were embarked 
upon during the four-year period of the Forum, although not every one was 
carried out or could be described as successful.24 Some of the projects were 
very limited in scope, producing nothing but a compiler for a small subset of 
the programming language to a specific hardware platform. Others were 
large and ambitious as they tried to design flexible compilers that could 
                                                     
24 An overview is found in Chill Bulletin 1, no. 1 (1981), 39. This gives a status as of 
August 1981, a year after the official endorsement of Chill by the CCITT.  
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accommodate different hardware targets and host machines. Six projects 
were started at the outset of the Implementors’ Forum. Siemens, ITT, 
Philips, the Nordic telecommunication administration, the Dutch 
administration and the NTT all started on constructing new compilers 
immediately. Others embarked on similar undertakings as the Forum period 
progressed. An overview of the compiler projects, large and small, is given 
in the table below. The compilers listed were either finished or under 
development as of August 1981. Projects that never got off the planning 
stage have been left out. Host computer implies the computer that ran the 
compiler and the target computer implies the computer or processor type for 
which the compiled code was intended. In this period of trials, the target 
computer did not always imply a computer platform used in switching 
products, but could be a general computer architecture, like Intel’s 
revolutionary 8086 system introduced in 1978, which was the target of four 
of the projects.25 
  
                                                     
25 Intel’s 8086 processor holds a special place in computer history, as it eventually 
resulted in 30 years of successful chip designs that have allowed Intel to dominate 
microcomputers, like the 386, 486 and Pentium processors. On the history of Intel’s 
8086, see Stanley Mazor, "Intel's 8086", IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 
32, no. 1 (2010). 
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Participating organsations Host computer Target computer 
Runit, The Nordic and British 
telecommunication 
administrations 
Nord-100 APZ-210, 
Intel 8086 
NTT DC-10 DC-10 
ITT IBM 370 and IBM 3033 Intel 8086 
Siemens Siemens 7000, IBM 370 S7000, IBM 370 
SSP103, SSP303 
Intel 8086 
CSELT, SIP, Italtel PDP 11/VAX PDP11/VAX, PDP11/MIC-
20 
Technical University of Denmark 
and the Danish 
telecommunication 
administration 
VAX-11 VAX-11 
CNET (French PTT) IRIS 80 Unknown 
Philips DEC-20 TCP 36, TCP 16/Z 8000 
GTE IBM 3033 Intel 8086 
Dutch PTT DEC-10, DEC-20 PDP-11 
British Telecom ICL 2900 GEC Mark II BL 
Table 4.5: Implementation projects started in the period of the CCITT 
Implementors’ Forum.26 
 
How extensive were these projects? Economic details about the extent of 
investments in the implementation projects in terms of man-years or real 
sums are available only through sporadic evidence and casual reports of such 
to the Implementors’ Forum. We know, for example, that ITT invested about 
five staff-years in their initial compiler project.27 Other estimations indicated 
that Siemens, which in conjunction with the development of a Chill compiler 
also developed high-level debugging tools, had devoted in the region of 13 
to 20 man-years to their early implementation project. Philips, which had 
been the most active manufacturing firm in the project overall, was supposed 
                                                     
26 Information primarily found in various reports circulated in the Implementors’ 
Forum, all documents found in KRC. On the compiler constructed by the Dutch 
PTT, see R. W. Meijer and G. H. te Sligte, "Status report of CCITT HLL 
implementation at the Dr Neher Laboratory of the Netherlands PTT", in Software 
Engineering for Telecommunciation Switching Systems (Helsinki, Finland: 
Institution of Electrical Engineers, 1978). On the Nordic Chill compiler, see Rekdal, 
"The Nordic CHILL Project". On the NTT, see K. Maruyama, N. Sato, and K. 
Konishi, "NTT CHILL implementation aspects and its application experience", in 
Software Engineering for Telecommunciation Switching Systems (University of 
Warwick, Coventry: Institution of Electrical Engineers, 1981). On the ITT compiler, 
see C. G. Denenberg, "CHILL Implementation techniques", in Software Engineering 
for Telecommunciation Switching Systems (Helsinki, Finland: Institution of 
Electrical Engineers, 1978). 
27 Denenberg, "CHILL Implementation techniques". 
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to have financed about 10-12 man-years for their initial implementation 
project.28 The Nordic compiler project was perhaps the most wide-ranging, 
at least in terms of participating organisations. It involved the 
telecommunication administrations of Denmark, Sweden, Finland and 
Norway, and the Norwegian research establishment Runit. However, in 
terms of manpower, this project actually amounted to little more than 5-6 
man-years, being fairly modest when compared with the industry-sponsored 
projects reviewed above. The Danish telecommunication administration also 
sponsored another project. The more sporadic projects, like compiler 
projects embarked upon in Italy and in France, were far more limited, even 
though details are hard to come by. 
Summing up, the implementation projects embarked upon in the 
period of the Implementors’ Forum were characterised by a small number of 
extensive and ambitious ventures, particularly led by firms that had already 
committed themselves to the cause through their active participation in the 
design phase, like the ITT, Siemens and Philips.  
 
Nordic cooperation and competition 
Many of the compiler projects were organised within one firm or body, but 
one project tried to mimic the cooperative spirit of the Implementors’ Forum 
at a regional level. The Nordic Compiler project was formally organised 
within the framework of the Nordic telecommunication conference, which 
initially was a biannually meeting of the administrations of the five Nordic 
countries. From 1969, the conference had broadened its mandate and 
organisation to a set of steering committees cooperating on technical 
matters.29 Delegates of the telecommunication administrations in the Nordic 
countries would meet in a special working group from 1977. They met nine 
times until 1979 to follow up on questions regarding the Nordic compiler 
project and general Chill matters. The group worked well into the 1980s with 
further meetings and ultimately organising conferences about programming 
telecommunication equipment.30 A considerable amount of information 
circulated among the groups’ seven regular members and their parent 
                                                     
28 All these estimates are based on information found in Knut Bryn, ”Report of 
meeting no. 7 in Trondheim”, 29/6 1979, NTT 77-2 Report no. 7, box “NTT 77-2 
1977-1979”, KRC. 
29 On the Nordic telecommunication cooperation, see Ari T. Manninen, "Elaboration 
on NMT and GSM Standards" (Univeristy of Jyväskylä, 2003), 39-41. 
30 See the proceedings of the NT-P Symposium on Languages and Methods for 
Telecommunications Applications, Turku, Finland, 6 – 8 March 1984, box “L 0135, 
Samarbeid,” series “Da, 1961 – 1996”, NTR. 
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organisations.31 From 1978, the British Post Office joined the Nordic ranks 
and participated in the compiler project, strengthening the impression of a 
project oriented towards the administrations and the software knowledge 
they needed. 
The administrations were supposed to create code tests and examples 
and carry out educational programs. This was something that was done with 
varying degrees of commitment, as the administrations in Sweden and 
Denmark were the most active ones, while the Norwegian administration 
participated in the code trials only in a very limited sense. The Norwegian 
research establishment Runit was responsible for the creation of the compiler 
and assisting the administrations with test runs of their code examples. 
However, the Nordic compiler project was not exclusively geared towards 
the administrations. At first, Runit was to cooperate with L. M. Ericsson and 
produce a compiler for their computer APZ-210, which was the computer 
used in the hugely successful AXE switch.32  
The APZ-210 had been developed by Ericsson and the Swedish 
telecommunication administration. It was a “natural” target for the Nordic 
cooperation on Chill compilers, because of its Nordic origin, its ties to both 
Ericsson and the Swedish administration and because it was considered 
technically very advanced. However, the target for the Nordic compiler 
project changed as it soon became evident to the developers at Runit that the 
APZ-210 was so peculiar and esoteric that very close cooperation with L.M. 
Ericsson was needed. As technical information about the processor was hard 
to come by and no test machine was regularly made available to the Nordic 
group, the project never took off. 
Initially, Runit’s compiler was hosted on computers produced by the 
Norwegian computer manufacturer Norsk Data and the compiled code was 
transferred by modem to be tested out on an APZ-210 in Sweden. The 
participating administrations could submit their code examples for 
compilation on Runit’s machine through a similar setup. However, the 
transfer of the test code was cumbersome and unsatisfactory.33 Then Runit, 
in accordance with their sponsoring administrations, changed their target to a 
                                                     
31 On 9 June 1980, an overview of all documents, publications and correspondence 
that had been circulated among the members of the Nordic working group, since its 
inception in 1975, was published. Here, 414 documents were listed. See Chill 
dokumentoversikt, 9 June 1980, box “NTT 77-2 1979-1980”, KRC.  
32 The AXE system was developed by a joint research and development company 
called Ellemtel, owned by both L. M. Ericsson and Televerket, Sweden’s state-
owned PTT, from 1970. On the development of AXE, see Fridlund, "Switching 
Relations and Trajectories: The Development Procurement of the Swedish AXE 
Switching Technology"; Bengt-Arne Vedin, Teknisk revolt: Det svenska AXE-
systemets brokiga framga ̊ngshistoria (Stockholm: Atlantis, 1992). 
33 Kristen Rekdal, interview with author, 28 November 2007, Oslo, Norway. 
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general Intel 8086 architecture, which had been released on the market in 
1978. This made the compiler project of interest to other manufacturers, like 
the Swiss company Hasler and the Norwegian ITT subsidiary STK, which 
both planned on using the Intel architecture in future switching equipment. 
STK and Hasler started to invest in the project by issuing development 
contracts to the Runit group, to which I will return in chapter seven. Here it 
is sufficient to note that the Nordic compiler project appeared interesting and 
viable to the industry already at its inception. 
The two most active participants in the initial Nordic compiler project, 
beside the contractor Runit, were the Swedish and the Danish 
administrations. The latter sat up a local contact group that coordinated the 
Danish participation in the Nordic project and carried out experiments at a 
local exchange in Kolding.34 The feedback was not all positive or supportive. 
In Denmark, there was a distinct reaction from some of the electrical 
engineers involved in the project that the language was too far removed from 
conventional telecommunication practices. Two members of the contact 
group, the engineers Ove Færgmand and Jørn Johansen, both of the 
telecommunication research establishment (TFL) run by the Danish 
telecommunication authority, and the three Danish telecommunication 
operators, all expressed views that the language was not satisfactory. Too 
little effort, according to Færgmand and Johansen, had been spent on 
practical problems like “reliability and error messages”.35 Such impressions 
were not uncommon. Remi Bourgonjon has, in retrospect, referred to a 
similar type of response in Philips: 
I remember that, when the first CHILL language documents became available, a 
manager at my company, experienced in telephony applications, was very 
disappointed with the result. He had expected that a telephony language, as 
CHILL was announced to be, would have statements such as “switch path from 
A to B” and “give ringing tone”.36 
These arguments give a good impression of the encounters between the 
language designers and the potential users (typically electrical engineers), 
and that they were not always straightforward. The expectations of what a 
programming language should be were widely different. Typically, issues 
like reliability and the possibility of portable code were high on the agenda 
of many administration-employed electrical engineers.  
                                                     
34 Jens R. Rasmussen,”Mødereferat, 4 april 1978”, box ”NTT 77-2 (1977-1978)”, 
KRC. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Remi Bourgonjon, “Programming languages, Environments and CHILL,” Chill 
Bulletin 3, no. 1, (1983), 3 – 8. 
 127  
 
The Danish contact group not only mediated interests between the Runit 
project and the Danish authorities. It also followed a separate Danish 
compiler project started at the Technical University of Denmark. This 
project was led by Dines Bjørner and was carried out by the Technical 
University of Denmark and the Research Laboratory of Telecommunication. 
From the outset, this project relied heavily on a formal and mathematically 
oriented approach to compiler design. This was a natural to Bjørner, who 
was a professor at the Technical University of Denmark, but had working 
experience at the IBM Vienna Lab from 1973 to 1975. This laboratory 
spearheaded the development of formal development methods and 
definitions during the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. In particular, the 
years when Bjørner was actively involved with the work in Vienna have 
been considered of great importance when it comes to the history of formal 
programming language descriptions.37 For example, the very first formal 
definition of programming language semantics was created for the 
programming language PL/1 (which was created by the IBM) at the 
laboratory in 1974.38 As such, it should be of no great surprise that Bjørner’s 
project was strictly focused on formalism: he applied what was known as the 
Vienna Development Method (VDM) to the Chill compiler project, a method 
he had partly developed when based in Vienna. To Bjørner, the ideal was 
that formal definitions of a programming language should presuppose the 
compiler design:  
We believe, seemingly contrary to all textbooks on compiler design that the very 
initial stages of any compiler development must concentrate first on a precise 
description of the source language and the target language, to be followed by a 
precise description of the compiling algorithm.39  
                                                     
37 An overview is found in Kurt Walk, "Roots of Computing in Austria: 
Contributions of the IBM Vienna Laboratory and Changes of Paradigms and 
Priorities in Information Technology", in Human choice and computers: Issues of 
Choice and QUality of Life in the Information Society, ed. Klaus Brunnstein and 
Jacques Berleur (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002). 
38 D. Bjørner and C. B. Jones, The Vienna development method : the Meta-language, 
Lecture notes in computer science 61 (Berlin ; New York: Springer-Verlag, 1978). 
39 Dines Bjørner, "Programming Languages: Formal Development of Interprenters 
& Compilers", in International Computing Symposium, ed. E. Morlet and D. 
Ribbens (Liege, Belgium: North-Holland, 1977). Bjørner’s contribution was one of 
a few invited papers to the conference, and was published alongside a paper by 
Edgser Dijkstra entitled “Programming: From Craft to Scientific Discipline“, a title 
that gives an idea of the issue at stake. See Edsger W. Dijkstra, "Programming: 
From Craft to Scientific Discipline.", in International Computing Symposium, ed. E. 
Morlet and D. Ribbens (Liege, Belgium: North-Holland Publishing Compnay, 
1977). 
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These precise descriptions should be mathematical in character, and should 
make it possible to prove correctness, again according to Bjørner: 
First, and independently of each other, one must have a precise, unquestionable, 
terse and formal definition of the source (CHILL) and target (IBM series/1). 
Formality is required so that one is able to prove properties of e.g. the CHILL 
compiler (like correctness!), CHILL programs (like their correctness!), and the 
runtime system on the IBM series/1 enabling single CHILL programs, consisting 
of multiple co-ordinated processes, to be scheduled, to share logical resources, to 
be allocated physical resources, and to communicate and be synchronized.40 
Bjørner’s approach contrasted substantially with that of the other projects, by 
not being geared towards the practical use of the finished compiler but 
towards proving the applicability of the formal methodology to compiler 
design more in general. The electrical engineers of the Danish 
telecommunication administration would not encounter practical trials and a 
focus on reliability and errors in the Danish compiler project. Instead, they 
came up against semantic formalism. None of the other compiler projects 
approached the issue of compiler design with the scrutiny of the team led by 
Bjørner. Compiler designs more concerned with the performance of the 
compiler and the effectiveness of the compiled code, rather than its 
correctness, were typical. One such example was the efforts led by the ITT, 
which is the subject of the next section. 
 
Compilation in the ITT 
One substantial compiler project developed by the ITT is worth noting. The 
ITT project had a large geographical scope, because of the freestanding 
company’s multinational character: in the 1970s ITT had operations in 10 
countries (not including the United States) that were concerned with the 
development and/or supply of telecommunication switching systems.41 The 
ITT’s advanced technology centre in Connecticut had the mandate to create 
a compiler that could take the considerable diverse needs of ITT’s 
subsidiaries into account. The research centre had been set up in the mid-
1970s, with the main task of developing the System 12 switch. The compiler 
development was part of the same project, even though the compiler was 
intended to service multiple ITT installations, and as such had to cater for a 
variety of target machines as well as being portable between host machines. 
The particular needs of the ITT were communicated in the following manner 
to the Implementors’ Forum:  
                                                     
40 Dines Bjørner, ”The ID/L/CHILL Project – An overview”, April 7 1978, SJ1, 
KRC. 
41 C. G. Denenberg, ”Chill Implementation techniques.” box “CCITT IF 
Arbeidsdokumenter 6, Serie J”, KRC. 
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Particular consideration was given to questions of compiler portability to 
different host machines, code generation for different target machines, the mixed 
usage of CHILL and ESPL-1 (The ITT HLL for SPC) in existing SPC system 
developments, and compiler maintenance at various locations. These questions 
of technology transfer influenced both the project objectives and the final 
compiler design.42 
While a formal approach like the one proposed by Bjørner could be 
understood as a method towards portability, which also was needed in the 
ITT, this project was much more conventional in its approach than that of 
Bjørner’s team. The ITT focused on designing what was essentially a 
modular compiler with what could be described as an interchangeable back-
end, which ITT hoped would cater for the different needs of the various 
subsidiaries. The design decisions implied a compiler designed in a way that 
should enhance its portability, as the interchangeable back-end would cater 
for different hardware platforms, while retaining the Chill-specific front-
end.43 However, the in-house design of a compiler by the ITT’s advanced 
technology centre did not produce an effective compiler. In around 1980, it 
was decided that a more effective compiler, in terms of the object code it 
produced, had to be developed. This time, the ITT hired an outside firm, the 
Massachusetts Computer Associates, to develop the compiler that would 
eventually produce the code for the System 12 switch.44 The lofty goals of 
portability had previously got in the way of an effective code. According to 
Tom Love, formerly of the ITT and directly involved in the decision to 
contract for a new compiler outside the ITT walls, this piece of the system 
was crucial, as he noted: “Had a fast enough and correct enough compiler 
not been provided, the 1240 [the System 12] could not have succeeded.”45 
Summing up, the above analysis of compiler projects reveals the 
variety in organisational principles, commitment and technical approach to 
the issue. In terms of organisational form, the Nordic compiler project was 
special, as it consisted of a network between the research organisation Runit, 
the Nordic telecommunication administrations and some interaction with the 
manufacturer L.M. Ericsson. The more typical projects were the in-house 
development at Siemens, Philips and the ITT. In terms of technical 
approach, I have highlighted how the Danish project led by Dines Bjørner 
                                                     
42 Ibid. 
43 On the development of compiler structure, see Aho and Ullman, Principles of 
compiler design; Wirth, Compiler construction. 
44 Here, I rely on email conversations with Tom Love (formerly of ITT), February 
2011 and his short account of this in Tom Love, Object lessons : lessons learned in 
object-oriented development projects, Advances in object technology 1 (New York: 
SIGS Books, 1993), 81. 
45 Tom Love, e-mail to author, 15 February 2011. 
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mirrored a formal development virtue that characterised parts of European 
computer science, while the others were more geared towards performance 
aspects, on both host and target machines. 
Problems that emerged locally when trying to design the compilers fed 
back into the language design processes in the CCITT group. This was 
particularly so in two areas: the implementation of language concepts of so-
called concurrent programming and the creation of a formal definition of the 
programming language. The former was directly linked to programming 
language design, while the latter only implicitly so. Concurrency had popped 
up as a challenge in many of the implementation projects: ITT, for example, 
would spend a considerable amount of time working on their implementation 
of language constructs for process handling in their implementation 
project.46 Formal descriptions were, in particular, related to the work done by 
Dines Bjørner and his team. It was first and foremost understood as a part of 
their take on compilation – and only implicitly associated with the design of 
the programming language. The formal description was believed to make it 
easier to construct compilers, and could also help in getting rid of 
inconsistencies in the language itself by explicating relationships that were 
difficult to come by through other descriptions.  
In the following pages, I will account for both of these issues, which 
dominated much of the activity in the Forum during this period. Both cases 
highlight how decisions made in the Implementors’ Forum were a 
continuation of the alliances between actors subscribing to what I have 
called a relatively formal and mathematically oriented development virtue, 
regardless of whether they had a background in computer science or the 
emerging field of software engineering.  
 
Concurrent processes and decisions 
Concurrency drew a lot of interest from computer scientists from the mid-
1960s and onwards, and is again receiving renewed attention nowadays.47 
Basically, concurrency means parallelism. At the machine level, operations 
are sequential if they occur one after another in time. Operations are 
concurrent if they overlap in time. At the software level, concurrency 
involves the notations for expressing potential parallelism so that operations 
may be executed in parallel at the machine level. Concurrent programming 
languages are programming languages that use language constructs for 
                                                     
46 C. G. Denenberg, ”Chill Implementation techniques,” box “CCITT IF 
Arbeidsdokumenter 6, Serie J”, KRC. 
47 As a result of multi-core processors gaining in popularity in regular PCs, 
concurrency has become a major issue in contemporary programming language 
discussions. For a casual overview, see the interviews in Federico Biancuzzi and 
Shane Warden, eds., Masterminds of Programming (Beijing: O'Reilly,2009). 
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execution of computational operations in parallel, rather than in sequence. 
These constructs may involve concepts such as multi-threading, support for 
distributed computing, message passing and shared resources such as 
memory.48 Furthermore, they include concepts for passing information from 
one concurrent process to another. Such capabilities would be an obvious 
boon to a language intended for usage in a real-time system such as 
telecommunication switching, which almost per definition involves 
parallelism, or to put another way, the real world phenomena with which the 
telecommunication software was to engage was concurrent by nature. One 
may think of the thousands of calls switched at the same time in such a 
system to understand this. 
The CCITT group started to consider concurrency seriously as they 
entered the implementation phase. Such concepts had also been discussed in 
the Team of Specialists, but were intentionally left for the Implementors’ 
Forum to work on. The overall state of concurrent programming language 
design in the mid-1970s was an important reason for this.  
According to pioneer Per Brinch Hansen, the first steps towards an 
understanding of concurrent programming were taken in the mid-1960s, but 
then developed fundamentally in the 1970s.49 In 1971, Tony Hoare claimed 
that the search for language features that would allow for parallelism and 
concurrency was “one of the major challenges to the invention, imagination 
and intellect of computer scientists of the present day”.50 Concurrency had 
been achieved by employing a number of different techniques since the 
1960s, but was not understood in any solid theoretical way before the 1970s. 
Several landmark articles had been published before the Team of Specialists 
was drummed together in 1974, but all in all, the efforts made in the 
Implementors’ Forum to create language concepts that would allow for 
concurrency were made just shortly after the publication of important 
research on the subject matter, and in some aspects in parallel to 
fundamental theoretical research. The first concurrent programming 
language was in fact only developed in 1975, by the aforementioned Dane, 
Per Brinch Hansen. Furthermore, the first book on concurrent programming 
was only issued in 1977, the very same year that the Chill designers started 
discussing their interpretations of the issue.  
It is worth noting that great scientific strides in this field were done by 
computer scientists who have been held in high esteem in computer science 
                                                     
48 An overview of abstractions for concurrency that also discusses their 
implementation in Chill is J. M. Bishop, Data abstraction in programming 
languages, International computer science series (Wokingham, England ; Reading, 
Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1986), 102-34. 
49 Hansen, "The invention of concurrent programming". 
50 Here quoted from Ibid., 16. 
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in general. When Per Brinch Hansen collected what he regarded as the 
classic papers in concurrent programming almost 30 years later their initial 
publication, he was surprised to see that every single paper turned out to 
have been written by Edsger Dijkstra, Tony Hoare or himself.51 Dijkstra and 
Hoare have already been mentioned as influential actors in a move towards 
the mathematically oriented computer science. They also made particular 
important contributions to the development of concepts facilitating 
concurrent programming. According to Judy Bishop, their simultaneous 
interest in the topic was unrelated, but spurred by a similar set of agendas: 
The swing away from assembly language gained genuine momentum during the 
seventies was slow to affect the area of concurrent systems – operating systems, 
embedded control systems, and the like. What happened was that three people – 
Edsger Dijkstra, Tony Hoare and Per Brinch Hansen – independently developed 
key abstractions which were taken up by researchers worldwide, realized in 
experimental languages, reported on, adapted and refined. In this way, the 
problems of concurrency could be expressed in well understood notation, and 
solutions and principles gradually evolved.52 
This was in full motion in the late 1970s, and informed the designers of 
Chill. In typical committee fashion, the issues of concurrency would take a 
considerable amount of time to resolve and involved a number of 
compromises affecting the finished language, not least because concurrent 
processing principles touched upon concepts quite familiar to those engaged 
with traditional telecommunication technologies.  
The first proposal regarding concepts for concurrency in Chill was 
made by Charlotte Denenberg of the ITT, at the very first meeting of the 
Implementors’ Forum in September 1977.53 Following this “tentative 
agreements were reached upon this subject” at this meeting.54 At the second 
meeting, in November 1977, Denenberg made further proposals.55 A 
contribution from GEC and two from L. M. Ericsson were also put forward 
                                                     
51 Ibid. 
52 Bishop, Data abstraction in programming languages, 103. 
53 C. D. Denenberg, ”Proposed HLL Primitives for Process Handling”, document 
number G4, RBC. 
54 CCITT HLL Implementors Forum, “Progress report on the first meeting, London, 
12 – 16 September 1977”, RBC. 
55 C. D Denenberg, “A higher level set of synchronization primitives”, document 
number H7, RBC; C. D. Denenberg, “Additions to the process handling primitives”, 
document number H8, RBC; C. D. Denenberg, “Comments on ‘proposal for 
monitor-like feature’”, H9, RBC. 
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at this meeting.56 The two contributions from the Swedish firm sparked a 
long and winding discussion. L. M. Ericsson had not been particularly active 
in the development of Chill before the issue of concurrency came up, but 
they put a lot of weight behind their proposals on concurrency. This was 
related to the fact that L. M. Ericsson had previous experience in using one 
specific concurrency concept, often referred to as the signals concept, in 
their programming language Plex. Representatives of the firm had also been 
heavily engaged in moving this concept into the other language that was 
developed by the CCITT at that time, the specification and description 
language SDL.57 At the time, pressure was also being put on the convenor of 
the Implementors’ Forum, Remi Bourgonjon, to strive for harmonisation 
between SDL and Chill.58 With L. M. Ericsson’s entrance into the debate 
and the increased pressure towards linking SDL and Chill, diplomatic 
negotiations became complicated and were being conducted on multiple 
fronts. In general, the main contestants were a constellation of Philips, the 
Dutch administration and the Nordic delegates from Runit on the one side, 
ITT on another and the Swedish manufacturer L. M. Ericsson on yet another 
side. How they would eventually end up with a proposal that everyone was 
able to agree on was in itself a combination of concurrent processes and 
diplomatic adjustments. 
An important participant in this debate was Ivar Jacobson, who started 
participating in the Implementors’ Forum from their second meeting.59 
Jacobson had experience of hardware design and telecommunication 
software systems and applications development.60 He had, however, no 
education in the field of computer science, nor any experience in 
programming language design or compiler programming. He described his 
own role as “a cat among ermines”, the odd one out, when interviewed about 
his role in the CCITT group, and said this was because his background was 
different from that of many of the participants in the Implementors’ Forum.61 
The representatives of L. M. Ericsson argued that the world of 
                                                     
56 GEC, “Substring handling”, document number H15, RBC; L. M. Ericsson, 
“Proposed HLL concepts for process handling and interprocess communication”, 
document number H17, RBC; L. M. Ericsson, “Proposed addition to the HLL for 
process handling and interprocess communication”, document number H18, RBC.  
57 Ivar Jacobson, telephone interview with author, 22 February 2011. 
58 Remi Bourgonjon, telephone interview with author, 21 March 2011. 
59 CCITT HLL Implementors Forum, “Progress report on the first meeting, London, 
12 – 16 September 1977”, RBC. 
60 Ivar Jacobson had, by 1978, been working on the AKE and AXE switching 
systems as what can be called a software architect, for about 10 years. On his 
background, see Vedin, Teknisk revolt: Det svenska AXE-systemets brokiga 
framgångshistoria 101-06. 
61 Ivar Jacobson, telephone interview with the author, 22 February 2011. 
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telecommunications in particular, and electrical engineering in general, had 
something to teach computer scientists, programming language experts and 
software engineers, when it came to concurrency. In a working document by 
the participants from L. M. Ericsson, it was argued that telecommunication 
switching systems would need special attention and that the general 
techniques developed by computer scientists were insufficient.62 Coming 
from this, the L. M. Ericsson representatives presented the Forum with their 
signals concept for inclusion in the language proposal. L. M. Ericsson’s 
signals concept, however, met with scepticism. It was argued that the 
favoured Ericsson solution was too high level and abstract, and would tax 
the limited hardware resources too much.63 According to Jacobson, the other 
participants would repeatedly claim that what Jacobson (and L. M. Ericsson) 
wanted to introduce to the standard was “semantically equivalent” to what 
they already had.64 Regardless of these specific objections, it seems likely 
that the members of the Forum had a hard time grasping what Jacobson and 
L. M. Ericsson actually tried to get into the programming language, in 
particular the exact semantic meaning of the concept.65 The different 
background of the contestants was a large part of the reason for this. By 
January 1978, Charlotte Denenberg, Ivar Jacobson and Remi Bourgonjon 
held an informal meeting in the Netherlands, to get an agreement on these 
issues.66 The outcome of this meeting was a reconciled proposal that would 
include the ideas from Philips, ITT and the signals concept so much argued 
for by Jacobson and L. M. Ericsson.67 
However, this compromise was not enough. The disagreements flared 
up yet again at the third and fourth meetings of the Forum. After a whole day 
of debating how to implement concurrent concepts in the language at the 
meeting of the Forum in June 1978, the group’s vice-convenor, Kristen 
Rekdal, was pessimistic. He reported the following to his sponsors, the 
Nordic telecommunication administrations: “One whole day was devoted to 
the subject of concurrent processing. Sorry to say, no agreement could be 
reached this time either. There is still some hope, however, because the 
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disagreements were smaller this time.”68 In particular, Jacobson was not 
content with the results of the informal meeting, nor the subsequent 
discussions in the Forum. L. M. Ericsson and Ivar Jacobson eventually found 
an unlikely ally in the concurrency debate, as they teamed up with Dines 
Bjørner. At the fourth meeting of the Forum, in June 1978, the new allies 
presented a new proposal.69 Bjørner used the concurrency debacle as a way 
to prove the usefulness of formal descriptions, and by creating a formal 
description he really translated Jacobson’s signals concept into a 
terminology that could be accepted by the other group member. However, L. 
M. Ericsson and the Danish administration developed a common proposal 
that completely sidelined the prior proposals from Bourgonjon, Denenberg 
and Jacobson.70 Here, the representatives from L. M. Ericsson and Bjørner 
argued the following: 
The underlying ideas of the proposals are not new. Thus they e.g. resemble very 
closely the basic concepts of C. A. R. Hoares’ “Communicating Sequential 
Processes.” The authors of the proposal are also pleased to note a very striking 
one-to-one correlation to basic concepts of SDL. Whereas the buffer/semaphore 
based constructs have been around for more than 10 years, the currently 
proposed constructs appear to form a much needed replacement of these older 
ideas.71 
This quote reveals a set of relationships that somewhat breaks down the 
dichotomous set of development virtues sketched out in the introduction: On 
the one hand, it signifies a link to cutting edge research on concurrency by 
aligning themselves with researchers such as Tony Hoare and Brinch 
Hansen, but at the same time identifying this route as something tied to 
electrical engineering thinking, as it notes the relationship to the description 
language SDL that was under development in the CCITT at the time. 
Furthermore, the authors noted that the existing proposals on the table in the 
Chill project were rather old fashioned, as the last line of their statement 
argued.72 
How did the revised proposal go down with the other participants? 
The replacement strategy proposed by Bjørner and Jacobson did not succeed 
in its entirety. Still, L. M. Ericsson’s favoured concept, the signals concept, 
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had crept its way into the language recommendation, already before the joint 
proposal by Bjørner and Jacobson. The final recommendation would still 
look similar to the one sketched out before Bjørner’s intervention to 
formalise the signals concept. However, according to Ivar Jacobson, the 
Bjørner-led definition was crucial to get the signals concept properly 
understood by the other members.73 To reach an agreement, the committee 
would still have to arrive on a compromise by the method of an informal 
meeting: this time, the agreement was reached at an informal meeting 
between the actors in the late summer of 1978. Remi Bourgonjon, Ivar 
Jacobson, Kristen Rekdal, Oleg de Bachtin and Anders Rockström were the 
participants. Here, they finally came to an agreement on harmonising the 
concurrency concepts agreed on at the previous Forum meetings.74 The 
results of the meeting, and its reception in the Forum, made Kristen Rekdal 
optimistic. He reported the following after the subsequent meeting in the 
Forum:  
Again [concurrency] consumed a large part of the meeting. This time there was 
luckily, agreement on most of the semantics, and even a provisional syntax. The 
agreement largely follows the document submitted by RUNIT, LME and Philips. 
It is hoped that the topic can now be settled at the next meeting.75  
The settlement was, in other words, a hybrid. It did not opt for the complete 
revised proposal that Bjørner and Jacobson brought to the table, but 
Jacobson’s favoured signals concept got into the final recommendation, 
perhaps in a more properly understood manner than without the alliance 
between Bjørner’s formalism and Jacobson’s ideas. 
Would such a hybrid degrade the result? In retrospect, this aspect of 
Chill has been regarded as one of its real strengths. Kristen Rekdal, who 
initially had been sceptical about the concepts, has stated that he is happy it 
was added, and that it became one of the most powerful constructs in the 
language. Furthermore, with the great strides made in hardware design and 
capacity, the feared lack of efficiency was largely overcome.  
All in all, the concurrency debate highlights the way compromises 
were not always such a bad thing. Kees Smedema, which participated in the 
CCITT work on Chill in the early 1980s on behalf of Philips, stressed this 
point: 
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[Chill] was designed by a committee, which has the well known disadvantage of 
having to compromise between the various preferred concepts of committee 
members, resulting in non-orthogonal language design. However, it has also an 
advantage: the experience of many people is shared. In the case of designing the 
facilities for concurrency in Chill it was definitively a great advantage that the 
people involved were experienced in software for switching systems […].76 
 
Formal definition 
In parallel to the concurrency debate, some members of the Implementors’ 
Forum started work on a more formal definition of the semantics of the 
language, meaning a model describing the possible computations by the 
language. Such a definition would add to the formal syntax and semiformal 
semantics already produced, and would create a description of each phrase in 
the language in some sort of other language, usually through mathematical 
formalism rather than another computer language.  
Again, the main inspiration as well as the initiative came from actors 
rooted in computer science. An important catalyst was Dines Bjørner. To 
Bjørner, Chill was already too complex and riddled with compromises.77 
One way out of the quagmire was to impose a so-called formal denotation of 
the semantics of the language. To Bjørner, such a definition of the language 
could ease its way towards the finished article, into the real world of 
language implementation and compilers. This was particularly so since such 
a formal definition of the language semantics could help prove that a 
particular compiler implementation was correct. It would also reconcile Chill 
with the mathematical and formal virtues that dominated the constituencies 
of computer science.  
Bjørner had started work on a Chill compiler prior to his involvement 
in the Implementors’ Forum and had experienced that the design of a Chill 
compiler could be helped by the use of what was known as “denotational 
semantics,” a field Bjørner had considerable knowledge of from his 
involvement with the IBM research laboratory in Vienna in the early 1970s. 
The outcome of Bjørner’s effort would go well beyond the limited problems 
of compiler construction, as it spun off an effort to formalise the language 
semantics within the Implementors’ Forum. The aim of denotational 
semantics was to formalise the programming language by constructing 
mathematical objects (called denotations) that would describe the meanings 
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of expressions from the languages – a large step towards full formalism from 
the more common route of formally defining the syntax of a language.  
There were high hopes. In 1978, it was noted that the denotational 
semantics would be “a very valuable contribution to the development of 
CHILL”.78 Some devotion was put towards formal definitions in 1979, hot 
on the heels of the agreement reached on concurrency by the detour of 
formal definition description of L. M. Ericsson’s signals concept. The efforts 
were pushed forward by two parties, one group led by Dines Bjørner and 
another that involved researchers at the Belgian Philips laboratory of 
research, the MBLE, primarily Paul Branquart, George Louis and Paul 
Wodon. The latter group had already been involved with the work in the 
Team of Specialists, through their affiliation with Philips, and held 
substantial experience of work on the programming language Algol 68. After 
a short period where both definitions competed for the attention of the 
Forum members, the MBLE group decided to continue their work as an aid 
for the compiler group of Philips, and not to pursue the larger goals of 
Bjørner’s group.79 
Bjørner hoped that the formal definition would “gain confidence in the 
language design, to check its completeness and consistency”.80 Bjørner 
expressed a sincere belief “that with the advent of this formal document a 
basis has been established for an orderly control of future developments of 
the language”.81 As such, it was a tool to minimise the ambiguity of the 
complex language, but also a tool that could point out deficiencies in the 
casually described language. This was not only something that Bjørner 
believed, but a view shared by many of the members of the Implementors’ 
Forum. As many discussions in the group were oriented towards ambiguities 
in the existing and at best semi-formal description of the semantics, it was 
believed that some of the ambiguities could have been avoided to some 
degree with a formal description.82  
Bjørner’s approach was rooted in a belief that a disciplined software 
development methodology, based on proof and formalisation, was a 
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necessity.83 Software development should be drenched in the virtues of 
computer science. The formal definition was not ready to be published as a 
supplement to the official recommendation. Instead, it was published in 
1981, as a result of repeated delays. As such, the arrival of the formal 
definition was too late to influence or help the budding compiler designers, 
who would be the main users of such a definition.84 In this respect, the high 
point of the influence of the mathematical development virtue became 
nothing but a delayed supplement to the official CCITT recommendation. 
This was due to the extreme complexity involved in creating and 
understanding such a definition. It was full of rigour and clarity, but it was 
not something that was well understood in the higher ranks of the CCITT 
hierarchy, or in telecommunication organisations. Still, with the formal 
description, Chill became the first industrial and widespread programming 
language to have, as part of its recommended standard, a rigorous definition. 
The result, however, was a disappointment. According to Bourgonjon, all 
forms of formal descriptions have a drawback: “There are several tools 
known to formally describe the context-free syntax, the static semantics, and 
the dynamic semantics [....]. Unfortunately, all those tools are hampered by 
the fact that they are very difficult to understand for non-experts.”85 When 
discussed in hindsight, Remi Bourgonjon argued that the formal description 
also did not help in vindicating errors in the language proposal: “The formal 
definition did not help anyone. I, for one, found the same errors in the formal 
definitions as I found it in the semi-formal description.”86 He followed by 
adding that he often found errors, other than those already noted by the 
Danish team, by applying the semi-formal approach.87 It also proved to be 
very difficult and time consuming to verify the equivalence between Z.200 
and the formal definition. This could only be done by experts on both Chill 
and VDM carefully and meticulously reading both documents side by side. 
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Even the maintenance of the formal definition proved impossible. Every 
time there was a change in the recommendation document, the formal 
description had to be updated and re-verified.  
Even to the supporters of formal definition, the Chill report was 
lacking in some respects. According to the “official” VDM annotated 
bibliography, the report “features an attractive style of presentation of 
operational intuition but fails to have been given a satisfactory semantics”.88 
Still, it was a starting point for more work on how to provide a formal 
description of concurrency, and thus spurred further refinements in the 
formal approach that the Danish computer science community were so fond 
of. 
To Bourgonjon, formal semantics was one step too far. Progress 
towards a more unambiguous language was made through logical thinking 
and extensive collaboration rather than through the use of a formal 
denotational semantics and a formal development method. This highlights 
how the project was a true intersection between formally oriented computer 
science and more practical concerns, and how some ideas about strictness 
and formal languages did not pave out. In another way, one would believe 
that such a definition would enhance the image of Chill in the formal 
computer science camp. It did not. Chill continually met with scepticism or 
blatant ignorance from actors in the computer science camp.  
It is worth noting that the cases of concurrency and formal definitions 
reveal two general mechanisms regarding the relationship between computer 
science and engineering in the development of Chill. Firstly, both 
implementations hinged on an active involvement of the computer science 
community: The implementation of concurrency was highly dependent on 
the applications of theoretical arguments advanced by influential scientists 
like Tony Hoare and Edgser Dijkstra. The application of formal descriptions 
was obviously another offspring of European computer science, highlighted 
by Dines Bjørner’s prior involvement with the IBM research laboratory in 
Vienna. However, these applications of theoretical computer science were 
just as dependent on fitting in and realigning with the concerns of 
telecommunication professionals and electrical engineers. The case of L. M. 
Ericsson’s relative high-level concepts for concurrency is most revealing: 
Here, the formal definitions of Dines Bjørner helped the idea translate into a 
vocabulary understandable and tolerable to the rest of the Forum’s members. 
I have interpreted these oscillations as processes of alignment of 
development virtues and ideals. However, it is also important to note that the 
process of creating a standardised programming language was a process of 
codification of practical experience and the assimilation of external pressure. 
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In the next sections, I discuss the externalities of Chill, in the form of 
stakeholders such as the telecommunication administrations and its 
programming language competitors, in particular the emergence of a 
standardised programming language for embedded real-time systems made 
for the American Department of Defense, Ada, and C, created at AT&T. 
 
Travelling in Chill 
In September and October 1979, Kristen Rekdal travelled extensively around 
the world with what was to be the final reference manual of Chill in his 
suitcase.89 First, he attended what was the last meeting in the Implementors’ 
Forum in Melbourne, Australia. After that, he participated in the official 
CCITT meeting of the sub-working party XI/3, which officially nominated 
the work of the Implementors’ Forum to the CCITT Plenary the coming 
year. Along the way, he visited the headquarters of the Australian 
administration, Telecom Australia, and the University of Canterbury in 
Christchurch, New Zealand. On his way back from the other side of the 
world, Rekdal visited the Indian Hill Bell Laboratories at Naperville, Illinois, 
where he gave a presentation of Chill before a large audience. 
In Australia and New Zealand, Rekdal met with representatives of the 
telecommunication administrations, and discussed the experience of using 
Chill in the Nordic administrations, as well as general aspects of 
programming expertise in telecommunications. In his travel reports, Rekdal 
noted that representatives of the Australian telecommunications 
administration, as well their counterparts in New Zealand, had expressed an 
interest in software as a means to become more independent of their 
suppliers, echoing some of the thinking behind the programming language. 
Representatives of both administrations expressed an interest in the use of 
Chill to achieve such a position. 90 
At his visit to Bell Laboratories at Naperville, Rekdal encountered 
what at the time was widely acknowledged as the leading research and 
development organisation in the field of computing as well as 
telecommunications. Rekdal’s mission was to gather information about how 
the organisation was administered as well as their activities on software 
development and use. With evident awe, Rekdal noted: “During the summer 
of 1979, it was decided to erect a new building to house 2000 people all 
working on various software aspects. The planning took only two months 
and the building will be finished in the summer of 1980!” 91 Furthermore, he 
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also noted: “50 per cent of the 1600 researchers and engineers at Indian Hill 
work with software. In the future, about 70-80 per cent will be working on 
software.”92 Obviously, he was no less impressed with these numbers. 
The Indian Hill establishment of Bell Labs was at the time involved in 
the development of the software for the Bell’s new switching system, called 
No. 5 ESS.93 This involved much novel technology, some of which Rekdal 
noted. He mentioned the use of mini-computers in place of mainframe IBM 
computers, all fitted with the Unix operating system, developed at Bell Labs, 
and the use of the programming language C, also developed in-house, which 
warranted a particular description in Rekdal’s report: “[C] is a middle level, 
partly machine dependent, systems implementation language.”94 At this 
time, C and Unix were almost unknown quantities to Rekdal, the community 
in the CCITT and the world at large. In hindsight, C became the dominant 
programming language in systems development during the 1980s and 
beyond.95 Without possessing the technical refinements of language such as 
Chill, C would nevertheless go on to achieve a status almost of a de facto 
standard, even though it was, according to its creator, “quirky, flawed, and 
an enormous success”.96 While C was unknown in 1979, Rekdal and his 
compatriots would encounter C numerous times; more often than not viewed 
as a direct competitor of the programming language he had been 
instrumental in creating. Both in technical and organisational terms, the 
differences between Chill and C were considerable. C did not strive for a 
high level of abstraction; it was fairly low level and could consequently 
produce fairly efficient code. Furthermore, its association with the operating 
system Unix made the environment of the programming language explicit, 
something not possible with Chill. 
On his travels Rekdal made contacts, gathered information and tried to 
understand whether the future of Chill was looking promising or grim. As 
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evident above, two aspects were of particular interest: the role of the 
telecommunication administrations and the technological choices of the 
manufacturers – in particular the role of competing programming languages, 
like C. However, at the time of writing, Rekdal was more concerned about a 
competing programming language named Ada, which increasingly looked 
like a viable contender to Chill for programming telecommunication 
equipment. 
 
“There need not be a conflict” – Chill meets Ada97 
From around 1977, Chill had a competitor. The US Department of Defense 
embarked on standardising a programming language for the creation of real-
time and embedded software systems. 98 The language would later be named 
Ada and attracted a lot of interest and investment, also from European 
actors. Some of those who became involved with Ada were also involved 
with Chill, creating conjunctions between the two projects during the period 
of the Implementors’ Forum. In 1979 and 1980, the participants of the Chill 
project often encountered the Ada project, either in the form of arguments 
against their own project or through common projects or meeting places. 
Sometimes the encounters were outright skirmishes, though others were of a 
more collaborative character. While the Chill designer Kristen Rekdal 
claimed, “there need not be a conflict” when asked about the relationship 
between Ada and Chill in 1980, an impression of competition and conflict 
remained.99 On the following pages, I am concerned with the meetings and 
encounters between Chill and Ada in the period when the Implementors’ 
Forum was active, that is, up until 1980.100 Particularly, I am concerned with 
how the competition influenced decisions and directions concerning 
programming language design and implementation. I will return to how Ada 
influenced the diffusion of Chill in chapter six. 
The design process of Ada differed somewhat from that of Chill. 
Whereas the CCITT did not manage to lure an expert of the standing of 
Niklaus Wirth to take on the project, the Department of Defense opted for a 
competition between four contractors to produce a prototype language. By 
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May 1979, the department decided to go forward with a proposal from the 
French company CII Honeywell Bull. The language was developed by the 
French company under contract to the United States Department of Defense 
during 1979 and 1980, a somewhat peculiar alliance if one considers 
France’s considerable nationally oriented industrial policy towards 
telecommunications and computing up until at least the early 1980s and its 
hostility towards American initiatives in general.101 That Ada would also 
attract considerable support from the European Economic Community 
(EEC) from the 1980s only supports the description of Ada as a somewhat 
peculiar alliance.  
The final reference manual of Ada was delivered in July 1980, and 
consequently finished just about the same time as the CCITT high-level 
language was getting its final seal of approval from the CCITT. The project 
was led by Jean D. Ichbiah, a founding member of the IFIP working group 
2.4, a group of computer scientists who under the auspices of UNESCO 
discussed issues of system programming languages, grew out of the 
conference on machine-oriented higher-level languages (which was a term 
disliked by Ichbiah) in Trondheim, Norway in 1974.  
Choosing Ichbiah’s group as the language designers also meant that a 
large group of European computer scientists was engaged, both as reviewers 
of the language proposals on behalf of the DoD, and later on as part of what 
was to be an emerging Ada community. Even some of the participants in the 
CCITT project would be engaged on Ada. However, the relationship 
between Ada and Chill in the early phase of Ada was not one of collegiate 
spirit. Whitaker, who led the work on behalf of the Department of Defense, 
has made one comment about this:  
The CCITT developed a common high order language for international use in 
communications. This was done at the same time as the HOLWG effort, and I 
was told off-line by members of the developing committee that they made a 
policy not to communicate with the competition. In any case they never 
answered any of my letters. CHILL was the product of that development.102 
Did the Chill camp view Ada as competition? Did they deliberately not 
communicate with them? The two efforts shared a great deal of common 
antecedents and meeting points. The IFIP was one, where Remi Bourgonjon 
met with Jean Ichbiah in the 2.4 working group. Dines Bjørner would, 
almost at the same time he was about to produce the formal definition of 
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Chill, embark on a similar project with Ada. So non-communication could 
hardly have been the case. However, the Chill group certainly felt the 
pressure.  
The Chill group did not give up without a fight: and in 1979, they had 
a head start: According to Rekdal, it seemed “that CHILL has more practical 
experience and a wider commitment behind it compared to ADA. CHILL 
has been through a shakedown period which ADA is still lacking. There is 
no reason to believe that ADA will pose fewer problems in this respect than 
CHILL has.”103 Furthermore, the Chill group believed in peaceful co-
existence, since the backing from the telecommunications industry was 
secured: 
There need not be a conflict: To be viable a language needs the support of a 
sufficiently large user community with homogeneous objectives. Trying to 
incorporate basically diverging objectives may ultimately erode user support. 
CHILL is, in this respect, in a fortunate position. The potential use community 
consists of all members of the CCITT. These members have declared their 
common objectives by joining the CCITT.104 
This “fortunate position” was not guaranteed for the future. Chill’s 
supporters feared that the Ada project would deflect attention and support 
from their programming language, and worried about the consequences: “If 
support wavers at this time, the current momentum will be lost and the 
language will die.”105  To the Chill group, the differences between the two 
projects were both technical and political: the Ada project put the 
Department of Defense in control of language development. To the CCITT 
representatives, this fact meant that it served US national interests rather 
than those of the international community. Chill advocates underlined the 
contrast: “CHILL on the other hand has been developed by the CCITT 
which is a truly international body working under the auspices of the United 
Nations.”106 It would also have been politically impossible for the CCITT to 
standardise a language over which it had no control. 
Nevertheless, Chill’s momentum was wavering, and the spotlight was 
firmly on Ada, although the EEC first considered finding a third way 
towards programming real-time systems. In 1978, the EEC started 
investigating the possibility of creating a new European programming 
                                                     
103 Kristen Rekdal, ”CHILL, ADA and ESL”, RUNIT Notat, 3 March 1980, box 
“NTT 77-2 NT-Programmspråk 1979 – 1980”, KRC. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid. 
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language, tentatively called the European Systems Language.107 The German 
Siemens and French CII Honeywell Bull carried out the study, and 
concluded that rather than opting for a new programming language, the Ada 
programming language should be chosen. The European Commission 
followed this up by granting funds for specific European Ada-related 
projects during the early 1980s. The EEC actively encouraged the formation 
of the interest group Ada Europe in late 1979, before the Ada language was 
even finished and fully defined. At the inception of the Ada Europe group in 
March 1980, more than 40 individuals or organisations had an active interest 
in the language. The group drew considerable interest from general computer 
manufacturers as well as the computer science community. Already at its 
outset, 16 projects involved either in direct language design activities, 
feasibility studies or implementation projects were underway in Europe, 
involving technical universities, research establishments and computer 
companies.108 Much of the interest in the language came from the formidable 
backing of the US Department of Defense, as a prospective standard 
language in the development of many military systems would mean a huge 
market. The backing also stemmed from the choice of the French language 
designers, in particularly Jean Ichbiah, who had a high standing within 
European computer science circles and the constituency of the IFIP. 
Furthermore, the language was considered technically advanced. As the 
initiator of the European group, Brain Wichmann of the UK National 
Physics Laboratory, stated in his opening remarks to the group’s first 
meeting: 
Even if Ada had nothing special to recommend it, concentrating on one language 
to avoid the inevitable duplication of effort would be a worthwhile gain. 
However, the package concept in Ada should allow tailor made systems to be 
built largely from standard components – components which are pre-compiled 
and whose is checked for type validity by the compiler.109 
By 1982, the EEC had actively pursued and sponsored projects related to 
Ada as a major part of the community’s data processing programme. In 
particular, the sum of 6.4 million ECU was put into two large Ada compiler 
projects from 1980, along with a number of smaller projects also given 
                                                     
107 For this, I rely on ”Community Data-processing Policy”, Communication from 
the Commission to the Council, Brussels, 22. July 1982. Available from Archive of 
European Integration  (AEI), hosted by University of Pittsburgh at http://aei.pitt.edu/ 
108 List of identified projects on 4 December 1979, attached to B. A. Wichmann and 
R. Gilbert, Proposal for a WGS-ADA-Europe activity, 5 December 1979, box “NTT 
77-2 NT-Programmspråk 1979 – 1980”, KRC. 
109 B. A. Wichmann, “Ada-Europe: Some opening remarks,” 1 February 1980, box 
“NTT 77-2 NT-Programmspråk 1979 – 1980”, KRC. 
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resources by the EEC.110 The extent of support and investment behind Ada 
was in another league compared with Chill. Where the Chill project 
depended on local networks for compiler projects, the Ada project was 
coordinated and published on the Arpanet, the US DoD-sponsored 
forerunner of the modern-day Internet.111  
At the establishment of Ada Europe, Remi Bourgonjon was invited to 
discuss the possibility of harmonising the two programming languages. 
Bjarne Däcker, who participated on behalf of L. M. Ericsson at the inaugural 
meeting of Ada Europe, remarked that the discussions between Bourgonjon 
and Ichbiah were not particularly constructive: the Ada supporters argued 
that it would be a waste of resources to create two standardised 
programming languages for almost the same type of users, and that Chill 
should be disbanded. The Chill supporters, on the other hand, thought that 
they had a head start, since they already had some compilers working at this 
time.112  
Däcker was impressed by the Ada effort in general, and believed that 
L. M. Ericsson should reconsider their contribution to Chill. The Swedish 
firm had participated in both the Team of Specialists and the Implementors’ 
Forum, but the emergence of Ada made Däcker believe that their future 
projects should be based on that programming language. This was based on 
two observations. Firstly, that the functionality of the language would be 
able to match the needs of L. M. Ericsson, if the representatives of L. M. 
Ericsson were able to influence the final design of the language. Secondly, 
that the level of backing for the language would ensure that a significant 
amount of supporting tools and resources would be available from other 
companies.  
                                                     
110 The European currency unit (ECU) was an artificial currency that was used by 
the member states of the EEC as their internal accounting unit. It was conceived in 
1979. To compute the real value of the Ada support to a present value is 
complicated, as it would necessitate taking into consideration the rate of price 
changes in the EEC member countries, and in the end, the conversion into a present-
day currency. The composite nature of the ECU makes this conversion difficult. 
Furthermore, it would also be necessary to take into account that there exist different 
Later in this thesis, where investments based on a single currency are given I will 
provide measures in 2010 US dollars, adjusted with the Consumer Price Index. 
Here, such an adjusted and converted measure is not possible to present. 
111 Janet Abbate, Inventing the Internet, Inside technology (Cambridge, Mass: MIT 
Press, 1999). 
112 This is revealed in a travel report by Bjarne Däcker, which was made available to 
the Nordic Chill project. See Bjarne Däcker, “Processkommunikation i Ada – 
resrapporter”, 6 March 1980, box “NTT 77-2 NT-Programmspråk 1979 – 1980”, 
KRC. 
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During late 1979 and 1980, L. M. Ericsson made moves towards influencing 
the implementation of concurrent language constructs in Ada, and became 
increasingly involved in the Ada project. If everything fell into place, L. M. 
Ericsson were willing to drop all other programming language activities, as 
both their own Plex and Chill were believed to be inferior to the coming Ada 
language.113 According to Däcker, L. M. Ericsson’s participant in the Ada 
process, there was one danger in dropping Chill in favour of Ada, and that 
was related to the possibility of Chill receiving some sort of exclusive 
monopoly in telecommunications. Däcker called the representatives of L. M. 
Ericsson in the CCITT to do everything they could to prevent such a 
monopoly, and also to discuss Ada in the CCITT.114  
Other industry actors shared L. M. Ericsson's growing scepticism 
towards Chill, and some of the participating manufacturer active in Chill 
would soon defect. John C. D. Nissen of the British General Electric 
Company (GEC) was appointed by the Ada Europe group to be responsible 
for issues concerning Ada in telecommunications.115 The French 
administration felt a strong push towards Ada, as it was strongly related to 
the French Honeywell-Bull consortium and the language designer Jean 
Ichbiah. At the executive level of the CCITT, the chairman of the CCITT 
Study Group XI, which was responsible for the Chill project, held 
discussions with people in the US Department of Defense on the issue of 
Chill versus Ada during the spring of 1980.116 However, none of these 
efforts would lead to the immediate disintegration of the implementation part 
of the Chill project, as it was not until later into the 1980s that Ada really 
started to gain support.  
Summing up, during the last months of 1979 and first months of 1980, 
a number of actors tried to shelve Chill in favour of Ada. However, the 
CCITT did not change its mind: the CCITT plenary assembly unanimously 
approved the language in 1980 and it was then formally endorsed as the 
language to use for telecommunication applications worldwide. Furthermore, 
the CCITT was not interested in taking part in the harmonisation of other 
languages. However, the adoption of Chill would be seriously hampered by 
                                                     
113 The arguments was made explicit in Bjarne Däcker, “Processkommunikation i 
Ada – resrapporter”, 6 March 1980, box “NTT 77-2 NT-Programmspråk 1979 – 
1980”, KRC. 
114 Ibid. 
115 John Nissen, “The current state of ADA tasking and application in 
communication.” 1 February 1980 (Sent to Ada UK Telecomms Subgroup, Ada UK 
Tasking Subgroup, Ada Europe), box “NTT 77-2 NT-Programmspråk 1979 – 1980”. 
KRC. 
116 J. S. Ryan to P. Sterndorff, 14 May 1980, box “NTT 77-2 NT-Programmspråk 
1979 – 1980”, KRC. 
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the continuing discussions along the Chill versus Ada lines. I will return to 
this in the next chapter.  
 
Some conclusions 
Chill was approved by the CCITT Plenary Assembly in November 1980.117 
The slow-moving ITU had finally got its programming language. To the 
ITU, Chill was an UFO created in the outer spheres of the CCITT. To many 
of the participants in the Forum and the Team of Specialists, the ITU was an 
alien landscape. Nevertheless, the language was finished, much to the 
surprise of even its creators. Summing up the final part of the Implementors’ 
Forum, Kristen Rekdal made the following remarks: 
The conclusion is that we have achieved what few thought possible five years 
back: Chill is finished. The definition is better and more thorough than most. 10 
– 12 compilers are already in progress or planned. More than a hundred 
programmers have been educated in Chill. Chill will be used for at least four 
new, large-scale computer controlled telephone exchanges that will be put into 
the market in the first half of the 1980s.118 
Evidently, there were high hopes. However, there were also lots of 
uncertainties. The emergence of Ada meant that Chill had a competitor, 
backed by the large and powerful US Department of Defense, a competitor 
that was considered a real challenge to the life of Chill. According to a 
comparison between the two languages made in 1981, both languages were 
adequate for their stated purpose, although with slightly different strengths 
and weaknesses. Still, as the comparison concluded: “There is considerable 
evidence that Ada will become a well-supported standard in virtually all 
embedded computer applications.”119  
This chapter has highlighted how community-level norms and 
organisational level strategies influenced the fate of Chill up until its final 
ratification. I have in particular argued that the processes of knowledge 
codification, where knowledge about software design and 
telecommunications was spelled out and turned into syntax and semantics, 
should be understood as a process of alignments of different development 
virtues: in the case of the implementation of concurrency concepts, the 
alignment of the ideas of Bourgonjon and Rekdal on the one hand, and the 
                                                     
117 Minutes of the Plenary Meeting, 10 – 21. November 1980, CCITT, ITUA. 
118 Kristen Rekdal, ” Reiserapport fra CCITT’s Implementors forum, Melbourne 24 
– 29 September 1976”, box “Implementors Forum 9. møte Melbourne, Sept. 1979, 
Serie O”, KRC. My translation. 
119 R. T. Boute and M. I: Jackson, "A joint evaluation of the programming languages 
Ada and CHILL", in Software Engineering for Telecommunciation Switching 
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proposals from L.M. Ericsson depended on the intervention of formal 
computer science. In the case of formal definitions, the practical concerns of 
the implementation group aligned themselves with what they believed would 
be the virtues of formal definitions. However, this did not go as well as 
planned. The formal definition was late on arrival and did not assist the 
compiler designers to any large extent.  
This is not to say that these realignments were independent of 
business strategies. The sudden interest in concurrency showed by the 
Ericsson representatives is just one example of how intertwined these 
considerations were at the time. Ericsson’s growing affinity towards Ada 
further underlines how the rapidly fluctuating business strategies were able 
to shape the life of Chill beyond the norms of the community of technical 
practitioners that had dominated its early emergence. 
The period of the Implementors’ Forum was also a period marked by 
prospective users and compiler designers. Compilers were made in 
companies like the ITT, Philips and Siemens. The Nordic administrations 
sponsored an ambitious compiler project contracted to Runit, which later 
would evolve into a project involving a number of manufacturing firms. 
Through these encounters with prospective users, the language designers 
gained knowledge about how various language concepts would be used. As 
shown above, not everyone was impressed. The external pressure from 
prospective users was further fuelled by the debate about the future of Chill 
in the wake of the Ada project. 
As a whole, the work of the Team of Specialists and the 
Implementors’ Forum framed the period of emergence and the initial birth of 
the programming language Chill, which involved both programming 
language design and trial implementations through the constructions of 
compilers. The close-knit community of technical practitioners never 
dominated the scene fully. Already at the very initiation of Chill, strategies 
formulated at the organisational level were of great importance. As shown in 
this chapter, the feedback from the field trials was allowed back into both 
programming language design and implementation, but to some extent, this 
also hinged on various strategies made at the organisational level of many a 
telecommunication manufacturer. 
By 1980, it was time for using Chill in real systems and application 
programming, as the language was about to diffuse beyond its initial set of 
early adopters. This is the subject of the next two chapters. 
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5. Large organisations and large systems: the use 
of Chill in large telecommunication 
manufacturers 
During the 1980s, Chill was used by large industrial manufacturers that 
developed and manufactured large and complex switching systems. The ITT, 
Siemens and Philips all applied the programming language to develop large-
scale public switches. Chill was used when programming switches that were 
widely used, making one participant of the CCITT project remark: “Since 
large companies as e.g. Alcatel and Siemens sell their systems all over the 
world, Chill is passively used by hundreds of millions of people.” 1 
Eventually, switches developed in Chill would be put into operations in 
countries as different as Germany, Pakistan, Norway, Indonesia, Brazil and 
many more along the way. Implicitly, the diffusion was impressive. 
This chapter is concerned with the pattern of Chill’s use and diffusion 
among industrial manufacturers of telecommunication equipment. It starts 
out with three reasonably detailed case studies of the use in the ITT, Philips 
and Siemens, which each highlight different reasons and patterns of use. In 
the Philips case, the study also involves the American AT&T, as Philips and 
the American AT&T formed a European joint venture to produce 
telecommunication equipment in 1983, named AT&T and Philips 
Telecommunications.  
The ITT’s telecommunication division also became a joint venture. It 
was sold off to the French company Alcatel in the mid-1980s, also initially 
as a part of a joint venture.2 I follow the use of Chill in the new combined 
company of Alcatel and ITT. Following this, I present a study of the use of 
Chill by the German manufacturer Siemens in their switching system, the 
EWSD.3 Rounding off this chapter, a more comprehensive survey of the use 
and implementations of Chill in the first half of the 1980s is presented. I 
consider how some of the firms that had taken part in the early phases of the 
CCITT cooperation defected from the Chill party. Given these mergers and 
acquisitions, this chapter casts light on how the changing corporate 
environment and the political economy of telecommunications influenced 
and shaped the diffusion and use of Chill throughout the 1980s. The lack of 
use of Chill by L. M. Ericsson, which had participated in the Chill project 
extensively until 1980, will be more thoroughly analysed in chapter six, 
                                                     
1 Jürgen F. H. Winkler, "CHILL 2000", Telektronikk, no. 4 (2000). 
2 Rand V. Araskog, The ITT wars (New York: Holt, 1989); Christensen, "Switching 
Relations: The rise and fall of the Norwegian telecom industry".: 259 - 266. 
3 EWSD was an acronym for Elektronisches Wählsystem Digital, or in English, 
Digital Electronic Switching System. 
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together with the stance of the Swedish telecommunication administration on 
the use of Chill. 
 
Programming systems 
In chapter four, I reviewed early implementations of Chill and the creation of 
programs that translated code written in Chill to machine code, the 
compilers. When concerned with Chill use in this chapter, we are primarily 
interested in use beyond implementations, meaning the use of Chill when 
programming telecommunication systems or prototypes of such. This is what 
often is referred to as systems programming. 4  In the particular case of 
programming telecommunication systems, such programming involved the 
development of software that would perform a few dedicated functions with 
real-time computing constraints, on hardware that was tightly integrated or 
embedded with the software systems. Compared with the more conventional 
programming of applications that a normal user would interact with, so-
called applications programming, systems programming was “closer to the 
machine”. Systems programming had more severe hardware constraints than 
what typically restricts application programming, but at least the limits were 
known in advance.  
Such systems programming was considered very different when 
compared with application programming: so much so that programmers and 
their tools tended to be specialised in one or the other. However, the 
programming of switching systems was considered even more esoteric than 
normal computer systems programming.5 So-called time-sharing techniques 
that had been developed for real-time computers used in scientific or 
business applications were also considered to have “little relevance to the 
requirements of electronic switching systems”.6 Consequently, the use of 
Chill we analyse in this chapter was related to the development of a very 
peculiar type of systems and not comparable with what is normally 
considered as systems programming. In some respects, various elements of 
such telecommunication systems were even considered as a variant of 
applications programming, like the programming of the important call-
                                                     
4 To my knowledge, there is no established and overarching classification scheme 
for programming languages, but the term systems programming is often used in 
references and textbooks.  
5 One contemporary and rather exotic source, which describes the Japanese D-10 
switching system and its software, is Takamura et al., Software design for electronic 
switching systems. 
6 Ibid., 16. 
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processing application.7 Nevertheless, in the following, I will use the term 
systems programming in relation to the use of Chill, as I consider it closer to 
what is conventionally understood as systems programming than anything 
else. 
While programming telecommunication switches was characterised by 
the same limited programming facilities that characterised more 
conventional systems programming, its uniqueness was related to the fact 
that it had to be capable of dealing with very large numbers of simultaneous 
calls and process these calls in parallel. Furthermore, the reliability with 
which it should be able to deal with these concurrent calls was almost 
extreme, as the example of two hours of total disruption of service in the life 
span of 40 years, as pointed out in chapter two. One would have to organise 
the software accordingly. In the early days of computer-controlled switching 
systems, the software typically came of two kinds, programs involved in the 
execution of the switching functions and programs involved in various 
administrative processes. The programs would typically be provided for by 
an execution environment, an operating system, holding everything, 
including data transfer, memory management and timekeeping, in check. 
The main part of the execution part would be the call-processing program, 
which controlled the switching operation of the calls originating from 
telephones or trunk lines and the routing of the calls to the correct receiver. 
The administrative program would be involved in collecting charging 
information used for billing, monitoring the grade of service the system 
could provide, and facilitating the modification of the data stored for 
particular subscribers or lines, like directory numbers and other features. In 
addition to these, a number of maintenance programs, which only came into 
operation if faults had been detected, were necessary.  
All in all, the programming involved in the development of a full-
scale switching system was extensive and varied. A full-blown switch like 
the EWSD from Siemens could have 100 million lines of code inside, which 
would require 10,000 man-years to produce.8 Chill was intended to be a 
general programming language that should be able to assist the programming 
of programs. An important aspect of systems programming of this type was 
also its managerial aspects, in particular how to make it possible for a large 
number of programmers, often in the 100s or even 1000s, to work on the 
                                                     
7 One example of this naming convention is Mark W. Clark, Hans-Joachim Hey, and 
Gerd-Arnold Schlaffke, "EWSD software modularity - smoothing the way for 
performance increases", in Global Telecommunications Conference (Hollywood, 
Florida: IEEE 1988). 
8  Hans-Eugen Binder, "A telecommunication development: Siemens' digital 
switching system, EWSD", in Proceedings of the 18th international conference on 
Software engineering (Berlin, Germany: IEEE Computer Society, 1996). 
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same systems, and in some cases, on the very same code.  The large numbers 
of programmers were necessary to be able to deliver the systems quickly. 
Consequently, a major undertaking when applying Chill to the development 
of the above-mentioned systems programs, be they administrative programs 
or operational ones, was to provide for such large-scale efforts. Between the 
process of writing the code and handing it over to the compiler, another set 
of tools can be applied to ease the work associated with software 
development. This part of the tool chain, including the compiler, has often 
been called the software development environment.9 In the following, we 
will often encounter such programming tools that existed as part of a larger 
software development environment built around the programming language 
Chill. In chapter six I will further analyse how the experience from creating 
programming systems fed back into the language design. 
 
Chill in the ITT 
ITT was one of the original collaborators in the Chill project and had been 
active in both the Team of Specialists and in the Implementors’ Forum, 
although their role in both groups was always somewhat peripheral. The ITT 
participants were often more observers than active contributors, although we 
noted the pioneering contributions of the ITT in relation to the concurrency 
debate in chapter four. Nevertheless, it came as no great surprise that ITT 
would be one of the first major switching manufacturers that adopted Chill. 
In fact, already from 1977, ITT was committed to using the programming 
language, at a point in time the language was only early in its 
implementation phase.  
The early commitment would be put under pressure as the whole 
organisational framework of the ITT telecommunication operations changed 
in the mid-1980s, as the ITT’s telecommunication division was sold off to 
the French company Alcatel, initially as a part of a joint venture, but later as 
a full merger.10  At that point, the ITT had used Chill extensively when 
developing their large-scale switching system, System 12.11 Alcatel would 
stick with Chill when they continued to produce the System 12. The new 
                                                     
9 The terminology of software development environments was, to some extent, a 
thing of the 1980s, where the term proliferated in conference proceedings, like those 
from the International Conference on Software Engineering, and in journals such as 
the Software Engineering Journal. As such, the term is historically correct when 
discussing the period under consideration, although it might not be in vogue at the 
moment. A similar term, so-called programming environments, appeared earlier, in 
the late 1970s, and implied much of the same thing.  
10 Araskog, The ITT wars; Christensen, "Switching Relations: The rise and fall of 
the Norwegian telecom industry", 259 - 266. 
11 Chapuis and Joel, Electronics, computers and telephone switching: 1960-1985, 
415 - 24. 
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firm would also port part of the software for another Alcatel switching 
system, the E10, to Chill.12 Furthermore, during the ITT years and after the 
Alcatel merger, a number of the company’s subsidiaries were involved in 
their own Chill-based development projects, for example in Austria and in 
Norway, independent of the System 12 and the E10 projects.  
The development of ITT’s major switching system, System 12, was 
programmed in Chill and introduced to the market in the mid-1980s. This 
involved the development of implementations and systems at a number of 
places in the USA, UK, Germany and Belgium. The French system E10, first 
developed by Alcatel and later a part of the portfolio of the outcome of the 
merger between Alcatel and ITT’s telecommunication activities, would 
gradually use Chill in its software development, after starting out with a 
number of other programming languages. Initially, the E10 was a result of an 
earlier merger between the civilian telecommunication division of Thomson 
and CIT, owner of Alcatel, which were put together just before the joint 
venture between Alcatel and ITT.13 The local initiatives to use Chill were 
going on within national subsidiaries, most notably in Norway and in 
Austria. The development of the so-called nodal switch system, a military 
switching system, in the Norwegian ITT subsidiary STK was done in Chill, a 
project that would later spur the development of a fairly successful private 
branch exchange called Digimat.14 STK had been active in the Nordic Chill 
implementation projects from the late 1970s, and was an early adaptor of the 
Nordic Chill compilers in many of their development projects. In the 
following, I will dwell on the reasons to use Chill in all these three settings, 
within the System 12 project, within the Alcatel merger and in the 
Norwegian subsidiary STK.  
The history of the System 12 switch is rather vague. The authoritative 
text on everything about digital switching, Chapuis and Joel’s second 
volume of 100 years of Telephone Switching, has even reverted to the 
narrative structure of a “fairy tale” to sketch the upbringing of the System 
12.15 The authors make it clear that there are many different versions of the 
history of the System 12, versions that involve technical wrangling and 
financial difficulties within and between various parts of the ITT. 
Eventually, both the financial problems and the technical difficulties led to 
the sale of ITT’s telecommunication divisions to Alcatel in 1987. However, 
one thing stands out in the Chapuis and Joel account, regardless of its vague 
                                                     
12 Ibid., 319-31. 
13 To be precise, Thomson-CSF Téléphone was taken over by “Compagnie 
Industrielle des Télécommunciations” (CIT) in 1983. 
14 Christensen, "Switching Relations: The rise and fall of the Norwegian telecom 
industry", 175-205. 
15 Chapuis and Joel, Electronics, computers and telephone switching: 1960-1985. 
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and “fairy tale” structure: the plethora of ITT subsidiaries involved in the 
System 12 development, and in particular how this was the case with its 
software development. This distributed and international mode of software 
development has also been confirmed in conversations with software 
developers associated with the project.16 In the early 1980s, 10 locations in 
different countries plus the USA were concerned with the development 
and/or the supply of switching systems in the ITT and about 800 
programmers were involved in the development, spread across a large 
number of these locations.17 As described in chapter four, the early software 
developments related to the System 12 project were initiated from two of the 
ITT’s central research establishments in the USA, the ITT Programming 
Technology Center in Stratford, Connecticut, and the Advanced Technology 
Center in Shelton, Connecticut. Over time, the programming migrated from 
the USA to Europe. The Americans kept the development of the operating 
system of the switch, further tools were developed by the subsidiary in the 
UK, the database of the switch was worked on in Germany while all 
software maintenance was handed over to the BTM company in Belgium. 
Subsidiaries in other European countries developed the call handling 
routines for the systems deployed in their own country.18 By that time, the 
numbers of people engaged in software development related to System 12 
had grown far beyond the initial 800.19 
ITT committed itself early to the use of the Chill programming 
language, mainly because it was in a hurry. Only Siemens and Philips 
embarked on similar “early adopter” projects, all three trying to bring out a 
new generation of digital switches in the early 1980s. The decision to put 
their weight behind Chill was also about striking a balance: the status of an 
international standard was an asset to the multinational company that wanted 
to coordinate development efforts across multiple local subsidiaries. It was, 
on the other hand, also a possibility to adapt it to the needs of the local ITT 
companies, like the possibility to accommodate it to a variety of target 
machines and building tools that would be portable between host machines. 
Furthermore, when the decision was made in 1977, the Chill definition was 
still in a state of flux, lacking in several respects features that would be part 
of the finished recommendation in 1980. Consequently, this created an 
                                                     
16 Neil Olsen, Tom Love and Capers Jones in various emails to the author, February 
2011. 
17  R. W. Daley and T. A. Haque, "ITT 1240 Digital Exchange – CHILL 
programming Environment", in Second CHILL Conference (Lisle, Illinois1983). 
18 Neil Olsen, in various emails to the author, February 2011. 
19 Neil Olsen, who moved from being a junior software developer to become a 
software architect at the ITT in this period, estimated the number of programmers to 
be about 2000 at its high point. 
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understanding of an apparent flexibility of the standard: the ITT could fill in 
the blanks themselves, as well as make restrictions of it into their own 
subset. 
Another reason for this early backing of the CCITT programming 
language was also the lack of a future for the existing high-level 
programming language used by the ITT, the ESPL-1, which was a PL/1-like 
language created within the company.20 Summing up, local conditions at the 
different ITT development and supply sites combined with the lack of 
technological unity around the existing programming language ESPL/1 
created the opportunity to adapt to the CCITT recommendation very early 
on. The ITT also believed that the technological choice to use Chill would be 
a valuable asset in the varied national markets they targeted with their new 
switching system, assuming the standard to be enforced as a requirement for 
bidding for new tenders.  
In use, Chill had considerable shortcomings. Within the ITT, this led 
to the development of several improvements and local modifications. Two 
issues proved particular problematic, as explained below by Wen from the 
ITT Technology Center in Shelton, Connecticut:  
ITT 1240 is made up of different software modules to enable separate 
compilation. These different software modules have to communicate with each 
other, or at least, the interfaces across these software modules have to be well 
defined so that there will be no gaps between these modules. However, CHILL 
as a programming language does not address these interface mechanism 
problems. In addition, CHILL does not address the problem of configuration 
management which is a crucial in a system as big as ITT 1240. This is especially 
critical since ITT 1240 is developed across multiple design centers around the 
world.21 
Consequently, the ITT would put considerable weight behind efforts to 
improve their toolkits to remedy these shortcomings, leading to the 
development of their own environments, capable of handling the division of 
labour they needed. Consequently, ITT’s use of the programming language 
was never “pure.” To the ITT, it simply was not a “high enough” language.22 
As a consequence, ITT developed a series of extensions and so-called 
problem-oriented languages on top of it.  
                                                     
20 Hills and Kano, Programming electronic switching systems - real-time aspects 
and their language implications, 143-46. 
21 W. Wen, "Problem Oriented Languages", in Second CHILL Conference (Lisle, 
Illinois1983). 
22 Neil Olsen, in various emails to the author, February 2011. 
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The ITT embarked on the construction of a new Chill compiler, the so-called 
Chill2, from late 1981.23 As was the case with the ITT’s first Chill compiler, 
this involved the use of outside contractors. This time around, the firm 
Intermetrics, a firm from Cambridge, Massachusetts, was the contractor, 
although some of the work was also retained within the ITT. The 
maintenance of this compiler was eventually moved to the UK, to the ITT 
Programming Support Centre in Harlow, Sussex. By the early 1990s, 
however, the Chill compiler was maintained, developed and supported by an 
outside company, Richard Daley Associates, and their improvements made 
to the Chill tools used by the ITT represented one of the few continued 
efforts in Chill tool developments in the 1990s. 
The use of Chill in the development of the Alcatel-developed switch 
E10 was an afterthought. The software in E10 was originally coded in three 
different programming languages. The call handling was programmed in 
machine code, the operation and maintenance software in PL/1-like language 
CPL/1 and the signalling system was coded in PL/M, a language originally 
created as the implementation language for the operating system CP/M. 
After Alcatel incorporated the ITT telecommunication operations, it was 
decided that the next E10 switch should use the same software as the old 
version, but that the code should be in Chill – the programming language 
favoured by the newly acquired ITT. To achieve this, Alcatel decided to port 
the existing software on the E10 switch – and not develop new software. 
Since the new generation of E10 switches, cryptically named OCB 283, 
would be based on the Motorola 68020 processor, a completely new set of 
compilers and tools would be developed. At the same time, tools that would 
try to automatically translate the code in CPL/1 and PL/M were developed. 
In the end, the software porting project would involve the development of 
new compilers, translation tools and manual translation. All together, Alcatel 
would use 83 man-months to port all the software to Chill, with an additional 
66 man-months used to port the machine code used in the call handling to a 
usable machine code for the new target processor.24  
The effort towards integration and concentration on Chill within the 
newly formed Alcatel system had various technical reasons. The mixture of 
machine code, PL/M and CPL/1-developed parts in the original E10 design 
were a result of a similar mixture of hardware, using three different 
processor families within the same switch. The new E10 design was based 
on a single processor, the Motorola 68020. Consequently, this change 
created an opportunity to focus on a single programming language (and a 
single compiler, respectively).  
                                                     
23 The following section is based on Richard Daley, emails to author, April 2011. 
24 F. Hamonno et al., "Switching System Software Base Portage to Chill", in Fifth 
CHILL Conference, ed. Antonio Palma (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil1990). 
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In the case of the Norwegian military switching system, the adoption of Chill 
as the programming language had a number of different causes than those 
discussed above. At the same time as ITT decided to use Chill 
internationally in 1977, the Norwegian subsidiary STK made the same 
choice, but within a rather different context: In 1973 STK got a contract 
from the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (NDRE, FFI in 
Norwegian) to develop a small digital switch called the nodal switch.25 This 
project was a local initiative based on a number of local relations, between 
STK and the NDRE and between STK and the research establishment within 
the Norwegian telecommunication administration. Today, the nodal switch 
forms one of the technological and commercial bases to the Norwegian 
subsidiary of the defence company Thales, and during the 1970s and 1980s it 
was an important part of the operations of STK.26   
From 1977, it was decided that the software part of this project should 
be developed in Chill. Here, the fear of an enforced standard could not have 
been imperative, since the market for the nodal switch was not that of public 
switching and telecommunication administrations, but that of the military. 
National relations were important, as the close relations between Runit in 
Trondheim and STK in Oslo paved the way for a close collaboration on 
software development within the nodal switch project. The compiler created 
by Runit within the Nordic Chill project was adopted and sold to STK, 
which bypassed the internationally coordinated compiler project within its 
parent, the ITT. STK was, in fact, the first real user of Runit’s compiler and 
the first customer of the soon-to-be-spun-off company Urd.27 As such, the 
decision to use Chill within STK was influenced by the nationally oriented 
relationships of the firm. The technical difficulties were, however, fairly 
similar to those that were experienced within the System 12 project 
internationally: the adoption of Chill at a very early point in time meant 
several of its features had still not been decided, and were not available to 
the Norwegian implementers. Still, STK relied on the relationship with Runit 
rather than with their parent company when developing the software and the 
tools.  
Two paths within the ITT, and, from 1987, a third path within the 
newly formed Alcatel organisation, led to Chill. Within the ITT, this 
included both the multinational use of Chill within the System 12 project and 
the local development project of the Norwegian Nodal switch. These two 
paths were continued within the Alcatel system, after the French 
                                                     
25 The following is based on Christensen, "Switching Relations: The rise and fall of 
the Norwegian telecom industry", 180-85. 
26 Ibid., 175. 
27 Stein Erik Ellevseth, "The SDS Software system", in Third CHILL Conference 
(Cambridge University1984). 
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procurement of the ITT’s telecommunication assets in 1987. This acquisition 
led towards the third path of Chill use, one concerned with porting the 
existing code of the E10 switch to Chill and the development of new E10 
software in this programming language.  
 
Encountering C – Chill, Philips and the AT&T 
Philips was one of the main participants in the creation of Chill. Their young 
programmer Remi Bourgonjon had led the work in both the Team of 
Specialists and the Implementors’ Forum. His successor, Kees Smedema, 
continued the strong presence of Philips within the CCITT in the study 
period right after the standard was made an official CCITT recommendation, 
from 1981 to 1984.28 Smedema was also actively promoting the use of Chill 
within the telecommunication division of Philips. One of the largest 
undertakings of Chill compiler design was begun; a project that continued 
well beyond early implementation experiments and was put into real use in 
the early 1980s. However, Philips joined the AT&T in a European joint 
venture from late 1983, radically altering the possibilities to use Chill in the 
development of new switching systems – and more generally, radically 
altering the possibilities to continue the development of a Philips-led 
switching project altogether.29  
The joint venture meant a complete halt in the development of the 
Philips telecommunication systems – as the strategy of the venture was to 
use the Philips organisation to market the AT&T-developed No. 5 ESS 
system in Europe. As such, the whole impetus of the Philips involvement in 
the Chill project seemed out of place. Some of the development and 
production of AT&T’s ESS system was continued in Europe, and in 
particular in its development laboratory in Brussels, Belgium, the 
Programming Languages Support Group. One of the efforts was to develop a 
European or international version of the software of AT&T’s switching 
system, a version based on Chill. The joint venture and the decision to create 
an internationalised software version for the AT&T’s switching system 
created an opportunity to muscle out the credentials of the C programming 
                                                     
28  Information about the two projects has been obtained through two extensive 
interviews: Remi Bourgonjon, interview with author, 16 January 2009, Heeze, the 
Netherlands; Kees Smedema, interview with author, 20 January 2010, Heeze, the 
Netherlands. 
29 The joint venture has been discussed in Farok J. Contractor and Peter Lorange, 
Cooperative strategies in international business (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington 
Books, 1988). The following chapter is particularly informative: Karen J. Hladik, 
"R&D and International Joint Ventures", in Cooperative strategies in international 
business, ed. Farok J. Contractor and Peter Lorange (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington 
Books, 1988).  
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language, used in the No. 5 ESS favoured by the AT&T, and the Chill 
programming language.30 However, the joint venture would soon crumble. In 
1990, Philips withdrew from the public telecommunications market all 
together, exiting the joint venture with AT&T. 31  As such, the wrestling 
match was a short one. However, it was still an important moment in the 
diffusion of Chill.   
To understand the skirmish and the outcome of the clash of 
programming languages within the joint venture, we need to understand a bit 
more about what went on within Philips before the joint venture, as well as 
the activities within the joint venture between Philips and the AT&T. 
Regarding programming languages, the practices within Philips in the 1970s 
were as diverse as those outside Philips. A plethora of programming 
languages and low-level coding practices flourished in the various product 
divisions involved in computer use and development at Philips. While Remi 
Bourgonjon had envisioned his participation in the CCITT as way to change 
the low-level coding of assembly-like languages to a more high-level 
language in the telecommunication division, spurred on by working long 
hours with the troublesome code in his initial job as a programmer, such a 
shift could also be fulfilled by applying another existing programming 
language, a policy favoured by other product divisions within Philips. The 
computer industry division of Philips were also heavy users of programming 
languages. PL/1 and Fortran were popular at the time. In the middle of this, 
                                                     
30  The general understanding of the telecommunications division of Philips has 
benefited from Herman Oosterwijk, "Switching Technology through Five Decades: 
Dutch Telecommunications under Change", in Buidling bridges between ideas and 
markets, ed. Frans van Waarden, Report to the European Commission (2002). See 
also Chapuis and Joel, Electronics, computers and telephone switching: 1960-1985, 
240-42. On the relationship between the research department and the product 
divisions, the detailed history of Philips’ Natuurkundig Laboratorium has provided 
invaluable insight. See Marc de Vries, 80 years of research at the Philips 
Natuurkundig Laboratorium (1914-1994): the role of the Nat.Lab. at Philips, ed. 
Kees Boersma (Amsterdam: Pallas Publications, 2005). On the development of 
Philips Computer Industry, see Jan van den Ende, Nachoem Wijnberg, and Albert 
Meijer, "The Influence of Dutch and EU Government Policies on Philips' 
Information technology Product Strategy", in Information Technology Policy: An 
International History, ed. Richard Coopey (Oxford: Oxford Unievrsity Press, 2004).  
31  AT&T itself spun off its technology company, composed of the remains of 
Western Electric and Bell Labs, on 30 September 1996, into what became Lucent. 
On Western Electric and Bell Labs, see Stephen B. Adams and Orville R. Butler, 
Manufacturing the future : a history of Western Electric (Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999); Kenneth Lipartito, "Rethinking the invention 
factory: Bell Laboratories in Perspective", in The Challange of Remaining 
Innovative, ed. Sally H. Clarke, Naomi R. Lamoreaux, and Steven W. Usselman 
(Stanford, California: Stanford Business Books, 2009). 
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Philips Research Laboratory was actively promoting the use of more modern 
(when compared with Fortran) and less complex (when compared with PL/1) 
programming languages, like Pascal or Modula.  
On the one hand, the scientific credentials were favoured by the 
Research Laboratory. On the other, industry favourites like PL/1 and Fortran 
were held in high esteem in the computer industry division. Between these 
two, the bastard child that was to become Chill would eventually become the 
choice of the telecommunication division. 
Initially, Kees Smedema was a researcher at the research laboratory, 
and not that keen on Chill. The research lab in which Smedema was working 
tried to persuade the different product divisions to switch to what Smedema 
described as “a decent language”,32 more or less hoping for the adoption of 
Pascal or Modula as the internal standard. This effort was directed towards 
the computer industry division and the telecommunication industry division. 
In January 1979 Philips installed a “Committee on Pascal-like languages”, 
which was usually known as the Pascal Group. The group held a mandate to 
advise on the use of different programming languages within various product 
divisions, and the setup of an in-house educational facility in programming.33 
This committee grew partly out of the active advocacy of the research 
laboratory, and consequently the group continued its effort to persuade the 
product divisions to switch to Pascal and Modula. The committee 
represented an important boundary-spanning unit, as it transgressed the 
corporate research laboratory and the product divisions, involving people 
like Remi Bourgonjon. After a while, Chill was included among the 
“favoured languages” of the Pascal Group, and from 1980, Kees Smedema, 
one of the central members of the Pascal Group, joined Bourgonjon at the 
Telecommunications division. The strong belief in the virtues embodied in 
Pascal and Modula had to be replaced by the much more unruly Chill. To the 
colleagues of Smedema in the research laboratory, the move to 
telecommunications was likened to the giving up of beautiful women for an 
old hag. See the figure on the next page for this. 
  
                                                     
32 Kees Smedema, interview with author, 20 January 2010, Heeze, the Netherlands. 
33  The committee is described in Smedema, Medema, and Boasson, The 
programming languages : Pascal, Modula, CHILL, and Ada. The committee also 
published a quarterly newsletter named Compas (Communication on Pascal-like 
computer languages). Copies of this internal publication have been loaned from the 
private collection of Kees Smedema (hereafter cited as KSC). 
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Figure 5.1 From lightly dressed temptations in research to the strict realities of 
telecommunications.34 
 
Despite the turning up of noses at the research laboratory over Chill, the 
programming language was used in the development of two new switches 
that were to be introduced during the mid-1980s: a small local exchange 
called TCP 16 and a large trunk exchange called TCP 36. Both were 
developed from around 1979.35 The TCP 16 was forcefully stopped fairly 
                                                     
34 This cartoon was drawn when Kees Smedema left the Philips Research Lab for 
Philips Telecommunications Systems. It depicts his room in the Laboratory, and 
illustrates his relationship with the two programming languages Modula and Ada, 
while his future looms in the background as a strict aunt with the rolling pin of Chill. 
The books with O.R. referred to Smedema’s activities as chairman of the employee 
representative council. The picture on the wall (voor Cees (wrong spelling) Dries) 
refers to the Dutch Prime Minister Dries van Agt, which was born in the town in 
which Smedema lived. Smedema was at the time a member of the Town Council, 
which wanted to make van Agt an Honorary Citizen, a proposition Smedema 
opposed. The cartoon was drawn by Alan Martin, a member of the so-called 
Tuesday Afternoon Club, led by the luminary computer scientist Edsger Dijkstra. 
35 Some details about the software aspects of the TCP 16 are given in D. Hammer, 
FG. Franken, and P. C. Green, "A distributed operating system for the TCP16 
system", in Fifth International Conference on SOftware Engineering for 
Telecommunciation Switching Systems (Lund, Sweden: Institution of Electrical 
Engineers, 1983). 
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early in its development, while the latter was continued up until a field trial 
in the summer of 1983.36 The early commitment did not pay off, as the joint 
venture with AT&T changed the playing field completely, stopping all future 
development of Philips switches, and consequently putting the lid on the 
TCP 36 project as well.  
Despite the joint venture with AT&T, the software developers of the 
Philips switches did not give up on Chill. This hinged on a different kind of 
argument than that of using a “decent language”, which had led to the 
adaptation of Chill within Philips in the first place.37 The crossroads that 
were the AT&T Philips joint venture opened up the possibility of using Chill 
in the development of AT&T’s new line of switches, the No. 5 Electronic 
Switching System (5ESS for short). This involved a close encounter with a 
programming language that was about to make a big stir in the world of both 
computing and telecommunications: C.38   
AT&T had during the 1970s developed the programming language C, 
which they used in all their development projects at the time of the merger. 
To the developers in Philips, C spelt trouble, as it threatened to replace Chill 
completely. However, it also created an opportunity to continue their Chill 
development. As Kees Smedema recalled: 
We tried to use every argument in order to persuade AT&T that they should do 
different in a European context than in an American context: C is American - 
Chill is international. You will be confronted with telecommunication 
administrations which will force you to use Chill. So you better make sure to 
have Chill in your switches, because otherwise you will be excluded from 
tenders. Of course we also used technical arguments: C was definitely a lower-
level language and less reliable than Chill.39 
This was, apparently, a sufficient argument, as the joint venture would 
support and pay for the use and development of Chill-related tools for a few 
years. The AT&T had to enter the emergent European market because of its 
loosening grip on the American market due to liberalisation. To get a foot in 
this market would require humility regarding what were believed to be the 
future specifications of their new customers, European telecommunication 
administrations. As a result, the AT&T Philips Telecommunications tried to 
create a bridge between C and Chill at their Programming Language Support 
Group in Brussels, both in technical and organisational terms. In 
organisational terms, the project involved people on both sides of the 
                                                     
36  Remi Bourgonjon, interview with author, 16 January 2009, Heeze, The 
Netherlands.  
37 Kees Smedema, interview with author, 20 January 2010, Heeze, The Netherlands.  
38 Ritchie, "The Development of the C Language". 
39 Kees Smedema, interview with author, 20 January 2010, Heeze, The Netherlands. 
 165  
 
Atlantic, like the designated group in Brussels (an AT&T Philips 
Telecommunications operation) and at Bell Labs Software Development 
Systems Department in Naperville.40 A group of 15 people on both sides of 
the Atlantic worked on a technical solution to bridge the two programming 
languages, C and Chill. 
Technically, this resulted in a set of tools that facilitated the 
translation of C code to Chill, and the integration of Chill-programmed code 
into the 5ESS system. 41  The result was an integrated development 
environment for both Chill and C programming, including a continuation of 
the compiler implementation projects that were already underway before the 
joint venture, although with a different set of target machines.42 This was 
achieved without hampering the capabilities of Chill, nor altering the 
components in the 5ESS development environment. This latter part was the 
biggest challenge, according to Tom Hornbach of AT&T in Indian Hills: 
“One thing we discovered is that interfacing two high-level language isn’t 
necessary very difficult. The challenges arise when you take into account a 
pre-existing software environment.”43 At the time, it was believed that the 
way Chill was integrated into the C environment of the AT&T provided a 
model for others interested in implementing transparent interfaces between C 
and other high-level languages, like Ada and Modula.44 
  
                                                     
40  “CCITT Languages Shape Products, Development”, AT&T Technical Report, 
May 1986, KSC. 
41 Mary J. Rowe, "Interfacing Chill with existing C-based systems", in Third CHILL 
Conference (Cambridge University: ITT Europe, 1984). 
42 “Chill compiler released on Unix/370”, 5ESS Export News Flash, 26 February 
1985, KSC. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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Figure 5.2 The bridge that almost was. 45 
 
Mary Jo Rowe of Bell Labs summarised parts of the project and its future as 
follows:  
This work has shown the compatibility and the ease of interfacing the C and 
CHILL languages. Moreover, it demonstrates that an evolutionary approach is 
possible to provide a multi-lingual software environment that will allow a 
graceful introduction of CHILL into current and future C-based software 
systems.46  
In 1987, only two years after the full release of a compiler for AT&T’s Unix 
system, the Chill programming environment and the Chill compiler were 
ended. 47 The legacy of the Chill environment in Philips was summarised in 
an internal note circulated from Hilversum in 1987: “The CHILL 
programming environment provided a sound and healthy, though resource 
intensive method of developing software. It will go into history as a major 
positive contribution to quality software development.” 48  Technically, its 
legacy was a mixed blessing. Organisationally, the project was one of many 
signs of a crumbling partnership: the AT&T Philips joint venture soon 
                                                     
45 Unix/C and Chill was about to be bridged in AT&T Philips Telecommunications. 
This picture was a poster made for the AT&T Philips joint venture. 
46 Rowe, "Interfacing Chill with existing C-based systems". 
47 Erik Helbo, untitled note, Hilversum, KSC. 
48 Ibid. 
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disintegrated and Philips would leave the venture and telecommunications 
altogether. For the people involved in Chill and software development for 
telecommunications systems in Philips, this meant reallocations and new 
pastures: Smedema and Bourgonjon moved to the centre for software 
technology at Philips, set up at corporate level and led by Remi Bourgonjon. 
Here, work on software improvement techniques was put into use and 
developed; highlighting the move away from the belief in particular 
technologies like a programming language as a sole driver of improvements. 
AT&T would, on the other hand, continue its reliance on C.  
The failed partnership marked the end of the telecommunications 
division of Philips, a transition towards digital switching and computerised 
systems. At the outset, the company had sought partnership within the 
CCITT to help ease the transformation. In the end, another partnership, with 
an American technological leader, would mark its end. On a technological 
level, this also marked the end of the strong presence of Dutch engineers and 
computer scientists within the Chill community. Kees Smedema ended his 
involvement with the core Chill community when the new study period 
started in 1985. Another indication of this was the total absence of Dutch 
participants at the fifth Chill conference in 1990.49 However, some of its 
legacy continued within the company, as the importance and centrality of 
programming and software development in other product divisions would 
only increase during the 1980s and 1990s. In this way, the arguments 
favoured by those wishing to orient the software engineering practice in the 
direction of a mathematically oriented computer science would continue to 
exert influence of the coding practices within Philips. 
  
                                                     
49 Apparently, the use of Chill continued in Philips Kommunikations Industrie AG, a 
part of Deutsche Philips GmbH. At the fifth conference, one paper by authors 
affiliated with this subsidiary was presented. See A. Bergmann, T. Letschert, and A. 
Lingen, "CHILL/tss – a System Development Environment for Telephone Switching 
Systems", in Fifth CHILL Conference (Rio de Janeiro: Telebras, 1990). 
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Early adopters and evolutions at Siemens 
One of the largest systems developed in Chill was created by Siemens, with 
their switching system EWSD.50 The first EWSD switch was put into service 
in November 1980 in South Africa, and by 1982 the system was installed in 
eight other countries.51 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the system was 
widely exported, making the EWSD one of the most widely adopted 
switching systems, together with ITT/Alcatel’s System 12.52  
The use of Chill coincided with an extensive effort to expand into new 
markets by Siemens. Most notably, it coincided with Siemens opening a 
development facility in Boco Raton, Florida, in 1979, targeting the so-called 
Bell Operating Companies, an effort that increased after the AT&T 
divestiture in 1984.53 The development of the EWSD switching software was 
spread around various locations in Europe and the USA. 
The first version of the EWSD system was already at the market at the 
very same moment that the CCITT ratified the Chill proposal as an official 
recommendation, making use of Chill as the main programming language for 
the programming of the switching system’s central processor. This early 
adoption was in the similar mode as Philips, the ITT and the NTT, which all 
committed to the use of Chill in the period of the Implementors’ Forum. Just 
as with these other early adopters, Siemens had been an active participant in 
and contributor to the work within the CCITT, in particular through Heiko 
Sorgenfrei, who held prominent positions in both the Team of Specialists 
and the Implementors’ Forum.  
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Siemens continued to be committed 
to Chill.54 By the mid-1990s, it was estimated that Siemens had spent 25,000 
staff-years on software engineering at around 20 development centres around 
the world to develop the software. More than one billion gross lines of code 
                                                     
50  On the EWSD in general, see Chapuis and Joel, Electronics, computers and 
telephone switching: 1960-1985, 409-14.On EWSD and its software, see Dietrich 
Botsch and Hans Eberding, "EWSD, A Real-Time Communication System with 
High-Level Language Software", IEEE Transactions on Communications 30, no. 6 
(1982). 
51 On the sale to South Africa, see David Kaplan, "State Policy and Technological 
Change-The Development of the South African Telecommunications Industry", 
Journal of Southern African Studies 15, no. 4 (1989). 
52 By 1988, the EWSD system had been sold to 32 countries, to a total of 80 
telecommunication agencies and had 8 million lines in service. Chapuis and Joel, 
Electronics, computers and telephone switching: 1960-1985, 413. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Clark, Hey, and Schlaffke, "EWSD software modularity - smoothing the way for 
performance increases". 
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were, by that time, contained in the EWSD Configuration Management 
Database, a major proportion of this being Chill code.55  
The use of Chill at Siemens was extensive, probably more so than at 
any other manufacturer. It was used in the development of the switching 
execution programs, in the administrative applications and in the 
development of a number of support and software development tools. This 
latter category, where Siemens chose to develop support software such as 
library routines, linkers and testing aids all in Chill, even though they were 
tools used when developing software rather than tools used in 
telecommunication systems, was novel and considerably more extensive 
than in any of the other examples of use. 56  This was no small feat.  
According to Erwin Reithmaier, a Siemens engineer, it paid testimony to the 
generality of the CCITT language: 
We think there is no better proof for the general applicability of CHILL […] than 
the EWSD support system executing now for more than three years under most 
severe development and mass production conditions.57 
According to reports in technical journals and at conferences, the 
experiences were generally positive. One example was a paper presented in 
the American IEEE’s journal Transactions on Communications in 1982: 
“The overall experience of using Chill in a telephone switching system is 
very positive.”58 In particular, this was related to the effect the programming 
language had on eliminating errors in the software: 
The main advantage was found in the number of software errors still present in a 
large software package. A considerable reduction, on the order of one magnitude 
compared to assembly language programming, was experienced at the point of 
time when developers, after module and functional test, hand over their product 
to the integration team for final integration and stabilization. On average, only 
two errors per 100 lines of code have been found by integration teams. The 
number of latent faults in a system, which is an indication of stability and failsafe 
operation, can therefore be estimated to be remarkably small.59  
Apart from the better error rate provided by the application of Chill, the head 
                                                     
55  Numbers from Binder, "A telecommunication development: Siemens' digital 
switching system, EWSD". 
56 Botsch and Eberding, "EWSD, A Real-Time Communication System with High-
Level Language Software": 1341. 
57  Erwin Reithmaier, "Compilation Control in a Large CHILL Application", in 
Second CHILL Conference (Lisle, Illinois: Bell Laboratories, 1983). 
58 Botsch and Eberding, "EWSD, A Real-Time Communication System with High-
Level Language Software": 1337. 
59 Ibid.: 1342. 
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of the EWSD project and its chief software developer, Dietrich Botsch and 
Hans Eberding, emphasised two important aspects of Chill: the portability of 
the code that made it possible to provide software for different switching 
processors without extensive recoding, and the concurrency concepts built 
into Chill. As put forward in chapters three and four, these two were 
important design criteria when the Chill project was started. In terms of 
concurrency, it was also a hotly debated subject within the Implementors’ 
Forum. As the EWSD project evolved throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
Siemens would increase their stake in the Chill developments within the 
CCITT. Although the Siemens role in the Team of Specialists and in the 
Implementors’ Forum had been of some importance, they were not the most 
significant of contributors. Later on, and in particular in the latter half of the 
1980s and in the early 1990s, Siemens participants spearheaded several 
important language design improvements in the CCITT.60 I will return to 
these advances in chapter six. 
 
Taking on the World 
To account for the diffusion of Chill beyond the efforts mentioned above, a 
general survey of its diffusion has been conducted. In the following, I 
account for both the implementations and the system programming efforts 
that emerged after Chill was ratified by the CCITT in 1980. In 1984, more 
than 25 different organisations had implanted or were developing compilers 
for Chill. A much smaller number were developing telecommunication 
systems with it in terms of programs and applications deployed in 
telecommunication equipment. The organisations ranged from small 
research establishments to large telecommunication manufacturers. In 
general, a large number of compilers were created, while the numbers of 
actual systems created with Chill were fewer.  
Only ITT (through various subsidiaries) and Siemens used Chill in the 
production of software for switching systems that were put into full 
operation on a global scale. Philips had, up until the creation of a joint 
venture with AT&T in the end of 1983, used Chill in the creation of two new 
switching systems, but the projects were stopped as the joint venture was put 
into action.61  
Furthermore, the NTT of Japan used Chill in various ways in the 
creation of a number of switching systems. From 1979, the NTT had used 
Chill when developing the D10 switch, which was later followed up in a 
                                                     
60 Winkler, "CHILL 2000". 
61  Information about the two projects has been obtained through two extensive 
interviews: Remi Bourgonjon, interview with author, 16 January 2009, Heeze, the 
Netherlands; Kees Smedema, interview with author, 20 January 2010, Heeze, the 
Netherlands. 
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series of other switches.62 The international telephone carrier of Japan, the 
Kokusai Denshin Denwa (KDD), also applied Chill in switching projects in 
cooperation with NEC.63 NTT, NEC, Hitachi, Fujitsu and Oki Electric were 
all cooperating in producing the D10/D50/D60/D70 range of switching 
systems programmed in Chill, using a compiler developed by the NTT.  
Chill was first and foremost used and implemented by organisations 
that had participated in the initial design process: ITT, Siemens and Philips 
had all been important contributors in the Implementors’ Forum and were 
continuing their backing of the programming language in the early 1980s. 
However, the language also spread to a number of new markets and 
countries like Korea, Brazil, China and India, which all embarked on their 
own switching systems development projects in the 1980s. The Swedish firm 
L. M. Ericsson, which had participated in both the Team of Specialists and 
the Implementors’ Forum, is the most notable exception to this. By the early 
1980s, L. M. Ericsson opted to not use Chill at all, continuing their use of 
their own programming language Plex and applying the competing Ada 
programming language in smaller projects, which is something I will return 
to in the next chapter.  
Below, I have compiled an overview of the use of Chill from 1980 
onwards. For the period up to 1984, it draws on official reports from the 
CCITT. For the later years I have added projects that have been reported on 
at the Chill conferences. Consequently, the survey is most complete for those 
first four years, while not that all-inclusive for the period until 1990.  
I make the distinction between implementations and systems: an organisation 
involved in an implementation would typically be working on the creation of 
a compiler, a linker and various other tools that would assist the 
development of applications written in Chill. For reasons of completeness, 
some of the projects that are discussed in more detail in the next two 
chapters are included in the survey below. In particular, this is the case of 
use of Chill within independent tools suppliers, which is the subject of 
chapter seven, and the use of Chill within telecommunication 
administrations, which is the subject of chapter six. 
  
                                                     
62  Maruyama, Sato, and Konishi, "NTT CHILL implementation aspects and its 
application experience". See also Lars-Göran Larsson, "Future Telecommunications 
in Japan - Policy and Technology", in Utlands rapport från Sveriges Tekniska 
Attachéer (Stockholm: Sveriges Tekniska Attachéer, 1984). 
63 Chapuis and Joel, Electronics, computers and telephone switching: 1960-1985, 
426. 
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Country Organisation Implem. System Switching System 
USA ITT/ATC X X System 12 
 CTE X   
Austria ITT Austria X X 5200 BCS (Amanda) 
 Siemens Austria X  EWSD 
Brazil Telebras / Embratel X X Tropico RA, EX 
Poland Technical University 
of Warsaw 
X   
Japan KDD X X XE10, XE20 
 NTT / Hitachi, 
Fujitsu, NEC and Oki 
X X D10 ESS, D50, D60, D70 
 Fujitsu X X Fetex 2000/3000 
China Nanjing Institute of 
Communication 
Engineering 
X X PXAJ-500/2000 
 10th Research Institute 
of China 
 X PXAJ-500/2000 
Romania ITCI X   
South Korea ETRI, Daewoo, 
Samsung, LG, 
Hanwha 
X X TDX-1, TDX10 
Portugal INESC X   
India Tata X   
 C-Dot X X DSS (M680X0-based switches) 
Italy Telettra X   
 SIP-CSELT X   
 Italtel-SIT X X UT-100, LINEA UT 
 FACE (ITT) X X System 12 
Germany Siemens X X EWSD, ETS, EMS, AIGFON, 
BIGFON 
 Tekade (Philips) X   
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 Standard Electric L. 
(ITT/SEL) 
X X System 12, 5600 BCS 
Norway STK (ITT) X X 5500 BCS, Digimat 2000, 
Tadkom 
 Norwegian Telecom 
Administration 
X   
 Runit / Urd / Kvatro X   
USSR Moscow Institute of 
Telecommunication 
X   
 Moscow State 
University 
X   
Netherlands Administration X X  
 AT&T & Philips 
Telecom 
X X TCP 16, TCP 36 
Denmark Technical University 
of Denmark /  
Administration / 
Imperial Software 
(UK) 
X   
Switzerland Hasler  X TTCF Telex switch 
Table 5.1 Chill implementations and applications.64  
 
As can be seen, most of the table is made up of organisations that had 
committed themselves to Chill through their active participation in its 
development. It also tells us that few administrations were directly involved 
in using Chill, even though some implementations were carried out by 
administration-affiliated research institutes, such as the Italian SIP-CSELT. 
A few administrations, such as the Nordic and the Dutch, were directly 
                                                     
64  Based on information in “Reply to Question 8/XI – Maintenance, training, 
compliance and environment aspects of CHILL”, CCITT Plenary Assembly 7 
Yellow Book Vol. 1-3 1980, CCITT, ITUA. Other sources are Svein Hallsteinsen, 
“Overview of projects and contracts at RUNIT dealing with CHILL and CHIPSY”, 
20 November 1985; Kristen Rekdal “CHIPSY – Reference List”, 6 March 1986, 
URD Information technology A/S; Kristen Rekdal, “Report from fourth Chill 
Conference”, 8 October 1986, all in ”L 0136 Samarbeid”, series ”Da, 1961 – 1996”, 
NTR. Some details of the outcomes of the joint venture between AT&T and Philips 
Telecom draw on interviews with Remi Bourgonjon and Kees Smedema. On the 
Korean use of Chill, see Kwon Yong Rai, "Software technology and industry of 
Korea: widening horizon and emerging presence" (Orlando, FL, USA). Additional 
information are drawn from Rekdal, "CHILL - The International Standard Language 
for Telecommunications Programming". 
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involved in implementation projects. 
The survey reveals broad diffusion of the programming language in 
geographical terms, as its use spread from the countries first involved in its 
design to countries with limited involvement in the early period of Chill. 
Also notable is that the language spread to a number of projects outside the 
area of public switching for which Chill was originally mandated, like the 
military communication switch of the Norwegian ITT subsidiary STK. Some 
of this diffusion was partly due to the reorganisation of firms like Philips and 
the ITT, involving subsidiaries in various countries and new joint ventures 
like AT&T Philips Telecommunications and the sale of ITT’s 
telecommunication division to Alcatel. However, its diffusion to countries 
like India, South Korea, Brazil and China reveals a geographically 
expanding community: new implementations and applications sprung up in 
these countries, in particular in the fourth study period within the CCITT, 
running from 1985 to 1988. The Indian, Brazilian and Korean efforts were 
also on a large scale, involving the programming of what would eventually 
become commercially available switching systems.  
 
Some conclusions 
In terms of use by large manufacturers, Chill was a moderate success and a 
relative failure. Since its inception in the mid-1970s, more than 12,000 
programmers worked with the language. Some of the most successful 
telecom switching systems on the world market until the early 1990s were 
engineered with Chill, like the System 12 family of switches from the ITT 
and the EWSD switches from Siemens.65  If one counted the number of 
installed lines of public exchanges by the early 1990s, one would find that 
Chill dominated as the language used by the most installed switches, with 
the programming language Protel, used by Northern Telecom, and C, used 
by AT&T, the next most important. 66  Chill was, at that time, the only 
programming language common to more than one of the major public 
telecom switching systems. 
Chill became the tool of choice in a number of extremely large 
programming projects, involving large teams, spanning numerous user sites 
and in organisations that spread their programming across national 
boundaries, resulting in technically large systems. Furthermore, Chill was 
                                                     
65 Statistics and numbers are found in Rekdal, "CHILL - The International Standard 
Language for Telecommunications Programming". The main switching system 
programmed in Chill was System 12, produced by ITT and Alcatel, and EWSD by 
Siemens. See Chapuis and Joel, Electronics, computers and telephone switching: 
1960-1985. 
66 Rekdal, "CHILL - The International Standard Language for Telecommunications 
Programming". 
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adopted by researchers and manufacturers in emerging economies, in 
particular in China, India and Brazil. Following this, in 1993 Kristen Rekdal 
concluded: “It is safe to say that CHILL has largely achieved its original 
objective of becoming a standard language for the programming of public 
telecom switching systems.”67 However, most of the manufacturers that used 
Chill were part of the Chill project from its outset, with the exception of the 
more specialised application of Chill in newly industrialised countries.  
The evolution of the telecommunication equipment market fostered, 
as well as hindered, the widespread use of Chill in the 1980s. For example, 
the use of Chill in ITT and later on, in Alcatel, was intimately related to the 
expanding international market, as well as the acquisition of ITT’s 
telecommunication division by Alcatel. An example of the opposite was the 
case of Philips. In 1983, Philips joined the American AT&T in a joint 
venture, a move that would eventually halt the use of Chill in that company, 
although not without a fight: the American AT&T first agreed on developing 
a system for translating existing software and integrating new Chill-based 
software into their new switching system. The Siemens use of Chill can be 
understood in a similar fashion, as it coincided with a sustained effort to 
export the Siemens systems beyond the company’s typical markets, in 
particular to the US market after the AT&T divestiture in 1984. The 
adoption of Chill within the ITT was, on the other hand, related to their 
strategy to commit early to Chill as a way to gain market shares. However, 
the difference in strategies between ITT subsidiaries highlights the 
considerable amount of independence lent to technical expertise in technical 
decisions, and as such at least implicitly underscores the importance of the 
resonance Chill had among some technical practitioners.  
All in all, Chill was really neither a success nor a failure: it was 
something in between, something that did not really take off, but neither did 
it fall flat.  Most discouraging was the relative failure of the vision of Chill 
as a tool that would increase the administrations’ control over their own 
equipment and procurements, which would simply disintegrate during the 
1980s. Few of the users documented in the survey above had any clear 
relationship with the administrations, and few administrations would enforce 
the use of Chill upon their manufacturers, even though many of them acted 
upon a fear of such enforcement. This limited appeal to the 
telecommunication administrations is the subject of the next chapter. 
  
                                                     
67 Ibid.: 6. 
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6. Advances and rejections: administrations, 
communities and the struggle for diffusion 
Throughout the 1980s, Chill was improved and made more capable. The 
language specification was refined and new language features were added. In 
particular, the language was made more advanced and efficient when used in 
large projects. Despite these advances, the language did not attract any real 
interest from telecommunication administrations, either as a tool or as a 
mandatory requirement in their procurement. Consequently, its impact and 
diffusion was more restricted than the initial success had suggested. This 
chapter looks at why the national administrations abandoned the language. 
Following the rejection by the administrations, the Chill community of 
language designers became even more dominated by participants from 
manufacturing firms. Still, the community expanded in real term and went to 
improve the language considerably. This community was underlined by an 
infrastructure of conferences, user groups and a circulated bulletin. 
This chapter explores the duality of technical improvements and 
limited diffusion among the administrations, from around 1980 and up until 
the late 1980s. In particular, I trace the reasons why the administrations 
rejected the language, and the reasons to continue improving the language 
within the CCITT and the wider Chill community. Following this, this 
chapter answers the question on how the pattern of diffusion directed the 
advances and improvements made to the language. 
 
Commitments 
In December 1980, the telecommunication administrations of Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland released a 
statement on their continued support for Chill in preference to any other high 
level language for telecommunication applications.68 The signatories to the 
agreement stated that “since Recommendation Z.200 was approved 
unanimously and since the Administrations concerned invariably seek 
harmonization in agreement with the CCITT, CHILL is the approved 
                                                     
68 The agreement was revealed in a letter from the president of the responsible CEPT 
committee, D. Gagliardi, to the European Commission, February 1982. D. Gagliardi 
to Commissions des Communautés, 3 February 1981, Rome, in Annex 6 to Doc. 
T(81) 4 Add, “Télecommunications” Réunion extraordinaire de la Commission 
Innsbruck 11 – 20 mai 1981, Tome II, Documents présentés á la Commission (T 
(81) 1 á (81) 28).” box “L0022 – Telekomiteen, 1979 – 1984”, series “Dbc 
Utenlandskontoret,” Archive “Administrasjonsavdeling”, NTA. A report on the 
meeting is also given in Kristen Rekdal, “Report from CEPT/CCH meeting on 
CHILL vs Ada, Helsinki 5 December 1980,” box “NT-P 1980-1981”, KRC.  
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language within their countries”. 69  Evidently, these 10 European 
administrations wanted to put their weight behind Chill, by stating it was the 
approved programming language in their territories. The agreement was 
released after a meeting in a special working group of the CEPT, the 
European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations, 
which until the early 1990s was engaged in cooperation on commercial, 
operational, regulatory and technical standardisation issues, in many ways a 
European ITU, even more “administration dominated” than the CCITT.70 
Support from the CEPT reaffirmed the initial impression of Chill as a tool 
favoured by the administrations, and also hinted towards the idea of 
programming as an activity carried out by the administrations. The statement 
is also in line with those made at the inception of the Chill project, when it 
was proposed that the administrations should take larger responsibility for 
the software of their switching equipment. By the late 1970s and early 
1980s, similar tendencies were reported as emerging in Australia, New 
Zealand and in smaller countries like Singapore.71 In a paper presented at the 
1981 SETSS conference, the importance of gaining control over the software 
was emphasised by Finnish administration representatives: “Trying to gain 
independence from the manufacturers, the administrations are very interested 
in the production and maintenance of the software they need.”72 
The CEPT statement was, however, not only an expression of the 
proactive vision of the administrations. It was also a response to increasing 
pressure to commit to the programming language Ada. During the first years 
of the 1980s, the momentum behind Ada was increasing, as it gathered 
support from the European Economic Community (EEC) and a number of 
industry actors, and it was believed to be paramount to the future of Chill to 
fend off the competition. It was clear that in technical terms, the two 
                                                     
69  ”Programming languages for telecommunication applications”, COM-XI 
Temporary Document No. 36-E, Geneva, 6-16 April 1981. Published in Chill 
Bulletin 1, no. 1 (1981), 40. 
70  On CEPT, see Gerhard Fuchs, "Policy-making in a system of multi-level 
governance-the Commission of the European Community and the restructuring of 
the telecommunications sector", Journal of European Public Policy 1, no. 2 (1994). 
71 Kristen Rekdal, “Reiserapport fra CCITT Implementors Forum, CCITT WP XI/3, 
TELECOMM Australia, University of Canterbury, Bell Labs, 20/9 – 16/10 1979,” 
box “Implementors Forum 9. møte Melbourne, Sept. 1979, Serie O”, KRC. On the 
Singaporean case, see Kristen Rekdal, “Travel report from 1. Telecoms, Singapore, 
2. CCITT WP VII/3, Melbourne, 3. Nord Computers, Melbourne, 4. Intel Corp, 
Santa Clara”, Runit notat, 13 April 1982, box “NT-P 1982”, KRC. 
72  J. Hirvensalo, A. Myllkangas, and K. Rahko, "Quality standardization of 
telecommunciation swicthing system software", in Software Engineering for 
Telecommunication Switching Systems (University of Warwick, Coventry, United 
Kingdom: Institution of Electrical Engineers, 1981), 16. 
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languages were quite similar and that the battle for credentials was just as 
much a battle for political and commercial support.73  
One month before the CEPT meeting, the plenary assembly of the 
CCITT had finally approved the Chill recommendation. However, neither 
here, nor at the CEPT meeting in December 1980 did this happen without a 
quarrel. While the recommendation was approved without any problem, the 
new mandate for the working group responsible for Chill caused trouble. 
The French administration had filed a proposal that would instruct the new 
working group to reconsider the “technical and economic criteria for 
determining the preferential applications of Chill” given that “other high 
level languages for similar purposes already exist and action has been taken 
to extend the field of use of one of them, namely Ada, to 
telecommunications”.74 In non-diplomatic terms, this proposal implied that 
the CCITT should consider in which cases, if any, Chill would be given 
preferential treatment. After numerous rounds of corridor diplomacy, the 
choice of words was altered slightly, as Ada was only mentioned as an 
example and references to technical and economic criteria were deleted.75 
While Ada had crept into the CCITT papers, it was not longer the reason for 
further study into which areas Chill would be a preferred technology. 
Yet, only a month after the skirmish at the CCITT plenary assembly, 
the same strategic manoeuvre was repeated at the CEPT meeting mentioned 
above. Once again, the French administration was eager to promote Ada as a 
viable alternative to Chill. Their preferred route of action was through the 
constitution of a working group that should report on the possibility of 
“harmonisation” of the two languages. 76  Three official documents were 
presented at the meeting, one by the French administration, one by the 
Norwegian and one by the Dutch. The two latter documents presented pro-
                                                     
73  Some comparisons are found in Smedema, Medema, and Boasson, The 
programming languages : Pascal, Modula, CHILL, and Ada; Erik Meiling and 
Steen U. Palm, "A Comparative Study of CHILL and Ada on the Basis of 
Denotational Descriptions", in Second CHILL Conference (Lisle, Illinois: Bell 
Laboratories, 1983). 
74  ”Draft addendum to new question 8/XI”, 18 November 1980, Temporary 
Document No. 18-E/COM B, box “NT-Programspråk 1980-81”, KRC. 
75 Nic Knutzon, ”VII CCITT plenarforsamling, Behandling av CHILL spørsmålet”, 
24 November 1980, box “NT-Programspråk 1980-81”, KRC. 
76 Administration francaise, ”Harmonisation de langages de programmation de haut 
niveau”, box “NT-Programspråk 1980-81”, KRC. 
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Chill views.77  The outcome was the agreement mentioned above, as the 
delegates to the CEPT meeting concluded that the organisation was not 
“interested in, or in a position to, take part in the harmonisation of other 
languages”.78 The report by Kristen Rekdal, who participated at the CEPT 
meeting, stated that the French administration felt very strong pro-Ada 
pressure from French industry, which was perhaps no surprise, given that the 
language was developed at CII Honeywell Bull. The atmosphere was also 
influenced by the EEC, as the Commission encouraged the setting up of a 
specific interest group, called Ada-Europe, which brought together technical 
expertise at a European level and exerted certain influence over the 
development of the language. The hope of the European Commission was 
that these activities and support programmes would:  
encourage the European industry would commit itself more firmly to the 
development of completely new software technology stemming from Ada, on the 
same line as the energetic efforts being made by the American industry, research 
institutions and universities.79 
As discussed in chapter four, the funding directed towards Ada-oriented 
projects was substantial. One of the projects that benefited was carried out 
by GEC telecommunications in the UK and the Dansk Datamatics Center, 
which had been started by Dines Bjørner. This was to study the support for 
Chill regarding a future “Ada programming support environment.”80 Despite 
this small conciliatory gesture, the telecommunication administrations and 
the industrial partners involved in the Chill project looked on the EEC 
initiatives with scepticism. In a reply to a letter sent by the Dane Jens 
Rasmussen, of the Nordic Chill project, one of the Commission’s 
bureaucrats replied that they were “aware of Chill”, but their support for Ada 
was based on its “standards aspects and potential effects on market and 
industrial structure”.81 Accordingly, Chill was not regarded as a language 
that could provide the same effects. The letter continued as follows: 
                                                     
77 Administration francaise, ”Harmonisation de langages de programmation de haut 
niveau”, box “NT-Programspråk 1980-81”, KRC. Netherlands PTT, “Harmonization 
in the field of SPC programming: CHILL, Ada, or both?”, Doc T/CCH (80) 17, box 
“NT-Programspråk 1980-81”, KRC. Norway, “CHILL, ADA and ESL”, Doc 
T/CCH(80)18, box “NT-Programspråk 1980-81”, KRC. 
78  Kristen Rekdal, “Report from CEPT/CCH meeting on CHILL vs. ADA”, 5 
December 1980, box “NT-Programspråk 1980-81”, KRC. 
79 ”Community Data-processing Policy”, Communication from the Commission to 
the Council, Brussels, 22 July 1982, 23. 
80 Ibid., 40. 
81 H. Hünke to Jens R. Rasmussen, Brussels 30 August 1982, box ”NT-P 1982”, 
KRC. 
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Our requirements for standards come from one of the major goals of the 
European Economic Community for open markets and free (i.e. unhindered) 
exchange of goods and services. Only standards assuring a very high degree of 
portability can be expected to contribute towards this goal.82 
Obviously, open markets and free exchange of goods and services would not 
be considered as a likely outcome if Chill were made mandatory as a 
standardised programming language for telecommunications, according to 
the EEC insiders. In brief, it was considered a property of the “ancien 
regime” of telecommunications rather than a technology that could break it. 
The pressure from the EEC would, at first, force the CEPT to encourage the 
industry to use Chill, and did not alter its preference for Ada, quite contrary 
to the intentions of the EEC.   
The attitude of the administrations was a lot more ambiguous than the 
CEPT agreement made it seem. The stipulation of Chill as a prerequisite for 
tenders was generally not followed up. Neither was the idea of software 
development and maintenance done within the administrations. In the next 
section, I will closely follow this ambiguity in the case of the Norwegian 
administration, and contrast this with the Swedish administration, which 
abandoned all links to Chill in the mid-1980s and embraced Ada 
wholeheartedly. Both administrations had been particularly important in the 
first years of the Chill project, and therefore make up an interesting pair of 
cases when considering the ambiguity and negativity that the 
telecommunication administrations felt towards Chill in the first half of the 
1980s. 
 
Ambiguity and negativity  
The case of the Norwegian telecommunication administration (NTA) 
illustrates both the hopes the onset of ambiguity. In late 1979 the policy of 
the administration was that of enforcing Chill on its prospective suppliers. A 
policy note circulated within the administration in October 1979, stated: “We 
find it important to make clear that [the NTA] wants to use Chill in future 
switches and other processing equipment for the telecommunication network 
and that we will make this a requirement in future specifications of such 
equipment.”83 The note added a hope that the Norwegian industry would 
follow and use Chill as its programming language. This started a long 
discussion about the role of Chill in a future tender for the digital backbone 
                                                     
82 Ibid.  
83 TAS/79/Kha, ”Vedr. CCITT høynivå programmeringsspråk, CHILL” 3 October 
1979, Notat fra Teledirektoratet, box ”NTT 72-2/NT-P 1979 – 1980”, KRC. My 
translation. 
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of the Norwegian telecommunications network.84 In this discussion in the 
early 1980s, the ideal of a Chill-programmed system was put to a real test: L. 
M Ericsson had made it clear they did not intend to offer a system 
programmed in Chill. They would stick with the proprietary language Plex 
for the moment but might opt for Ada at a later time. L. M. Ericsson was 
also the favourite supplier of many in the technical division of the 
Norwegian telecommunication administration, not least after the problems 
the administration had experienced with their last large-scale procurement of 
switches from the ITT. The technical director of the NTA, Ole Petter 
Håkonsen, wrote the following:   
Even if we introduce a requirement in terms of use of Chill in our specifications 
on digital switches now, it seems obvious that we are not in a position where we 
can exclude well known systems developed in another language. However, such 
a requirement should indicate to our supplier that the next generation of their 
systems should preferably be made with Chill.85 
In the same note, Håkonsen also admitted that if they were to choose a 
supplier that did not use this international standard, it would be a failure:  
As particularly active in this field, it would hurt our credibility if we do not use 
this recommendation. A lot of manufacturers of telecommunication equipment 
have already implemented it and it is only fair that they get the support of the 
administrations.86  
By 1982, the NTA was ready to sign a contract to purchase a number of new 
digital switches, after much political and economic wrangling. According to 
historian Lars Thue, the decision marked the beginning of a new type of 
industrial telecommunication policy in Norway, as the tender was open to 
international bidders and not just the two national, although internationally 
owned, producers Elektrisk Bureau (EB) and STK.87 This decision involved 
technical conflicts in the administration as well as a large political shift, 
which involved a newly formed conservative government in 1981. The 
choice would eventually be System 12 from the ITT. However, the contract 
                                                     
84 Detailed chronicles of the various projects leading up to the digitalisation of the 
Norwegian telecommunication network are found in Christensen, "Switching 
Relations: The rise and fall of the Norwegian telecom industry"; Lars Thue, Nye 
forbindelser: 1970-2005 (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2006). 
85 Ole Petter Håkonsen, ”(Hvorfor Chill?)”, box ”L0048, Indig-prosjektet, 1981 – 
1983”, series ”Da Teletjenesteavdeling (T), 1968 – 1992”, Archive ”Teknisk 
avdeling / Teletjenesteavdeling (T),” NTA. My translation. 
86 Ibid. My translation. 
87 Thue, Nye forbindelser: 1970-2005, 147. 
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was not won through a tender from which L. M. Ericsson had been excluded 
due to their choice of programming language. EB was invited to submit a 
tender based on the Ericsson-produced switch AXE, programmed in their 
own proprietary language Plex. The choice of the ITT had, in the end, very 
little to do with choice of programming language. Still, the technical director 
Håkonsen managed not to lose face since the administration ended up with a 
switch that was programmed in Chill.  
Coincidentally, the Norwegian administration would continue to 
support the Nordic Chill project and eventually Urd, the company spun off 
from their partner, Runit, to which I will return in the next chapter. At face 
value, the Norwegian administration was backing the international standard 
Chill, through procurement as well as research and development. However, 
the realities were far more ambiguous. Throughout the 1980s, the “Chill 
question” was raised within the Norwegian administrations numerous times. 
It was proposed in 1986 that the Norwegian telecommunication 
administration should “concentrate” on Chill and the specification language 
SDL, a proposition coming from the research establishment of the 
administration. The SDL policy was actually adopted, but concerning Chill, 
the technical division of the administration was lukewarm. 88  Again, the 
possibility of excluding technology from L. M. Ericsson made such a policy 
unpopular. In 1989 a multidivisional working group within the 
administration cooperated with industry players, and developed a policy of 
focussing on Chill within the areas of broadband communication and 
management networks. The results were meagre – as it continued to be a 
policy of little more than wishful thinking and had few implications. The 
Norwegian Telecommunication Administration was ambiguous about Chill 
throughout the 1980s, even though the impression was that the 
administration held the language in high esteem.89  
 
Betrayed from within 
A comparable story is that of Sweden, although in that case the ambiguity 
was replaced by outright negativity. Sweden had been one of Norway’s 
partners in the Nordic Chill projects from the mid-1970s and in many ways it 
was also the main initiator of the CCITT’s surge in interest in language 
design in the late 1960s. The Swedish administration had also sponsored the 
Nordic compiler projects – and had sponsored the Nordic representative in 
the CCITT, Kristen Rekdal, throughout his stint there. Still the Swedish 
telecommunication administration and L. M. Ericsson abandoned Chill 
almost altogether right after the language was officially endorsed by the 
                                                     
88 F89/u/949, ”Foreløpig anbefaling om bruk av Chill in Televerket”, 23 August 
1989, box ”L 0136 Samarbeid”, series ”Da, 1961 – 1996”, NTR. 
89 Ibid. 
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CCITT in 1980. In the following, I will analyse this together, which makes 
sense in the case of Sweden, where the cooperation between the national 
champion Ericsson and the telecommunication administration was so 
extensive that they had a joint research establishment, Ellemtel.  
L. M. Ericsson had made a considerable contribution to Chill by 
adding the signals concept to its repertoire of concurrency-related concepts. 
This concept was, again, derived from their own proprietary programming 
language, Plex. However, the designer of Plex, Göran Hemdal, was never 
interested in Chill. In retrospect, he would denounce the project on the basis 
that it had turned into something completely dominated by computer 
scientists and programming language theoreticians. To Hemdal, Chill lacked 
features that would make it work in a telephony setting, and this was due to 
the composition of the working groups.90 To Hemdal, the success of Plex 
was related to the fact that he, as the language designer, really did not know 
what programming was.91 
By 1979, Hemdal had moved on to ITT and it was time for change 
when the APN 167 processor was introduced to the Axe system.92 However, 
the result was EriPascal, a Pascal-inspired language, and not a fully fledged 
Chill adoption. According to Bjarne Däcker, who designed EriPascal, this 
happened in a rather arbitrary manner: EriPascal was really similar to a 
subset of Chill, but with a Pascal-like syntax. It included the signals concept 
from Chill, but not all the other concurrency-related features of the language. 
The Pascal syntax was chosen because the group responsible for 
programming technology at L. M. Ericsson was in a hurry and adopted a 
compiler developed for a Pascal dialect called San Diego Pascal. Instead of 
making the compiler accept Chill code, they created a programming 
language that looked like Pascal. The idea was to make the compiler work 
on Pascal-like code, but also to make it accept “something that looked like 
Chill”.93 The plan was also to move gradually to a more proper Chill subset 
and a precompiler for Chill, known as EriChill, “but there were no user 
requests for it”, according to Däcker.94 Däcker would go on to be a founder 
of the Ada user group in Sweden in 1983, but would later work on a new 
specialised programming language for telecommunication inside Ericsson, a 
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language called Erlang.95 By 1981, the interest in Chill at L. M. Ericsson was 
close to zero, as was explained in a meeting between representatives of the 
company and participants in the Nordic Chill, coming from the 
administrations. L. M. Ericsson made it clear the company would not change 
its programming language to either Chill or Ada, unless it was forced to do 
so.96 
Ada caused a stir not only with Bjarne Däcker in Ericsson, but also in 
Ericsson's close ally, the Swedish telecommunication administration. One 
paradoxical figure who was instrumental in the change of policy towards 
Chill was the Swedish electrical engineer Kurt Katzeff, who was one of the 
main designers behind Ericsson’s Axe switches in the 1960s. 97  Katzeff 
moved on to the ITT’s European headquarters in Belgium in the early 1970s, 
and was their chief technical officer until he returned to be deputy head of 
the technical division of the Swedish telecommunication administration from 
1980. As Katzeff returned to Sweden, the Swedish administration opted 
against the use of Chill on his recommendation. Obviously, his stint at the 
ITT had not made him warm to the idea of Chill as a standard, even though 
the company was one of Chill’s main supporters and came to be one of its 
main users. Instead, Katzeff argued that the Swedish administration could 
not “introduce Chill”. 98  He felt it was unimportant which programming 
language was used in future switching systems, as long as the system was 
well supported and documented by its manufacturer. He claimed it was not 
the programming language that should be the decisive factor. “Given the 
alternatives of one system coded in Chill with no support system and one 
assembly coded system with a powerful support system available, the choice 
is not difficult,” Katzeff wrote, implying that the assembly-coded system 
would win hands down every time. 99   As such, it was all up to the 
manufacturing firm. Furthermore, Katzeff was altogether uncertain about the 
necessity of such programming languages as Ada and Chill:  
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[…] the apparent conclusions of most comparisons to date are, that the computer 
world does not need two such similar languages as Chill and Ada, and that they 
may not be ready for practical use until it is too late, as advances in specification 
and description language, support tools and systems architecture, may well make 
both languages redundant.100 
Despite this, the Swedish telecommunication administration would soon put 
all its weight behind Ada. In 1983, the Swedish administration and Katzeff 
spun out a company named Telelogic, a research and development company 
focusing on software and development tools.101 At the same time, a policy of 
adopting Ada, with an exception for the Axe sphere of L. M. Ericsson 
switches, in all future products, was put in place. 102  Two years later, 
Telelogic acquired parts of the American company Telesoft – an 
independent developer of Ada tools - to strengthen their position as an 
important player in the market of firms making tools for Ada. In 1984, 
Ericsson sat up the Computer Science laboratory – which would be engaged 
in the design of an altogether new programming language, Erlang, which 
was planned to be a successor of Plex for the Axe sphere.103 Both events 
were strong indications of the Swedish reluctance towards Chill, which 
manifested itself in the non-use of Chill in every part of the Swedish 
telecommunication system. Taken together, the Swedish case is one of 
abandonment. By 1984, the Nordic cooperation on a common Chill policy 
ended, and according to the Swedish administration representatives, the 
compiler developed by Runit had “so far found no use in the Swedish 
administration”.104  
Still, two years later, in 1986, Ericsson would reconsider the use of 
Chill in Axe.105 This time around, the idea would be dismissed not because 
of enthusiasm for Ada, but because of Ivar Jacobson, inspired by object 
orientation. 106  Jacobson had participated in the Chill work on behalf of 
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Ericsson in the late 1970s, most significantly contributing the concurrency-
related signals concept to the language.  
By 1983, Jacobson spent a year at MIT on sabbatical leave, preparing 
for his doctoral thesis, by reading up on the latest advances in computer 
science, in particular object orientation. This would significantly influence 
Jacobson’s later work, also his doctoral thesis, which was defended at the 
Swedish Royal Institute of Technology in 1985.107 By 1986 he had met Tom 
Love, who had just developed the language Objective-C (together with Brad 
Cox), an object-oriented extension of C.108 Inspired by Love and a lot of 
reading about Smalltalk and object-oriented programming during his year at 
MIT, Jacobson started working on a proposal to extend the existing Ericsson 
programming language Plex into Objective-Plex. On his return to Sweden, 
Jacobson was consulted on the issue of using Chill in the AXE line of 
switches. Ericsson had, as noted above, got their way in terms of 
communication mechanisms in Chill and in some parts of the firm they were 
now apparently eager to use the CCITT standard. Jacobson remarked that it 
would be much cheaper, faster and more effective to go for Objective-Plex. 
Following this, Ericsson put the lid on any future Chill plans, and worked on 
the Objective-Plex path. Objective-Plex was a simple extension of Plex, and 
could have yielded rapid results. However, after the beginning of the work to 
objectify Plex, another path was selected towards C++. All in all, Jacobson’s 
arguments to objectify Plex were what really ended all possibilities of the 
use of Chill at L. M. Ericsson. 
A similar tendency to the Swedish experience was under way in Japan 
by the mid-1980s. The role of the telecommunication administration of 
Japan, the NTT, had been highly visible in the development of Chill from the 
beginning. As noted in the previous chapter, Chill was used by the NTT and 
some of its industrial partners in the development of switching equipment. 
From 1979, the NTT had used Chill when developing the D10 switch.109 The 
international telephone carrier of Japan, the Kokusai Denshin Denwa 
(KDD), also applied Chill in switching projects in cooperation with NEC.110  
However, there is also evidence that the Japanese telephone 
companies faltered in their support for Chill. While the D10 switch was 
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developed in Chill, there was still widespread uncertainty within the NTT on 
what to do with Chill after it was ratified as a standard in 1980. Future 
support for the language could easily ceased right after that, according to 
Norio Sato, who became the NTT’s delegate to the CCITT from 1981. Real 
uncertainty about the future of Chill existed. However, it was decided to 
develop its use further towards more modern environments, microprocessors 
and new switching equipment, which continued throughout much of the 
1980s.111  
However, from the mid-1980s, the NTT’s interest in Chill waned. 
This was related to two major events: the privatisation of the NTT in 1985 
and the initiation of the large research project Tron in 1984.112 While the 
former only influenced the use of Chill in the NTT indirectly, the latter had a 
more direct and severe influence. I will deal briefly with each. 
Traditionally, the government-owned NTT had designed, developed 
and operated the Japanese domestic telecommunication network. At the 
same time, the NTT played an important role in researching and developing 
new telecommunication technologies. To some extent, this role was 
performed in cooperation with the group of competing suppliers like NEC, 
Fujitsu, Hitachi, and OKI Electric, which over time had been engaged in 
some sort of coordinated competition. To some extent, the 1984 part-
privatisation and the introduction of competition in both long-distance and 
local telecommunication services changed the “NTT way”, both in terms of 
operations and in terms of research and development. In the long term this 
meant that the supplier companies would have to rely on their own research 
and development rather than that done by the NTT. The R&D expenditure of 
the NTT actually increased in the aftermath of the privatisation and the 
opening up to competition. However, the NTT’s R&D priorities changed 
from equipment to network planning, design, operations and new services, 
which at least indirectly influenced the switching projects to which Chill had 
been applied, which were tied to equipment development.113 
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The fate of Chill in the NTT was apparently more directly influenced by the 
initiation of the so-called Tron project, a large and ambitious research 
project introduced with great fanfare in 1984.114 The project’s general goal 
was to replace American software and hardware technologies with home-
grown ones, involving everything from an operating system to integrated 
circuits and processors. The project was initially a collaboration between a 
number of private companies and was led by professor Ken Sakamura of the 
University of Tokyo. However, it also influenced a number of choices made 
at the NTT. Among them was the decision to develop an operating system 
for switching systems based on technologies and specifications defined by 
the Tron project, a project that was in turn named CTRON.115 This meant 
that future switches would have to rely on the programming language C and 
not Chill. This was quite a paradox since C was an American programming 
language directly related to the Unix operating system, controlled by the 
AT&T. The Unix system was one of the direct causes behind the anti-
American objectives of the whole TRON project. 116  Nevertheless, the 
overarching concepts and rationales behind the TRON project led meant less 
work was put into Chill diminished and future programming on new 
switching projects would be done in C. By December 1993, Chill 
developments within NTT were almost at an end.117  
Summing up, it seems fair to describe the position of the 
administrations as more passive in terms of enforcement than what was 
hoped in the 1970s, and feared by the manufacturers in the 1980s. As such, 
Chill failed as an administration-driven wedge between operators and 
manufacturers. However, this wedge was thoroughly enforced by political 
bargaining, as efforts to liberalise and reorganise the sector swept across 
Europe, America and Japan during the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
Modular improvements 
Despite the gradual defection of the administrations, Chill was continually 
worked on and improved in the first part of the 1980s, resulting in a 
significantly improved version published as a new recommendation in 
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1984. 118  In practical terms, improvements made to Chill were discussed 
within a sub-working party in the CCITT, which came up with a revised 
language definition, which in turn was ratified by the CCITT plenary in 
1984. This resulted in the publication of the revised edition of the language 
specification, the Z.200 document. The sub-working party responsible for 
Chill improvements, the “Sub-Working Party XI/3-2” in the CCITT 
hierarchy, had several agendas and goals. Improvements made the language 
more capable in large-scale projects. Furthermore, standardised facilities for 
input and output were added, meaning a set of language features that would 
make it easier to provide data transfer between Chill programs and its 
environment. While all this might sound trivial – both were big deals. Both 
areas were considered weak spots by the large firms that already had used 
the language, as evident in the ITT story discussed in the previous chapter. 
These improvements pay testimony to the considerable influence the 
firms using the language in the development of real switches held at the 
time. The addition of facilities for input and output meant that set features 
would make it easier to provide data transfer between Chill programs and its 
environment. This included features for the manipulation of files and records 
within files, which in general would make it easier to use Chill in real-world 
projects, or at least would make it unnecessary to create such facilities time 
and time again.119 The second area of improvement concerned facilities for 
separate compilation. In the lingo of the language designers these was called 
facilities for “piecewise programming”. This involved the possibility of 
separate compilation of program modules. 120  Piecewise programming 
allowed independent development and compilation of pieces of a program, 
something that was important for the use of the programming language in 
projects involving a large number of programmers, who could now safely 
code away on their respective bits and pieces. Thus piecewise programming 
was a technological improvement that allowed the possibility to the division 
of labour in large programming projects.  
The details about the processes leading up to these improvements are 
sketchy. Both areas of improvements added functionality and concepts that 
had long been discussed within the Team of Specialists and in the 
Implementors’ Forum. In the two previous periods (from 1974 and up until 
1980), the separate compilation element was thought of as a technological 
hurdle of such proportions that it could not be dealt with adequately in the 
available time. It was a deliberate leftover and something that the language 
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designers thought could be treated on a level different from the language 
definition. By 1981, the language designers would think differently in the 
last respect, namely that the issue of separate compilation was something 
that would have to be implemented in the language itself. The problem of 
using Chill when doing “programming-in-the-large” was very much the 
constituting agenda when discussing separate compilation facilities.121  
From 1981, compilation issues were given considerable attention in 
the CCITT meetings. Initial contributions were made by the French and the 
Italian administrations, Runit of Norway and the NTT in Japan. Other 
propositions came from AT&T (this was before the joint venture with 
Philips), British Telecom and Philips, which quickly formed an alliance to 
create a common platform.122 The alliance formed around three different 
proposals, which all tried to rectify the shortcomings in the programming 
language in terms of dealing with the development of large programs: AT&T 
proposed some extensions for controlling the visibility of names and 
enhancing the facilities for libraries in Chill. British Telecom was about to 
embark on a project involving multisite development and the design of a 
programming support environment for both Chill and Ada and proposed 
extending Chill with Ada-like facilities for separate compilation. Philips 
proposed extending Chill with a set of facilities that provided for the 
specification, decomposition and manipulation of large pieces of code. 
Before a meeting in Geneva in December 1982 the three organisations 
agreed on a common proposal that incorporated the different propositions, 
which eventually received a wide acceptance from the participants in the 
working group. 123  Here, the experience and learning of different 
organisations fed back into the core Chill development group and clearly 
influenced the final solutions. This was a reiteration of a common strategy in 
the Team of Specialists: alignment through alliances and common proposals. 
However, this time around, the proposals stemmed from organisations that 
either had gained experience from using the language in systems 
programming, or at least in implementing the language and not by aligning 
ideals and virtues.  
It is worth highlighting that at this time, some administrations were 
still taking part in the CCITT work, as the presence of British Telecom, the 
French and Italian administration-run research establishments and the 
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administration-allied Runit of Norway. Furthermore, participants from the 
Danish administration-run research establishment was an important part in 
the work on the piecewise compilation work. Still, the impetus behind these 
changes was very much rooted in the needs of large programming efforts by 
the manufacturing firms. 
The propositions that in the end led to these improvements were very 
much also a part of the larger Chill community. Some of the papers at the 
Chill Conference in 1983 and at the larger International Conference on 
Software Engineering for Telecommunication Switching Systems the same 
year dealt with these issues.124  
Beyond the first half of the 1980s, Chill was revised continuously up 
until the late 1990s. 125  Again, a dominance of industry participants was 
evident. One of the most decisive changes was the gradual evolution of so-
called object-oriented language concepts in the standard, a major influence 
on almost all programming language designs from about the early 1980s. 
What exactly entails the term object-orientation is disputed. 126  That it 
signified a considerable shift in programming language design is, however, 
quite obvious: the historian of programming languages, Mark Priestly, has 
argued that a definite shift in programming language design happened with 
the advent of object-oriented programming languages in the early 1980s.127 
This was bound up in an underlying change in what was considered virtuous 
programming, a change in the dominant programming virtue. Much of the 
mathematical computer science had been spun around the Algol 
programming language and originated in the tradition of scientific 
programming carried out in the 1950s. The background for the constitutive 
object-oriented programming language, Smalltalk, on the other hand, was a 
completely different conception of what programming should be. As 
Priestley has argued for Smalltalk: “Programming was conceived not as the 
production of code following an engineering-like process, but as an ongoing 
interaction with a complex and reactive system.”128 This would, eventually, 
radically influence the practices of software engineering, and by the 1990s: 
“Object-oriented technology has become a dominant – if not the dominant – 
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software technology.”129 To some of the practitioners in the field, it had 
proportions similar to that of Kuhn’s paradigm shifts. To Brian Cox, who 
developed Objective C together with Tom Love at the ITT, it was a 
“paradigm shift – a software industrial revolution”.130 The euphoria of the 
rhetoric was related to the perceived otherness of object-oriented 
programming when compared with regular programming – and the otherness 
in terms of programming language design: basically, object orientation 
meant that data structures and the algorithms used to manipulate the data 
could be presented to programmers as a single entity. However, this little 
distinction had larger implications. In traditional programming languages, 
the structure of the language closely modelled the computer, as it split 
features for expressing algorithms and features for describing data structures, 
mirroring the split between the data store and the control and arithmetic units 
in the dominant computer architecture.131 In object-oriented programming, 
the form of the programming languages differed profoundly from those 
developed to mirror the scientific computing models of the Algol kind. 
The object-oriented approach made inroads in the Chill community by 
1984, four years after Smalltalk had reached its definitive form. 132 
Subsequently, both Siemens and Alcatel (after its acquisition of the 
telecommunication division of the ITT) developed their own variants of 
Chill that included object orientation features. 133  By the mid-1990s, this 
interest was reworked into the official language definition of Chill.134 All in 
all, the addition of object orientation to the repertoire of Chill pays testimony 
to two elements: the changing virtues of computer science and the growing 
interest in object orientation in industry. The move towards object 
orientation could be understood as a move away from the dominant doctrines 
of the 1960s and 1970s. 
By the time Chill officially got object-oriented concepts in its official 
recommendation, the language was, however, far less viable than 10 years 
before. By this time, most telecommunication administrations were 
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transformed into network operators competing in a liberalised market, with 
considerably different strategic priorities than integrating more technical 
expertise into their organisations.  
The first wave of improvements made to Chill, made in the first half 
of the 1980s, was made in a period where some administrations still 
followed the CEPT agreement on continued support for Chill in preference 
to any other high level language for telecommunication systems.135 In the 
case of piecewise compilation, the agreement that was necessary involved 
work by participants from administration-related research establishments, in 
particular the Runit and the Danish telecommunication laboratory, and some 
direct involvement of the British telecommunication administration. 
Nevertheless, the technical diplomacy behind the improvements made in the 
first half of the 1980s was intimately related to implementations and 
knowledge gained through use, which was dominated by implementation by 
the large manufacturers, in particular the ITT, Siemens, Philips (later on 
together with AT&T). This dominance would be reflected in the Chill 
community, which is the subject of the next section. 
 
Coordinated emergence 
In the Team of Specialists and the Implementors’ Forum, identities and 
virtues clashed. The period beyond 1980 was one of more unity, with the 
emergence of what can be described as the Chill community. The Chill 
community can be envisioned as being made up of two parts. Firstly, the 
actors associated with the formal CCITT working group were at its core. 
Secondly, actors that were involved in the use and development of Chill 
outside the ITU tower of Geneva were part of the wider Chill community. 
Both the core and the periphery of the Chill community consisted of actors 
working for telecommunication administrations, manufacturing firms or 
research institutions, some of them even working in competing organisations 
at the local level. The international and transnational meeting points of the 
CCITT, conferences and transnational user groups made up a level for 
interaction where the local user sites were less important and explicit than 
they otherwise would have been, although the local user sites were the 
starting point for the interactions and the decisions made within the Chill 
community. 
The Chill community of users, prospective users, language designers 
and researchers was partly constructed by the CCITT. Coordinated efforts 
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structured the way the community functioned, as the CCITT set up a number 
of community initiatives, like conferences and the publication of the 
technical journal. However, the community was not fully subordinated to the 
CCITT, but came about through what can be described as “coordinated 
emergence” – partly structured, partly unorganised.  
In the theoretical literature on communities and the commons it is 
typically held that communities must possess the ability to self-organise, and 
consequently to shape the supporting and institutional arrangements, to 
effectively govern a common resource. 136  The participants in the Chill 
project lacked many of these possibilities. They were bound by the 
formalities of the CCITT process, even though there were many ways to by-
pass these. The use of delayed contributions and the organising principles of 
special teams and forums are good examples of such actions in the previous 
periods. Now, the by-pass operations were all the more evident: the Chill 
community organised local user groups and collaborative projects beyond 
the CCITT framework. Yet, the Chill community was one of the official 
objectives delegated to a part in the CCITT named the “Sub-Working Party 
XI/3-2” in the study period that ran from 1981 to 1984. The group had 
previously been responsible for the organising of the Team of Specialists and 
Implementors’ Forum in the preceding two study periods. Now, the 
boundary-spanning entities like the Team of Specialists and the 
Implementors’ Forum were dropped and the main Chill activities were 
brought into the formal hierarchy of CCITT working groups. In 1981 the 
agenda of the group was formulated as follows: “The objective of Sub-
Working Party XI/3-2 in the 1981-1984 study periods is to encourage and 
facilitate the widespread use of CHILL as a standardized basis for 
engineering reliable software in telecommunication.” 137  The subject 
(“engineering reliable software in telecommunications”) and the intent 
(“facilitate the widespread use”) were clear. The group was to facilitate 
training in Chill and promote it by presenting papers on Chill at conferences 
and in journals, establish a Chill users’ conference, establish a Chill bulletin 
and investigate the possibilities of making Chill documents more easily 
available to a larger audience.  
The core group looked fairly similar to that of previous CCITT study 
periods, although somewhat smaller and less active than in the 
implementation phase. The group was made up of some veterans, like 
                                                     
136 The standard reference is Elinor Ostrom, Governing the commons : the evolution 
of institutions for collective action, The Political economy of institutions and 
decisions (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
137 Sub-Group XI/3-2, 6-16 April 1981, “Study programme for the period 1981-1984 
for CCITT Sub-working party XI/3-2 (Question 8/XI)”, COM XI 25-E. COM XI 
1981-1984, CCITT, ITUA 
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Kristen Rekdal, as well as newcomers, like the successor of Remi 
Bourgonjon in Philips, Kees Smedema. Organisations that had actively 
participated in the Team of Specialists and the Implementors’ Forum, like 
Philips and the NTT, started out in a fresh spirit and with new participants.138 
Some of the members represented telecommunication administrations, while 
others came from research establishments or manufacturing firms.139  
Several coordinated initiatives were started in the first half of the 
1980s. This included the creation of the Chill Bulletin and the initiation of a 
series of Chill Conferences. The CCITT would also publish an official user’s 
manual to the language. The manual was intended as an elementary 
introduction to the language, much more approachable than the official 
CCITT language definition and not least, compared with the mathematically 
rigorous approach of the “Formal definition of Chill”, which finally hit the 
shelves in the early 1980s. Both were published as so-called CCITT 
manuals. Tellingly, the language was “described fairly informally using 
prose and a number of examples”.140 
Furthermore, a variety of tutorial sessions took place inside 
telecommunication companies, schools of engineers, universities and 
professional societies. The sessions entailed the production of educational 
materials such as slides and exercises, material that would circulate among 
participants of the community afterwards.  The CCITT summed up the 
activities of the Chill community in May 1984 and produced the following 
data about their extent and frequency: 
  
                                                     
138 Remi Bourgonjon of Philips, who had led both of the special task forces from 
1975 until 1980, was succeeded by Kees Smedema from 1981. Smedema was active 
in the CCITT until 1984. The NTT was represented by Norio Sato, who succeeded 
Katsumi Maruyama. The ITT was, as in previous periods, represented by various 
people.  
139 The available documentation on what went on within the CCITT in the study 
period from 1981 to 1984 is a lot scarcer than in previous periods. The amount of 
information found in the private archive of Kristen Rekdal is sporadic and less 
systematic than those for previous periods. Full details are only available on the 
meetings held up until early 1982, including contributed documents and lists of 
participants. The limited amount of material found in the ITU archives in Geneva is 
comparable to that of previous study periods, which means no delayed contributions 
or temporary documents. As such, analysis that necessitates details on participation 
and document contribution, like the social network analysis undertaken in chapters 
four and five, is not possible for the period analysed here. However, some of the 
events were reported in the Chill Bulletin, which also published the official reports 
to the CCITT. 
140 CCITT, Introduction to CHILL – The CCITT High Level Language (1980), 2. 
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Year Press 
releases 
Conferences, seminars, tutorial 
sessions 
Total number of 
participants 
1982 10 20 945 
1983 5 15 1290 
1984141 1 2 210 
Total 16 37 2445 
Table 6.1: The frequency and extent of Chill-related activities, 1982-1984. 
 
These numbers included everything big and small, but still give a good 
indication of what appeared to be a rising interest in Chill in the first half of 
the 1980s. The number for 1984 includes only activities for the first quarter 
of that year, and there are reasons to believe that the numbers for the year in 
full would match those of the two previous years. Such a trend is comparable 
with a number of similar indices, like the number of subscribers to the Chill 
Bulletin and the participation in the Chill conferences. The Chill Bulletin 
was issued between September 1981 and May 1984. It increased its 
circulation from about 180 in 1981 to about 400 subscribers in 1984.142 Five 
Chill conferences were held during the 1980s and one in 1990. The first was 
held in Lyngby, Denmark in 1981. The second was held in Lisle, Illinois in 
1983, the third in Cambridge in 1984, and the last two in Munich and Rio de 
Janeiro in 1986 and 1990, respectively.143 The number of active participants 
and an estimate of general participation are given in the table below. 
  
                                                     
141 This number contains only information about the first quarter of 1984, due to the 
sources used. 
142  Information about these aspects is found in “Reply to Question 8/XI - 
Maintenance, training, compliance and environment aspects of CHILL”, COM XI 
1981 - 1984, CCITT, ITUA. 
143  The conference proceedings utilised here were found in KRC. Some of the 
proceedings can also be located in various libraries. No information has been 
retrieved about the first conference, held in Lyngby, Denmark. 
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  1983 1984 1986 1990 
Papers 32 33 31 42 
Authors and co-authors 49 47 60 99 
Contributing organisations 19 22 19  22 
Estimated number of participants 70 130 140 Unknown 
Table 6.2 The Chill conferences.144 
 
The Chill conferences were initiated by the CCITT, but organised by some 
of the most active users of the programming language, like the ITT, AT&T 
(after the joint venture with Philips), Siemens and Telebras. As the table 
above reveals, the conference grew in scale, although the number of active 
organisations represented by contributing authors or co-authors seems stable 
throughout the whole period. Furthermore, the conference programming 
seems fairly stable for the three first conferences, with a similar amount of 
papers and sessions.  
The organisations that were active in the CCITT in the 1970s came to 
dominate the Chill conferences. The ITT, Philips and Siemens were the only 
organisations being present with papers at all four conferences, although a 
number of organisations took part in all the conferences through direct 
participation or by acting as session chairmen throughout the period.145 Some 
of the organisations that were active in the two former periods of the Chill 
projects did not participate actively in any way on the four conferences: most 
notable was the absence of L. M. Ericsson, which was not very surprising 
given the defection of L. M. Ericsson and the Swedish administration from 
the Chill cause early in the 1980s. 
The conferences were dominated by manufacturing organisations. The 
only administration with a large presence at the conference was the Brazilian 
Telebras. A third group of participating organisations were scientific 
organisations or research establishments, like CSELT of Italy and the South 
Korean ETRI. These organisations typically held tight links to their 
respective administrations. Small start-up companies like the Norwegian Urd 
were also active at the conferences, which is something I will return to in the 
next chapter. 
  
                                                     
144 Overview of papers presented at the Chill Conference, number of authors and 
estimated number of participants, 1983 – 1990. Sources: Conference proceedings. 
The estimated numbers of participants are drawn from “Reply to Question 8/XI, 
1984”, and list of participants for the Fourth Chill Conference, 1986, in the KRC.  
145 The KRC contains a participant list for the fourth Chill conference in Munich in 
1986. 142 participants from 29 different countries are listed, with 60 authors or co-
authors being present. 
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Affiliation Country 1983 1984 1986 1990 
Bell Labs (prior to AT&T Philips) USA 3 1 - - 
CpqD – Telebras Brazil - - 3 17 
CSELT Italy 2 5 - - 
Dansk Datamatik Center Denmark 3 2 - - 
ETRI South Korea - - 2 11 
GEC Telecommunications UK - - 1 2 
GTE USA 2 3 - - 
Hasler Switzerland - 1 3 - 
ITALTEL Italy - - 6 3 
ITT / Alcatel UK, USA, Belgium, 
Norway, Austria, 
France 
10 11 2 7 
Nanjing Communications 
Engineering Institute 
China - - 4 4 
NTT Japan 3 2 3 2 
Philips (including AT&T from 
1986) 
The Netherlands, 
Belgium, Germany 
7 5 4 3 
Telecommunication administration The Netherlands 1 - 1 - 
Runit Norway 3 - - 2 
Scandpower Norway 1 1 - - 
Siemens Germany, Austria 2 4 7  10 
Technical University of Warsaw Poland - - 6 6 
Telecommunication Research Lab Denmark 1 2 - 2 
Telletra Italy - - 3 2 
Universidade Técnica de Lisboa Portugal - - - 2 
University of Berne Switzerland - 1 1 - 
URD / Kvatro Norway - - 2 2 
Table 6.3: Number of Authors and co-authors at Chill conferences, 1983 – 1990 
(ordered alphabetically).146 
                                                     
146 Organisations included in the table provided authors or co-authors at more than 
one conference. The grouping of parent organisations is as follows. For the ITT, 
Philips and Siemens, authors are ascribed to their parent organisation regardless of 
their personal host country. In the case of Philips, this includes authors from Philips 
Telecommunication Industry, the joint venture of AT&T and Philips, the Belgian 
MBLE and the German Philips Kommunikationsindustrie. For the ITT, the numbers 
for 1990 include authors affiliated to Alcatel CIT, after Alcatel acquired ITT’s 
European telecommunication operations in 1986.  Before that, the ITT numbers also 
included authors affiliated to the Norwegian ITT subsidiary Standard Telefon og 
kabelfabrikk (STK) and Bell Telephone Manufacturing (BTM), Antwerp, the 
Belgian subsidiary of the ITT. The numbers include keynote speeches. 
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The community of Chill designers, developers and users grew throughout the 
1980s. Its growth reflected the use of the language within a few large 
industrial firms and the ambiguity and negativity shown by a large number 
of administrations. While some of the veterans of the design and 
implementation period stayed on, new recruits were also won. In particular, 
participants from Asian and South American countries came to dominate the 
community at the end of the decade. Some of the old hats retired from the 
community or went on to greener pastures during the early 1980s. One 
example was the lead designer of the language, Remi Bourgonjon, who bid 
farewell to the community with his keynote speech at the Chill conference in 
1983.147 Here, he summarised his experiences, but also looked forward and 
in particular described a vision of what would be the important steps to 
tackle “the software crisis”. As discussed in chapter two, the software crisis 
had been an all-inclusive tag used to describe the problems associated with 
the software practice since the late 1960s. To Bourgonjon, Chill was only a 
partial solution: 
There are several approaches to tackle the software problem. High-level 
programming languages such as CHILL form one such approach. Although the 
most established approach, it still has to mature to exploit its full power. The 
CHILL level of programming languages is not expected to be surpassed by new 
techniques, at least not for many years. Programming environment, incorporating 
CHILL, will become operational and will further contribute to increased 
software productivity. The problems here lie not in the interface to the 
programming language but with the interface to the target system. Most new 
results from research are to be expected in the area of specification and design 
techniques. They can be a big step in reduction and mastery of software 
complexity.148 
In his “thanks and farewell” speech, Bourgonjon pointed out two areas 
where new developments would make large contributions to software 
development: programming environments and most importantly, 
specification and design techniques. In particular, he betted on the advances 
in specification and design techniques, implying techniques for describing 
the properties of a telecommunication system and the structure of its 
implementation. 149  Implicitly, this meant that huge improvements in 
programming language design were a thing of the past.  
                                                     
147  Remi Bourgonjon, ”Programming languages, environments and Chill”, Chill 
Bulletin 3, no. 1 (1983), 3 – 8. 
148 Ibid.  
149 Bourgonjon would go on to manage large software projects within Philips and 
claimed he did not follow the fortunes of Chill after the mid-1980s. Remi 
Bourgonjon, interview with author, 16 January 2009. 
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Did this implicitly point towards a change in the type of knowledge that was 
circulated in the Chill community at the time, or was this particular 
language-oriented community confined to incremental changes in language 
technology – and thus, already passé? According to Bourgonjon, he had by 
now started to consider Chill, and programming languages in general, in a 
different light. “I started to realise that the choice of programming 
languages, or their design, was not that relevant as when we designed Chill,” 
he told me.150 
 
The circulation of knowledge 
The proceedings of the five Chill conferences held during the 1980s and in 
1990 give good indications of what type of information and knowledge was 
circulated and distributed in the Chill community. The published bulletin 
adds to this material. In the following, I analyse this material to characterise 
the effectiveness of the Chill community and to capture whether the gradual 
withdrawal of the administrations somewhat changed the dynamics of the 
community. 
A thorough content analysis of all 138 conference papers and 30 
authored bulletin contributions and informational pieces would be difficult 
and time consuming. Consequently, I have applied a simple classification 
scheme to reveal some of the characteristics of the knowledge that circulated 
in the Chill community at the time. Of central interest is to what extent 
prescriptive knowledge about how to use the programming language was 
circulated, or whether the information circulated was purely about language 
extensions and changes in the language design.151 A second issue is the one 
raised by Bourgonjon in the quote above: whether the community was able 
to extend itself in terms of its subject matter, and whether important fields of 
knowledge about specification techniques and programming environments 
were “allowed” to circulate within the language-specific community of Chill 
practitioners.  
Two classification schemes have been applied to answer the questions. 
The main classification scheme tries to determine what type of knowledge 
the articles contain, while the second tries to single out articles concerned 
with specification techniques and programming environments, the very same 
categories that Bourgonjon singled out in his article from 1983. 
The main classification scheme is made up of three main article types. 
Firstly, articles presenting prescriptive knowledge about how to use the 
programming language, or reports on the experience of use of the 
                                                     
150 Remi Bourgonjon, telephone interview with author, 17 March 2011. 
151 On the terminology of prescriptive and propositional knowledge, see Joel Mokyr, 
The gifts of Athena : historical origins of the knowledge economy (Princeton, [N.J.]: 
Princeton University Press, 2002). 
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programming language containing real-world examples, either in natural 
language or in code, are singled out. This group includes articles including 
real code examples and illustrations of use. This is knowledge that typically 
is described as “knowing how”. Furthermore, purely informational articles, 
either concerning coming or past events, implementations or related 
technical projects are grouped together. The last group of articles concerns 
language development and language specific concepts and features, either as 
formal propositions or information about extensions, modifications or 
propositions to either the recommendation or a subset of the language. This 
category might look superficial or overlapping with the two broader 
categories, as propositions to change the programming language could be 
envisioned as some sort of prescriptive knowledge. However, the articles in 
question are so distinct and mainly about programming language design 
rather than prescriptive knowledge about language implementation or 
application or systems programming that singling them out is warranted. 
This type of knowledge is propositional, in a way they are of a “knowing 
why” kind. 
The scheme applied consists of mutually exclusive categories, which 
means that an article can either contain prescriptive knowledge or 
information. The main demarcation line has been what is perceived as the 
major part or point in the article at hand, or what is presented as such in its 
abstract. If the content in general is prescriptive in nature, but also includes 
specific informational aspect about the implementation or technique, I have 
categorised it as prescriptive. The other way around, if the prescriptive 
elements are minor when compared with the larger parts of the article, it is 
categorised accordingly. Some articles are, however, not possible to 
categorise within this scheme. Typical examples are broad discussions about 
standardisation or programming at large. Such general addresses have been 
left unclassified. This also goes for articles that are impenetrable and 
incomprehensible. 
It is not straightforward to apply such a classification scheme to a 
wide range of rather esoteric articles. Naturally, this exercise is hinged on 
subjective constructed criteria and my own interpretation of the content of 
the articles in question. A typical problem involves the technical nature of 
many of the articles, making them hard to read and difficult to understand. 
Furthermore, many of the articles are complex in nature, containing both 
informational aspects and novel technological knowledge. As such, drawing 
the line between informational articles and those circulating more codified 
knowledge is fraught with difficulties.  
The classification scheme still has possibilities that more than make 
up for its difficulties. First of all, it makes it possible to discuss the real 
content of the knowledge circulations within the Chill community somewhat 
more precisely. Furthermore, it makes it possible to discuss whether the 
bulletin and the conferences really distributed and circulated knowledge in 
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“codified” form, meaning rather precise and tight know-how, or only papers 
of an informational character. 152  Below, I present the findings after 
surveying all papers printed in the conference proceedings for the four 
conferences where I have been able to track them down, as well as from the 
issues of the Bulletin running from 1981 to 1984. 
 
  Prescriptive knowledge Information 
Language 
development Unclassified 
Bulletin 5 (15.6 %) 16 (50%) 9 (28.1%) 2 
Conference ‘83 10 (32.3%) 11 (35.5%) 8 (25.8%) 2 
Conference ‘84 11 (35.5%) 7 (22.6 %) 10 (32.3 %) 3 
Conference ‘86 16 (50%) 11 (34.4 %) 5 (15.6 %) 0 
Conference ‘90 15 (37.5) 18 (45 %) 5 (12.5 %) 2 
Table 6.4: Articles from the Chill Bulletin and Chill Conferences, categorised. 
 
Regarding the results, I will address the content of the conference 
proceedings first. The numbers reveal no obvious pattern dynamic and no 
article category dominates, except the diminishing relative numbers of 
articles primarily concerned with programming language issues. As revisions 
and additions to the programming language occurred less regularly past the 
third study period of Chill-related work within the CCITT, this tendency was 
natural. The relatively large number of articles concerned with language 
development or programming language issues at the conferences in 1983 and 
1984 concerning language development was related to ongoing discussions 
in the CCITT, in particular piecewise programming and compilation. 
The articles containing prescriptive knowledge in one form or another 
are a plenty, at all four conferences. In 1986, 50 per cent of all the papers 
presented were dominated by prescriptive knowledge in some way or 
another. Generally, it seems that these papers were mainly concerned with 
compilation techniques in various ways. At the 1986 conference this 
accounted for nine out of 16 articles. The typical issues discussed in these 
compilation-oriented articles are concerned with compilation design 
combined with the newly added piecewise compilation feature in the 1984 
                                                     
152 On the codification of knowledge, see Margherita Balconi, Andrea Pozzali, and 
Riccardo Viale, "The 'codification debate' revisited: a conceptual framework to 
analyze the role of tacit knowledge in economics", Industrial and Corporate Change 
16, no. 5 (2007); Cowan, David, and Foray, "The Explicit Economics of Knowledge 
Codification and Tacitness"; Björn Johnson, Edward Lorenz, and Bengt-Åke 
Lundvall, "Why all this fuss about codified and tacit knowledge", Industrial and 
Corporate Change 11, no. 2 (2002); Paul Nightingale, "If Nelson and Winter are 
only half right about tacit knowledge, which half? A Searlean critique of 
'codification'", Industrial and Corporate Change 12, no. 2 (2003). 
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version of the Chill recommendation. As such, they tied in nicely with a 
concern that was common to both the core and periphery of the Chill 
community, namely how to facilitate the use of the programming language 
rather than its use per se. The prescriptive knowledge that circulated within 
the Chill community was, in general, implementation knowledge. 
Knowledge that could ease the implementation of the programming language 
in various settings was readily available, and typically it was related to issues 
like portability between target systems, or its close cousin, portability among 
host systems. Another issue that was debated was how new language 
features influenced compilation techniques. On the other hand, almost none 
of the articles contained knowledge or examples of systems programming, as 
those articles touching on these issues are all informational in character, with 
precious few including real-world examples or code.   
Let us now turn to the Chill Bulletin. Both official reports from the 
CCITT and authored articles were featured in the four volumes and six 
numbers I looked into, but editorial content like the editor’s introduction and 
listings of coming events are not part of the survey above. All in all, the 
Bulletin was dominated by official reports or output from the core Chill 
community within the CCITT. Draft proposals on new language features, 
information about CCITT meetings and so on took up a large proportion of 
the material in the Bulletin.  
Only a handful of articles on particular aspects of the programming 
language can be said to contain prescriptive knowledge, and when that was 
the case, they were mainly concerned with implementation issues like 
compiler validation. All in all, the bulletin reported on the function of the 
Chill community rather than the knowledge held by it. The Chill Bulletin 
drew inspiration from other informal publications related to specific 
programming languages, like the Algol Bulletin and the Simula Newsletter.153 
Compared with the Algol Bulletin, which was published by the Association 
for Computing Machinery (ACM) from March 1959 till August 1988, the 
Chill Bulletin was a blip, a short-running publication containing little of real 
interest to the members of its community. Where the Algol Bulletin 
published informal papers and discussion from a wide range of authors, the 
contributions to the Chill Bulletin were limited to a few authors and the 
journal had to include a number of official CCITT documents to fill its 
pages. The Algol Bulletin ran for 52 issues containing high quality articles, 
although in a pretty informal manner quite unlike a scholarly journal. 
                                                     
153 For the former, see the 52 issues of the Algol Bulletin, from 1959 to 1988. The 
Algol Bulletin is available in its entirety from the ACM library, see 
http://portal.acm.org/ For the latter, see sporadic information in Holmevik, 
Educating the machine : a study in the history of computing and the construction of 
the SIMULA programming language.  
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However, the comparison would also reveal that the Algol Bulletin was 
preoccupied with language development like propositions on changes in the 
programming language itself, which also were themes that made up nearly 
30 per cent of the articles featured in the Chill Bulletin.  
As a further extension to this survey, I have also identified which 
articles were concerned with the relationship between Chill and the two 
promising fields pointed out by Bourgonjon in his keynote speech at the 
second Chill conference: programming environments and specification and 
design techniques.154 Here, the schemes are obviously not exclusive in terms 
of the previous three categories, and applied only to a subset of articles to the 
total.  
 
 Specification and design techniques Environments 
Conference ‘83 2 2 
Conference ‘84 6 6 
Conference ‘86 4 9 
Conference ‘90 2 12 
Table 6.5: Articles and papers concerning environments and specification 
techniques in the Chill Bulletin and at the Chill conferences 
 
Discussions about the framework in which Chill would be used, typically 
called the environment, started to draw attention as the programming 
language went into use. This triggered a series of discussions about the 
toolbox that the use of Chill would necessitate, especially within large 
organisations. This tendency is evident in the subjects tackled at the Chill 
conferences. Articles concerned with specification techniques were fewer. 
They were mainly confined to discussions about the use of the specification 
language SDL, the CCITT specification description language. Often, the 
articles were also about various environment issues, and therefore more of 
an indication of the perceived importance of this issue.  
The prescriptions on how to compile Chill, or how to develop a 
compiler for Chill, which dominated the circulations of the Chill community, 
are examples of codified procedural knowledge. Within the literature on the 
economics of knowledge, it is widely held that linear procedures are quite 
easy to codify, and that this would lead to rapid established and codified 
practices. 155  Another issue is the fact that compiler techniques were 
perceived as something within the domain of computer science. The 
                                                     
154  Remi Bourgonjon, “Programming languages, environments and Chill,” Chill 
Bulletin 3, no. 1 (1983), 3 – 8. 
155 Cowan, David, and Foray, "The Explicit Economics of Knowledge Codification 
and Tacitness". 
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development of systems would be less general, and less likely to be codified 
and available as prescriptive knowledge within the knowledge community.  
 
Crossing boundaries? 
Did the conferences facilitate knowledge circulation among participants that 
worked for different and competing organisations? Conference papers can 
only be that much in terms of knowledge circulation. In a practice where the 
actual output of work is written code, there was at least a possibility of the 
transmission of prescriptive knowledge through conference proceedings. 
As shown above, participants from Siemens, ITT and Philips 
continued to be present at the conferences, and contributed a substantial 
share of the papers. To some extent, they continued to influence the 
technical changes made to the language through the CCITT. However, to 
what extent were they interested in being open about implementation, 
specification and systems programming within the wider community present 
at the conferences? Let me briefly consider the content the papers presented 
by participants from Siemens at the conferences in 1983, 1984, 1986 and 
1990, as an example. As one of the largest, earliest and most successful 
manufacturers using Chill, participants from Siemens were always present at 
the conferences. However, the firm was never a huge presence at the 
conferences, as they presented just a modest number of papers at each of the 
four conferences.  
 
  1983 1984 1986 1990 
Papers in total 32 33 31 42 
Siemens 2 4 5 4 
Table 6.6: Siemens at the Chill conferences 
 
In 1983, Siemens was present with two authors, presenting papers on what 
were the two most important advances in the next version of Chill language: 
piecewise compilations and the input-output facilities in the language. Both 
dealt with what were, at the time, concerns related to programming language 
design, and reported on practical experiences from the Chill use in the 
EWSD system development. In particular, the paper on piecewise 
compilation involved an exposition on how the issue of separate compilation 
had been dealt with before the programming language itself had any strict 
rules about the way to make this possible.156 
In 1984, of the four papers presented by Siemens employees, one was 
still concerned with language design, and another followed up on their 
                                                     
156 Reithmaier, "Compilation Control in a Large CHILL Application"; Winkler, "A 
New Methodology for I/O and its Application in CHILL". 
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interest in input-output facilities by reporting on how to implement the 
newly established rules in the 1984 version of the Z.200 language 
definition.157 One was a proposition of how to integrate various tools into a 
coherent programming environment or tool chain and the last paper reported 
on the experiences of using Chill in an experimental switch called Bigfon.158 
The 1986 conference was organised by Siemens in Munich and one 
common thread bound together the five Siemens papers: the portability of 
software written for one line of switches (processors) to another. 159  The 
background to this was the introduction of new types of processors into the 
EWSD lines of switches, the Motorola MC68020 processors. This 
necessitated, at least, the recompilation of the software, and put one of the 
main design criteria of Chill to test: the ability to write programs in a 
“machine independent manner”.160 One of the papers was about a specific 
compilation technique for a new processor Siemens was about to use in their 
EWSD systems, making explicit implementation knowledge accessible.161 
Others were partly about language design, partly about other implementation 
issues.162  
In 1990, the 10-man delegation of authors from Siemens presented 
four papers in total. One of the papers was again concerned with 
                                                     
157 Winkler, "The Realization of Data Abstractions in CHILL"; T. Mehner and J. F. 
H. Winkler, "An Implementation of the New CHILL-I/O", in Third CHILL 
Conference (Cambridge University: ITT Europe, 1984). 
158 Peter Meyer, "A CHILL-based Systems Development for BIGFON", in Third 
CHILL Conference (Cambridge University: ITT Europe, 1984); T. Mehner, R. 
Tobiasch, and J. F. H. Winkler, "A Proposal for an Integrated Programming 
Environment for CHILL", in Third CHILL Conference (Cambridge University: ITT 
Europe, 1984). 
159 NM. Clark, K. Neuhaus, and G. Walter, "Support Software Environment for a 
Multi-Processor-Development", in Fourth CHILL Conference (Munich: Simenes 
AG, 1986); H. Hey and K. Neuhaus, "CHILL Semaphore technique for 
Multiprocessing", in Fourth CHILL Conference (Munich: Simenes AG, 1996); J. 
Holden and A. Pink, "A Globally Optimizing CHILL Code Generator for the 
Motorola MC68020", in Fourth CHILL Conference (Munich: Simenes AG, 1986); 
Peter Meyer, "Process Communication in a CHILL Environment", in Fourth CHILL 
Conference (Munich: Simenes AG, 1986); M. Clark and G. Walter, "CHILL 
Language Solutions for Mixed Data Formats", in Fourth CHILL Conference 
(Munich: Simenes AG, 1996). 
160 CHILL - The ITU-T Programming Language, ITU-T Recommendation Z.200 
(1999), 1. 
161  Holden and Pink, "A Globally Optimizing CHILL Code Generator for the 
Motorola MC68020". 
162  In particular Hey and Neuhaus, "CHILL Semaphore technique for 
Multiprocessing"; Clark and Walter, "CHILL Language Solutions for Mixed Data 
Formats". 
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programming language design, this time on object-oriented aspects.163 One 
was concerned with compilation design; another more broadly on 
compilation techniques and the last one was about the use of the 
specification language SDL together with Chill, reinforcing the impression 
that the papers stemming from Siemens were largely concerned with 
implementation issues. 164  Some of these papers were fairly explicit and 
propositional in character, opening up to the circulation about, largely, new 
compilation techniques, which was something held in common by many of 
the papers presented by other participants from other manufacturing firms. It 
seems that many of the ideas in the papers by Siemens participants travelled 
and were picked up by others. The papers on piecewise compilation 
techniques are the most prominent example of this. 
The community formed around the programming language Chill was, 
to some extent, able to circulate and create knowledge, both within and 
outside the formal boundaries of the CCITT as well as across firm 
boundaries. Where the CCITT meetings were focused on standardisation and 
language development, the conferences reported on real implementations 
and systems programming. However, the function of the community was 
also limited: one indication of this was the strong focus on implementation 
issues rather than application or systems issues. Furthermore, while 
knowledge of a prescriptive type was circulated to a certain extent, it seems 
that the effect of this circulation was fairly limited: few new organisations 
that were “recruited” to the Chill community would apply the programming 
language to large-scale switching development projects, and even fewer 
would circulate knowledge about such projects within the community. With 
the telecommunication administrations leaving much of the community to its 
own devices, the kind of knowledge that was shared was strongly related to 
the large industrial firms that were actively using Chill. 
 
Some conclusions 
This chapter has explored the general lack of interest in Chill shown by 
many telecommunication administrations in the 1980s, the development of 
the technical community of Chill designers, users and developers and the 
                                                     
163  Diebl, Schulz, and Winkler, "Object-CHILL: The Road to Object Oriented 
Programming with CHILL". 
164  J. Schefer, J. Schiffer, and J. Weiser, "A Machine Independent Model for 
Flexible Construction of CHILL Code Generators", in Fifth CHILL Conference (Rio 
de Janeiro: Telebras, 1990); A. Pink, "Fault Correction in a Running CHILL 
System", in Fifth CHILL Conference (Rio de Janeiro: Telebras, 1990); G. A. 
Schlaffke, J. Lantermann, and G. Becker, "A CHILL Procedure Tracer For a Real 
Time Multiprocessor Environment", in Fifth CHILL Conference (Rio de Janeiro: 
Telebras, 1990). 
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subsequent technical improvements made to Chill after its ratification as an 
official CCITT recommendation in 1980. All in all, this has revealed a rather 
paradoxical setting: the CCITT, the organisation that had been described as 
“the anchor of a regime that facilitated bilateral monopolistic bargains, 
reinforced national monopolies, and limited the rights of private firms in the 
global market”, facilitated the creation and subsequent improvements to a 
tool that became all the more controlled by a set of manufacturers striving 
for new international markets. 165  The limited appeal to the 
telecommunication administrations, which at the outset had seen Chill as a 
strategically and technologically important project, was most discouraging. 
When even the Norwegian administration did not find it important to 
demand Chill when purchasing new digital switches – it seemed highly 
unlikely that anyone else would do so. In this regard, the use of Chill within 
administrations was a real failure. The main initiators of the Chill project 
were the first to withdraw from it. Furthermore, as the technological 
practitioners started to realise that the choice of programming language was 
perhaps not the most important issue through which to express their 
development virtues, the impetus behind Chill started to seem futile. 
The pattern of rejection and adoption among administrations were 
clearly bound up in the shifting strategies of the division of programming 
labour among administrations and manufacturers throughout the 1980s. The 
prospective status of a Lingua Franca was more likely when the 
administrations moved towards technical independence by moving 
programming within their own realms, while Chill became an obscure 
dialect as soon as the administrations left much of the technical development 
to the manufacturers. 
In terms of development and refinements, the early 1980s were a 
period where closer interaction with users fed back into improvements to the 
language design, and in particular improved the few software engineering 
elements that existed in the language. These changes were considerably less 
difficult to get approved in the CCITT working group than what had been 
the case under the modus operandi in the two previous study periods of 
CCITT work. This hinged on a change in the decision-making structure 
within the core Chill community, which was less tense and conflicting than 
in previous periods, as the group was “united” around a real object: the Chill 
recommendation. As such, while the prospects of a functioning and effective 
core Chill community were quite meagre at the end of the Implementation 
Forum period, the prospects of the Chill community seemed considerably 
more positive in the mid-1980s.  
                                                     
165 Cowhey, "The international telecommunications regime: the political roots of 
regimes for high technology": 176. 
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The Chill community expanded during the first few years of the 1980s as it 
drew interest from countries that had been peripheral at best during the 
inception years, like China, India and Brazil. However, few new 
manufacturing firms participated in the community, as it was still dominated 
by firms like the ITT, Philips and Siemens. As will be made clear in the 
coming chapter, where I analyse the use of Chill in large organisations, this 
was all due to Chill’s limited appeal to existing manufacturers that had 
already come a long way in applying other programming languages to their 
development programs.  
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7. Possibilities and opportunities: entering 
markets with Chill 
The defection of the national administrations from the Chill cause coincided 
with rapidly changing conditions for many telecommunication equipment 
manufacturers. The ties between what often had been nationally confined 
manufacturers and administrations fell apart and trade in telecommunication 
equipment surged internationally, in particular in the second half of the 
1980s. Previously closed markets were opened up to outside contenders as 
“national champions” lost their footing and home base.166 Paradoxically, this 
could have put Chill in the ascendant once again. However, this time around 
the diffusion had to involve independent tool vendors that catered for the 
users of the programming language rather than the established 
manufacturers.  
This chapter analyses the possibilities for new Chill use that emerged 
in the second half of the 1980s and tries to answer why particular 
entrepreneurial firms were created to seize these opportunities. In particular, 
I focus on the ideas and knowledge that were commercialised. I try to 
answer why some ideas were brought to the market by new and 
entrepreneurial firms, while others would depend on already established 
firms and still others would never reach outside large manufacturers.167 I 
focus on the possibility to commercialise products related to Chill 
programming. In addition to this, I explore how these possibilities were 
pursued and to what extent the ventures were successful or not. I focus in 
particular on the commercialisation of the Nordic compiler project through 
the firm Urd, the most extensive entrepreneurial effort related to Chill. In the 
end, I conclude on whether the extensive re-regulation and liberalisation of 
the telecommunication industry from the second half of the 1980s 
represented a new possibility for further diffusion of Chill or whether it was 
a set of rather unfeasible opportunities. This includes a review of the fate of 
Chill throughout the 1990s until the last maintained recommendation 
published by the ITU in 1999.  
 
The “ancien regime” and the new beginning 
By the late 1980s Chill’s status as a standard was severely weakened. The 
faltering position of formal international agencies of the “ancien regime,” 
                                                     
166 An overview of the changes in the trade of telecommunication equipment of the 
time is OECD, "Telecommunications Equipment: Changing Markets and Trade 
Structures, No. 2", in OECD Digital Economy Papers (OECD Publishing, 1991). 
167  This question mirrors the general concern raised in Nicholas Dew, S. 
Ramakrishna Velamuri, and Sankaran Venkataraman, "Dispersed knowledge and an 
entrepreneurial theory of the firm", Journal of Business Venturing 19(2004). 
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like the CCITT, followed the liberalisation of the telecommunication 
administrations. This made the possibility of Chill as a mandatory 
requirement seem all the more unlikely. 168  However, as established 
manufacturers started to target new markets and start-ups tried to wrestle 
their way into the rough seas of the international telecommunication 
equipment market, Chill could play a new role. To compete in the 
international markets, new demands were put on the equipment 
manufacturers, demands that could be met by developing software more 
effectively. Chill was not without technical merit and in the mid-1980s it 
was more capable then before. Tools were made available to supplement the 
language and suddenly Chill looked like an attractive offer again, despite its 
faltering status as a standard approved by the CCITT. These tools were 
products, in contrast to the early example of the ITT’s hiring of the firm 
Massachusetts Computer Associates, an outside software contractor, to 
create a compiler for the System 12 switch. ITT’s further reliance on outside 
contractors for new developments and maintenance of their Chill tools, like 
the compiler development with Intermetrics and the services and further 
developments made by Richard Daley Associates, followed this model of 
using sub-contractors rather than products bought through market 
exchange.169 
In a paradoxical way, the technical merits of Chill were reinvigorated 
and strengthened just as the ties between governing agencies and the 
manufacturers loosened, and the possibility to release software tools as 
products to the market was emerging. As the ties between manufacturers and 
administrations were severed, firms that had previously been limited to 
operations in their national market tried to establish new ties, but of a 
different kind: strategic alliances, mergers, acquisitions and eventually the 
increasing use of outside suppliers became increasingly common throughout 
the decade. The joint ventures by ITT and Alcatel and by the AT&T and 
Philips are important examples, and by the late 1980s, these were joined by 
the merger of the two British manufacturing firms, the telecommunication 
division of General Electric Company (GEC) and Plessey, an organisational 
entity that eventually would end up in the joint acquisition of Plessey by 
                                                     
168 The concept of an “ancien regime” in telecommunications, and how the ITU 
supported this regime, was explained in chapters one and two. See also Drake, "The 
Rise and Decline of the International Telecommunications Regime". 
169 Richard Daley, emails to author, April 2011. 
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GEC and Siemens in 1989. 170  The number of similar large-scale 
reorganisations in the telecommunication equipment industry only 
accelerated in the 1990s.171 These reorganisations created an opening for 
outside suppliers of software tools and programming services. New 
businesses could target the telecommunication equipment industry by selling 
compilers and other programming tools as products to the industry. Before 
this, these products had been made by the large manufacturers that had 
already committed themselves to Chill and to research establishments with 
strong ties to the telecommunication administrations.172 The early examples 
of reliance on outside aid have already been mentioned, where the most 
international of all the manufacturing firms, the ITT, contracted out the 
development of a new compiler for Chill to the specialist firm Massachusetts 
Computer Associates in the early 1980s.173 However, this early example was 
one of contracting, as the compiler was never traded openly in a market, but 
was limited to the one customer, the ITT. 
 
New ventures and new environments  
A programming language and its accompanying set of compilers are only 
part of what is needed to develop software. The programming language is 
only a set of rules for writing programs and the compiler is what transforms 
this writing into executable computations. Between the process of writing 
the code and handing it over to the compiler, other tools can be applied to 
ease the work associated with software development. This part of the tool 
chain, including the compiler, has often been called the software 
                                                     
170  On the considerable differences between the equipment markets in various 
Europe countries, see Enzo Pontarollo, "Procurement and market structure in the 
telecommunications industry : A European survey", European Journal of 
Purchasing & Supply Management 1, no. 2 (1994). On the reorganisation of GEC 
and Plessey, see Owen, From Empire to Europe, 282-88. 
171  Fernand Amesse et al., "The telecommunications equipment industry in the 
1990s: from alliances to mergers and acquisitions", Technovation 24, no. 11 (2004). 
172  As noted in chapter one, the similarity to the changes in the production of 
machine tools in America, which were first made on an ad hoc basis by their users 
and later on spawned the emergence of firms devoted to machine production from 
about 1840 to 1880, is striking. See Rosenberg, "Technological Change in the 
Machine Tool Industry, 1840 - 1910".  
173 See chapter five. 
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development environment.174  
Some elements of these environments could be language independent, 
making way for generic tools. One example is sophisticated code editors, the 
word processors of software development if you like. Other elements would, 
to some extent, have to integrate the programming languages into their midst 
to be effective, like the compiler. In addition to the compiler – which forms 
an important element in any programming environment - these tools could 
be so-called debuggers, which is a type of software used to find the cause of 
an error (a so-called bug) that exists in a program. Other valuable tools in 
such environments could be linkers, which tied together separately compiled 
modules. Many other types of tools were available to the software developer 
in the 1980s, a point in time that generally marked a shift in focus from a 
past centred on the programming language.  
Programming languages for telecommunication were something 
special, and accordingly, the elements in the software development 
environments were peculiar to the telecommunication industry. Furthermore, 
as Chill was a very peculiar programming language, so the environments 
would have to be rather language-centred. According to Remi Bourgonjon, 
what such environments should consist of was also a difficult question: 
In large system developments, such as SPC switching systems, it is [....] difficult 
to decide what should be in the programming environment. For example, in SPC 
systems development almost everything is related to everything else. The 
compiler has a strong relation with the debugger, which has a relation the 
operating system, file system, telephony test system etc. The telephony test 
system has a relationship to the telephony programs etc.175  
Accordingly, the environments used in telecommunication programming 
were often tightly integrated with the telephony systems, something that 
gave those directly involved with such systems a head start. Large firms 
using Chill, like the ITT, Siemens and Philips, had already in the early 1980s 
developed a number of tools to strengthen and complete their own software 
                                                     
174 The terminology of software development environments was, to some extent, a 
thing of the 1980s, where the term proliferated in conference proceedings, like those 
from the International Conference on Software Engineering, and in journals like the 
Software Engineering Journal. As such, the term is historically correct when 
discussing the period under consideration, although it might not be in vogue at the 
moment. A similar term, so-called programming environments, appeared earlier, in 
the late 1970s, and implied much of the same thing.  
175 Here, Bourgonjon used the terminology of programming environments in place 
of software development environments. See Remi H. Borugonjon, "Programming 
Languages, Environments and Chill", Chill Bulletin 3, no. 1 (1983). 
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development environments.176  
The entrepreneurial efforts to commercialise knowledge gained 
through the Chill project were geared towards the needs of strengthening 
such development environments, meaning that they targeted openings in the 
environments of established firms. At first, the primary focus was the 
development of compiler technology, which is the most language-specific 
part of a development environment, but other tools were also made available 
through entrepreneurial firms. Consequently, they targeted a market where 
in-house developments already had been going on for a number of years. 
However, the entrepreneurial ventures were not without their own history. 
They were, in some way or another, related to already existing Chill users or 
researchers. 
Three “and a half” ventures tried to commercialise products or 
services related to Chill through market exchange, meaning that the product 
or service was made available from more than one contracting customer.177 
All the ventures started out by selling compilers and providing services to 
users of compilers, although Urd would eventually branch out into a series of 
different implementation tools, eventually ending up offering a complete 
software development environment. The ventures under consideration in this 
chapter were primarily involved in the introduction of tools to the market, 
but I do also briefly consider some additional service offers that were made 
by firms not offering products. Only one of these ventures relied completely 
on Chill-oriented products.  
The first and largest venture to introduce products that could assist in 
using the Chill programming language was first introduced to the market by 
Urd Information Technologies. Urd Information Technologies was 
established in Trondheim, Norway, as a direct result of the Nordic Chill 
Compiler project. It was established in 1984. It was started by Kristen 
Rekdal, who had held prominent positions within the CCITT Chill project 
for a long time, and was set up to commercialise Chipsy (an acronym for 
Chill Programming System), the programming environment that had been 
developed by Runit for the Nordic telecommunication administrations since 
1978. Starting out as a compiler for a limited number of target hardware 
platforms, the programming system now included other tools, such as testing 
                                                     
176  See for example Ibid; Clark, Neuhaus, and Walter, "Support Software 
Environment for a Multi-Processor-Development"; Mehner, Tobiasch, and Winkler, 
"A Proposal for an Integrated Programming Environment for CHILL"; Meyer, 
"Process Communication in a CHILL Environment". 
177 On the difference between software contractors and products, see Campbell-
Kelly, From airline reservations to Sonic the Hedgehog : a history of the software 
industry; Campbell-Kelly and Garcia-Swartz, "From Products to Services: The 
Software Industry in the Internet Era". 
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tools and tools for simple configuration management, meaning the task of 
tracking and controlling changes in the software. In short, it gradually filled 
in the space in a Chill-oriented software development environment.178 
The second product that was tried and sold through a market was a 
Chill compiler by the British company Imperial Software Technologies, 
which had been funded in 1982 as a spin-off from the Imperial College of 
Science and Technology in London. Imperial’s Chill compiler was, however, 
not a result of work done at the Imperial College, but a product developed 
through a Danish-British relationship. The British telecommunication 
manufacturer GEC, the Dansk Datamatik Center (DDC), which was founded 
by Dines Bjørner in 1979 as a sideline of the technical university in Lyngby, 
and the Danish Telecommunication Research Laboratory extended the 
formal approach to compiler design that Bjørner had pioneered throughout 
the 1970s, by developing a Chill compiler.179 The main architecture of the 
GEC-commissioned compiler stemmed from this work, while the code 
generator was eventually coded by Imperial Software Technology. The 
project also involved the use of a Chill compiler in a proposed Ada 
programming environment, making it possible to combine programming 
projects that used both languages. GEC was one of the main participants in 
this project, which was sponsored by the EEC.180 
This compiler was put on the market by Imperial Software from 
around 1986, making the technology available to customers other than 
GEC.181 The main person behind the work at Imperial Software was Peter J. 
Smith, who had previously worked for the ITT creating a compiler for their 
System 12 switch. Smith had also been active in the CCITT on behalf of the 
ITT in the study period from 1981 to 1984, contributing a number of papers 
on the revisions of Chill.182 By the time the GEC compiler was put to use, 
the company was locked into a dogfight with the second British 
                                                     
178 On Urd and Chipsy, see various documents available in the NTR archives, which 
contain extensive material on Urd and Chipsy. See in particular boxes “L 0135 
Samarbeid” and “L 0136”, series “Da, 1961 – 1996,” NTR.  
179 Peter Haff and Søren Prehn, "The TFL/DCC CHILL System Development", in 
Second CHILL Conference (Lisle, Illinois: Bell Laboratories, 1983). 
180 Meiling and Palm, "A Comparative Study of CHILL and Ada on the Basis of 
Denotational Descriptions". 
181 Peter J. Smith, "Experiences in Achiving A Full Implementation of CHILL", in 
Fourth CHILL Conference (Munich: Siemens AG, 1986); D. R. Johnson and C. P. 
Miller, "Testing a CHILL Compiler", in Fourth CHILL Conference (Munich: 
Siemens AG, 1986). See also Kristen Rekdal, ”Report from forth Chill conference, 
Munich, 29/9 1986 – 2/10 1986”, 8 October 1986, box “L 0136 Samarbeid”, series 
“Da, 1961 – 1996”, NTR. 
182 Details given in the biographies section of the conference proceedings of the third 
CHILL Conference (Cambridge: ITT, 1984). 
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manufacturer, Plessey, and the System X switching system, which had 
previously been a joint development programme between the two companies 
and the British telecommunication administration, was in disarray. The now 
privatised telecommunication division of the Post Office, now named British 
Telecom, bought a substantial number of System X switches, but by 1985, 
Ericsson was let into the British network. By the late 1980s, GEC, together 
with Siemens, bought the remains of Plessey. System X, on the other hand, 
did not experience any major success, as its diffusion was largely confined to 
the British Isles. The Chill compiler did not, however, survive the constant 
upheavals at GEC in the late 1980s, or at Imperial Software.183  
The “half” in the “three-and-a-half” was the Dutch telecommunication 
administration, which sold their Chill compiler on ad hoc basis. 184  The 
compiler had been developed throughout the period of the Implementors’ 
Forum, where the Dutch PTT was one of the most active participants.185 In 
the 1980s, this compiler was developed into a software development system, 
consisting of a set of tools such as compilers for different target computers, a 
formatting tool for the source code and a debugger.186 The effort to sell the 
compiler or the development environment did not develop beyond the 
preliminary and ad hoc basis. 
In the 1990s, the American company Cygnus pioneered the open 
source business model by providing software developer tools as open source 
software and delivering services to their users. 187  A Chill compiler was 
developed by Cygnus in the early 1990s, and it was later included in what 
became the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC), an open source collection of 
                                                     
183 Information about GEC and System X is briefly given in David Parker, The 
Official History of Privatisation Vol. I: The formative years 1970-1987 (Routledge, 
2009), 260. See also Owen, From Empire to Europe, 282-88. 
184  Details about this are found in Kristen Rekdal, ”Report from fourth Chill 
conference, Munich, 29/9 1986 – 2/10 1986”, 8 October 1986, box “L 0136 
Samarbeid”, series “Da, 1961 – 1996”, NTR. 
185  On the technical background of this project, see G. H. te Sligte, "A cross-
implementation of Chill on existing hardware under a commercial operating 
system", in Software Engineering for Telecommunciation Switching Systems 
(University of Warwick, Coventry: Institution of Electrical Engineers, 1981); Meijer 
and Sligte, "Status report of CCITT HLL implementation at the Dr Neher 
Laboratory of the Netherlands PTT". 
186  G. H. te Sligte, "A programming environment for Chill", in Second CHILL 
Conference (Lisle, Illinois: Bell Laboratories, 1983). 
187  On Cygnus, see Michael Tiemann, "The future of Cygnus Solutions : and 
entrepreneur's account", in Open sources : voices from the open source revolution, 
ed. Chris DiBona, Sam Ockman, and Mark Stone (Beijing ; Sebastopol, CA: 
O'Reilly, 1999). 
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compilers for various programming languages.188 This made the core of any 
Chill implementations available for free. Nevertheless, the Chill part of 
Cygnus was never extensive: quite the contrary. By the late 1990s, The GNU 
Chill implementation was no longer being actively developed. Cygnus had at 
that point only one customer for whom they were maintaining the Chill 
compiler. Subsequently, the Chill compiler was pulled back from the GCC 
collection due to little interest.189 The Cygnus venture, although intimately 
tied in with the availability of a free and open source version of a Chill 
compiler, points towards the possibility of other service-oriented Chill 
ventures. Such cases would be much harder to track down, in particular if 
they were small and mainly dealing with one or a very limited set of 
customers. Following this, and the fact that the Cygnus effort was developed 
quite some time after the others, I will in this chapter focus on the efforts to 
commercialise Chill tools in the latter half of the 1980s. Another case that I 
do not consider any further was the compiler developed by the NTT, which 
had made their Chill compiler available to their favoured cooperative 
manufacturers, NEC, Hitachi, Fujitsu and Oki. I consider this more in line 
with the old telecommunication regime and not as a result of new 
opportunities and market exchange.190 
 
Entrepreneurship, communities and knowledge 
As seen above, the Chill community was not exactly bursting with 
entrepreneurship. The few examples that existed were limited. The 
entrepreneurial activities were initiated by or associated with people who 
held central positions within the Chill community and concentrated on 
implementation technologies like compilers and other parts of the 
development environments.  
The three main efforts to sell Chill-related products originated with 
people with central positions in the Implementors’ Forum: Rekdal, who 
founded Urd, Bjørner, who was central in the Danish compiler project that 
would be transferred to Imperial Software, and Meijer, who led the work of 
Dutch administration on Chill, were all important actors in the early 
development and implementation efforts of Chill. Rekdal would go on to be 
the chairman of the CCITT working group in the 1980-84 study period and 
                                                     
188 “Chill Front End”, August 29, 1998, http://gcc.gnu.org/news/chill.html (retrieved 
5 April 2011). 
189 The Chill compiler was omitted from the 3.0 version of the GCC, which was 
released in 2001. It was removed from the GCC source tree on 15 April 2002. See 
http://gcc.gnu.org/news/ (retrieved 5 April 2011). 
190 As noted in chapters five and six, the details on the use of Chill in Japan are 
scarce and hard to come by. An overview is found in Chapuis and Joel, Electronics, 
computers and telephone switching: 1960-1985, 425-30. 
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held a prominent position within the CCITT throughout the Chill project, 
while Bjørner, and his related research group, were active and vocal in the 
development of both Ada and Chill. Furthermore, Peter J. Smith, who led the 
Chill work at Imperial Software, had previously represented the ITT in the 
CCITT in the early 1980s. 
Another similarity between the entrepreneurial efforts was their 
networked nature outside the CCITT community: Rekdal’s work spanned the 
CCITT, the Nordic compiler project and various positions in academia. The 
same goes for the Imperial Software Technology project, which involved a 
number of companies, like GEC, and the research institute DDC and the 
Danish Telecommunication Research Laboratory, and implicitly, through the 
prior employment of Peter J. Smith, also the ITT. All in all, the early efforts 
to commercialise Chill tools were spun out from cooperative networks of 
various kinds, releasing the entrepreneurial potential of the networks 
established within the boundaries of the “ancien regime” of 
telecommunications.  
However, they were also carved out by technical experts who held a 
rather independent position. It was no coincidence that the two main 
entrepreneurial efforts that I have discussed in this chapter, Urd and the 
Danish compiler transferred to Imperial Software, were fruits of research 
done at fairly independent research establishments, in countries with no 
dominant telecommunication manufacturer, Norway and Denmark. The 
central position in the Chill community held by Kristen Rekdal and Dines 
Bjørner was a consequence of the same free-standing positions, and would 
go a long way towards explaining their specific possibility to realise 
commercial products from their Chill activities. Furthermore, both Rekdal 
and Bjørner had expressed affinity for elements of formally oriented 
computer science. Bjørner and his partners at DDC and the Danish 
telecommunication research laboratory extended this towards the 
construction of compilers, with an explicit focus on correctness-proving of 
compilers aided by his formal description methods.191 
All the cases discussed above tried to commercialise knowledge about 
how to implement the programming language Chill, first by offering 
compilers for various host computers and hardware targets – and in the case 
of Urd by eventually providing elements of complete software development 
environments. They were, in other terms, not products already available in 
the market. There are reasons to believe that Rekdal, Bjørner and the Dutch 
telecommunication administration were ahead of the curve in terms of 
acquiring such knowledge early on in the Chill development, providing 
                                                     
191 One example is Flemming Andersen and Karsten Nyblad, "Compiler testing, 
theory and experiences", in Third Chill Conference (Cambridge University: ITT 
Europe, 1984). 
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access to advanced and comprehensive compiler solutions. In particular 
Bjørner and Rekdal had considerable experience in compiler design, also for 
other languages and towards various hardware platforms. 
The community in itself could be deemed an obstacle to market 
creation, as the network facilitated the exchange or transfer of knowledge 
without the need of monetary exchange and there existed few reasons for 
people holding central positions within the community network to act 
entrepreneurially, since the knowledge available to the central actors would 
be much the same as to those in more peripheral positions within its borders. 
To people outside the Chill community, however, the knowledge was so 
difficult to grasp, in some ways because of the astute formalism of some of 
the technology, that they were not able to effectuate on it.  
Compared with the continuous activities around the programming 
language Ada, the number of Chill-related products and services exchanged 
in market-like structures was meagre. As of June 1986, there were 47 
compilers from 19 different vendors developed to serve the Ada market. 
Together with the substantial amount of other Ada-related activity within a 
slew of established firms, this creates the impression of an expanding 
market.192 The activities in Europe expanded throughout the 1980s as well.193 
By the late 1980s, the number of Chill compilers was not all that 
meagre: I accounted for 29 of them in chapter five. However, many of those 
were not available from vendors, but held as in-house tools by large 
manufacturers or created as proof-of-concepts by research establishments. A 
software tools exhibition was held at the 1990 Chill conference. Five 
organisations took part. The Warsaw University of Technology exhibited 
their Chillit programming environment (about which I have no further 
information). Kristen Rekdal showed off the Chipsy system by Urd, now 
named Kvatro. Karsten Nyblad of the Danish Telecommunications Research 
Laboratory displayed their compiler and interpreter, which had previously 
been developed and marketed by Imperial Software. The NTT demonstrated 
their software development environment and the Brazilian hosts, the CPqD, 
revealed a number of development tools. 194  If the exhibition was 
representative to what was available at the time, and there are good reasons 
to believe it was, it was a long way from the 19 Ada compiler vendors in 
1986. Furthermore, it is not given that these exhibitors were vendors of 
anything, apart from the Urd/Kvatro team. 
                                                     
192 The numbers are taken from Jean E. Sammet, "Why Ada is not just another 
programming language", Commun. ACM 29, no. 8 (1986).  
193 See for example Ada Language (Great Britain) Ltd., "Ada yearbook", (London: 
Chapman & Hall, 1991). 
194 The exhibition is listed in the final programme leaflet of the 5th Chill conference.  
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The opportunity to commercialise Chill-oriented tools rested on the opening 
up of established manufacturers to outside tool vendors. GEC’s involvement 
with Imperial Software was one signal of this. Another signal was the 
extensive cooperation between the administration-sponsored Nordic 
compiler project and the ITT subsidiary STK in Norway, which was 
described in chapter five. Here, the key technology to the development of the 
so-called nodal switch was delivered by an outside party. In the same period, 
the ideal of Chill as something preferred by administrations was also not 
without merit: Siemens used Chill as a part of their campaign to get into 
markets like Pakistan in the second half of the 1980s. However, the signals 
off an opening in the market to target existing and large-scale switching 
manufacturers did not last. The following section looks into these dynamics 
in detail through a case study of the setting up and development of Urd. 
 
Spinning off 
The most comprehensive and extensive case of Chill-related 
entrepreneurship was the creation of the Norwegian firm Urd Information 
Technologies. 195  It was definitely a case of an insider from the Chill 
community – in many ways one of the most ardent supporters of the Chill 
cause – entering the market through a new venture. 
Urd was set up to commercialise products developed within the 
Nordic Chill compiler project, which the Nordic telecommunication 
administrations had started in 1977. This activity expanded substantially in 
the early 1980s, and was related to a larger development system called 
Chipsy (the Chill Integrated Programming System), a full software 
development environment. The project also included the British 
administration, and continued up until the mid-1980s. Eventually, the 
product would be marketed under the name Chipsy and comprised a set of 
tools in addition to the compiler first developed, some developed within the 
realms of Urd, some originating from the continuation of the Nordic 
compiler project in the early 1980s.196 
                                                     
195 The following is based on extensive interviews with Kristen Rekdal, but also the 
material available in the NTR archives, which contains regular reports on the 
fortunes on Urd’s sales of their Chill technologies, as the administration was one of 
the owners of the product due to their sponsorship of the Nordic Chill Compiler 
project. See in particular the two following boxes “L 0135, Samarbeid” and “L 
0136, Samarbeid”, series “Da, 1961 – 1996”, NTR. Furthermore, additional 
information about the relationship between Runit and Urd was obtained from Svein 
Hallsteinsen, interview with the author, 21 January 2009, Trondheim, Norway. 
196  For an overview of the Nordic compiler projects, see Rekdal, "The Nordic 
CHILL Project". 
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Three exits predated the establishment of Urd. At the micro level, the start-
up coincided with Rekdal’s exit from the CCITT, as he left his role as 
chairman of the working group that had been responsible for Chill 
development in 1984. Furthermore, it coincided with Rekdal’s departure 
from his position at Runit and technical research. At an organisational level, 
a prerequisite for the creation of Urd was the unwillingness of the Nordic 
administrations to continue their coordination of the Chill activities, and 
their unwillingness to market the Chill tools they had developed with Runit. 
At the macro level, the firm’s creation overlapped with the coming of what 
the historian Lars Thue has described as “the neo-liberal order”, a broad 
transformation of Norwegian politics towards market orientation and the 
downsizing of the role of the state. This involved the abandonment of the 
social democratic consensus that had prevailed since the post-war period.197 
The Labour Party left government in 1981, to be replaced by the first 
majority Conservative government since 1928. More directly, this initiated a 
change in industrial policy and an increased focus on how applied technical 
research could be commercialised through spin-offs and firm creation.198  
In the following, I will substantiate my description of each of these 
three exits on the political, organisational and individual level. I will also 
discuss how each exit created an opportunity to commercialise the Chill 
knowledge that existed at Runit and introduce Chipsy to the marketplace. 
Let me start at the bottom, at the level immediately experienced by the 
people involved in the Chill projects. 
Kristen Rekdal’s exit from Runit came after he had realised that he 
would not be able to develop Chipsy further at Runit.199 Runit had “severe 
problems with funding” and it was believed that the only possibility to 
develop Chipsy into a more mature product was to commercialise it and spin 
it off into a separate entity.200 The increasing maintenance responsibility for 
the early Chipsy users was in conflict with the research objectives of Runit. 
By exiting Runit, Rekdal also left the possibility of an academic career as 
well as the possibility to continue a more theoretical interest in programming 
                                                     
197 The conception of the neo-liberal order has pervaded Thue’s work for a number 
of years, largely in Norwegian. It has also been substantiated in Lars Thue, 
"Norway: a resource-based and democratic capitalism", in Creating Nordic 
capitalism: the business history of a competetive periphery (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008). 
198 This is extensively treated in the Norwegian historiography. For an introduction 
in English, see ———, "Norway: a resource-based and democratic capitalism", in 
Creating Nordic Capitalism: The business history of a competetive periphery, ed. 
Susanna Fellman, et al. (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008). 
199 Kristen Rekdal, interview with author, 11 November 2008, Oslo, Norway. 
200  ”CHIPSY information meeting”, Oslo 15 January 1985, box “L 0135, 
Samarbeid”, series “Da, 1961 – 1996”, NTR. 
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languages and software development, since just before the formation of Urd, 
Rekdal was appointed as professor at the Norwegian Institute of Technology 
in Trondheim, a position he never took up.201  
Rekdal’s exit from Runit coincided with the end of his stint as a 
chairman of the CCITT group that had refined the 1980 version of Chill. By 
this time, he had also closely watched how the group was unable to fulfil an 
initial concern towards creating a standardised Chill environment and, more 
modestly, a standard compiler. He had first-hand experience of the limits of 
cooperation within the CCITT. He also possessed an almost complete 
overview of how Chill was used and by whom, since this was reported 
regularly in the Chill Bulletin, of which he was the editor until 1984. If the 
market for Chill-based tools existed, Rekdal would be the man to know.   
To be able to effectuate on this knowledge, ending his liaison with the 
telecommunication administration, which he represented in the CCITT, 
while being able to maintain his close relationship with the same 
organisations, was important. The telecommunication administration had put 
substantial weight behind the development at Runit. In total, through 
financing from the Nordic administrations and various industry contracts, the 
investment totalled 25 million Norwegian kroner between 1975 and 1985.202 
The product, Chipsy, was developed and marketed by Runit, and already in 
1979 had been sold to the Norwegian ITT subsidiary STK. In 1981, the sales 
of Chipsy escalated, with two major orders, one from STK and one from the 
Swiss company Hasler.203 In 1982 and 1983 development on Chipsy was 
substantially influenced by these contracts, and 1984 saw more new 
customers, in this case the No. 10 Research Institute of the Ministry of Post 
                                                     
201 ”Statsråd ble holdt på Oslo slott 28. oktober 1983”, Aftenposten, 29 October 
1983. 
202 Stipulations made from Svein Hallsteinsen, “Overview of projects and contracts 
at RUNIT dealing with CHILL and CHIPSY”, 20 November 1985, box “L 0135, 
Samarbeid”, series “Da, 1961 – 1996”, NTR. Costs related to the participation in the 
CCITT are not included and all investments are given in current prices. In prices for 
2010 (adjusted with CPI), this would amount to 52 million NOK or 8,605,032 in 
2010 US dollars.  
203 In total, these two sales were worth two million Norwegian kroners, and triggered 
maintenance and development contracts worth 7.7 million Norwegian kroners, in a 
period from 1981 to 1985. All numbers taken from Svein Hallsteinsen, “Overview 
of projects and contracts at RUNIT dealing with CHILL and CHIPSY”, 20/11 1985, 
box “L 0135, Samarbeid”, series “Da Sakarkiv ordnet etter arkivnøkkel, 1961 – 
1996”, NTR. 
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and Telecommunications of China, and smaller licenses to the Korea 
Advanced Institute of Science and Technology.204  
These activities created a mismatch between the institutional setting 
and the project. It was stretched between the interests of the owners (the 
telecommunication administrations) the research institute, Runit, and the 
commercial activities. This caused concern. In a report from the steering 
committee in February 1982, this was expressed in the following way: 
The activities inside and outside Runit are now so complex that it is difficult to 
distinguish between the interests of NT-P [The Nordic coordination group on 
programming languages, basically the steering committee of the Nordic Chill 
project], Runit, The Norwegian industry and others. Runit’s main activities are 
neither basic research nor pure industrial projects, but rather applied research and 
development. Runit must raise money in order to survive, which means that 
Runit’s interest goes where the money is.205 
The economic squeeze at Runit was well known to the participants in the 
Nordic Chill project. The steering committee would often report on the 
economic problems of various sub-projects, which were caused by too 
ambitious technical goals and contracts with industry partners like STK and 
Hasler that pushed the project in a direction not necessarily in line with the 
wishes of the administrations. Generally, Runit lacked both resources and 
expertise in dealing with commercially applied research and development, 
which the development of Chipsy resembled more and more, as the 
increasing amount of maintenance that was involved in the various Chipsy 
installations would seriously stretch the resources available. 
The organisational stretch escalated during the period up until 1984, 
when the administrations felt that the Chipsy project had run its course and 
considered cutting the project altogether. In a report from the owners’ 
coordination group, it was argued that: 
  
                                                     
204 “Rapport no 7 to NT from NT-P for the period 84-03-01—84-09-01”, 31 August 
1984, box “L 0136, Samarbeid”, series “Da Sakarkiv ordnet etter arkivnøkkel, 1961 
– 1996”, NTR. 
205 Søren Werner, “Report from the 10th Meeting on NT-Programming Languages, 
British Telecom, London, February 9-10, 1982”, 10 May 1982, box “NT-
Programspråk 1982”, KRC. 
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CHIPSY has served its purpose. It has been giving experience with CHILL 
matters to the Nordic countries in their CHILL activities in CCITT. It has 
supported the common Nordic financed chairman of SWP XI/3-2. Contributions 
from Nordic delegates in CCITT have also been supported. Furthermore RUNIT 
as a scientific organization has seen that the administrative tasks of CHIPSY 
including marketing and selling have become too man consuming in order to 
continue the way CHIPSY deserves. Therefore CHIPSY could be stopped 
now.206 
Despite these objections, there was also considerable interest in continuing 
the project. Three arguments were used in support. Firstly, Chipsy had 
attracted far more interest from industry than had been foreseen. The feeling 
was that while Runit was not able to market and sell Chipsy professionally, 
it could be “sold to a greater extent if it were taken care of by a professional 
company”. 207  Secondly, there were some indications that the 
telecommunication administrations in Norway and Finland were planning to 
use Chipsy for in-house software development. Thirdly, contracts with 
industrial partners like STK and Hasler obliged Runit to maintain Chipsy for 
a number of years. The steering committee of the Nordic Chill project 
concluded: “Chipsy should be kept alive – but handled in an easier way than 
is the case today.”208 That easier way was to license the rights to Chipsy to 
an existing firm willing to take it on, or by supporting the creation of a new 
firm dedicated to marketing, selling and developing Chipsy. Consequently, 
the committee started searching for an agent. At this point in time, Urd was 
already in planning.209  
Even though a tender to “take over” Chipsy was circulated to a 
number of prospective and existing companies, it was no surprise that the 
Nordic administrations opted for Urd in the end, since Chipsy basically was 
                                                     
206 In an appendix to “Rapport no 7 to NT from NT-P for the period 84-03-01—84-
09-01”, 31 August 1984, NT-213 and NT-P(84)139, box “L 0136, Samarbeid”, 
series “Da Sakarkiv ordnet etter arkivnøkkel, 1961 – 1996”, NTR. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Urd was discussed at a board meeting at Sintef on 11 April 1984. The business 
plan that was presented was general, but Chipsy was already mentioned as a point of 
departure for further product developments in the prospective firm. Ola Nordal, who 
has written the history of both the Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
(NTNU) and the computer history of Sintef, lent me a copy of the business plan.  
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a product of Runit and Urd was a Runit spin-off.210 By 1985, the newly 
formed company Urd obtained the rights to sell and further develop 
Chipsy.211 The agreement meant that Chipsy remained the property of the 
administrations involved, and that all sales of Chipsy made by Urd would 
yield royalties for these owners. However, the administrations could choose 
to reinvest their net income in further Chipsy developments and would be 
eligible to use Chipsy free of charge. 
The opinion that Runit and the Nordic cooperation was the wrong 
environment for further developments of Chipsy was not something felt 
within the administrations. It resonated with a shift in general industrial 
policy.  
In November 1983, the Norwegian minister of labour and local 
governance, Arne Rettedal, visited the biannual industry conference in 
Trondheim. A notable conservative politician and former mayor of the oil 
capital of Norway, Stavanger, Rettedal criticised the dominant attitude in 
industry and academia in Trondheim for its general lack of risk-taking and 
market-orientation – something contrary to what he believed was the key to 
the rise of Stavanger as the dominant city in the rapidly expanding 
Norwegian offshore oil industry. 212  To remedy this, Rettedal proposed 
increasing funds for applied technical research and initiatives to increase the 
efficiency of research and development. In total, the conservative minister 
claimed that the knowledge institutions of Trondheim had to serve 
commercial interests in a more effective fashion than before. 
At the same conference, Johannes Moe, head of the Foundation for 
Industrial and Technical Research (Sintef), rhetorically asked whether the 
organisations in Trondheim engaged in industrial and technical research 
contributed enough in terms of innovations.213 Moe claimed they did not, and 
that Sintef could be an important mediator in a more innovative future. 
                                                     
210 On the tender, see ”CHIPSY information meeting”, 15 January 1985, Oslo, box 
“L 0135, Samarbeid”, series “Da Sakarkiv ordnet etter arkivnøkkel, 1961 – 1996”, 
NTR; Jens R. Rasmussen ”CHIPSY Marketing, Sales and Distribution Companies in 
Denmark”, 17 January 1985, box “L 0136, Samarbeid”, series “Da Sakarkiv ordnet 
etter arkivnøkkel, 1961 – 1996”, NTR. Here, a Danish alternative to Urd is 
mentioned, Danish Telecom International a/s. Apparently, their offer was not as 
favourable as that from Urd.  
211  “Agreement between URD Information technology A/S, British 
telecommunications PLC and Norwegian telecommunications Administration: 
CHIPSY sale and development”, 13 August 1985, box “L 0135, Samarbeid”, series 
“Da Sakarkiv ordnet etter arkivnøkkel, 1961 – 1996”, NTR.  
212 “Rettedalkritikk mot industri og forskning”, Aftenposten, 2 November 1983. 
213 “Johannes Moe under Industridagene: - Samlet kan vi få fremgang”, Aftenposten, 
2 November 1983. 
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Trondheim was a prime target for such criticism, as Norway’s largest 
organisations engaged in technical and industrial education and research 
were located in the city.214 As one of many consequences of these critical 
assessments, a fund for seed money (A/S Etablering og 
virksomhetsutvikling, Asev for short) was set up in January 1984, only 
months after Rettedal’s visit and Moe’s speech.215 Asev was partly funded 
by Moe’s Sintef, partly from government money and partly by five private 
banks. Asev’s mandate was to help fund and support small spin-offs from 
Trondheim’s academic organisations, and rectify the shortcomings pointed 
out by Rettedal and Moe.   
Only months after Asev’s start, Kristen Rekdal was planning to break 
away from Runit and Sintef. With help from Asev, the creation of Urd was a 
reality during summer of 1984. The Rettedal and Moe statements in 1983 
and the creation of Asev in 1984 illustrate a general shift in research and 
industrial policy in the early 1980. This involved a policy in which research 
was to prove its worth through innovations and new firm creation. The idea 
of creating university spin-offs and subsequently provide knowledge 
diffusion through the mobility of academic employees was novel and carried 
out with great optimism.216 It is worth noting that this belief in spin-offs was 
not necessarily compatible with the crux of a neo-liberal belief in the 
effectiveness of markets. One of the prerequisites of this early period of 
university spin-offs was its reliance on personnel mobility in place of the 
market exchange of ideas or patents, the epitome of what many an observer 
has equated with the neo-liberal order.217 Indeed, the policy of providing 
institutional and governmental support for spinning off firms from academic 
institutions could just as well be understood as a stop-gap for market failure.  
Just a year after Asev was founded, the new head of the Norwegian 
Research Council (Norsk Teknisk-Naturvitenskapelig Forskningsråd, 
                                                     
214  Two newly published histories of the main organisations in Trondheim are 
Thomas Brandt and Ola Nordal, Turbulens og tankekraft: historien om NTNU (Oslo: 
Pax, 2010); Nordal, Verktøy og vitenskap: datahistorien ved NTNU. 
215 “Har vist at det går an: Flere nye småbedrifter er etablert”, Aftenposten, 12 
November 1984. 
216 University spin-offs and their role in knowledge diffusion is a field of scholarly 
research in its own. See Scott Andrew Shane, Academic entrepreneurship : 
university spinoffs and wealth creation, New horizons in entrepreneurship 
(Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA: E. Elgar, 2004). 
217 For an explicit discussion about changes in policy towards science in this period, 
see Philip Mirowski and Esther-Mirjam Sent, Science bought and sold : essays in 
the economics of science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). Here, the 
“globalized privatization regime” is the catch-all phrase, used in a similar sense to 
the neo-liberal regime above.   
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NTNF), Inge Johansen, argued that the last few years had entailed an 
important change to Norwegian research: 
We have noted a change of attitude among our academics during the last few 
years. They are less modest when it comes to founding their own firms. Many 
have realized that it is not such a risky undertaking to start on your own. It is 
great potential to diffuse research results through young people who wish to fund 
new ventures. Venture capital firms seem to flourish in different regions around 
the country. These are important instruments to help such entrepreneurs [...].218 
Funding new firms was, from the viewpoint of the research council, a way to 
diffuse research results. In that way, the new wave of young people who 
wished to start on their own was definitively a positive change in terms of 
fulfilling Rettedal’s goal of greater risk-taking and market-orientation. 
Whether this was down to a change in attitudes or a change in policy 
instruments and the availability of capital is not so important. What was 
important was that the change was observable in young people who were 
eager to start on their own, according to Johansen. One of the examples was 
Urd, which was trying to move knowledge from the rather closed realms of 
the Chill community to the market.  
 
Entering the market 
By the summer of 1984, Urd was about to enter the market with their 
developed version of the Nordic Chill compiler, now a comprehensive 
programming environment named Chipsy. At the same time, Urd entered the 
market for financing. Urd was able to secure financing from the seed capital 
fund Asev. Urd also obtained further financing from Sintef, the owner of the 
research establishment Runit, and so-called start-up loans from the 
Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse. The company raised a modest sum 
initially, but had made provision for future capital needs in the region of 20 
million Norwegian kroners.219 Both rounds of financing drew on existing 
networks and seed capital rather than the venture capital market per se. In 
1984, Urd presented itself in the following manner: 
  
                                                     
218 Inge Johansen, quoted in “Adm. direktør Inge Johansen i NTNF: Unge våger 
nyetablering”, Aftenposten, 20 March 1985. My translation. 
219 In 2010 prices (adjusted with CPI), this would amount to 43,960,000 NOK or 
7,271,764 in 2010 US dollars. 
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Urd Information Technology A.S has the primary objective of doing marketing, 
sales, production, distribution and customer support of advanced software 
products and doing consultancy work and development projects in that context. 
Urd operates in the international marketplace and will primarily focus on the 
telecommunications sector. The initial product line comprises Chipsy – the Chill 
Integrated Programming System. Chipsy is a software support environment for 
Chill – the CCITT High Level Language.220 
The ambitions were high. The company was to be international from the 
outset, and it was to base its products on knowledge developed at the same 
international level. Furthermore, its expertise was within an advanced area of 
software products that involved huge companies and organisations. The 
product, Chipsy, had been developed over a number of years and evolved 
into an advanced and comprehensive programming system or software 
development environment. After developing Chipsy within the Nordic 
context from the late 1970s, the product had grown considerably in scope 
since its inception as a compiler, and was now described as a “software 
support environment”. This meant that a host of different tools was now 
included in the Chipsy product, like various debugging tools and a run-time 
system for various target computers.221 An illustration of the Chipsy system 
as of 1993 is reproduced below: 
 
                                                     
220 “URD Information Technology- A new Software Company to serve you”, box “L 
0136, Samarbeid”, series “Da Sakarkiv ordnet etter arkivnøkkel, 1961 – 1996”, NTR 
221  For an overview, see Kristen Rekdal, ”Catalogue of CHIPSY Products and 
services”, 28 September 1985, box “L 0135, Samarbeid”, series “Da Sakarkiv ordnet 
etter arkivnøkkel, 1961 – 1996”, NTR 
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Figure 7.1 Chipsy as of 1993 
 
Chipsy had been developed into a comprehensive system that included 
advanced development technologies. Some of these were unique features, 
like the concurrent run-time system and a linker system for separately 
compiled modules. The debugger, called chillscope, was also tied in with the 
particularities of the programming language, in particular the concurrency 
and modular concepts.222 
The move from what was basically just a compiler towards a more 
integrated support environment mirrored the general shifts in the software 
engineering field at the time. One indication of this was the aforementioned 
keynote speech made by Remi Bourgonjon at the 1983 Chill Conference, 
where he pointed out so-called programming environments as one of four 
major technical areas where progress was expected.223 As such, Urd and 
Chipsy were part of a technical trend. With regard to its commercial 
possibilities, setting up an independent firm like Urd was rooted in the 
positive belief and high hopes that the product, Chipsy, would sell in an 
emerging market.  
                                                     
222 See Svein Hallsteinsen, "Source level debuggers: Experience from the design and 
implementation of chillscope", in Advanced Programming Environments, ed. Reidar 
Conradi, Tor M. Didriksen, and Dag H. Wanvik (Trondheim: Springer, 1986). 
223 Remi Bourgonjon, ”Programming languages, environments and Chill”, Keynote 
address at the second Chill Conference, Chicago, March 1983. 
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Why did Rekdal believe in an emerging market for Chipsy? To answer this, 
one has to review the signals and indications that led Rekdal and the 
investors to believe in a market for Chipsy and step back a few years. During 
March 1982, Rekdal had been on one of his many trips to a CCITT meeting, 
this time in Melbourne, Australia. On his way, he visited the 
telecommunication administration of Singapore, some subsidiaries of 
Norwegian companies abroad and on his way home, he stepped off the plane 
in Santa Clara, California, to visit Intel, the leading microprocessor 
manufacturer. Two main impressions stuck out in his report from the trip. 
Firstly, when visiting the Singaporean telecommunication administration and 
Jeng Yuan Sheng, Rekdal once again got the impression that Chill was a tool 
of importance for telecommunication administrations:  
Singapore will take delivery of a new digital SPC exchange in September this 
year and Singapore had managed to require in the contract that 30 – 40 % of the 
software should be written in Chill. They had also tried to convince Hitachi, 
which has already installed a SPC system, to reprogram parts of it in Chill. 
Hitachi had refused. Even though Singapore is a small country such initiatives 
are worth noting. Hopefully they are the start of a trend.224 
As noted in chapter six, the Singaporean administration was hardly at the 
start of a trend: it was more like they were at the dying end of another one. 
However, the impression was still a valid one, as administrations looked 
towards international standards when ordering new digital equipment in the 
early 1980s. More so, their ability to specify what they wanted from their 
procurements was considerably more advanced than before, in many ways 
thanks to international coordination and cooperation. That more and more 
manufacturers would be interested in a short cut towards Chill-compliant 
coding was likely. A product like Chipsy would, therefore, be of interest to 
more and more manufacturers.  
The second impression was one not from the telecommunications 
market, but one from the computer industry. In Santa Clara, Rekdal visited 
one of the leading suppliers of microprocessors, semiconductors and 
                                                     
224  Kristen Rekdal, “Travel report from 1. Telecoms, Singapore, 2. CCITT WP 
VII/3, Melbourne, 3. Nord Computers, Melbourne, 4. Intel Corp, Santa Clara”, 
Runit notat, 13 April 1982, box “NT-P 1982”, KRC. 
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computer electronics, Intel. 225  Here, the idea of independent software 
suppliers and tool-makers had a strong supporter. Intel represented a rather 
different type of company, unlike the large integrated firms that dominated 
telecommunications, as it encouraged the involvement of independent 
software vendors to supply applications and tools for their product. Unlike 
most computer manufacturers at the time, Intel did not only encourage 
vendors of application software, but “fundamental software as well”, which 
implied software development tools like compilers, as made clear by Rekdal 
in his report from the visit.226 This meant that Intel, a major supplier of 
microprocessor equipment to other computer manufacturers, was open to the 
commercial exchange of compilers and development tools from outside 
firms, although the firm also supplied their own range of tools. 
The impression Rekdal got from his discussions with the company 
was that “Intel will not try to compete with [the] independent software 
vendors, but rather have a strong cooperation.”227 To Rekdal, this was an 
encouragement, and furthermore, he received solid promises of actual 
backing from the company. Rekdal noted: “Intel is willing to lend us 
hardware and software needed to complete the bootstrapping of Chipsy onto 
iAPX86.” 228  This strong support for independent software vendors of 
programming tools from one of the leading American firms was another 
indication of a future market to Rekdal, as he envisioned 
telecommunications as something that would slowly move in the direction of 
the computer industry structure. To support the idea of Urd as an 
independent tool-making firm in such a future market, the fact that 
throughout the 1970s, software development tool-makers had been steadily 
able to find independent positions in the American computer market, as 
                                                     
225 In the early 1980s Intel was not a dominant supplier of semiconductors, but rather 
a pacesetter and the original microprocessor producer. For an overview of the 
history of the semiconductor industry, see Ernest Braun and Stuart Macdonald, 
Revolution in miniature : the history and impact of semiconductor electronics, 2nd 
ed. (Cambridge Cambridgeshire ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); 
Richard N. Langlois and W. Edward Steinmueller, "The Evolution of Competetive 
Advantage in the Worldwide Semiconductor iNDUSTRY, 1947 - 1996", in Richard 
R. Nelson, ed. David C. Mowery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
On the history of Intel, see Ceruzzi, A history of modern computing. 
226  Kristen Rekdal, “Travel report from 1. Telecoms, Singapore, 2. CCITT WP 
VII/3, Melbourne, 3. Nord Computers, Melbourne, 4. Intel Corp, Santa Clara”, 
Runit notat, 13. April 1982, box “NT-P 1982”, KRC. 
227 Ibid. 
228 Ibid. 
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illustrated by the fact that some of the very first traded software products 
were products aimed at software developers, was an encouragement229 
Rekdal encountered what he thought to be the two most important 
elements of a market for Chipsy on this trip: administrations pushing for 
Chill and hardware manufacturers interested in independent software 
vendors supplying “fundamental software”. The interest from small 
telecommunication manufacturers – like Hasler and STK – had already 
created an impression of a specific place in this market for Chipsy. Both 
STK and Hasler used Chill and Chipsy to programme systems that would be 
part of non-public switching, in the case of Hasler a telex machine, in the 
case of STK, a PABX and a military digital telephone switch, equipment 
sold in expanding and non-regulated markets. Furthermore, a contract 
amounting to somewhere in between two and three million Norwegian 
kroners sold Chipsy as part of a deal done by the Norwegian computing 
manufacturer Norsk Data to a research establishment in China made the 
involved parties optimistic over an international future.230 
The belief in entering the market with Chipsy was built on two pillars. 
Firstly, experience from selling Chipsy to a number of early adapters, like 
the Norwegian ITT subsidiary STK and the Swiss manufacturer Hasler was 
understood as an indication of the viability of selling the Chipsy system as a 
product. Secondly, the impression of a future in which Chill was something 
the administrations would insist on was still realistic until the mid-1980s. 
Furthermore, the established structure of the computer industry, where 
independent tool-vendors had an important role to play, was feasible in 
telecommunications.  
The decision-making context in which Kristen Rekdal acted was a 
changing environment, a context that moved on the continuum from 
uncertainty to risk, but not only in one direction. In 1982, the idea of Chill as 
an administration-enforced standard was probable, and there were several 
indications that the market for Chill tools was quite viable. Many 
manufacturers without prior Chill competence could be forced to programme 
their new equipment in Chill, and buying a product that could ease this 
would certainly be a viable strategy. This created an opportunity to market 
Chill to two types of organisations: administrations with heightened 
ambitions and manufacturing firms challenging for new market openings. 
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However, as the firm was set into motion, these probabilities changed 
dramatically, and the possibility to sell a tool like Chipsy to administrations 
became either unrealistic or highly uncertain. Things did not work out. 
 
Hard times 
Sales were hard to find after Chipsy was spun off from Runit and into Urd.  
The international marketplace and the telecommunication sector were no 
easy place to be in and Chipsy was not easy to sell. In other words, Urd had 
a rough start. Just eight months after the company started selling Chipsy, the 
future looked grim. Kristen Rekdal reported on the problems to the 
representatives of the Nordic administrations, which still met regularly in the 
group of Chipsy stakeholders: 
After having actively marketed CHIPSY for 8 months, there is no sign that the 
market will take off soon. Although considerable interest has been shown in the 
product and more than 30 potential customers identified, no new customers for 
full binary or source licenses have been signed up, so far. There is a great 
reluctance in the marketplace to invest in new programming languages or tools 
based on technical merits only.231 
Obviously, the plans for Chipsy and Urd had not panned out. What had 
changed since the inception of Urd and the industrial pressure for 
“professional marketing and support”, which had made it impossible to 
continue supporting Chipsy within Runit and the supporting administrations?  
While the sales of Chipsy to STK and Hasler created a situation where 
the Nordic owners wanted to get rid of it due to the administrative workload, 
such sales were apparently hard to come by after the creation of Urd.  Chipsy 
sales during 1986 give us some indications of a lacklustre performance: by 
1986, Urd supported 32 Chipsy users, of which 25 had Chipsy supplied from 
Urd. The others were delivered by Runit before 1985. However, none of the 
25 deliveries made by Urd was to a substantial industrial company that 
would be eligible for a so-called full binary license, which would be the 
most lucrative customers, but to users that were eligible for discount 
licenses. These were either strategic placements of Chipsy at educational 
institutions, deliveries to the Chipsy owners (the five administrations that 
had financed the project were initially eligible for free licenses), or deliveries 
to existing users like STK and Hasler. During 1986 Urd held talks on major 
development projects with the German firm Nixdorft AG, the Swedish 
company Telenova, the British GEC and the Indian C-DOT research 
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establishment, without any luck.232 What caused these problems? Chipsy was 
intimately tied in with Chill, which was both its strongest selling point and 
its biggest problem. By the mid-1980s, the general market for programming 
tools for real-time and telecommunication systems was expanding. Tools for 
the competing programming language Ada was popping up regularly.233 
However, there was no real impetus for this market to be directed towards 
Chill, an obvious problem for Urd. As such, the market was there, but not in 
the form envisioned by Rekdal a few years back. Rekdal was, however, 
optimistic that such a move would happen, eventually.  “Given the general 
increase of CHILL activity world wide, the CHILL market is bound to 
mature, but the timing is difficult to forecast,” he noted.234 The interest in 
Chill came mainly from large industrial firms, such as Siemens, the ITT and 
Philips, and rested on the belief that it would become a mandatory 
requirement from the administrations. These large firms did not depend on 
market exchange to obtain Chill tools. They developed the necessary tools 
themselves, much like the origin of the capital tool industry in the USA 
during the second industrial revolution. 235  Rekdal marketed Chipsy in a 
market that did not exist at the time. As evident from the encounter with the 
telecommunication administration of Singapore, his hope was that this 
market would be created with the aid of the telecommunication 
administrations, either in terms of mandatory requirements for future 
procurements or through their use of in-house development (and 
consequently, their need for development tools). Rekdal formulated this in 
the following way when he addressed the owners of Chill in 1986:  
URD Information Technology is a company too small to develop the CHILL 
market alone [...] It is necessary to have a much stronger backing from the 
telecom administrations, in particular the Owners. Otherwise it is not possible to 
generate the income necessary to keep CHIPSY alive while waiting for the 
market to expand.236 
The ill-fated attempt to sell Chipsy in the market was intimately bound up 
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with the ambiguous policy of the administrations, and in particular the five 
that owned Chipsy: the Nordic administrations plus the British one. Rekdal’s 
call on the administrations to take a greater interest in Chill and Chipsy 
brought about nothing more than uncommitted formulations like the 
following, made by the Finish representative Seppo Ylä-Pietila: ”Concerning 
backing CHIPSY, all we can do, and have done is to recommend our 
organisations to use CHILL.”237 However, Pietila also made it clear that 
Rekdal’s summary of the market situation was received “with great 
astonishment”. 238  The participants in the Nordic Chill project had also 
believed in the prospective market, but could do little to create it themselves. 
To Urd, neither uncommitted recommendations nor astonishment 
were enough. When the Norwegian telecommunication administration was 
considering a tender for their pilot ISDN project in 1986, Urd was hoping for 
a change. In a letter to the powerful head of the Norwegian 
Telecommunication Research Establishment, Nic Knudtzon, Kristen Rekdal 
argued that the ISDN software had to be based on Chill, and that this could 
be an important outlet for the Norwegian industry.239  However, no such 
preference was articulated by the administration in their invitation to 
participate in their ISDN pilot. The lack of a positive response led the Urd 
chairman to address the ministry of industry, Finn Kristensen: 
The ISDN project represents a unique opportunity to build an internationally 
oriented software activity based on existing [Chill] competence. One condition 
would be that the government services such as Televerket [the administration], 
through high ambitions within the field of software and an extensive use of 
international standards, would support such industry activities.240 
However, no intervention from the minister was forthcoming and as 
discussed in chapter six, the Norwegian administration never took a strong 
stance on the issue of programming languages. Urd was left with a market 
that did not move in the direction it had planned for. 
In 1990, Rekdal would concede: “The market has not at all fulfilled 
expectations. License sales have been at best sluggish and are likely to 
                                                     
237 Seppo Yla-Pietila – Kristen Rekdal, Norwich, 27th November 1986, box “L 
0136, Samarbeid”, series “Da, 1961 – 1996”, NTR. 
238 Ibid. 
239 Kristen Rekdal – Nic. Knudtzon, 6 November 1986, box “L 0136, Samarbeid”, 
series “Da, 1961 – 1996”, NTR. 
240 Erik Amble - Finn Kristensen, 21 November 1986, box “L 0136, Samarbeid”, 
series “Da, 1961 – 1996”, NTR. 
 237  
 
remain so [...]” 241  Consequently, the license agreement with the Nordic 
administrations was cancelled, and Urd (now named Kvatro) would go on to 
focus on different products and services. Pietila, summarised the fate of 
Chipsy in the following way: 
I also have a feeling of disappointment at CHILL and CHIPSY not having had 
more general support in the world of telecommunications. May be the main 
reason is that manufacturers (many of them) already had their development tools 
chosen when CHILL came along. The lack of CHILL training in Universities in 
general and lack of widely spread CHILL tools have also had their impact on 
decisions made concerning the support of CHILL. De facto standard languages 
such as C and Pascal seem to have overrun [the] actual standard language.242 
Pietila’s summary seems apt: Chipsy was intimately bound up with Chill. In 
the mid-1980s, it experienced strong competition from C and Ada. 
Regardless of which programming language triumphed, the viable market 
for Chipsy in the second half of the 1980s was limited: the large 
manufactures developed the tools they needed in-house, and the possibilities 
of them opening up were slim. Furthermore, the administrations never got 
around to doing much programming on their own, which made them 
unlikely customers. The few customers were the small and medium-sized 
companies, like STK and Hasler, companies that had already been recruited 
before the firm’s creation.  
Could the reason be that Chipsy was not a very good product? 
Whether the compilers developed by firms like Philips, Siemens and the 
ITT, or the one distributed and sold by Imperial Software, were 
“objectively” better than the one developed by Runit and Urd is difficult to 
judge in retrospect. Among other things, it would necessitate the availability 
of a rather esoteric set of hardware and the availability of a reasonably 
complex part of code to be able to judge the compiler’s efficiency (in terms 
of compile time and amount of compiled code) and the ability to search out 
erroneous code. However, I find few reasons to doubt the quality of the 
software: The Urd compiler was a well-tested compiler at the time of its 
commercialisation, and was used by many outside Runit, and I think such 
use would be improbable had the system not worked. Furthermore, while 
user comments about the state of Chipsy were certainly not all positive all 
the time, it seems the product was valuable enough to make industrial users 
pay for it long before it was introduced to the general telecommunication 
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market. The compiler developed by the Bjørner group and Imperial Software 
was known to produce effective code through its translation of the source 
code into machine code.243 
Despite all the misfortune with Chipsy, Urd continued to hang on, but 
the company had to continue to look for new opportunities. While 
maintenance and consulting for Chipsy customers continued throughout the 
1980s and into the 1990s, the small growth resulting from these activities 
was unsatisfactory for both owners and employees. 244  One of the 
consequences of this was an owner-led intervention in 1988 that reorganised 
the firm substantially. After the initial seed capital financing, the venture 
capital fund Origo became one of the owners of Urd. By 1987, Origo 
reorganised Urd and merged it into another of its companies called Kvatro 
(Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk avdeling Trondheim). Kvatro had been 
established as a Trondheim-based outpost of the state-owned armament 
factory Konsberg Våpenfabrikk (KV) in the mid-1980s, as a means of 
recruiting programmers directly from the city’s technical university. The 
main task for Kvatro was programming embedded military systems 
produced by KV and it employed about 50 programmers by 1987, when the 
state-owned Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk capsized in what has become the 
epitome of the failed industrial policy that was associated with the 
interventionist Labour party in the 1970s.245  After this a number of the 
armament factory’s divisions were reorganised or sold off, including Kvatro. 
Kvatro was initially sold off to its employees, but later on helped through by 
the venture capital fund Origo, which also had bought parts of Urd 
previously.246 One requirement for Origo’s financing of Kvatro was to merge 
Kvatro and Urd, a merger that was completed in 1988.   
Kvatro and Urd held, at least technically, some similarities. Kvatro 
was programming embedded military computer systems, which held many 
similarities to telecommunication switching systems. Some of KV’s systems 
were even programmed in Mary, the Runit-created precursor to Chill. The 
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result was a merger between Kvatro and Urd, with the former name taking 
precedence.  
However, the technical similarities were not enough to secure renewed 
success and growth. The market for Kvatro’s original military systems 
programmers was shrinking rapidly, in particular because of the severe 
problems with KV. The business of the telecommunication division 
depended on the long-term contracts won by Urd and even Runit before the 
merger. However, none of these contracts led to growth.  
The envisioned benefits of merging the two lines of business did not 
materialise, as the technical similarities were not matched by market 
convergence. The consequence was downsizing, in particular in the original 
Kvatro part of the company, which ended up with no more than about 30 
employees when it finally reached the bottom and started growing again 
from 1990. 
Despite all the misfortune with Chipsy, Kvatro continued 
telecommunication operations, some related to Chill, and even some further 
developments to Chipsy. In particular, the developments focused on 
targeting new host platforms, meaning the systems on which Chipsy was 
able to run. In 1990, several Unix platforms were able to run Chipsy and by 
1992, new debugging technologies and modelling tools were integrated into 
the Chipsy system.247 The telecommunication division of Kvatro was spared 
the downsizing of the late 1980s, as its long-term contracts made it possible 
to develop new products. In the early 1990s, it fortunes improved slightly. In 
1992 Kvatro signed a substantial contract with the NTT, a contract that led 
to Kvatro being awarded a prize for securing exports and was hailed as an 
example for an internationally oriented industry in the company’s host town, 
Trondheim.248  
The development contract was related to an advanced debugging 
system for telecommunication systems called Pilot, a product that was 
closely related to Chipsy but was still substantially novel and advanced 
compared with what the Japanese administration or any of its industrial 
partners were able to develop on their own. Later on, contracts for Pilot were 
signed with the Korean research institute ETRI and with the companies 
Samsung, LG and Hanwha. This product would later on be the main spur for 
two buy-outs of the telecommunication part of Kvatro, the first by the Finish 
consultancy firm TietoEnator in 1997, and in 1999 by the Swedish company 
Telelogic. At the height of the telecommunication bubble in 2001, the 
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Norwegian subsidiary was first downsized and ultimately closed, and much 
of the telecommunication activities finally disappeared.249  
The alert reader will immediately see the irony in this: Telelogic was 
initially the company created by the Swedish telecommunication 
administration to capitalise on the programming language Ada (created for 
the American military) and on the SDL definition language that were 
developed in the CCITT in parallel with Chill. Telelogic’s development of 
Ada tools was toned down and later on scrapped altogether, and eventually 
the company was spun off of from its tight relationship with the Swedish 
telecommunication administration. When Telelogic bought Kvatro Telecom 
in 1999, this development was finally brought full circle. The diffusion of 
Chill was once hampered severely by the lack of support from the Swedish 
industry, and in particular the way Telelogic preferred to concentrate on 
Ada. When buying Kvatro, Telelogic was mainly interested in Kvatro’s SDL 
expertise and the debugging system Pilot, which was also what had attracted 
TietoEnator in the first place.250  
To complete this, Telelogic was itself the subject of an acquisition in 
2008, by IBM.251 All in all, the venture founded by Kristen Rekdal in 1984 
would implicitly end up in IBM by 2008, through a number of market exits 
and entries, buy-outs and mergers.  
 
The viability of independent vendors 
Large manufacturers like ITT, Siemens and Philips committed themselves to 
a specific Chill subset very early on, which basically left them with fairly 
specific implementation tools and incapable of or uninterested in utilising 
tools made by independent suppliers. However, firms in the midst of the 
upheavals of the equipment industry, like the British GEC, did turn towards 
outside vendors for their Chill needs, as exemplified by the involvement of 
the Danish Chill compiler, which was eventually further developed by 
Imperial Software for GEC. Nevertheless, what had looked like a real 
opportunity became unfeasible just a few years later. The chance to sell 
Chill-based products did exist, but it was an opportunity far smaller than first 
envisioned. It involved selling Chill tools to small equipment manufacturers, 
like the Swiss-based Hasler, and to other types of organisations, like Urd’s 
sales to Chinese research establishments. This leads inevitably to question 
whether the problems of selling such software tools to large 
telecommunication manufacturers were specifically related to Chill, or to the 
telecommunication industry itself. None of the other tool vendors got far 
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with Chill-related tools, although Imperial Software continued and 
developed a range of other software development products. Other companies 
were, however, able to carve out a niche by delivering tools to 
telecommunication manufacturers. The aforementioned Telelogic, with its 
SDL products, was just one example. Urd also followed that route, investing 
in tools that transformed SDL code into Chill code. A casual analysis would 
at least indicate that it was not completely impossible to sell tools to the 
manufacturers, while Chill was a particularly difficult realm. 
Ada can again serve as a comparative example. Just as the Chill 
community and the Chill marked struggled to take off, the DoD-sponsored 
Ada project never made the huge impact that had been expected in the 
1980s. According to one central participant in the Ada project, there was no 
rapid growth of components and tools for that programming language either: 
However, upon adoption of the common language, I had envisioned a rapid 
growth of components and tools within a cooperating community, an Ada 
culture. It did not happen as quickly as I had hoped. ‘Repository’ is now a 
universal buzzword, but DoD contracting limits (and the mindset that these have 
built up) long strangled the vision for cooperation and growth. I mistakenly 
thought that with the influence of the DoD we could pull it of. The thrust of 
cooperative development struggled and faded, several times.252 
This was experienced by an organisation we have already encountered, 
namely the aforementioned Dansk Datamatik Center (DDC). DDC was the 
creation of Dines Bjørner, as a sideline to his stint as a professor in computer 
science at the Danish technical university. It was set up in the late 1970s, and 
was instrumental in developing the Chill compiler that was taken over by 
Imperial Software. Its main line of business, however, was related to Ada. In 
the early 1980s, DDC was heavily involved in applied research on Ada 
compilers, which were eventually sold through DDC International by the 
mid-1980s. Compilers were sold to industrial firms like Nokia, Honeywell 
and NEC. However, by 1990, DDC was closed down. The company failed to 
attract Danish customers to the Ada tools, and the EEC and government 
funding were not enough to run the commercial operations of DDC.253 
However, the sustainability of the independent tool vendor model of 
business was nevertheless more viable for Ada than for Chill. One of the 
most successful ones, Rational Machines, ended up in IBM, as did Telelogic, 
in 2002. Rational started out as a firm specialising in Ada tools in 1981, and 
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by the late 1980s, it was one of many companies selling such tools that were 
not involved in hardware developments at the same time. By 2002, IBM 
bought Rational Software for about 2.1 billion dollars.254 On its way, it had 
bought Ivar Jacobson’s Objectory AB from Ericsson. Ivar Jacobson had, as 
described in chapter four, been instrumental in the design of the concurrency 
features in Chill.255 
This illustrates the viability of firms specialised in software tools for 
the telecommunication industry. Chill was, however, seemingly too tied up 
in the “ancien regime” to be a viable platform for extensive 
entrepreneurship. The opportunities were limited and the eventualities of the 
1980s did not pan out in its favour.  
 
The long postlude  
The closing down of the remains of Urd in 2001 marked the end of the tool-
selling opportunity for further Chill diffusion. The final closure of Urd was 
also the end of all efforts to commercialise Chill-related products. In many 
ways it did mark the end of the Chill life cycle, beyond the last ITU-
approved recommendation of 1999. Throughout the hard times of the 1990s, 
Chill was still maintained and improved upon in the CCITT. As seen in 
chapter six, important technical improvements were made to the language as 
late as 1996, when object-oriented features were added. However, by 1999, 
CCITT published what was to become the last version of the programming 
language. As such, the demise of Urd and the final withdrawal of the Chill 
compiler from the free Gnu compiler collection, both in 2001, mark some 
sort of closure. By that time, no new developments were done with Chill. 
All in all, Chill petered out by the end of the 1990s. It tailed off and 
diminished into nothing. However, its demise was far slower than what 
would normally be expected for to a failure. Because of the longevity of 
many telecommunication systems, the remains of the programming language 
are still ticking along in old switching systems still operating around the 
world. The legacy code in these systems has to be maintained like other 
elements in technological systems, although the maintenance of software is 
something completely different from the common repair job. More often, 
repairs to Chill software arise from responses to changes in the extended 
technical environment of the telecommunication systems, changes that were 
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not anticipated by the original software developers.256 Dealing with legacy 
code written in ancient programming languages like Cobol and Fortran has 
been a pervasive part of software development. The Year 2000 debacle, 
when the software industry franticly updated old software so it could 
distinguish properly between the years 2000 and 1900, is just one of many 
recent examples. 257  That similar updates of antiqued telecommunication 
equipment programmed in Chill, although not related to the year 2000 
problems directly, have been common, is not in doubt. As such, a 
programming language never dies, but rather just peters out. In this case, the 
fate of Chill seems quite common. 
As Chill became legacy code, the idea of so-called concurrent 
programming languages also faltered. The general technological change of 
languages that catered for the perceived needs of large communication 
systems and real-time computing, languages like Modula, Chill and Ada 
never gained a solid grounding, at least not to become commonplace in 
general computing.  
Ada and Chill had other things in common: their early standardisation 
and focus on concurrency did not make them the end-all languages of real-
time and embedded computing. When the US Department of Defense 
commissioned the Ada programming language in the late 1970s, the idea 
was to mandate its use across all the services. Despite this, few programmers 
used Ada, and it was finally dropped as a mandate by the Department of 
Defense in 1997.258  
In contrast, the programming language developed at the AT&T’s Bell 
Labs, C, became a huge success throughout the 1980s and 1990s, also as a 
systems programming language for embedded and real-time systems. The 
success came despite the fact that C was, according to its designer, quirky 
and flawed.259 According to another well-known computer scientist, Niklaus 
Wirth, C did not represent much of an improvement at all, as it certainly did 
not raise the level of abstractions for the programmers.260 Yet C certainly 
became a huge success without the huge range of features that Ada and Chill 
shared. Its feature set and scope were indeed quite small. Its more advanced 
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and object-oriented sibling, C++, became widely adopted.261 Adoption was, 
however, not the same as success. C++ It was famously used in L. M. 
Ericsson’s failing second-generation Axe switches, which completely 
capsized by 1995.262  
An almost paradoxical extension to the C programming language was 
Objective C, which was first developed by researchers at ITT’s 
programming technology centre in Stratford, Connecticut in conjunction 
with the company’s use of Chill. Objective C was eventually used as a 
system programming language for the NeXT Computer, Steve Jobs’s project 
after quitting Apple. This would later form the base of Apple’s OS X 
operating system, and Objective C would be the main programming 
language for development for Apple’s iPhone. In a very indirect manner, a 
C-based programming language made at a telecommunication manufacturer 
became a key technology when Apple entered the market for mobile 
telephones in the late 2000s.263 
To testify further to the problems of getting the idea of such 
specialised programming languages to stick, we can turn to one of the most 
radical and late entrants to the pack, the programming language Erlang.264At 
the 1990 International Switching Symposium (ISS), the new programming 
language was presented hot off the shelves of the Computer Science 
Laboratory of L. M. Ericsson, incorporating the latest and greatest strides in 
concurrent programming language design.265 After eight years of tentative 
use within the firm and on one major switching project, L. M. Ericsson put 
                                                     
261 On the history of C++, see Bjarne Stroustrup, "A history of C++: 1979 - 1991", 
ACM SIGPLAN Notices 28, no. 3 (1993); ———, "Evolving a language in and for 
the real world: C++ 1991-2006", in Proceedings of the third ACM SIGPLAN 
conference on History of programming languages (San Diego, California: ACM 
Press, 2007). 
262 The AXE-N venture was to be the most expensive industrial project in Sweden 
after Saab’s JAS fighter. The project has often been described as a total failure. See 
Sven Olof Karlsson and Anders Lugn, Changing the world : the story of Lars 
Magnus Ericsson and his successors (Stockholm: Sellin & partner, 2009). 
263 The development of Objective C and its relationship to ITT are discussed in 
chapter five. See also the interview with Brian Cox and Tom Love, the language 
designers, in Biancuzzi and Warden, eds., Masterminds of Programming 241-76. 
264 On the history of Erlang, I rely on Däcker, "Concurrent Functional Programming 
for Telecommunications: A Case Study of Technology Introduction"; Joe 
Armstrong, "A history of Erlang" (New York, NY, USA, 2007). 
265 Erlang is, apart from being a programming language with a strong focus on 
concurrency, quite different from the aforementioned languages, as it is a so-called 
functional programming language. This makes it an odd match for the languages 
discussed above. However, it is at least one in a long line of programming languages 
initially made for telecommunication systems, which makes it part of the Chill 
family. 
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the lid on the technology and banned it from further use within the company. 
By that time, L. M. Ericsson had decided on a policy of outsourcing software 
tools development to the American firm Rational, finally opting for a policy 
that independent tool vendors like Urd had hoped for 10 years earlier. 
Although Erlang would make a strong comeback as an open source 
programming language that diffused to a large number of firms in the 
following decade, the late 1990s seem like a natural end point of this 
story. 266  This is not so only for Chill, but for a host of concurrent 
programming languages in general. By that time, the role of the 
programming language had also been downgraded in general, and the role of 
software methodology and tools was promoted to such a degree that some 
would argue that the choice of programming language was the least 
important matter. 267  Furthermore, as the re-use of and open sourcing of 
important software components became all the more common from the late 
1990s, the goals of the CCITT, and the virtues of the technological 
practitioners, were fulfilled by other means. However, tools and 
methodologies that were too language specific, like Chipsy, would share the 
fate of their antiqued languages. 
The long postlude of Chill and the general demise of programming 
languages that were designed in the mid-1970s with concurrency in mind 
pay testimony to the unruly nature of the direction of technological change. 
In the mid-1980s, this period was looked upon with awe, as evident in a 
book by Judy Bishop from 1986. Here, it is argued that  
the period from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s was one of immense change 
and development in programming language design. The host of Pascal derivates 
launched during this period [..…] all aspired to the three goals of reliability, 
understandability and verifiability. The achievement of these goals rested on the 
resolution of the new language issues of data abstraction and formal 
specification, but also led to a renewed look at accepted features such as data 
types, operators, loops, exceptions, input/output and modularity. The culmination 
of much of this research is embodied in one language which is destined to 
become widely available – Ada.268 
In retrospect, this period of “immense change and development” looks more 
                                                     
266 On the surge of interest in Erlang after its separation from Ericsson and the 
Computer Science Laboratory, see Däcker, "Concurrent Functional Programming 
for Telecommunications: A Case Study of Technology Introduction", 39-44. More 
recent indications of this are given in Armstrong, "A history of Erlang". 
267 On this move to repudiate the importance of programming languages, see M. 
Ben-Ari, Understanding programming languages (Chichester ; New York: Wiley, 
1996).  
268 Bishop, Data abstraction in programming languages, vii. 
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like a period of liminality, and to some extent, a period where the importance 
of programming language design waned in general. 
 
Some conclusions 
The three last chapters have surveyed some paradoxical effects of the re-
regulation and transformation of the telecommunication industries: Most 
obviously, the upheavals of the 1980s were followed by a contraction in the 
telecommunication equipment industry, as established manufacturers merged 
or took part in strategic alliances, effectively reducing the number of market 
players. Secondly, the administrations that wished for more control over 
their own equipment in the 1970, in particularly those in the smaller markets, 
would defect from the cause just as the ties to the strong manufacturers were 
severed. Rather then becoming more technically savvy organisations able to 
develop the switching software themselves, the network operators of the 
1990s became all the more dependent on the technological capabilities of 
their suppliers. Thirdly, while new tools that would ease the use of Chill 
matured throughout the 1980s, they were bought by smaller manufacturers, 
like the Swiss Hasler, firms that did not internationalise to any large extent. 
As such, it seemed the market that start-ups like Urd had hoped for did not 
materialise.   
Urd’s rise and stuttering life was due to the same cause: the re-
regulation of the telecommunication market signalled a substantial 
opportunity for commercialisation of Chill-oriented tools, as the early sales 
of Chipsy indicated. However, the same re-regulation did not open up the 
large established manufacturers to outside vendors, as they instead 
contracted and merged with each other. In some ways, Urd was a double 
casualty of the upheavals of the 1980s: the entrepreneurial route of an 
independent toolmaker was one very much in line with the impetus behind 
the re-regulation of the telecommunication industry, but the consequences of 
this change did not favour its disciples.  
The number of entrepreneurial firms emerging from the Chill 
community or exploiting the opportunities of Chill was limited. During the 
implementation phase in the late 1970s, about 12 compiler construction 
projects were started. That two of these would end up as spin-offs from 
applied research settings is, perhaps, not so impressive. However, the limited 
number of entrepreneurial firms stemming from the Chill project has partly 
been dealt with in the previous chapter, which highlighted the rapid 
internalisation of tools within large manufacturing firms. Of the 12 trial 
implementations, four would go on be used extensively within firms, and 
only a couple of the other projects had a similar organisational footing as the 
two that spun off from independent research institutions.   
The selection of entrepreneurial ideas was intimately related to a set of 
virtues esteemed within the technical community of Chill users. Firstly, both 
the Imperial Software system and Chipsy were related to actors with a strong 
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bent towards computer science and a mathematically oriented software 
development virtue. More so in the case of the Danish compiler per se, as it 
was based on the work initiated by Dines Bjørner, but the work at Runit was 
steeped in European computer science just as much. However, the 
entrepreneurial activities were more influenced by a particular understanding 
and belief of the strategies towards the division of programming labour 
between administrations, manufacturers and independent toolmakers. The 
opportunities inherent in the break up of the “ancien regime” were 
discovered and acted on in countries with no strong links between a 
nationally oriented manufacturer and rather weak administrations, such as 
Denmark and Norway. 
This involves a paradoxical conclusion: parts of the Chill community 
had pursued an approach to software development marked by formalism. In 
one way, this would ease technology development as it made knowledge 
explicit. The formalism was, indeed, practical. However, this could also be 
understood as a hindrance to further entrepreneurship, since the knowledge 
was easily diffused within the community and no one would be more “in the 
know” than anyone else. On the other hand, the formalism applied was of 
such an astute structure that a very strong background in computer science 
formalism, or membership of the Chill community, was necessary to be able 
to draw on it. As such, entrepreneurship coming from outside the community 
never materialised. Those who were able to draw on this were first and 
foremost employees of the large manufacturing firms. In some ways, these 
firms were really those that were freed from the “ancien regime” in the 
1980s and the entrepreneurial possibilities were not for everyone to grasp. 
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8. Conclusions 
In 1974, the ITU decided that the organisation should make a common 
programming language for all public telephone exchanges. In 1980, after 
more than six years of work, the ITU published their recommended 
programming language as an international standard called Chill. In 1990, 
Chill was the only programming language used by more than one 
manufacturer of public switching equipment. It was used in successful 
switching systems like ITT’s System 12 and the Siemens EWSD. More than 
12,000 programmers had been acquainted with the programming language. 
By 1999 the recommendation was no longer maintained by the ITU. From a 
highpoint of somewhat widespread adoption, the language slowly faded out 
and diminished into very little. An imagined obituary would have concluded 
that it reached the age of 25, that it had led a troubled life but passed away 
peacefully. How did this happen? 
This thesis has accounted for the emergence, diffusion and demise of 
Chill by analysing the changing political regimes of telecommunications, the 
role and ideals of different technical communities and the influence of the 
strategies of various telecommunication organisations. I have tried to 
integrate these levels of analysis into an account of the technical diplomacy 
that went on within and around the Chill project. This has highlighted how 
and why the programming of telecommunication equipment, in general, was 
developed in the direction of high-level languages like Chill. As the process 
has been analysed as technical diplomacy, the participants have been 
characterised as ambassadors of their professions or smaller technical 
communities. They also held loyalties to their organisations, be they 
telecommunication manufacturers, administrations or more independent 
research establishments. Which loyalties held the highest currency, and at 
what time they enjoyed the greatest legitimacy, have been the general mode 
of explanation of the direction of technological change analysed in this 
thesis. Three periods have been looked into in detail: the design and 
implementation phase of emergence, the diffusion years and the long 
postlude of demise. Together, these three phases spanned the 25 years 
between 1974 and 1999.  
The initial phases of the design of Chill started, in its earnest, in the 
first half of the 1970s, and were intensified from 1974 to 1976. Together 
with the years of trial implementations, officially lasting from 1977 to 1980, 
this period makes up the phase of emergence of Chill. In this period, the 
Team of Specialists acted independently of many organisational strategies, 
often only adhering to norms common to larger communities of 
technological practitioners. It did not fit into the customary framework of the 
ITU’s technical wing, the CCITT. Contrary to common CCITT practices, the 
participants were largely computer specialists and programming language 
design theoreticians. The work was often organised in an ad-hoc fashion and 
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often, they would have to meet outside the ITU tower in Geneva. Still, the 
diplomatic bickering inside the Team of Specialists and the Implementors’ 
Forum could often run along organisational boundaries.  
The level of abstraction chosen as appropriate for the future language 
drew on computer science research, popularised through IFIP conferences 
and made visible through Nicklaus Wirth’s PL/360 programming language. 
The reliability and portability concerns were also given high priority, which 
pays testimony to the interests of the telecommunication administrations. 
During the last years of the 1970s, the interests of manufacturing firms were 
given a clearer outing in the diplomatic process: L. M. Ericsson was to some 
extent able to influence the direction taken when including concurrency 
concepts in the language. Still, formal descriptions trumped most efforts, 
again pointing out how the formally oriented development virtue was 
activated as a norm in decision-making processes. 
Chill has also to be understood as coming from a set of processes 
rather than the logics of a stable regime. The dissatisfaction of, in particular, 
the smaller state telecommunication administrations with their dependency 
on oligopolistic or monopolistic telecommunication manufacturers, in 
particular those foreign owned, spurred the initiative of standardising 
technologies that could allow the administration to control the procurement 
of equipment or the technical abilities of the equipment. Closer connections 
between manufacturers and administrations were sought in some markets in 
the 1970s, in particular in Britain, Japan and Sweden, but the impetus behind 
Chill was, at the outset, an alliance between administrations wishing for 
more control over the software in their switches. Paradoxically, this also 
included the Swedish telecommunication administration. However, Chill 
would soon be dominated by manufacturing firms, and its ultimate fate was 
almost completely bound up in how it was perceived by decision-makers in 
the dominating incumbent manufacturers of the 1980s: ITT, Siemens and 
Philips all used the language in the development of real switching 
equipment. The telecommunication administrations that had led the work 
abandoned Chill almost completely, with a few minor exceptions being the 
financial support from the Nordic administrations and the continued use of it 
in the Japanese administration, the NTT. L. M. Ericsson, AT&T and 
Northern Telecom, the three other dominant firms at the time, jumped ship, 
or in the latter case, they never got on board. The diffusion was tangled with 
technical improvements made to the language, as improvement to the 
modular capabilities of the language came to the fore. These improvements 
were mediated trough a specific Chill community, built around conferences 
and the publication Chill Bulletin. Still, these improvements were very much 
a result of continued support by a few manufacturing firms, in particular 
firms that were challenging for new international markets, like ITT and 
Siemens.  
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The long demise throughout the 1990s can best be explained as an outcome 
of the changing political economy of telecommunications, visible both in the 
organisational framework of Chill, the ITU, and in the changing 
relationships between manufacturers and administrations in many countries. 
The independence that the smaller administrations had wished for in the 
1970s was won through political re-regulation. Following this, their interest 
in a common standard disappeared. As the close connections between 
administrations and manufacturers disintegrated in many larger countries, 
Chill also lost its institutional potency. Paradoxically, the fate of Chill in the 
last years of its life was intimately related to the ITU, the organisation that 
had so much trouble integrating Chill’s Team of Specialists in the 1970s. 
ITU had never been a comfortable home for Chill. Still, when the ITU lost 
some of its powers due to the ongoing reorganisation of telecommunications, 
Chill faltered. The ambitions of regulating technological change through 
international governance were dismantled as the political economy of the 
sector was reframed. 
The effort to gain prominence outside the realms of the “ancien 
regime” never came to much. The entrepreneurial efforts to spread the use of 
Chill beyond its initial adaptors never gained prominence and the 
community of Chill practitioners also disintegrated in the early 1990s. 
However, even just before the moment where the language was led to rest in 
the late 1990s, members of the Chill community were able to add object-
oriented concepts to the programming language, initiated by Chill 
developers at Siemens. As such, the ability to develop the language still 
existed, even in its last rounds.  
Even if it was possible to change the technology even in the 1990s, 
certain technical decisions hampered its ability to move beyond its initial 
realm. One such example was directly related to the mode of technical 
diplomacy that characterised the Chill project, namely the frequent use of 
compromises. This created some overlapping concepts in the programming 
language, the concepts for communication between concurrent processes 
being one example that I have analysed in detail. At first, one could argue 
that multiple features for doing (almost) the same thing could promote 
flexibility, and that this could ease the diffusion of the language. However, 
when all the large manufacturers that started using Chill could create their 
own subsets of the language, one ended up with a lot of firms using only 
portions of the language, which made entrepreneurial efforts targeting the 
large manufacturers difficult. This also made it less likely that those already 
on board the Chill ship would update to a newer version of the language, 
making the updates beyond 1988 more theoretical than something that was 
put to real use. 
Furthermore, not all the desires that spurred the design and 
standardisation of Chill were something that was possible to achieve. Goals 
like increased reliability, portability of software between switches made by 
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different manufacturers and the possibility to add custom software to any 
switch, because of a common programming language, were, in some 
respects, ill warranted. While the reliability of programming code certainly 
increased by moving from assembly code to high-level languages, this was 
already well under way before the design of Chill. Portability did rely on a 
lot of other things besides a common programming language, and so did the 
possibility of adding software to it for outside vendors. To use a stock phrase 
from software development, Chill was not a silver bullet.269 
Summing up, Chill was neither a total success nor a total failure. It 
was neither a radical innovation, nor just incremental change. Almost all 
efforts towards creating high-level programming languages for 
telecommunication systems can be characterised by such “betwixt-and-
between-ness”. This thesis has tried to explain this change by stressing the 
importance of organisations, norms and regimes, explanations that should go 
beyond the specificities of the telecommunication industry. I have 
highlighted how arguments that resonated with community norms and the 
development virtue common to many computer scientists trumped corporate 
strategies in the second part of the emergent phase. Throughout this thesis, I 
have showed how technological arguments about programmers’ 
productivity, software reliability, code portability and program efficiency 
were all related to different communities of technological practitioners, and 
how the priorities can be understood as a process of technical diplomacy, 
involving different negotiators, ambassadors and loyal bureaucrats. The 
direction of the technological change towards high-level programming 
languages can therefore not be explained without taking the priorities of 
these participants into consideration.  
 
The direction of technological change 
In the introductory chapter, I denounced the preoccupation with the rate of 
technological change evident in much literature on innovation and change. 
Regrettably, questions related to the direction of technological change have 
attracted less research. I also put forward the argument that to be able study 
the direction of technological change in the telecommunication sector, one 
would have to go beyond national specificities, technological particularities 
and naïve periodisation schemes. In many ways, the case study of Chill has, 
                                                     
269  The expression comes from Fredrick P. Brooks legendary essay, “No Silver 
Bullet – Essence and Accident in Software Engineering”, where it is claimed that 
“there is no single development, in either technology or in management technique, 
which by itself promises even one order-of-magnitude improvement within a decade 
in productivity, in reliability, in simplicity.” See Frederick P. Brooks, "No Silver 
Bullet - Essence and Accident", in The mythical man month: essays on software 
engineering (Addision Wesley Longman, 1995). 
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regardless of all its peculiarities, been able to address these general concerns: 
its unruly becoming has highlighted the international aspects of 
technological decisions. Its place in time has confounded any easy 
periodisation scheme. I have also tried to render the technological 
specificities as transparent and context-free as possible, by pointing out how 
Chill was an example of a family of high-level languages particularly made 
for real-time and communication systems. This was related to the general 
ambitions raised in the introduction of this thesis, namely to explain how and 
why most organisations in the telecommunication industry started to use 
high-level programming languages by the 1980s in their development and 
production of telecommunication equipment. 
In the early 1970s, programming telecommunication switches were 
regarded as “venturing into virtually unknown waters”.270 The question of 
who should be on the navigation bridge was high on the agenda in all types 
of telecommunication organisations, as programming was not something 
solely in the domain of the equipment manufacturers. In some smaller 
countries it was even believed that it could be something that the 
administrations could handle themselves. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
different telecommunication organisations and communities of technological 
practitioners tried to come up with organisational and technological answers 
to the programming problem. One of the general answers was the use of 
high-level programming languages and more specifically, high-level 
programming languages with particular features tailored for 
telecommunication systems, so-called concurrent programming languages. 
However, this family of concurrent languages was really betwixt and 
between the unknown waters of the early 1970s and the more tried and tested 
practices of the late 1990s. By the late 1990s, these languages almost 
vanished, until they reappeared as important concerns to both academics and 
practitioners ten years later. As such, the pioneering concurrent languages 
were really liminal languages, but pointing towards a future reintegration.  
As argued in the first few chapters of this thesis, the move towards 
high-level, yet specialised, programming languages in telecommunications 
was tied in with a general concern in both computer science and in 
telecommunications about how to produce reliable and efficient software for 
telecommunication systems. The interactions between these two domains, 
exemplified in chapter two with the analysis of some important conferences, 
were important reasons to the directions that were sought. The coincidental 
disappearance of many such high-level programming languages for 
communication systems was, in time, related to the dismantling of the 
“ancien regime.” However, it was also marked by a shift in programming 
                                                     
270 Chapuis and Joel, Electronics, computers and telephone switching: 1960-1985, 
265. 
 254  
 
language design, where object orientation became the attraction of many 
communities of technological practitioners throughout the 1980s. 
On a theoretical level, this thesis has tried to explain this direction of 
technological change towards the specialised high-level languages by 
exploring the interplay of institutions and communities on the one hand side 
and strategies and organisations on the other. This has been coupled with an 
interest in how regimes at a political economic level meddle and direct lower 
level technological decision-making. Another imperative has been to stick to 
a denouncement of functional explanations, which implies that the change 
towards high-level languages could not be explained by the effects of the 
change, be it more reliable code, economic efficiency or more reliable 
software. However, that these goals can direct activities and influence 
community norms has been revealed throughout this thesis.  
Another important theoretical objective has been to explore the limits 
of what can be understood as strong regime logics in the existing literature 
on telecommunications, the logics of the “ancien regime” if you want. In 
particular, I have been interested in to what extent the changes analysed 
followed a pattern that mirrored that of the stability of the international 
telecommunication regime in the first phase and its upheavals in the latter 
stages. When approaching technological change from the bottom up, by 
following the technology and processes of technical diplomacy, the 
limitations inherent in regime-oriented explanations became increasingly 
evident. In the phase of emergence, the ambassadors of computer science 
and those with a strong affinity towards a mathematical oriented 
development virtue steered the diplomatic processes, however unrelated and 
alien they were to the traditional domain of telephony and 
telecommunication engineering. In the phase of diffusion, the diplomatic 
processes were more unruly. As a result of the weak enforcement by the 
ITU, for example by not setting up a formal compilation validation system as 
was done with Ada, the shape and fate of the language were more open to 
influence of organisational strategies and local circumstance. However, the 
ultimate demise of the language, despite both entrepreneurial efforts and 
large-scale use at successful telecommunication equipment makers, cannot 
solely be ascribed to the internalities of the Chill project. In the end, the 
institutional turmoil of telecommunication policy in the early 1990s isolated 
Chill in its late stages of life.  
All in all, it was not the stable regime of national monopolies and their 
prolonged international arm of the ITU that brought Chill to life, despite 
wishes for a programming language under the control of the regime, but it 
was when this regime were trembling, when it was in a transitional state, that 
Chill was brought to an end. One could propose that only a stable regime 
could have prolonged Chill’s life and made it more successful: Such a 
complex programming language as Chill could quite simply not be widely 
adopted without some sort of control mechanism outside a market. 
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Following this, one could propose that the once dominant development 
virtue, influenced by ideals about the mathematically proficient programmer 
and affinities towards formalism, was more compatible to an institutional 
context where large organisations dominated, and was too complex to 
integrate easily into a system of small entrepreneurial start-ups. Still, it was 
hardly the natural offspring of such a regime.  
On the individual level, Kristen Rekdal is, perhaps, the best example 
of how the changing conditions of Chill influenced individual actions. As a 
researcher turned technical diplomat and finally a business entrepreneur, 
Rekdal had to adapt to the changing conditions throughout the 1970s and 
1980s. Rekdal had to decide about new and novel technologies, decisions 
that were of a different kind than “normal engineering”, where technological 
design follows much the same patterns as Kuhn’s normal science inside a 
paradigm. It was also deviant of what can be understood as radical inventive 
development, where actions are understood as contingent and highly 
uncertain. Rekdal made decisions that were somewhat risky, but not 
completely uncertain. They were made by daring technological practitioners 
rather than heroic inventors. The process was ambiguous but also goal-
directed at its outset and depended on successful reintegration into the 
economic and technical system at its end. However, what it had to be 
reintegrated into was something that had changed. There is no better 
illustration of these changes than the dismantling of the international 
telecommunication regime. While Kristen Rekdal’s move from a practically 
oriented research establishment such as Runit to the one of a venturing 
entrepreneur does, at first sight, not look all that improbable or remarkable, it 
might nevertheless illustrate a key point to much innovation literature: what 
is perceived as entrepreneurial action is really a function of its environment.  
The classical perception of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur is that of a 
unique and creative individual who develops new products, services or 
techniques, and brings these developments into the economic system. 
Initially, the entrepreneur was perceived by Schumpeter as an individual 
bringing novelty into the economic system by setting up his own firm.271 
However, and this is very well known from the extensive literature on 
Schumpeter, his vision of the role and the importance of the entrepreneur 
changed over time. 272  In Schumpeter’s later work, the function of the 
individual entrepreneur was replaced by large research laboratories, as 
                                                     
271 Joseph Alois Schumpeter, The theory of economic development; an inquiry into 
profits, capital, credit, interest, and the business cycle, Harvard economic studies. 
(Cambridge, Mass.,: Harvard University Press, 1934). 
272 See, for example, the introduction in Richard Swedberg, Entrepreneurship : the 
social science view, Oxford management readers (Oxford ; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
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Schumpeter’s analysis of the changes in the capitalistic system underwent a 
major transformation. 273  If we interpret Schumpeter’s writings not as a 
change of heart, but as a theory of how the institutional framework of 
entrepreneurial action changes over time (and in Schumpeter’s lifetime), the 
question of how individuals act under liminality could add to our 
understanding of the crucial role of entrepreneurial action in different 
institutional settings. Rekdal’s changing professional identities resonate with 
one such view, although they reveal how programming technologies moved 
from the labs to an oligopolistic market place dominated by internationally 
oriented incumbent manufacturers. This move was not something that was 
easily done for an individual entrepreneur, and in particular with a direction 
of technological change based on a software development virtue that was 
more compatible with large organisations than small start-ups. However, this 
was not something predetermined. The programming language Objective C, 
which was developed to create assistance to Chill programmers at ITT, and 
later spun out into a small start-up firm and then ended up at Apple and in 
the iPhone, highlights this unruly nature of success, technology, and 
institutional structures. Both Chill and Objective C were developed in 
periods that were essentially betwixt and between, both in an industry-
specific manner and in a more general sense. In telecommunications, the 
1970s and 1980s essentially led up to the break up of the “ancien regime”, 
but it was temporarily replaced by an oligopoly of even fewer manufacturers 
than before. In the 1990s, this was gradually replaced by a deverticalisation, 
although the industry was still dominated by a few large firms. The opening 
up to outside vendors of programming tools illustrated this neatly, as in the 
case where L. M. Ericsson started using tools from the company Rational by 
1997. This was also part of the general trend of vertical disintegration, 
specialisation and decentralisation that swept many industries in the 1990s 
and onwards.274  
As proposed by the economist Richard N. Langlois, the 
decentralisation and deverticalisation of production was intimately 
dependent on the market, but also on institutions that support specialisation 
and exchange. One of Langlois’s strongest claims is that many of these 
institutions take on the form of standards – and that these standards are a 
necessity and a cause for the change towards a market-oriented decentralised 
production system: “Decentralisation of production implies an ability to cut 
apart the stages of production cleanly enough that they can be placed into 
separate hands without high costs of coordination; that is to say, 
                                                     
273 Joseph Alois Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism, and democracy (New York, 
London,: Harper & Brothers, 1942). 
274 This is convincingly described and analysed in Langlois, "The vanishing hand: 
the changing dynamics of industrial capitalism".  
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decentralization implies some degree of standardization of ‘interfaces’ 
between stages.”275 One of the more peculiar characteristics of this change 
towards the “knowledge economy” and the decentralisation of production is 
the distinct character of one of its most important capital goods, namely the 
intangibility and elusiveness of programming languages, and their possibility 
to provide such interfaces between stages of production. Some of these 
programming languages have lived with us for a very long time, just because 
of their role as a standardised interface between organisations. The amount 
of legacy Cobol code is a very good indication of this.276 However, as this 
thesis has shown, despite these characteristics programming languages are 
not malleable. As an effort of institutionalisation and standardisation, Chill 
was never able to break out completely of its initial framework, the 
international telecommunication regime, even though it never was closely 
aligned with it. This illustrates how processes of institutionalisation, like 
those concerned with the rules and regulations of programming embodied in 
programming languages, are tied in with institutions of many kinds, both 
regime-like structures like the ITU and with norms held by groups of 
technological practitioners. However, the relationship is never completely 
linear, nor altogether contingent.  
  
                                                     
275 Ibid.: 374. 
276 Ensmenger, The computer boys take over : computers, programmers, and the 
politics of technical expertise. 
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Appendix 1 
Example of code written in Chill from CCITT High Level Language 
(CHILL), Recommendation Z.200, CCITT (1988). 
 
 
   1    switchboard:
   2    MODULE
   3        /*  This example illustrates a swicthboard which queues incoming calls
   4            and feeds them to the operator at an even rate. Every time
   5            the operator is ready one and only one call is let through. This is
   6            handled by a call distributor which lets calls thorugh at fixed
   7            intervals. If the operator is not ready or there are other calls
   8            waiting, a new call must queue to wait for its turn. */
   9        DCL operator_is_ready,
  10            switch_is_closed EVENT;
  11        
  12        call_distributor:
  13        PROCESS ();
  14            wait:
  15            PROC (x INT);
  16                /*some wait action */
  17            END wait;
  18            DO FOR EVER;
  19                wait(10 /*seconds*/);
  20                CONTINUE operator_is_ready;
  21            OD;
  22        END call_distributor;
  23        
  24        call_process:
  25        PROCESS();
  26            DELAY CASE
  27            (operator_is_ready):/*some actions */;
  28            (switch_is_closed): DO  FOR i IN INT (1:100);
  29                                    CONTINUE operator_is_ready;
  30                                    OD;
  31            ESAC;
  32        END call_process;
  33        
  34        operator:
  35        PROCESS ();
  36            DCL time INT;
  37            DO FOR EVER;
  38                IF time = 1700
  39                    THEN CONTINMUE switch_is_closed;
  40                FI;
  41            OD;
  42        END operator;
  43        
  44        START call_distributor();
  45        START operator()
  46        DO FOR i IN INT (1:100);
  47            START call_process();
  48        OD;
  49    
  50    END swicthboard;
 260  
 
Appendix 2 
  Co-appearance Influence 
Name  Organization Degree alpha Degree alpha 
C. Breeus  Philips (MBLE) 176 285,25 891 3249,22 
R. H. Bourgonjon Philips  173 275,94 838 2941,79 
R. W. Meijer  PTT Netherlands 192 320,28 697 2215,26 
K. Rekdal  RUNIT  192 320,28 521 1431,63 
C. G. Denenberg ITT  84 136,10 368 1247,95 
R. Reed  GEC  143 218,95 423 1113,90 
D. Combelic  ITT  158 246,34 361 850,75 
H. R. Sorgenfrei GEC  174 280,41 335 749,08 
K. F. Clements  UKPO  165 271,37 324 746,71 
I. Jacobson  LME  142 220,30 296 663,00 
D. Bjørner  Tech. Univ. 141 210,94 281 593,46 
G. Louis  Philips (MBLE) 61 71,02 251 592,79 
K. Maruyama  NTT  52 72,16 209 581,48 
R. Martucci  S. I. T Siemens 192 320,28 247 467,33 
J. R. W. Smith  GEC  34 34,00 170 380,13 
D. A. Sedar  GEC  52 68,46 140 302,43 
O. de Bachtin  LME  35 45,18 123 297,68 
E. Benevolo  CSELT  159 248,68 176 289,61 
J. Devoil  ITT  54 77,82 126 277,38 
P. W. Dell  UKPO  86 132,92 138 270,19 
C. Langlois  CNET  89 116,43 151 257,31 
J. Sjödin  LME  49 70,01 115 251,73 
G. Ercolani  GTE  89 116,43 145 242,13 
J. Aminoff  GTE  89 116,43 145 242,13 
P. Branquart  Philips (MBLE) 28 28,00 112 224,00 
H. D. Rovengo  ATT  88 123,06 126 210,84 
G. Barberye  CNET  62 73,60 124 208,16 
H. Vanooteghem LME  62 73,60 118 193,24 
R. Laufenburger GTE  62 73,60 118 193,24 
T. Denvir  ITT  108 149,98 127 191,25 
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D. Tann  GEC  55 65,31 111 187,26 
P. Smith  UKPO  53 61,01 106 172,56 
A. Rockström  PTT Sweden 88 123,06 107 164,99 
T. Bingerfors  LME  67 81,75 101 151,31 
R. Wirth  GEC  28 28,00 84 145,49 
D. Cohen  ITT  16 16,00 64 128,00 
L. Kott  CNET  55 65,31 83 121,08 
T. Koizumi  C.I.A of Japan 93 120,93 93 120,93 
A. Cullen  GEC  19 19,00 57 98,73 
B. Robinet  CNET  34 34,00 68 96,17 
S. Suzuki  LME  34 34,00 68 96,17 
T. Sato  NTT  34 34,00 68 96,17 
D. Jacob  ITT  47 54,46 66 90,63 
E. Brigsted  PTT Denmark 27 27,00 54 76,37 
N. A. Matrellotto ATT  27 27,00 54 76,37 
G. Mitchell  ATT  62 73,60 62 73,60 
J. Moloney  ITT  61 71,02 61 71,02 
D. Chappel  ATT  49 70,01 49 70,01 
P. Neumann  PTT DDR  52 57,86 52 57,86 
H. Kvarneby  LME  16 16,00 32 45,25 
W. Ferreau  CSELT  33 42,39 33 42,39 
B. Forss  Hasler  34 34,00 34 34,00 
J. R. Rasmussen PTT Denmark 34 34,00 34 34,00 
K. Bryn  PTT Norway 34 34,00 34 34,00 
P. Molnar  PTT Hungary 34 34,00 34 34,00 
E. Camarotto  ASST  28 28,00 28 28,00 
G. Roucairol  CNET  28 28,00 28 28,00 
M. Ciccotti  Telettra  28 28,00 28 28,00 
V. Giarratana  CSELT  28 28,00 28 28,00 
G. Rochlin  PTT Australia 27 27,00 27 27,00 
H. Nagata  KDD  27 27,00 27 27,00 
K. Harwood  LME  27 27,00 27 27,00 
M. Yoshioka  GEC  27 27,00 27 27,00 
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R. Haylock  PTT Australia 27 27,00 27 27,00 
T. Kanda  KDD  27 27,00 27 27,00 
D. Ritchie  ATT  18 18,00 18 18,00 
H. Katzender  PTT Brazil  18 18,00 18 18,00 
K. K. Basu  PTT India  17 17,00 17 17,00 
J. D. Niessen  GEC  16 16,00 16 16,00 
N. M. Rothon  UKPO  16 16,00 16 16,00 
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Archival sources 
International Telecommunication Union Archive (ITUA), Geneva, 
Switzerland. 
 
Norwegian Telecommunication Administration (NTA - Teledirektoratet in 
Norwegian), Norwegian National Archive, Oslo, Norway.  
 
Two separate NTA archives have been used, one containing the material of 
the technical department (Teknisk avdeling / Teletjenesteavdeling in 
Norwegian), archive number S-2865, and the other covering the department 
of administration (Administrasjonsavdeling in Norwegian), archive number 
S-2854, Norwegian National Archives, Oslo, Norway  
 
Norwegian Telecom Research (NTR, Teledirektoaretet, Televerkets 
forskningsinstitut in Norwegian) archive number S-4173, Norwegian 
National Archives, Oslo, Norway. 
 
Private collections 
Kristen Rekdal (KRC), Trondheim, Norway. 
Remi Bourgonjon (RBC), Heeze, the Netherlands. 
Kees Smedema (KSC), Heeze, the Netherlands. 
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Interviews 
Remi Bourgonjon,  
interview with author, 16 January 2009, Heeze, the Netherlands. 
Telephone interview with author, 17 March 2011. 
Emails to author, March 2011. 
 
Richard Daley, 
emails to author, April 2011. 
 
Svein Hallsteinsen,  
interview with the author, 21 January 2009, Trondheim, Norway. 
 
Ivar Jacobson,  
telephone interview with the author, 22 February 2011.  
 
Capers Jones,  
emails to author, February 2011. 
 
Tom Love,  
emails to author, February 2011. 
 
Neil Olsen,  
emails to author, February 2011. 
 
Kristen Rekdal,  
interviews with author, 28 November 2007, 8 June 2008, 11 
November 2008, Oslo, Norway. 
Interview with Lars Thue and Gard Paulsen, 13 September 2004, 
Trondheim, Norway. 
 
Norio Sato,  
emails to author, November 2008 and March 2011. 
 
Kees Smedema,  
interview with author, 20 January 2010, Heeze, the Netherlands. 
Emails to author, March 2011. 
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